## **MOZAMBIQUE** News reports & clippings

**471 10 March 2020** Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

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### Also in this issue: Cholera again shows distrust CC calls for unified electoral code This is a climate change year

Corrections made 11 March 2012 to articles on pages 4 and 5. In the Embraer article, a sentence if corrected to read "The \$800,000 was to paid to a São Tomé account of Zimba, who then ordered payments." And in the heroin article the correct link for the Portuguese heroin paper is <a href="http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT">http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT</a>

# UN head says end war in Cabo Delgado by creating jobs, in a direct challenge to Nyusi

There is an "opportunity to completely change the situation in Cabo Delgado" through a joint donor effort for "development and job creation," Myrta Kaulard, the coordinator of the United Nations (UN) in Mozambique, told press agency LUSA Friday (6 March)

It was an explicit challenge to President Filipe Nyusi's portrayal of the war in Cabo Delgado as a military issue. "The government will not rest until order and security and social stability are restored [and] we count on the support of the international community", Nyusi told graduates of the police academy Thursday (*O Pais* 6 Mar). The police are the main security force fighting the insurgents in Cabo Delgado.

Myrta Kaulard has posed a stark choice: should donors support the continuing but still unsuccessful attempt to defeat the insurgents by force, or should donors support a rapid UN-led programme to create jobs and development to take away the grievances fuelling the war?

Implicitly she recognised the reluctance of donors to give money to the government. Of the \$700 mn needed for reconstruction after cyclones Idai and Kenneth, only \$100 mn was made available. "Our efforts must be stronger and more united" so that the resources are used in the best way, Kaulard said. (*O Pais* 6 Mar) Thus she is calling for an urgent UN-led \$120 mn programme which would be "a joint effort" in Cabo Delgado to deal with both the cyclone and the armed violence at the same time. "All authorities at the highest level in Mozambique must take this on as a priority", she stressed.

The UN coordinator for Mozambique accepts there is a problem providing humanitarian aid to zones were people are being attacked. But she argues that "at present there is security in the district towns and it is very important to preserve that security", hoping to create zones of development and humanitarian assistance as an alternative to the armed conflict.

## **Cyclone victims still homeless**

Over 1,300 households who had been displaced by Cyclone Idai, which struck Sofala in March 2019, are still living in tents or temporary huts and do not have proper water supplies, Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosario discovered when he visited there on 27 February.

And food is still short in cyclone affected areas. Crops were destroyed by Cyclones Idai and Kenneth so the first harvest in a year will start later this month. There was insufficient food aid to fill the gap, and the World Food Programmes has been forced to cuts its ration, since January, from 40 kg of maize or rice per family to only 20 kg. (*O Pais Económico* 28 Feb)

The government's on-going economic crisis and cuts in government spending are also having an impact. In Manica, 24,000 older people who normally receive social grants have not been paid for the past four months because the province ran out of money. Some are going hungry and have been reduced to begging on the street. (DW 18 Feb)

## This is a climate change year

Climate change is expected to bring drier conditions to the south of Mozambique, while the north should have the same average amount of rain, but concentrated in intense bursts, meaning dry spells and floods. And exactly that happened in the now ending October-March season.

"Across the country, nearly 200,000 hectares of various crops and more than 150,000 farmers have been affected by the combination of heavy rains, localized floods and drought during the current season. In the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Zambézia and Sofala, excessive rainfall associated with floods since mid-December 2019 has caused total or partial loss of more than 32,000 hectares of maize, beans and peanuts. In contrast, drought conditions in the southern zone affected more than 160,000 hectares in Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo. In the drought stricken southern region, the heavy rainfall in February arrived too late for additional planting," FEWS (Famine Early Warning System) reported in February. <a href="https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique">https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique</a> FEWS also stressed that maize prices are 50% higher compared to both last year and the five year average due to decreased production, which makes it harder for the poor people who buy maize as their staple food.

Flooding in northern Cabo Delgado has washed out key bridges and turned dirt roads to impassable mud, so there is little road traffic north of Pemba and Montepuez. On the N380, the only direct road from Pemba to Moçimboa da Praia, bridges over the Montepuez and Messalo rivers were washed out (south and north of Macomia town), and temporary crossings (embankments know as a "drifts") were built , But they wash away with each flood and must be rebuilt. They are open again, but restricted to light vehicles, and there have been attacks.

The main N1 north-south road is also restricted in two places because of bridge damage. One is the bridge over the Lúrio River between Namialo, Nampula and Metoro, Cabo Delgado, which remains is use, but restricted. The other is the bridge over the River Save between Inhambane and Sofala provinces, which is closed for repairs for the next year and bypassed by a temporary structure. On both, lorry weights will be restricted and only one heavy lorry at a time will be allowed on the bridge. Over the Save the temporary bridge has only one lane so there is alternating one way traffic.

## <u>Comment</u> Cholera again shows distrust

Cholera has spread from coastal Cabo Delagdo south to Nacala-a-Velha. And with it, rumours are spreading that primary school text books, distributed free of charge by the Education Ministry, are infected with cholera and can transmit the disease. The directors of schools where a bread and butter snack is distributed to the pupils have also been accused of spreading cholera. Parents

have forbidden their children to go to school and some families have fled from Nacala. Many schools in the two districts are deserted and some have closed their doors for lack of pupils. (*Noticas*, AIM 5 Mar)

Belief that their own leadership - in this case school heads and secretaries of Frelimo - want poor people dead has a long history in coastal Nampula and Cabo Delgado. And it has led to Red Cross and health workers being killed. Key is the reality that nothing is free, so there is a belief that if anything is being given away free (textbooks, bread and butter) there must be an ulterior motive.

Research into the phenomenon is on <u>http://bit.ly/SerraCol</u>. My paper two weeks ago (<u>http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins</u>) argues that in these coastal areas there is a long history of violence against people who are only a bit better off because people genuinely feel they are defending their own lives. This is one of the reasons some people in Cabo Delgado are willing to carry out violent attacks and chop off heads. *jh* 

## Communities not getting mining money

The 2018 budget set that local communities should receive 2.75% of government receipts from gas, oil and minerals. But the administrative tribunal said that the districts of Inhassoro and Govuro (Inhambane), Moatize (Tete), and Montepuez (Cabo Delgado) did not get more than 17 million meticais (\$280,000) due to them. (@*Verdade* 13 Feb)

The two Inhambane districts should have received \$235,000 from the Sasol gas project, but government only gave them \$80,000. Moatize should have received \$220,000 from coal mines but was only given \$120,000. In Montepuez the money received from the ruby mine was only slightly less than it should be, and local people were only short-changed \$17,000.

## CC calls for unified electoral code blocked by donors a decade ago

The cycle of revising a package of electoral laws every five years should be ended by adopting a single and permanent electoral code, the president of the Constitutional Council, Lúcia Ribeiro, told a conference on 3 March. Changing various laws means they sometimes do not agree, which leads to contradictions, confusions and conflicts. (*O Pais* 4 Mar)

The CC has been calling for a single electoral code for many years. After the 2009 election there was a consensus that civil society should hold open hearings and propose an agreed code, which could avoid the interparty fights and delays that occurred in parliament (Assembleia da República, AR). Budget support donors were strongly opposed, arguing that writing a unified code would waste time and cause huge delays, and that individual law changes could be done within months.

The donors went on strike, withholding budget support for three months (January-March 2010) to force government to ignore the CC and civil society. Government capitulated, and it was left to the AR to rewrite individual laws. The battles between Renamo and Frelimo continued for five years, particularly over the composition of the National Elections Commission (CNE), and the war between Renamo and government resumed. Direct negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo outside parliament finally agreed to the politicisation of all electoral bodies - elections commissions, STAE (Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral), and polling station staff. (this newsletter 241, 12 Feb 2014) This agreement has caused major problems in all elections since.

**Comment:** Budget support is gone so donors no longer have the power to withhold it, so the CC call for a unified electoral code could be accepted. But times have changed in other ways, too. The electoral system is much more polarised and it would be much harder now to build the civil society and party informal agreement of 2009 to write a new code publicly. The present confused and politicised system was used to its advantage by Frelimo in the 2019 general elections. Would Frelimo be prepared to concede that total power it has over elections under the present law? *jh* 

## <u>Personal view</u> Ex US ambassador Jett calls Mozambique a failed state, but ignores his role in that failure

"Mozambique Is a Failed State. The West Isn't Helping It" is the headline of an article in the US journal *Foreign Policy* (7 Mar) by Dennis Jett, who was US ambassador in Mozambique 1993-96. In the article he notes that "the press is largely government-run or thoroughly intimidated." He showed his support for a free press in December 1995 when he banned US embassy and USAID staff from talking to the editor of the *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin*, Joseph Hanlon, on the grounds that I was "totally biased". <u>https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent\_Action/apic\_mz2496.html</u> The ban was criticised by several international press freedom organisations. Jett and I go back a long way.

One thing that may have made him angry was the report in the *Bulletin* (11, August 1994) that he used his speech on US Independence day (4 July 1994) to call for Mozambicans to vote for the opposition against Frelimo in the first multiparty elections in October. Jett had been acting US ambassador in Malawi (*chargé d'affaires*, 1986-88) in a key period in which Malawi and South Africa were openly supporting Renamo in the north of Mozambique, with the covert approval of the US.

But the real problem was that 1993-96 when Jett was ambassador was when the international community sowed the seeds of corruption as they spread around money trying to convert the socialists to capitalists. I tell that story in more detail in a 2017 *Third World Quarterly* article "Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 billion secret debt deal" (http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon). Jett ignores his own role in creating a failed state.

Jett was also ambassador when the US was accused of threatening the withdrawal of aid if Mozambique did not sign an unfavourable contract with the US firm Enron for the exploitation of gas at Pande, Inhambane. Then Minerals Minister John Kachamila accused the US embassy of a "smear campaign" by telling the press he would not sign the contract because he wanted a big kickback. Jett told the *Houston Chronicle:* "The role of international trade to the US is tremendously important. We see other governments helping their businesses. and we aren't going to stand by and not help ours." (*Bulletin* 16 December 1995)

Issues of the *Bulletin* from 1994-5 are on <u>http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/political-process-1993-2008</u>

## **Corruption round-up**

What do you do with the \$s? The Embraer bribe trial began last week in Maputo. Former Transport Minister Paulo Zucula, the former chair of Mozambique Airlines (LAM), Jose Viegas, and the alleged fixer, Mateus Zimba are charged with taking an \$800,000 bribe from Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer in 2009 so that LAM would buy two Embraer aircraft. Embraer admitted a series of bribes including this one in a US court in 2016. The list showed that Mozambicans were cheapest to bribe - they received a smaller percentage of the deal price than any other country. The \$800,000 was to paid to a São Tomé account of Zimba, who then ordered payments. The list of payments was published by Carta de Moçambique (3 March):

https://www.cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/4560-saiba-como-mateus-zimba-gastou-os-800-mil-usd-da-embraer

Of Zucula's money, \$275,000 was sent to NedBank in London for payment to Frelimo for Armando Guebuza's election campaign and \$150,000 was transferred to development finance agency GAPI to pay off a loan to Greenpoints (a Zucula company which had built a resort in Vilankulo).

Of Zimba's money, \$49,000 went to the late wife of Finance Minister Manuel Chang for Frelimo, a substantial amount went on property investment in Maputo and abroad, \$9,000 was invested in a barber shop on Av Julius Nyerere, and \$500 paid for a band at his wedding. But his investments were not always wise - the prosecution says he paid \$140,000 for deposits on two new apartments in Maputo, but never completed the purchase, so the \$140,000 was lost.

Drivers for both Zucula and Zimba were given cheques - in the drivers' names - to cash and give the money to Zucula and Zimba, the prosecution says.

**Maputo Murder investigation stopped**. Before the election of Eneas Comiche, noted for his integrity, as mayor of Maputo in 2018, it is alleged that many outgoing officials sacked the municipal coffers. The Vereadora (local minister) of administration and finances, Célia Cumbe, would have known many of the details. On 5 March 2019 she was found dead and police concluded she had been murdered and an attempt had been made to make it look like suicide or an accident. On 9 December the Maputo Province prosecutor Eveline Gomane told *Carta de Moçambique* (10 Dec 2019) that no suspects had been identified, so the case was closed.

**Police at Nacala airport** were filmed stealing 200 metres of electrical cable, making the runway lights inoperable. The cameras were set up after earlier cable thefts. But *Carta de Moçambique* (14 Feb) reports that the cable thefts were actually to stop secret night flights, particularly by Russian Wagner mercenaries in Cabo Delgado. The police were told to steal the cable, but not told why.

**MPs are getting two salaries** according to a report by CIP (Centro de Integridade Pública, 3 March). By law a member of parliament cannot receive remuneration from the state or a state company. From 1 January MPs are paid by parliament, but some who had state jobs are still being paid in those posts.

**Bank of Moçambique will end nepotism,** bank governor Rogério Zanamela told a staff meeting. A rule has already been imposed that relatives of directors cannot be hired. (*Carta de Moçambique* 17 Dec 2019)

## <u>Speculation</u> Are the heroin routes shifting?

For decades there were no heroin seizures in Mozambique. The trade was tightly controlled by the Frelimo leadership. Heroin from Afghanistan was carried in dhows from the Makran coast of Pakistan to the coast of Cabo Delgado, than transported by road to South Africa, where most was sent on to Europe. The deal was that if none of the heroin stayed in Mozambique and the party and police received a substantial commission, the trade would be permitted. In 2018 we did a major report on the trade which suggested that 40 tonnes per year of heroin passed through Mozambique adding up to \$100 mn/y to the local economy: <a href="http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin">http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin</a> in English and <a href="http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT">http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT</a> in Portuguese.

But there have been four significant heroin seizures in recent months:

+ A dhow with an Iranian crew of 13 was seized off the coast in mid December carrying at least a tonne of heroin. The crew set the boat on fire and the drugs were destroyed.

+ A dhow with a Pakistani crew of 13 carrying 450 kg of heroin and methamphetamine ran aground off Pemba on 23 December and the cargo was seized and the crew arrested. Police said the drugs were intended for three groups in Tanzania.

+ Maputo City Court in February sentenced a 66 year old US citizen, Rodney Baldus, to 18 years for smuggling 4.6 kilos of heroin which was destined for Italy. Baldus was caught at Maputo airport.
+ In February three people, two Mozambicans and one from Ivory Coast, were convicted of carrying 15 kg of heroin from South Africa. They were caught at Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi.

What follows is pure speculation. First, drug routes shift regularly in response to crackdowns and attempts to control the trade and we suggest such shifts. Second, there is growing competition in Mozambique, and raids could be attempts to block competition to the traditional Frelimo-licenced heroin traders.

*Times of India* quoted the Narcotics Control Bureau to say the Delhi arrests show a new route through which heroin was being sent from Afghanistan to Mozambique and South Africa and then

routed to India and other Asian countries. The excellent and accurate 2-18 BBC series McMafia by Misha Glenny portrays heroin being passed over the border from Pakistan to India and then being put into containers in Mumbai port to be sent to Africa; it is believed some heroin has gone to Beira port via this route. It is possible that tensions between India and Pakistan have closed the border to the heroin traffic, and to support local demand the route has been reversed and heroin now goes from Mozambique to India. The Pakistani dhow which ran aground was said to have heroin and methamphetamine for Tanzania, which confirms a route change we noted two years ago. Kenya and Tanzania have both cracked down on heroin smuggling, so the dhows simply go further south to Cabo Delgado. Control in Tanzania may now be so tight the heroin has to arrive via Mozambique.

WhatsApp, Telegram and other encrypted social media mean the personal contact is no longer needed. A shipment from Afghanistan to Mozambique and then to Johannesburg passes through many hands. but in Uber-fashion, it can all be organised on the phone. This opens space for competition to the Frelimo licensed trading groups, who may be working with police and customs officials to target new un-licensed traders.

Most dhows are allegedly Pakistani, but sanctions on Iran may be increasing pressure there leading to Iranian dhows or crews competing with existing ones. Was there a tip off? Did the dhow with heroin from Pakistan really run aground, or was their a tip off because the trade back to Tanzania is not authorised? Rodney Baldus taking a large amount of heroin out via Maputo airport seems unusual, which suggests a trader testing a new route. Was he caught by the airports new use of dogs, or was it a tip-off?

Only speculation. But four seizures in three months suggests something is changing.

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### **Background reading**

#### **Special reports**

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <u>http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin</u> Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <u>http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT</u>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or just\_for\_money?\_2015 <u>bit.ly/MozGasEng</u> Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 <u>bit.ly/MozGasPt</u> Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <u>http://bit.ly/MozSocPro</u> Special report on four poverty surveys: <u>bit.ly/MozPoverty</u> 2018 Constitution - <u>http://bit.ly/2KF588T</u> Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <u>http://bit.ly/MinWage18</u> **\$2bn secret debt - in English** Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <u>http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full</u> Kroll report summary - <u>http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum</u> Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <u>http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En</u> Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon

#### In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

**Election study collaboration**: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <u>http://bit.ly/MozEIData</u> Election newsletters are on <u>http://bit.ly/2H066Kg</u>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <u>http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books</u> Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016) Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008) Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001) Paz Sem Beneficio: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997) Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996) Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991) Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

#### Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986) Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

#### These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English) Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013) Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010) Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese) Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

#### Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz O País: www.opais.co.mz @Verdade: <u>http://www.verdade.co.mz</u> Carlos Serra Diário de um sociologo: <u>http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com</u> **Mozambique media websites, English:** Club of Mozambique: <u>http://clubofmozambique.com/</u>

Zitamar: <u>http://zitamar.com/</u> Macauhub English: <u>http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/</u> AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

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