

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

492 28 June 2020 Editor: Joseph Hanlon ( [j.hanlon@open.ac.uk](mailto:j.hanlon@open.ac.uk) )

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## Important external links

Cabo Delgado civil war weekly report - Zitamar, MediaFax, ACLED - <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

Covid-19 daily updated data and graphs <https://covidmoz.netlify.app/>

Previous editions of this newsletter: [bit.ly/MozNews2020](http://bit.ly/MozNews2020)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

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## Also in this issue:

**Mocimboa da Praia occupied again**

**Press crackdown: journalists detained, editors charged**

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## Intensifying argument over roots of war - and response

As the civil war in Cabo Delgado intensifies, so does the argument about the roots of the war and the appropriate response. The US State Department, the Tony Blair Institute, much of the international community, and the government of Filipe Nyusi call it Islamic State terrorism. This points to a military response, probably involving private military contractors (mercenaries) operating under the flag of the EU, African Union, or SADC.

But the researchers on the ground actually studying the war point to local roots in the growing inequality between an elite and young people feeling increasingly marginalised and with no future, at a time when some become wealthy from mineral resources and corruption. The roots of the insurgency are local, but more recently have gained support from international fundamentalist Islamic groups. Supporting groups are treated a bit like aid agencies, not unlike the NGOs and UN agencies which for decades have provided technical assistance and financial support to Mozambicans in exchange for flying their flag and reading statements praising them.

The debate is becoming more intense, and last week Alex Vines from Chatham House in London called on Frelimo to look at its own history in the liberation war.

The new civil war is centred around Chai, exactly where the current Cabo Delgado "big man" Alberto Chipande fired the first shots of the liberation war 64 years ago. Is that war being fought again, but this time with Frelimo following the Portuguese line that they faced a foreign insurgency and the solution was military? Frelimo won 54 years ago because it gained the support of the local people. Why does it think a military and mercenary solution will work this time?

## Unequal access to state resources and marginalisation of the poorest fuel the insurgency says new study

Unequal access to state resources and marginalisation of the poorest are behind the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, according to an important new research study by João Feijó of the Observatório do Meio Rural (Environment Observatory). High poverty rates are widespread and similar in all three

ethno-linguistic groups, and the insurgency is fuelled by post-independence changes related to unequal access to state resources. "The Muani and Macua populations see the State as partisan and captured by specific ethno-linguistic groups (mostly Macondes in alliance with elements from the South)."

Five factors have combined to cause support for the insurgency:

- + Youth trapped in "waithood" - a growing young population who cannot find the jobs or income sources to become independent and move on to adulthood.
- + Group or horizontal inequalities, in which Muanis and Macuas (largely Muslim and supporting the opposition) are disadvantaged with respect to Maconde (Christian and Frelimo). But,
- + Growing class divisions within the Maconde, which are promoted by
- + Corruption and nepotism in the state, in turn fuelled by
- + The mining and gas boom.

I have done an English translation of the summary and conclusion, on <https://bit.ly/FeijoSummary> "Assimetrias no acesso ao estado: um terreno fértil de penetração do jihadismo Islâmico?" by João Feijó, published 8 June 2020 in Portuguese, is on <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/publicacoes/or-93/>

Feijó finds no socio-economic differences between the three ethno-linguistic groups, at least in terms of access to education, housing, sanitation, energy or consumer goods.

"Special attention should be paid to the social situation of a 'waithood' youth. In places of great investment in natural resources and the creation of great social expectations, the existence of masses of more educated young people, but without socio-economic integration, moreover, in an emerging consumer society, makes them particularly vulnerable to illegal or violent activities, or captureable by radical populist discourses."

Increasing control of resources by the state and Frelimo has combined with growing corruption and nepotism in "a process locally interpreted as serving powerful Maconde individuals. This takeover [of resources] interrupted countless semi-legal activities of exploitation of timber, ivory and precious stones, affecting thousands of young people's access to income. The situation was aggravated by population resettlement processes [for mining and gas] and the limitation of access to production sites - agricultural land and fishing areas - feeding tension and conflict."

"The repression of illegal miners in Montepuez, as well as Operation Tronco (restructuring the timber trade) and the burning of ivory, was to the detriment of extensive local networks on the margins of the law. The brutal action of state forces in the protection of private economic interests participated by prominent Maconde individuals (notably Montepuez Ruby Mining) was locally understood as an opportunity for this ethno-linguistic group to appropriate state resources for its own benefit, to the detriment of the other groups in the province," Feijó notes.

"In the far north of the province, in the areas of implementation of the gas industry, the tension focuses not only on access to jobs and income, but also on access to benefits and compensation resulting from major projects. In terms of access to power, there are feelings of discrimination and disadvantage compared to foreign citizens or those from the south of the country (known as Maputecos), considered to be privileged in the access to the best jobs to the detriment of local people."

Feijó warns that "despite the presence of ethnic tensions and conflicts, any simplistic understanding of conflict in Cabo Delgado based on the existence of ethno-religious contradictions between Muanis and Macondes or between Islamists and Christians should be avoided." Similarly, "while it is true that thousands of Maconde families have privileged access to a number of state funds [such as pensions for ex-combatants and the '7 million' rural development loans], existing data shows that this group is a minority, with thousands of Maconde excluded from such access. In Muidumbe, during the election campaign for the 2019 legislative elections, there was a greater involvement of young people in caravans of opposition parties, a scenario that would have been unthinkable some 10 years ago." And he notes that "reports on the ground reveal the existence of

a growing number of young Macondes among the ranks of rebel groups." This could explain why Muidumbe has become such a centre of battles between Frelimo and insurgents.

## Has Frelimo forgotten the lessons of liberation?

"In this centenary month of his birth, it is worth reading Eduardo Mondlane's book, [Struggle for Mozambique](#). It is a reminder that insurgency succeeds when there is a governance and developmental deficit. The Portuguese failed because they had neglected the far north and responded solely with violence. Relearning the science of liberation would help Frelimo to stabilise the conflict of Cabo Delgado," writes Chatham House Managing Director of Ethics, Risk & Resilience, Alex Vines, in the *Mail & Guardian* (24 June): <https://mg.co.za/africa/2020-06-24-as-conflict-in-cabo-delgado-increases-will-frelimo-learn-from-its-mistakes/> It is a surprisingly critical article, headlined "As conflict in Cabo Delgado increases, will Frelimo learn from its mistakes?"

## US State Dept says "ISIS attacks" threaten gas

"ISIS attacks in this area have threatened employees of an international liquid natural gas consortium, in which a US company is a participant, and have prompted the consortium to approach further investment in Mozambique with caution," warns the US State Department in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019" published 24 June

<https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/>

The report is explicit in calling the attacks "terrorist activity" and saying the attackers are "ISIS's affiliate in Mozambique". There is no mention of local grievances or local causes of the insurgency. The report is also highly critical of the division and lack of coordination between police and military, and of "access constraints" restricting information:

"In 2019, Mozambican law enforcement entities, including the national police force, Rapid Intervention Unit, and National Criminal Investigative Service engaged in CT [counterterrorism] operations and activity in northern Mozambique. Mozambique does not have a CT strategy to guide operations in the North, and law enforcement agencies lack the training, equipment, and overall capacity to proactively detect, deter, or prevent acts of terrorism. Though law enforcement entities operate as part of a joint task force with military counterparts, coordination, strategic planning, interagency communications, and intelligence sharing remain significant challenges. Border security remains a significant security challenge for Mozambique. Terrorists are known to cross the porous border into and from Tanzania, which serves as a recruitment and transit point for terrorist and criminal organizations."

"The attacks varied in intensity and scale, but generally included the use of firearms, edged weapons, and arson. The attacks often included the theft of food and other basic supplies ... In 2019, in addition to targeting civilians, ISIS's affiliate in Mozambique conducted increasing attacks against security forces and vehicles. Fighters connected to ISIS's affiliate in Mozambique are frequently reported to wear stolen police or military uniforms. Access constraints and limited reporting on the violence render reports of attacks difficult to verify."

**If the US intervenes, it expects to stay**, Ambassador-at-Large Nathan Sales, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, made clear in response to a question at a special briefing on 24 June to launch the report. "I can tell you that the United States does counterterrorism capacity building like nobody else in the world. We don't just parachute in, kill some bad guys, take some money and leave. What we do is make sustained and durable investments in the capabilities of our local partners to ensure that they are able to do in their homelands what we do in our homelands: investigate and prosecute criminals, secure the borders, crack down on terrorism financing, and advance counter narratives to prevent terrorist radicalisation and recruitment. So we are well aware of the increasing threat levels in Mozambique and looking at ways that we can assist." <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-us-well-aware-of-growing-terrorist-threats-nathan-sales-163994/>

## Illicit economy is shaping the war

"Criminal networks have become socially, economically and politically embedded in northern Mozambique," and there has been a major increase in illicit traffic, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (GI) says in a new report. And it warns "the illicit economy in northern Mozambique helped shape the conditions that led to the current insurgency in Cabo Delgado and may drive future instability."

Insurgents may be trying to capture or tax the illicit economy. "The locations of recent attacks - which include coastal landing sites, transport hubs and areas rich in natural resources - suggest that the insurgents may be targeting the illicit economy as a more substantial source of future revenue. Over time, control over the illicit economy may begin to shape the actions of the group."

And it is generating recruits: "The local licit economy is viewed as being captured by the elite, or by foreigners who are allowed access to the resources under corrupt systems, while locals are forcibly removed from newly created concessions. The result is that local people are aligning themselves with other systems that provide some form of structure or protection against a government that they perceive to be failing them. In some cases, they turn to the illicit economies and align themselves with criminal groups. In other cases, they are joining the violent religious extremist group that speaks of imposing sharia law and rejecting corruption."

The full report "A Triangle of Vulnerability - Changing patterns of illicit trafficking on the Swahili coast", by Alastair Nelson is on <https://globalinitiative.net/triangle-vulnerability-swahili-coast/>  
A summary article in the *Daily Maverick* (15 June) is on <https://bit.ly/GITriMav>  
A short Portuguese version of the article is on <https://bit.ly/GITriCarta>  
My (jh) 2018 detailed paper on the heroin trade in Mozambique is on <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>  
Seymone Heysom's March 2020 update on the heroin trade is on <https://bit.ly/HeroinHeysom2020>

**A major expansion of illicit trade routes** is shown in the report. For more than two decades, heroin has been taken from Afghanistan to the Makran coast of Iran and Pakistan, transported in seagoing Jelbut dhows to a point off the coast of Cabo Delgado, transferred to small boats and taken to the coast, to be transported overland to South Africa from there to Europe. See <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Enforcement in China, Mozambique, and Tanzania has totally stopped the ivory trade, and the timber trade has been reduced. This has led some traders to move to wildlife products - lion teeth and claws, pangolins and pangolin scales are exported through Pemba. The GI report claims that "a dubious contract granting sole rights for sea cucumber and crab exploitation in the Quirimbas National Park [has been given] to a company owned by a Chinese individual who was allegedly previously implicated in illegal timber trafficking."

A totally new transit trade is cocaine smuggled into Pemba in containers from Brazil; some is sold and used locally, but most is moved on to Europe, some with drug mules and some along with heroin. A new network based in Zanzibar does both people and heroin smuggling, sending both in boats down the coast to Mocimboa de Praia. Both heroin and people are sent overland to South Africa. The agent in Pemba is well known and when the report was written in January he was said to be building four houses on a compound near the university. Boats are also sent to beaches near Pemba on full-moon nights.

Heroin is now available in Cabo Delgado and the researchers checked prices in Montepuez in January 2020, They found three grades of heroin:

1. Low-grade street quality, sold to artisanal miners, and imported overland from Tanzania in the same packaging as heroin found on the local market in Tanzania (\$3 per bag)
2. Medium quality (\$7.50 per bag), and
3. High quality in a larger size bag (\$30). The high quality heroin was packaged quite differently and local sources said that it came from Pemba.

The war has shifted some heroin landings down to Angoche, Nampula province.

**'Forefront of Governance breakdown':** "Northern Mozambique is at the forefront of this governance breakdown," the report says. "Underlying inequity, insecure land rights and distrust of authorities have created social, political and economic vulnerabilities that are now playing out through a breakdown in rule of law and a concomitant increase in organized crime, corruption and an outbreak of violent extremism."

"The recent natural resource finds in northern Mozambique, such as rubies around Montepuez and offshore gas in Palma, have highlighted the extent of the capture of associated benefits by the political and economic elite. Prime land in both areas [Palma and Montepuez] has been awarded as concessions to elite families, and key national and international ruby-mining companies have the sons of political elite families on their boards. This higher-level corruption, and local government corruption in Cabo Delgado in particular, is now rife, and is leading to a major breakdown in law and order.

"Corrupt access to residency permits in Montepuez, for example, has resulted in foreign nationals (including from Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Thailand) capturing the various secondary and illicit economies associated with the ruby mining: from market stalls selling wheelbarrows and spades, to buying rubies on the black market and the local heroin market."

## Press crackdown: journalists detained, editors charged

Two journalists have been detained and two editors charged in what appears to be a crackdown on the press. *Carta de Moçambique* journalist Omardine Omar was arrested Thursday afternoon (25 June). Palma (Cabo Delgado) community radio journalist Ibraimo Mbaruco is still missing after he was kidnapped, apparently by military, on 7 April. The last anyone heard from him was a short text message to colleagues saying he was "surrounded by soldiers". And *Canal de Moçambique* director Fernando Veloso and executive editor Matias Guente were charged last week with violating state secrets for reporting improper contracts between gas companies and the ministries of defence and interior.

*Carta* Editor Marcelo Mosse said that Omar had received a report that illegal street vendors outside the Estrela market were paying bribes to police to be allowed to continue to sell. When police saw him watching them, they beat and arrested him. While being held at Alto Mae police station he was given a statement to sign saying he admitted to have been drinking, but he refused as it was not true. He was taken to Kapmhumo Urban District Court for a hearing Friday afternoon, but when his lawyer arrived, the hearing was postponed until Tuesday and Omar was sent to Machava central prison. A magistrate ordered his release last night (Saturday 27 June).

Omar is perhaps best known for breaking the story about the Brazilian drug dealer Fuminho who had been openly staying in Maputo, and when this was revealed was quickly sent to Brazil without being interrogated about who had protected him. Omar has also written about the Cabo Delgado war. Both make him a police target.

*Canal de Moçambique* director Fernando Veloso and executive editor Matias Guente were charged last week with violating state secrets for reporting improper contracts. The 8 February 2019 contracts between gas companies and the military were published by *Canal de Moçambique* on 11 March 2020 (and reported here 17 March). The two contracts are between the gas companies Anadarko and ENI and the ministries of defence and interior, in which the gas companies pay for military and police protection. What is unusual is that the money goes not to central government account, as required by law, and not even to the ministries, but to a special account with four signatories: then defence minister Atanásio Mtumuke, then vice minister Patrício José, permanent secretary Fernando Campire, and Casimiro Mueio.

## Domestic violence OK after court says it cannot judge

The Higher Appeal Court has overturned the conviction of the man accused of beating Josina Machel, daughter of the country's first President, Samora Machel, so badly that she lost the sight in her right eye. In its ruling the court said "there is no proof that the accused injured the victim because the event allegedly occurred when the accused and the victim were alone and there were no witnesses to this crime".

Thus the ruling means men can attack women if no one is watching.

The violence occurred in October 2015. In 2017 businessman Rufino Licuco, who had been in a relationship with Josina for three years, was found guilty of assault and of domestic and psychological violence. He was sentenced to 3 years and four months in jail, or the payment to the victim of nearly \$3 mn. Licuco appealed, and has now won.

## Mocimboa da Praia occupied again

Insurgents again occupied Mocimboa da Praia yesterday (Saturday 27 June) morning. There was heavy fighting and the town was still partially occupied this morning (Sunday). Electricity and mobile phone links were largely cut at 10h00 Saturday. There have been significant insurgent, government and civilian casualties on both sides, including a senior government military officer. Videos posted on social media show insurgent bodies. This follows a series of raids in Mocimboa neighbourhoods by special police units attempting to find insurgents they believed local people were hiding in their homes. The police were accused of violence, confiscating telephones and money, and arbitrarily detaining people. (Zitamar, Pinnacle News)

Local people fled when the fighting started, many taking boats to get away. Pinnacle News says the local military base was taken by insurgents and then recaptured by the military. Official buildings and the cathedral were burned. By yesterday afternoon Dyck Advisory Group mercenaries had responded with three helicopters and a light plane, apparently refueling at a new DAG base in Mueda. An unconfirmed satellite photo shows two boats 5 km off the coast of Mocimboa, said by local people to be government boats.

Pinnacle News also reports that few government officials remained in Mocimboa da Praia, and that for all the districts affected by the war shadow administrations have been established in Pemba. <https://www.facebook.com/pinnaclenews79/>

There appear to have also been attacks on villages along the main road west of Mocimboa.

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**Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material** are posted on [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

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## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

**\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

**In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

**Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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**Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:**

Notícias: [www.jornalnoticias.co.mz](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz)

O País: [www.opais.co.mz](http://www.opais.co.mz)

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carlos Serra Diário de um sociólogo: <http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com>

**Mozambique media websites, English:**

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: [www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news](http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news)

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