MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

307 17 January 2016 Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

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Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. http://bit.ly/MozElecData

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique by Teresa Smart and Joseph Hanlon is on http://bit.ly/chickens-beer

Gas for development or just for money? is on http://bit.ly/MozGasEn

Also in this issue:

Refugees in Malawi cite Moz government attacks ProSavana NGO north-south split Caught smuggling \$7.3 million in cash

Kariba repair delayed but World Bank says no danger

"Urgent" repairs to the Kariba dam on the Zambezi river have been delayed for two years, but the World Bank says there is no danger. In 2015 the Institute of Risk Management South Africa published a report which included the quote "if nothing is done, the dam will collapse in three years". (https://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/kariba_dam_risks.pdf) This led to an AIM report headlined "Race against time to save Kariba dam". There has been similar South African press coverage in 2014. Apocalyptic predictions were made of the dam breaking and a flood rushing down the Zambezi river and destroying the Cahora Bassa dam as well.

The Kariba dam is between Zambia and Zimbabwe, upstream from and similar to Cahora Bassa, generating electricity and providing some flood control. The dam holds one of the largest reservoirs in the world, with a capacity of 181 cubic kilometres.

It was built in 1956-59, during the colonial era, with World Bank funding, and design problems were soon recognised. The dam was designed by French engineer André Coyne and is similar in design to his Malpasset Dam in France, which collapsed in 1959, destroying two villages and killing 423 people.

Water from the dam goes through hydropower stations of both banks and water flows throughout the year. In addition, there are six giant flood gates which can be opened during the rainy season to dump flood waters. These have two problems. The first design error became clear quickly. It was assumed that the water could simply pour out onto the river bed below the dam, but by 1962 the plunging water had already cut a hole 30 metres deep in the rock. By 1981, after the independence of Zimbabwe, inspection showed that the hole was 80 metres deep and that water was splashing back toward the dam, eroding the rock at the base of the dam. In the early 1980s, the joint Zambia-Zimbabwe Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) introduced a new policy that no more than three gates could be opened and that adjoining gates could not both be opened. This stopped the deepening and widening of the plunge pool, and World Bank sources argue that since then the dam has been safe from collapse. But it also meant that with only three of six gates possible to use,

Kariba could not dump as large a flood, so the lake water level had to be kept lower, which in turn limited the amount of electricity that could be generated.

The second design problem appeared later. The stone in the concrete should be inert, but aggregates containing reactive silica materials are common, and highly alkaline cement reacts with the silicon dioxide to form a gel that swells and weakens the concrete. The flood gate structures have now swollen and there is a danger that they could jam open (which would slowly drain the late) or closed. This chemical reaction was not well understood at the time of construction. Furthermore the concrete was not built with the kind of reinforcements which are now used in such structures.

The World Bank is now coordinating a \$294 million project to cut 300,000 cubic metres of rock from the downstream side of the plunge pool and reshape it to stopped water splashing back toward the dam, and to rebuild the six flood gates. Funding is complex: \$100 mn from the European Development Fund, \$75 mn from the World Bank, \$75 mn from the African Development Bank (AfDB), \$25 mn from Sweden, and \$19 mn from the ZRA itself. The World Bank is not allowed to fund a project which benefits Zimbabwe, so it had to argue that the protecting the dam was "urgent" and of regional benefit. Money is being lent only to Zambia, which then passes it on to the ZRA. Putting the package together caused huge delays. The United States did not support the project in the World Bank (but only abstained, so it could go ahead) and a fight between the AfDB and the European Union caused delays. Technical questions and fiduciary questions also caused delays.

Work should have started last year (2015) but the plunge pool contract will not be issued until at least November this year (2016). Work can only be done in the dry season and will take three years. The contract for the flood gates will not be issued until June 2017. One gate at a time will be repaired and the project will take eight years.

There seems no evidence that the dam is in danger of collapse, but there are serious worries about the flood gates. Clearly the 55-year old dam needs work, and the two year delay shows how hard it is to package even an "urgent" project with multiple donors and that is partly in Zimbabwe.

So has the World Bank itself used scare tactics? In attempting the rectify the mistakes of its own colonial project and put together a difficult funding package, did the World Bank raise the hype and danger warnings? It is interesting that the 24 November 2014 project appraisal document which contains all the project details and risk assessments was not made available on the World Bank website, making it difficult for outsiders to assess the project. The key appraisal document has only just been posted, after we noted its absence, on

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/01/20433168/

All the project documents are on

http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P146515/?lang=en&tab=documents&subTab=projectDocuments

Low water: One reason that World Bank is more sanguine about Kariba is that after two years of drought, the lake behind Kariba on 28 December was only 14% full, compared with 51% a year earlier, according ZRA. This is partly caused by the inability to keep water from earlier high rainfall years due to need to keep the lake level lower. But this very low level means it is highly unlikely that the flood gates will be needed in the next two years, which could allow the work to progress faster.

Power production has already been halved, and on 7 January the Zambian Energy Minister, Dora Siliya, that a continued absence of rains could force the power plants to shut down altogether. There is, however, no such problem further downstream at the Cahora Bassa dam. Mozambique's National Water Directorate (DNA) said Cahora Bassa reservoir is 61% full, which is enough to continue normal electricity generation.

UNHCR says new refugees in Malawi cite government attacks

The number of people fleeing Tete and seeking asylum in Malawi has increased significantly over the last few weeks, said UNHCR spokesperson Karin de Gruijl in Geneva Friday (15 Jan). Refugee women told a UNHCR protection officer that government forces are attacking villages believed to be harbouring Renamo. They said their homes were burned down with one grandmother left inside to die. UNHCR could not confirm the accuracy of these allegations.

Refugees told UNHCR and local authorities that they fled fighting between Renamo and government forces. UNHCR estimates that 2300 people have arrived the village of Kapise, Mwanza, 100 km south of Lilongwe. Another 400 new arrivals have been reported in 16 villages located further south in the district of Chikwawa. UNHCR reports that Malawi is considering reopening Luwani refugee camp, which previously hosted refugees from Mozambique during the 1977-1992 war. http://www.unhcr.org/5698dbff6.html

Voice of America (11 Jan) reports 40 Mozambicans a day are crossing the border into Malawi and that the camp in Mwanza now has 2500 refugees. VOA says "Refugees tell stories about people they believe are Frelimo government fighters torching their houses and killing their relatives on suspicion of hosting Renamo fighters."

Meanwhile, on 9 January Frelimo accused Renamo of kidnapping and beating six party militants in Sofala; one is still missing. (*O Pais*, 11 Jan) On 13 January Angelo Naene, Sofala provincial director for veterans' affairs, claimed 100 members of the Renamo militia had handed themselves over to the government; 13 were presented to the press in Beira. (*Diario de Moçambique* 14 Jan) And on 29 December police and army used dogs, tear gas and armoured cars to stop a Renamo demonstration, including members of parliament, in Maputo. Requests for demonstrations require 72 hours notice, and Renamo only gave 48 hours because of the Christmas holiday. (*O Pais* 30 Dec)

Dhlakama promises take-over in March

Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama on Thursday (14 Jan) declared that his decision to seize control of six northern and central provinces as from March is "irreversible". Speaking by telephone to a press conference in Nampula, he said the takeover will be peaceful – unless he faces resistance. In order to avoid violence, governors and others should simply leave their posts. And in an 11 Jan press conference by telephone in Beira, Dhlakama called on the government not to use violent means to resist the take-over. He said Renamo would only use weapons if government did. We want a "peaceful transition, peaceful and no shots." (AIM, , Lusa - 11,15 Jan). In an interview with Canal de Mocambique (6 Jan), the reporter pointed out that that last year Dhlakama repeatedly promised to take over the six provinces, and asked: "Do you think people will take this deadline of March seriously?" But Dhlakama insisted that this time he was serious. Dhlakama has apparently returned to his bush headquarters in Satunjira, Gorongosa, Sofala.

On 14 January he also said that as the matter was "closed", there was nothing to negotiate, so he was not calling for talks. But on 11 January he said that the Mozambican Catholic church had accepted his request to mediate new talks, and that "I have Indications" that South African President Jacob Zuma would also agree. But in an interview with *Canal de Moçambique* (6 Jan) he ruled out talks with Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi, despite Nyusi's invitations to a face-to-face meeting in Maputo. "We're not interested. Negotiate what?", asked Dhlakama.

Historically among the Christian churches, the Catholics have opposed Frelimo and backed first the Portuguese colonial government and then Renamo, while the Protestants backed Frelimo. On 21 December Renamo spokesperson Antonio Muchanga said the previous mediators were biased

and Renamo no longer accepted them, and had asked Zuma and the Catholic church to mediate. (AIM En & Pt, 12, 15 Jan)

ProSavana NGO north-south split: Is redemption possible?

The split between Maputo-based and northern-based civil society on the ProSavana project was illustrated by an angry confrontations last week around a meeting in Nampula.

ProSavana was originally a Brazilian designed and Japanese funded project to attract giant Brazilian agribusiness to set up huge plantations in the Nacala corridor. But the initial 2009 plan foundered because of a major international campaign to defend the land rights of local peasants, and because visiting Brazilian businessmen found there were no large tracts of land available. Both the Brazilian and Mozambican government are now deeply divided on the project, especially on whether it should support big or small farmers. An embarrassed Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has recently been trying to put together a revised plan that satisfies both peasants and foreign investors. A strategic plan (*plano director*) "draft zero" was finally published early last year. (see *Mozambique News reports & clippings* 286)

On 12 and 12 January there was a public workshop at Nampula city hall to discuss community involvement in ProSavana, called by the civil society forums for Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa; the environmental network RADEZA; and Majol Consultoria for JICA.

The Maputo-based UNAC (National Peasants Union, União Nacional de Camponeses) issued a statement saying that at the meeting two of its activists had been physically threatened and accused of being "marginals" and "anti-development". Majol responded with a statement saying the two has been using offensive language and interrupted the meeting, saying the participants were illiterate and being manipulated."

The build-up to the meeting saw an angry exchange of press releases, which showed the wide division on two issues. The first is whether to talk to ProSavana at all, and whether pro-Savana can change - Is redemption possible? The northern civil society groups which have some links with the farmers believe that it is worth talking to ProSavana to perhaps protect peasants and that it is possible "to actively participate in the decision making processes and influence them positively for the good of the communities." But the Maputo-based organisations see ProSavana as irredeemably evil and anti-peasant, and as nothing but a land grab. UNAC stresses "the urgent need is to stop ProSavana." The Maputo-based ADECRU (Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Rurais - Academic Action for Community Rural Development) says simply that anyone talking to ProSavana is being "co-opted" because JICA only wants "to eliminate focuses of resistance to ProSavana".

The second difference is about rural development itself, and does not come out in this angry debate but is clear from previous discussions. The northern forums back the development of small-scale family commercial farming, perhaps supported by contract farming, as a way of raising rural incomes. In the five years of debate this has become part of the ProSavana proposals. Nampula governor Victor Borges is quoted in *Notícias* (8 Jan) as saying the goal is to transform small producers into medium producers.

In contrast, the Maputo-based organizations follow a line similar to Via Campesina, the international peasant movement, and stress defending the smallest one hectare hoe farmers; they generally oppose contract farming as exploiting peasants.

But both sides agree on one thing, that draft zero of the strategic plan is not acceptable. The joint forums stressed that draft zero is "not the appropriate model for the agricultural sector in the Nacala Corridor." And UNAC cites Peter Bechtel, senior manager of Majol and one of the facilitators of the meeting, to say "the master plan does not have qualities to be considered a

strategic or project document. The document presents generalizations without concrete issues."

The article in *Noticias* (8 Jan) accuses Japanese NGOs of a campaign to discredit ProSavana. For their part, four Japanese civil society groups says that Japan has since 2013 been paying consultants to develop the ProSavana communications strategy, and that it is violating Japan's freedom of information laws by refusing to release its full contract with Majol. But documents released so far say that part of the strategy is to "improve the image of ProSavana". And *Noticias* (13 Jan) quoted Bechtel to say that communities do not identify with ProSavana. which he blamed on "weak communications" rather than the content of the project

COMMENT: Nampula governor Victor Borges' comments in *Noticias* (8 Jan) underlines the confusion over ProSavana and contradictions within the government. The article stresses the peasant fear that their land will be expropriated, and quotes governor Borges to explicitly say that peasant land will not be taken. But Borges then stokes rather than calms the fears by saying that land is owned by the state and that 800,000 hectares of Nampula are virgin and unused. Under the present land law, peasants and communities have use rights to virtually all of that land, and any large-scale expansion of peasant farmers from small to medium size would make use of most of that land - so it is not really available. Thus the governor seems to saying three things that are impossible to have at the same time: the state will not take the land that peasants are actually farming, peasants will expand to use land not being farmed, and government has the right to expropriate this same land which it thinks is not being used to be given to large investors as part of ProSavana.

Any initial upgrading of peasants to small family commercial farmers will involve the use of more land, and any significant growth of Mozambican family commercial farming will use all of the available land in Nampula province. Government and ProSavana will have to make a choice - does it want foreign investment in large scale farming or Mozambican small scale commercial farming? It cannot have both; there is not enough land. Thailand provides a model - a ban on foreign farming but encouraging foreign investment elsewhere in the value chain - inputs, machinery, and marketing. But government only creates confusion when it says everything is possible and no choices are necessary. *jh*

Caught smuggling \$7.3 million in cash

Two Mozambicans were caught carrying the equivalent of \$7.3 million in cash from Mozambique into South Africa on Christmas Day, 25 December. They are still being held with no bail set. The cash was \$4.9 mn US dollars, 2.2 mn euros and 20,000 rand. They were stopped at the Lebombo border post and were travelling in a Toyota Hilux pick-up truck and the money was found in a hidden compartment, after a tip off. They had passed unchallenged through the Ressano Garcia Border Post on the Mozambican side.

Assan Momade and Abdul Ahmed are said to have crossed and re-crossed the border frequently, sometimes several times on the same day. Momade has nine different Mozambican passports; Ahmed has five.

Momade is brother-in-law of Nazir Lunat, a leader of the mosque "Masjid Taqwa" on Av. Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo and owner of a money exchange on Av. Samora Machel in the baixa of Maputo. This has led police to speculate that money could be ransoms from kidnappings in the Asian community, or could be for Islamic state. South African authorities note that in August 2015, they caught a group of men at Oliver Tambo Johannesburg, flying to Dubai with 23 mn rand and \$3.77 mn. They were believed to be going from Mozambique to Pakistan. (*Savana* 1 Jan 2016)

The money took five hours to count at the local Standard Bank. In \$100 notes, \$1 mn weighs about 10 kg and can be put into six stacks 20 cm high, so would fit in a large briefcase. So \$7.3 mn could easily fit in a secret compartment of a vehicle. The Euros, probably in 500 Euro notes, would take

up less space.

Newsletters

After more than a decade with very little competition, the free English language Mozambique newsletter field is growing rapidly and there are three new ones and two others:

Zitamar News is run by journalist Tom Bowker and published twice a week, focussing on commerce and business. To subscribe: http://zitamar.com/

Future Africa started last month and largely reprints business and mining related articles. It is daily, edited by Fabio Benassi Scala, an Executive Director at Edgebold Capital, a UK investment company, and Dinho Lima, acting Creative Director at DDB in Mozambique. To subscribe: http://furtherafrica.com/mozambique/

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The Mozambique Investor is an older newsletter which provides a good summary of links to Mozambique press articles and is published weekly by the Club of Mozambique. To subscribe: http://clubofmozambique.us9.list-

manage2.com/subscribe?u=6b106b76597725328448194ea&id=d3b369a42d

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Chickens and beer:

A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique

by Teresa Smart and Joseph Hanlon

E-book for Kindle and iPad, for \$9.32 from US Amazon - http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00NRZXXKE - £5.14 from UK Amazon.

In pdf format, 6 Mb file, free on http://bit.ly/chickens-beer

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento

by Teresa Smart & Joseph Hanlon. Copies are in Maputo bookshops or from **KAPICUA**, Rua Fernão Veloso 12, Maputo; Tel.: +258 21 413 201 or +258 21 415 451 Telm.: +258 823 219 950 E-mail: kapicuadir@tdm.co.mz / kapicuacom@tdm.co.mz

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Zimbabwe takes back its land

by Joseph Hanlon, Jeanette Manjengwa & Teresa Smart is now available from the publishers https://www.rienner.com/title/Zimbabwe_Takes_Back_Its_Land also as an e-book and https://www.jacana.co.za/book-categories/current-affairs-a-history/zimbabwe-takes-back-it-s-land-detail

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Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South

by Joseph Hanlon, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme Most of this book can now be **read on the web**

tinyurl.com/justgivemoney

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NOTE OF EXPLANATION:

This mailing list is used to distribute two publications, both edited by Joseph Hanlon. This is my own sporadic "News reports & clippings", which is entirely my own responsibility. This list is also used to distribute the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, published by CIP and AWEPA, but those organisations are not linked to "News reports & clippings" Joseph Hanlon

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