

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

496 26 July 2020

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Important external links

Cabo Delgado civil war weekly report - Zitamar, MediaFax, ACLED - <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

Covid-19 daily updated data and graphs <https://covidmoz.netlify.app/>

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Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Comment

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace?

The failure to resolve the growing Cabo Delgado civil war is now attracting a wide range of actors hoping to profit. And many come with neo-colonial, racist and anti-Islam agendas, or trying to use Mozambique as a pawn in global chess games.

As we report below, France, the United States, South Africa and many private military companies are already involved or want to join in. A few Mozambicans and others profit from the war, or profit from Cabo Delgado's resources. Local people gained little from those resources. Lacking hope or prospects, some young people began attacking the symbols of that wealth and of a state seen to be protecting the rich and not the poor. Already the outsiders have piled in. Private security companies protect the gas installations, mercenaries back the government, and Islamist militants back the insurgents - turning this into a war in which wealthy individuals and institutions are protected, and the poor suffer even more.

There are 250,000 displaced people and an estimated 700,000 affected and in need of help. "The world still has no idea what is happening, because of indifference, and because it seems that we have already become accustomed to wars. There is war in Iraq, there is war in Syria and there is also now a war in Mozambique," Pemba Bishop Luíz Fernando Lisboa said last week.

Increasing amounts of money are being spent militarizing this war and succouring the affected. If five years ago even part of this money had been shared with the poor and marginalised of Cabo Delgado, the war would never have started. Is the point of no return being passed, where the only response is stepping up the military action, creating hopelessness and insurgent recruits on the ground, and propelling a war that will run for a decade? Or is there still a chance to show the young people of Cabo Delgado that they can share in the province's wealth and resources, and have a future? *Joseph Hanlon*

Mercenaries to the fore as Dyck contract extended

Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) mercenaries have had their three-month contract extended and expanded. They started as a shoe-string operation with just 30 men entirely operating from the air, with three helicopters with machine guns, two fixed wing aircraft, and two microlight armed spotter planes. The new contract apparently includes training and perhaps supply of ground troops, expansion of the air operation, and a new forward base based on improving the Macomia airstrip. (Zitamar 16, 20 July; Savana 24 July)

"The Mozambique Defence Forces are unprepared and under-resourced and we have to move fast. Some of the atrocities committed are unlike anything I have seen before and I've seen a lot of wars, in a lot of different places," DAG head Lionel Dyck told Hannes Wessels who runs a website *Africa Unauthorized* (17 July). Both fought for the Rhodesian army before independence there. Dyck continued, "Despite this barbarism, this enemy is organised, motivated and well equipped. If we don't get on top of this, it's going to spread south fast and that will be a catastrophe for the entire region."

Wessels commented: "At this point it looks like a semi-retired 76 year old veteran of many wars, in the twilight of his years, stands pretty much alone in the ongoing struggle to stem the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and to stop the slaughter of blacks by blacks on the killing fields of Africa." <https://africaunauthorised.com/?p=3383>

In the *Telegraph* (London, 9 June), Rhodesian and Zimbabwean journalist Peta Tornycroft wrote an article headlined "Band of Angolan civil war veterans led by retired Rhodesian army colonel hailed for 'saving the day'." She writes that "the desperate Mozambican government" recruited Dyck. "As hundreds of militants advanced on [Pemba], Col. Dyck's helicopters flew in and started shooting at the attackers. Insiders say they 'shot the shit' out of the fighters, killing dozens."

This is part of a growing chant that white men who fought for apartheid South Africa and UDI Rhodesia are now coming to the rescue of the people they fought against (and lost to) 30-40 years ago.

Changing sides: At Zimbabwe independence Lionel Dyck stayed and joined the new joint army. He rose to be commander of Zimbabwe paratroops which took part in 1981-3 in actions against dissident Zanla troops, some of who had been organised without their knowledge by agents of apartheid South Africa to fight against the new government. In 1985 he was a commander of Zimbabwean troops fighting Renamo in Mozambique, and commanded the troops that took Renamo's Casa Banana base on the Gorongosa mountain. *Savana* Friday (24 July) has a photo of Dyck with Samora Machel and Marcelino Dos Santos at Casa Banana in 1985. This gave Dyck high level contacts in Frelimo as well as with Emerson Mnangagwa, now president of Zimbabwe but then Minister of State Security and head of the Central Intelligence Organisation. Dyck moved on to demining and in 2013 DAG was contracted for Mozambique anti-poaching operations. With the failure of Russian Wagner mercenaries in Cabo Delgado, DAG was brought in by Police Chief Bernardino Rafael.

It is reported that Dyck plans to use the "fireforce" tactic developed in the late 1970s by the Rhodesian army when Dyck was a member. The tactic involves a small attack aircraft accompanied by several small helicopters with groups of just four men who land and try to surround an insurgent group to prevent it escaping while it is attacked from the air.

DAG is violating South Africa's Foreign Military Assistance Act which requires all paramilitary activity, including that conducted outside of South Africa, to obtain prior approval from the South African Government. *Africa Intelligence* (22 July) reports that to avoid scrutiny, Dyck has used his anti-poaching operations and connections to create a logistics base with a landing strip in the Limpopo National Park, adjacent to South Africa's Kruger National Park, and he used this at least to import helicopters to Mozambique which are now being used in Cabo Delgado. Mozambique and South Africa are not signatories to the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa.

US and French look to move in

Both the United States and France are trying to become involved in patrolling the coast of Cabo Delgado. The US is explicitly linking anti-drug and anti-insurgency activity.

"There's a lot of overlap between the drug traffickers and extremists and the types of conditions that enable them to thrive, and sadly, those conditions are present in Mozambique. So in Mozambique [the State Department is] supporting some of the Mozambican government's counter-narcotics efforts. We're also working ... to help them disrupt some of the transnational organized crime at sea through more effective patrolling," said Heather Merritt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in a 21 July press briefing. <https://www.state.gov/telephonic-press-briefing-on-drug-trafficking-in-africa/>

Merritt stressed that across Africa crime syndicates often "engage in multiple crime areas, and those networks may traffic in wildlife, drugs, people". She noted that "narcotics trafficking may be indirectly funding some of the terrorist networks and activities, as traffickers pay for safe passage via under-governed spaces and through routes that have been exploited as well by terrorist entities."

"We're definitely concerned about Mozambique, and ... drug traffickers and violent extremists have both utilized the ungoverned space", Merritt continued. And then she hinted at military and navy involvement, linking terrorism and heroin: there is "limited patrolling and limited law enforcement reach there. ... We are as a US government concerned about the extremism in Cabo Delgado ... We recognize that it's a security threat that has a nexus to criminality, to terrorism, and to looking at sort of governance capacity, law enforcement capacity, and military capacity within Mozambique."

At least one US private security company is already recruiting Portuguese speaking US nationals to "provide strategic and tactical advisory support services" to the Mozambique government.

Meanwhile, French sources confirmed to Lusa (17 July) that Mozambique and France are discussing a military maritime cooperation agreement in the context of possible support in the fight against insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The French Armed Forces of the Southern Zone of the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI) have been promoting military cooperation, "conducting training with the Mozambican authorities on state action at sea", the source said.

The island of Mayotte is just 500 km east of Pemba and is officially part of mainland France (and thus the EU). It has an important French military base. In addition France has several Islands in the Mozambique Channel between Mozambique and Madagascar, shown on this map: <https://bit.ly/llands-Fr>

Equally important, the French company Total recently bought control of area 1 of the Cabo Delgado gas field. Total brought in former French foreign legion officer Frédéric Marbot to manage security for its gas project on the Afungi peninsula in Palma (*Africa Intelligence*, 1 June; *Cabo Ligado* 9 June). Marbot, who reportedly also ran security at Total facilities in Nigeria and Kazakhstan, will be joined in Cabo Delgado by his former foreign legion colleague Charles Stroeng. It appears that he is setting up a security unit partly composed of Mozambican troops already deployed to protect the Afungi camp.

Total already has contracts with five private security companies. Three are British: Blue Mountain, Control Risks and G4S, The other two are Arkhe (owned by Omega, South Africa/Mauritius) and GardaWorld (Canada), Arkhe, one of the biggest suppliers of security guards in Mozambique, including to embassies, was cited in the legal actions against Gemfields for atrocities at its Cabo Delgado ruby mine.

Push for South African intervention

"Staying out of Mozambique could see the insurgency there continuing to grow," warns the South African Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) in an article by Peter Fabricius in *ISS Today* (23 July).

Islamic State has sleeper cells in South Africa and has recruited South Africans into its ranks. Some of these extremists fought with the group in Syria, some are involved in Cabo Delgado, and others are lying low in various cities in the country, according to Martin Ewi, ISS regional observatory coordinator.

Fabricius writes that "security sources have revealed that two accomplices of Islamic State suspects in South Africa were identified by South African officials in a photograph which the Cabo Delgado insurgents recently posted. The two are linked to legal cases underway in South Africa. That being so, it does not seem far-fetched to worry that these or other Mozambique insurgents might cross into or return to South Africa with hostile intent."

The article comes after State Security Minister Ayanda Dlodlo said "we are taking very, very seriously" Islamic State's 3 July warning to South Africa not to get involved in Cabo Delgado. (News24 19 July; this newsletter 494 9 July). Dlodlo said South Africa could not extricate itself from conflict in the southern African region. "As a result of that, it becomes a responsibility for all of us in SADC to assist Mozambique in whatever way we can," she added.

The appointment of Robert McBride on 17 July to head the State Security Agency's (SSA) foreign branch, Dlodlo added, would assist in South Africa's efforts to deal with these threats. The job is effectively coordinator of foreign intelligence. McBride and Dlodlo were both Umkhonto weSizwe guerrillas.

\$14.9 bn loan go-ahead for Total LNG

\$14.9 bn in debt finance for Cabo Delgado gas was signed on 17 July. It includes the development of the Golfinho and Atum natural gas fields located in Offshore Area 1 and the construction of a two-train liquefaction plant with a total capacity of 13.1 million tons per annum (MTPA). LNG production could start in 2024.

Standard Bank calls it "the largest project financing deal" in Africa. It includes direct and covered loans from 8 Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) from US, Japan, UK, Italy, South Africa, Netherlands and Thailand; 19 commercial bank facilities; and a loan from the African Development Bank.

The French company Total (with 26.5% which it recently bought, indirectly, from Anadarko) is the operating company. Other owners are Mitsui (20%), ENH (Mozambique government, 15%), three Indian state-owned companies (30%), and the Thailand state company PTTEP (8.5%)

In Area 4, deep-water offshore, there are two LNG projects. The \$10 bn Coral South floating LNG project led by ENI will produce 3.4 MTPA, entirely sold to BP, and could begin by 2022. The second \$25 bn project is led by ExxonMobil which has postponed indefinitely its final investment decision (FID), in part due to the dramatic fall in LNG demand and prices.

Other news

Mozambique's hand in the secret debt dispute should be strengthened by Goldman Sachs agreeing to pay Malaysia \$3.9 bn in the 1MDB scandal. Although not identical, the two are often reported as the two biggest global scandals involving big international banks. Goldman Sachs was blamed for using a \$6.5 bn bond issue to facilitate the looting of Malaysia's 1MDB investment fund. Credit Suisse is accused, in the same way, of promoting a corrupt \$2 bn loan to Mozambique. In November Malaysia turned down a Goldman offer of \$1.75 bn from Goldman and last week it agreed to a payment of \$3.9 bn; it has already received an additional \$600,000 as a share of fines in US court cases. (*Guardian*, London, 25 July) The similarity to the Mozambique case will make it much harder for Credit Suisse to deny liability. But in pressing its cases Malaysia charged a former prime minister, his wife, and stepson. To reach such a large settlement will require hard bargaining from the Mozambique side as well as clear evidence of prosecution of the Mozambicans involved.

China's challenge to India could have an impact in Mozambique. The Macao-based China-Lusophone Brief (CL Brief 16 July) reports that Mozambique will be one of ten countries in India's International Solar Alliance' (ISA), in which state-run NTPC will develop solar power parks, funded by Indian credits. This is billed as India's "Energy Silk Road" and is seen by China as a direct challenge to its Belt and Road strategy.

"The law does not deal with mere impertinence and vulgarity," confirmed Mozambique's Higher Appeal Court, in confirming the acquittal of economist Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and journalist Fernando Mbanze, in an important victory for press freedom. In 2013 Castel-Branco published a Facebook post criticising then President Armando Guebuza in very strong language. The post was widely circulated and reprinted in MediaFax. The Public Prosecutor's Office said the article was libellous and that libelling the head of state is a security offense. In 2015 Maputo city court Judge Joao Guilherme threw the case out, saying the language might be regarded as "impertinent and vulgar" but the post was not libellous. Unexpectedly, the Public Prosecutor's Office appealed, and five years later the Higher Appeals Court upheld the acquittal. It noted that "The President of the Republic, because of his topmost position in the leadership of the State, is exposed to criticism. Calling on a President to resign because the writer does not believe he is handling correctly the destinies of the country is normal throughout the world".

Covid-19 cases rising; what are the implications from South Africa

Covid-19 cases are rising, with 53 new cases announced today, pushing the 7-day average to 35 per day, compared to 20 per day for much of June. There have been 11 deaths. There have been 1669 confirmed cases, of which 1063 are still active; 4298 people are in quarantine. The four provinces with most active cases are Cidade de Maputo: 228, Cabo Delgado: 225, Nampula: 209, and Provincia de Maputo: 202.

But there are concerns both about the high numbers in neighbouring South Africa where case numbers are still rising and there were 312 deaths reported yesterday, and that cases and deaths may be underestimated in both countries.

Researchers from South Africa's Medical Research Council say the South African figures for natural deaths are far higher than usual - suggesting thousands of Covid-19 deaths may be going unreported. (BBC 23 July)

Official figures show 6655 people have died from Covid-19. But a study of the past 10 weeks shows there have been 17,000 more deaths than usual for this time of year. That suggests more than 10,000 unexplained deaths.

Many are likely to be Covid-19-related but who died at home. There is also concern that South Africans are staying away from hospitals - because of a lack of space, or fear of catching the virus, which could mean more people dying of illnesses, such as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, that are not being treated.

South Africa has double the population of Mozambique. South Africa currently reports 112 deaths per million population so if all extra deaths are counted as Covid-19 related, this would be nearly 300 deaths/mn, which is at levels similar to Brazil, Russia, Netherlands, and Ireland. (Germany is 110, Portugal is 167, UK is highest in Europe at 670)

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"Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, bit.ly/mozamb, accessed XXX.

Previous newsletters and other Mozambique material are posted on bit.ly/mozamb

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Background reading

Special reports

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroínaPT>

2001 first article - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014)

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

Two more will be available shortly to download:

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carlos Serra Diário de um sociólogo: <http://oficinadesociologia.blogspot.com>

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news

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