

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

261 10 June 2014 Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe: tinyurl.com/sub-moz

To unsubscribe: tinyurl.com/unsub-moz

Previous newsletters, more detailed press reports in English and Portuguese, and other

Mozambique material are posted on tinyurl.com/mozamb

This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings"

Also in this issue:

Dhlakama attacks and threats

Budget support donors hit only 4 of 33 targets compared to government hitting 20 of 33 United States is bottom of class

Donors put pressure on the government to meet targets, but are embarrassingly unable to do so themselves. Rather than try to meet targets, some donors are reducing their budget support; three have already dropped out, reducing the G-19 group of budget support donors to just 16. At a pledging ceremony Thursday 12 June the 16 will report on their reducing commitments.

Responding to complaints that it was only donors setting targets, a few years ago the G-19 agreed there should be targets for both sides. And both sides are improving. In 2012 the G-19 met only 1 of 23 targets, and this improved to 4 of 33 last year: none of 5 targets on aid composition and none of 9 targets on aid alignment between donors was met; however, on transparency 4 of 9 targets were met. A big success was reducing the number of aid missions from 158 (3 per week) in 2012 to 108 in 2013 (only 2 per week). Ireland, Austria, Denmark, the UK, and Switzerland were rated "very good". The United States was the only country with the lowest score: "weak".

In 2012 the government met 17 of 33 targets, and in 2013 it met 20 of 33. In good governance, only 2 or 6 agreed targets were met; in employment promotion 1 of 2 was met; in human and social development 7 of 10; agriculture and food 5 of 6; and macroeconomic policy, 5 of 9 were met.

The scores were related at the joint donor-government meeting on 16 May. Below are three summary tables: the performances of the donors and government, and a full ranking of donors. The full set of targets is in annexes I and II of the "Revisão Anual 2014 aide-mémoire".

Performance

Donors

	2012		2013	
	Targets	%	Targets	%
Met	1	4%	4	17%
Progress	0	0%	5	22%
Not met	22	96%	14	61%
Total	23		33	

Government

	2012		2013	
	Targets	%	Targets	%
Met	17	52%	20	61%
Progress	8	24%	8	24%
Not met	2	6%	5	15%
Total	33		33	

Ranking of donors

Donor	Rank	Points 2013	Performance 2013 (% possible points)	Category	Performance 2012 (% possible points)	Δ 2012 - 2013 (change in %)
<i>Ireland</i>	1	35	80%	<i>Very Good</i>	67%	13
<i>Austria</i>	2	35	80%	<i>Very Good</i>	67%	13
<i>Denmark</i>	3	32	73%	<i>Very Good</i>	63%	10
<i>UK - DFID</i>	4	31	70%	<i>Very Good</i>	71%	-1
<i>Switzerland</i>	5	31	70%	<i>Very Good</i>	38%	33
<i>Finland</i>	6	30	68%	<i>High</i>	54%	14
<i>Canada</i>	7	30	68%	<i>High</i>	71%	-5
<i>Italy</i>	8	28	64%	<i>High</i>	44%	20
<i>European Union</i>	9	26	59%	<i>Middle</i>	48%	11
<i>Sweden</i>	10	25	57%	<i>Middle</i>	58%	-1
<i>Netherlands*</i>	11	16	50%	<i>Middle</i>	38%	13
<i>France</i>	12	20	50%	<i>Low</i>	52%	-2
<i>BAD - African Dev Bank</i>	13	19	48%	<i>Low</i>	40%	8
<i>World Bank</i>	14	20	45%	<i>Low</i>	33%	12
<i>Belgium*</i>	15	10	42%	<i>Low</i>	50%	-8
<i>Germany</i>	16	16	36%	<i>Low</i>	23%	13
<i>Norway</i>	17	14	32%	<i>Low</i>	65%	-31
<i>Portugal</i>	18	14	32%	<i>Low</i>	31%	1
<i>Spain*</i>	19	12	32%	<i>Low</i>	40%	-8
<i>United Nations*</i>	20	10	31%	<i>Low</i>	14%	17
<i>USA*</i>	21	7	29%	<i>Weak</i>	6%	19

* = associate member The IMF is an Ex Officio Member.

The tension between the donors and with the government was clear in the statements at the 16 May meeting. Planning and Development Minister Aiuba Cuereneia pointed to the decline in budget support as a share of aid and noted that this goes against the preferred aid mode set out in Mozambique's International Cooperation Policy. The G-19 chair, Italian ambassador, Roberto Vellano pointed to "moments of difficulty" (Ematum, but not actually named), which led some of the G-19 to again withhold aid early this year. He called for improved dialogue on good governance and anti-corruption, but did not mention the poor performance of donors in meeting their targets.

The incoming chair, Swedish ambassador Ulla Andrén, picked up on tensions and difficulties within the G-19. Reflecting complaints about secrecy under Italian leadership, she promised "more transparency in the work of the G-19". And she said that if budget support is to continue to work,

donors and government have to improve their performance and also adapt to a changing context in which the government has substantially more money of its own. This is, she admitted, a "great challenge for the leadership of the G-19".

As direct aid to the government budget became more fashionable, the budget support donor group grew to 19 members. It is officially the Programme Aid Partnership (PAP, Parceiros do Apoio Programático), but generally known as the G-19. It became the main forum for policy dialogue with the government, so the United States demanded to join, and a special category of Associate member was created. Last year, three countries stopped budget support and became associate members: Belgium, Netherlands and Spain. The G19 is headed by a "troika". The chair for 2013/14 was Italy, who remains on the troika next year. On Thursday Sweden will assume the chair, Portugal will join the troika and become chair for 2015/16, and Denmark (chair 2012/13) leaves the troika.

Budget support is based on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) last signed in 2009, and which should have run out early this year. Donors among themselves and with government failed to agree a new MoU, so the old one has been extended 18 months to September 2015, to allow negotiations in with the new government.

Links to May 2014 budget support documents:

[Independent Evaluation of Budget Support in Mozambique - Final Report Vol 1 - 2014](#) - (in English, cited in the previous newsletter) bit.ly/G19-indep-eval

[Avaliação Independente do Apoio Directo ao Orçamento em Moçambique 2005 -2012](#) - bit.ly/G19-aval-ind-completa

[Avaliação Independente do Apoio Directo ao Orçamento em Moçambique 2005 -2012 \(Resumo\)](#) - bit.ly/G19-aval-ind

The joint donor-government power point presentation gives a good summary: [Annual review 2014 - summary presentation - 16 May 2014](#) - (in Portuguese) bit.ly/G19-May2014

The G-19 budget support donors web page (<http://www.pap.org.mz>) has recently been updated and has the complete set of annual review documents: [Annual review 2014 - complete set of documents - ZIP file - 16 May 2014](#) - http://www.pap.org.mz/eng/index.php/en/2012-07-04-14-54-58/doc_download/357-annual-review-2014

Dhlakama attacks religious leaders & threatens to divide Mozambique

If the government does not accept parity in the armed forces between Frelimo and Renamo, Renamo will divide the country - like north and south Sudan, north and south Korea, and the former east and west Germany - Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama told religious leaders Friday. He was speaking by telephone with religious leaders in Maputo, which was broadcast on STV.

And he strongly attacked them, calling them "traitors and cowards". He continued, "you are traitors because when Frelimo attacks in Gorongosa you do not condemn, but when we try to stop the incursions of government troops in Muxungué [on the main N1 road], you condemn us. ... Now you cry, but you are not serious. You are responsible. Who are you afraid of? Is Guebuza king of the world? And a god? Who are you afraid of?"

The religious leaders appealed to Dhlakama to stop the attacks, but he blamed the religious groups for the tension, saying they had to convince the government to stop attacking Renamo. (O Pais, 6 June, @Verdade & CanalMoz 9 June, all web only)

Dhlakama's current demand is a total restructuring of the army, reversing all changes since 1994, and with "parity" - half the senior people being Renamo and half Frelimo, and each with a deputy of the other party.

The issue is presented in the on-going negotiations as a dispute over demobilisation of Renamo soldiers, according to briefings after the 61st round of talks on Monday. Frelimo is insisting that Renamo soldiers must be disarmed and demobilised before being integrated into the government military; Renamo insists that its fighters must join a totally restructured army as armed soldiers.

Attacks on N1 continue

Two attacks on Saturday 7 June on convoys on the main north-south N1 road brought to 8 the number of attacks last week. There are no reports of attacks on Sunday or Monday. CanalMoz also claims there is an escalation of fighting around Gorongosa, and that government is using heavy weapons to shell Renamo bases.

@Verdade Saturday posted an article on the Saturday morning attack, based on mobile telephone conversations with people in the convoy. (<http://www.verdade.co.mz/newsflash/46654>) Hundreds of vehicles were heading southbound led by an armed military 4X4 Land Rover and a police car. @Verdade reports that gunmen only shot at the military cars and disabled the 4X4, bringing the convoy to a rapid halt. There were several dozen soldiers being given lifts in civilian vehicles as well as the two military and police vehicles; some shot back but others simply "took refuge among the civilians".

@Verdade reported: "Some citizens who spoke to us by telephone said that the lack of preparation by the military was evident, as well as the lack of means of combat. 'They brought some bazookas and machine guns, and a big gun was in the car in the front that was shot. But the soldiers had no means of communication and used their mobile phones to contact the command. The network in that area was low and there was no way to ask reinforcements'."

Comment:

Poor strategy or internal divisions?

The return to war does not seem to make sense for either side, and appears to end moves that seemed rational for both sides. Afonso Dhlakama genuinely believes that if the election is "fair", that he will win. Frelimo is sure he will lose. So President Armando Guebuza apparently ordered the government's chief negotiator, José Pacheco, to give the opposition anything they wanted on elections so they could not complain of unfairness. The result is a totally politicised election machine according to specifications set by Renamo and the other opposition party, the MDM. Next Dhlakama called a cease fire, which was scrupulously observed outside the Gorongosa area. Government and Renamo military and the National Elections Commission then negotiated conditions which allowed Dhlakama to register to vote in the bush, and thus become a candidate for president.

Everything seemed to be moving smoothly and the obvious next step was to quietly reduce the military presence around Gorongosa to allow Dhlakama to leave the area, establish himself in a city, and campaign. Instead, it is widely reported that the government military stepped up pressure on Renamo in Gorongosa, even attacking the bush location where Dhlakama registered. Not surprisingly, Dhlakama does not feel it is safe for him to leave the forest. The previous sensible strategy collapses, because if Dhlakama loses the election, he will say it was because it was not "fair" because he was not free to campaign. So the complete electoral restructuring will have been a waste of time and \$30 million.

Dhlakama responded to increased military pressure with new demands for a return to the 1992 peace accord and a total restructuring of the military, with "parity" - equal numbers of senior Frelimo and Renamo commanders and senior officers. And he ended the ceasefire.

Few observers expected the government to cave in completely to Renamo demands to politicise the electoral process. But it was a brave and imaginative choice to let Dhlakama set the electoral

conditions so he could not say it was unfair. So once that course was set and seemed to be working, why was it stopped?

There seem two explanations. One is that neither Dhlakama nor Guebuza have proved to be good strategic negotiators and both seem trapped by advisors who cannot raise hard questions, which does not encourage any kind of lateral thinking. Thus it could simply be poorly thought out strategies on both sides.

But there is an alternative, which is a split between the military and political leaderships on both sides. When the first attacks began on the N1 last year, Dhlakama told a press conference that he had been forced by his generals to agree. Over the past five years the government has been quietly giving more weapons including planes and boats to the military. The attack on Dhlakama's headquarters at Sadjundjira last October and the escalation of military action after Dhlakama's registration both seem ill-advised and counter-productive. Has a formerly weak military asserted more power, and is it attacking Gorongosa without agreement of the Frelimo political leadership?

The role of an increasingly assertive government military seems important. Filipe Nyusi was Defence Minister when he was chosen as Frelimo presidential candidate and part of his power base must be in the military. There is no way that he can accept any negotiated settlement that gives Renamo a significant role in the military, and thus Dhlakama's recent demands for "parity" in the military must make the negotiations seem pointless.

On the other hand, the government military has not proved to be a very effective fighting force, and Nyusi as former Defence Minister must take some of the responsibility. The army failed to capture Dhlakama when it took Sadjundjira, and now is showing that it cannot even control 100 km of main road. The @Verdade report of the Saturday attack points to one or two shooters being able to cause chaos by taking out a single military Land Rover, and the soldiers "guarding" the convoy being totally unprepared. Of course, the 100 km north of the Save River is forest and good guerrilla country, but it raises questions if an army with effectively unlimited resources cannot take control of a relatively small area.

The prognosis seems pessimistic: that poor negotiating strategies at the political level and weak but assertive militaries on both sides will simply lead to more of the same. That suggests that the low key war in the centre of the country will continue up to and beyond the elections, and that Dhlakama will continue to feel trapped and have to remain in Gorongosa and thus will say he lost the election because he could not campaign. *Joseph Hanlon*

=====

The next book → LAUNCH DELAYED TO 30 JULY

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento

by Teresa Smart & Joseph Hanlon will be launched 30 July in Maputo.

Zimbabwe takes back its land

by Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa & Teresa Smart is now available from the publishers https://www.rienner.com/title/Zimbabwe_Takes_Back_Its_Land also as an e-book and <http://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/current-affairs-a-history/zimbabwe-takes-back-its-land-detail>

Now in paper at a reasonable price

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique?

by Joseph Hanlon & Teresa Smart

is now available in **paperback**, for £17.99 (+ p&p)

from the publisher <http://www.boydellandbrewer.com/store/viewItem.asp?idProduct=13503>

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South

by Joseph Hanlon, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme

Most of this book can now be **read on the web**

tinyurl.com/justgivemoney

=====
This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings"

Also on the web: Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on

tinyurl.com/mozamb

=====
NOTE OF EXPLANATION:

This mailing list is used to distribute two publications, both edited by Joseph Hanlon. This is my own sporadic "News reports & clippings", which is entirely my own responsibility. This list is also used to distribute the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, published by CIP and AWEPA, but those organisations are not linked to "News reports & clippings"
Joseph Hanlon

=====
Mozambique media websites:

Noticias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O Pais: www.opais.co.mz

On Facebook:

@Verdade: <https://www.facebook.com/JornalVerdade>

CanalMoz: <https://www.facebook.com/CanalMoz>

Macauhub English: www.macauhub.com.mo/en/

AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

Carlos Serra Diario de um sociologo: <http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com>

Good daily newsletters:

English: Mozambique Investor. Send e-mail to theinvestor@clubofmozambique.com

Portuguese: Mozambique Hoje. <http://mail.clubofmozambique.com/mailman/listinfo/mhoje>

=====
This mailing is the personal responsibility of Joseph Hanlon, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Open University.