

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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## **Covid-19 mainly in Maputo, which remains high risk**

Covid-19 appears to have become a largely Maputo disease. Cases have remain constant at between 90 and 100 a day since the beginning of November. More than half of the total cases have been in Maputo, and but Maputo accounts for two-thirds of new cases and remains very high risk

Cases in Mozambique:

+ peaked in late September at 215 new cases per day, (all seven day averages)

+ fell to 109 in early October,

+ peaked again at 169 on 24 October,

+ fell to around 100 in early November

+ and have remained constant between 90 and 100 since then.

Maputo cases follow a similar pattern, however in September Maputo cases were only half of Mozambican cases, but since the October peak Maputo has two thirds of all Mozambican cases.

Mozambique had 1699 active Covid-19 cases on 20 November, of which 1510 (89%) were in Maputo city. Of 154 new cases reported that day, 125 (81%) were in Maputo city.

Testing is also highest in Maputo (69% of tests). Only 37 people are currently hospitalised, of which 34 (92%) are in Maputo city, which has the best hospital facilities. There have been 121 total deaths from Covid-19 in Mozambique, of which 93 (77%) have been in Maputo city.

In the week to Thursday 19 November, there were 16 deaths - the highest so far - and total deaths are 120, but this will reflect the higher number of cases three weeks ago.

By 20 November, Mozambique had recorded 14,877 cases. Of those, 7,678 (52%) were in Maputo. The 1699 active cases on 20 November were distributed: Cidade de Maputo: 1,510; Província de Maputo: 34; Cabo Delgado: 34; Gaza: 34; Sofala: 28; Nampula: 25; Manica: 21; Niassa: 5; Inhambane: 4; Zambézia: 2; and Tete: 2.

The table on the next page compares Mozambique and Maputo to other countries and to Lisbon, which shows Mozambique's rates very low, but Maputo's rate relatively high.

The Ministry of Health posts very good weekly tables and charts on <https://www.misau.gov.mz/index.php/relatorio-situacional-semanal>  
 And thanks to Miguel do Brito who keeps a very good Covid-19 scorecard.

<b>Comparison of Covid-19 cases</b>									
Worldometer 21 Nov and Mozambique data									
Country	Total Cases	Total Deaths	Active Cases	Cases / 1Mn pop	Deaths / 1M pop	Deaths / cases	Million Tests	Tests/ 1M pop	Population
UK	1,473,508	54,286	N/A	21,661	798	3.7%	40	591,931	68,025,098
Brazil	6,020,164	168,662	429,400	28,244	791	2.8%	22	102,746	213,147,624
USA	12,277,024	260,312	4,698,981	37,006	785	2.1%	177	533,988	331,759,224
Portugal	249,498	3,762	82,736	24,497	369	1.5%	4	395,974	10,185,020
South Africa	762,763	20,759	34,964	12,798	348	2.7%	5	87,974	59,598,116
Japan	125,267	1,943	14,901	992	15	1.5%	3	25,191	126,324,219
Ghana	50,717	323	1,113	1,619	10	0.6%	0.6	18,318	31,321,713
<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>14,877</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>1,703</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0.8%</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>6,924</b>	<b>31,588,553</b>
Lisbon region	70,751	1,162		19,310	317	1.6%			3,664,000
<b>Maputo</b>	<b>7,678</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>1,510</b>	<b>5,815</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>1.2%</b>			<b>1,320,474</b>

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## Cabo Delgado

### The battle for Mueda is on

A key battle in the Cabo Delgado civil war is under way. Mueda town is the Makondi capital and has become the centre of government military forces (FDS) fighting insurgents. It also controls the only open road to Palma and the gas fields.

Geography matters. Effectively there is a plate which reaches 250 metres high and slopes east 100 km to the sea. At the west and north there is a steep escarpment that falls to the Rovuma River. Two centuries ago some Makondi moved to the top of the plateau to escape the slave traders. They established Mueda, which in 1965 became the centre of the independence struggle. The plateau is divided into three districts, Mueda in the west, Muidumbe lower down, and then Mocimboa da Praia at the coast. Mueda and the western half of Muidumbe are predominantly Makondi and Catholic. Eastern Muidumbe and Mocimboa da Praia are mixed but the majority are Mwani and Islamic. The original insurgent force was largely made of young Mwani men.

Insurgents now occupy all of Mocimboa da Praia town and district, which means they control the N380, the only paved road north from Pemba to the gas fields as well as coastal shipping inside a chain of islands. Control of this zone has stopped the repair of electricity lines meaning no power to four districts for several months. Roads going east from Mueda to Mocimboa and southeast to Macomia are also cut. The only open road is a long dirt road from Montepuez to Mueda to Nangade to Palma, which remains open but will become impassable in the upcoming rainy season.

This year insurgents have attacked Muidumbe repeatedly, occupying villages and towns and then being pushed out. After the independence war, many liberation war veterans settled in Muidumbe. Although now older, they have organised militias which have been armed, and they have been effective in defending their home area.

Meanwhile Mueda town has been under threat since the beginning of the month. More than a week ago banks and other businesses as well as health facilities closed and most resident fled. Some

are trying to walk the 200 km south to Montepuez. Liberation war veteran and Frelimo Political Commission member Alberto Chipande is said to have moved his family out of Mueda.



Mueda has become a heavily armed garrison town, empty of civilians, and has not been attacked. But there has been heavy fighting in Muidumbe. Many civilians fled into the dense forests where they were sought out by the insurgents. The riot police and militias have recaptured some of Muidumbe, including the district town, Namacande, but the rest of the district remains occupied.

The district administrator had ordered all civil servants to return by 1 November, and shortly after that the insurgents began their new attack. One of those who had just returned was a teacher in Matambalale, Damião Tangassi, who was executed in front of his wife and family. A moving homage to Tangassi was published in *Carta de Moçambique* (17 Nov) and is posted, in English and Portuguese, here: <https://bit.ly/Tangassi>

We no longer publish detailed reports on the Cabo Delgado civil war and advise readers to subscribe to the weekly **CaboLigado** - free, published on Tuesday, and in English. It gives the best reporting on the war. Subscribe on <https://bit.ly/CaboSub> and go to the bottom of the form and tick Cabo Ligado.

**The number of people dislocated** by the civil war in Cabo Delgado and the small Renamo Junta in Sofala now exceeds 500,000, Prime Minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosario told parliament Wednesday (18 Nov)

## Comment on 'terrorism'

"Terrorism" is what the word says: creating terror and fear in your opponent and demonstrating your unchecked power. Aerial bombing of London and Berlin during the second world war, and in Aden now, is intended to terrorise the civilian population. But it is a common tactic of war and does not need an air force. It is particularly important for weaker guerrilla forces to establish their power and image.

In the 1981-92 war, Renamo used terrorism extensively and strategically. For example, an aim was to stop travel, so buses were attacked and passengers burned alive. But Renamo always allowed some passengers off the bus first, so there were people who would tell the story and spread the word. And the horror built Renamo's image as a serious opposition force. It also proved to be a safe strategy from Renamo. Peace involved talking to terrorists, as it always does. And the peace accord included no prosecutions and Renamo becoming the main political opposition. People who organised and took part in terror are now in parliament and honoured citizens, and no one mentions that they were once terrorists who did terrible things.

Cabo Delgado's insurgents began small, and used terror selectively - killing identified members of the local elites and those who were known to oppose them. And it worked, winning over young people as recruits and supporters.

The war started in coastal areas where they had support, and executions were mostly selective. When they moved inland to Muidumbe, they faced a more serious Makondi Catholic opposition which successfully resisted. Now it appears tactics have changed, killing larger numbers of people to terrorise civilians to not resist. Like Renamo terror four decades ago, it is structured. Many of the victims are part of the state apparatus, like teacher Damião Tangassi, and his family were forced to watch and then let go to tell the story.

In early November an estimated 50 people were killed on the local football pitch in Muatide village. The massacre was first reported on 5 November by the Nacala-based Pinnacle News, which has the best sources on the ground, and later confirmed by other local media. It was picked up by the BBC and then other global media, and then condemned by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and French President Emmanuel Macron. It was, however, curiously denied by Cabo Delgado governor Valige Tauabo.

Macron was criticised for calling the massacre "Islamic terrorism" in a tweet (11 Nov). As Islamic State has been made the global enemy, it is convenient for Macron to use that label, but we should be careful. First of all, nearly every person in rural areas has a sharp machete because it is one of the few farm tools they have, and is used for everything from cutting trees to harvesting to cutting open coconuts. The initial insurgent groups had only one or two guns and a few bullets, but all the young men had their machetes, which was used to attack and kill. Of necessity, that became the insurgent symbol.

Second, we have not given religious labels to earlier terrorism. Renamo was taught its terror tactics by the apartheid South African army, but this was never labelled "Afrikaner Christian terrorism". And the massacres in Mueda in 1960 and Wiriyaumu in 1972 were never described as "Portuguese Catholic massacres". *jh*

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## Elections

### Little opposition to unchanged election system

Parliament on 4 November established an ad hoc commission to select civil society members of the National Elections Commission (CNE). The current law will not be changed. It gives Frelimo a majority on all elections commissions because members at all levels are nominated by the three parties (Frelimo, Renamo, MDM) in proportion to their seats in parliament. The CNE has 17 members – 5 Frelimo, 4 Renamo, 1 MDM, and 7 from civil society. But by convention these "civil society" nominees are party loyalists in the same proportions, guaranteeing the Frelimo majorities.

There was no opposition in parliament and MDM and Renamo nominated their members of the ad hoc commission - 3 Frelimo, 1 Renamo, 1 MDM. Civil Society nominations must be submitted by the end of the month.

Civil society has denounced the continuation, without debate, of a system which so obviously failed in the elections last year. Ten groups involved in election observation issued a statement Wednesday calling for the selection to be stopped and that there at least be public debate on the criteria for civil society nominations and how they are selected. (*O Pais* 18 Nov, *Savana* 20 Nov)

**Comment:** Donor-funded Maputo civil society normally limits itself to issuing statements, which are ignored. There are no big street protests over fraudulent elections, as in Belarus. Elections were once important, but are no longer treated seriously. There has never been a serious political opposition. Donor agencies are now interested in gas and investment rather than governance and did not seriously protest the 2019 elections. Finally, Frelimo has been careful to keep the Maputo middle class comfortable so they do not protest as in Belarus. Inequality, poverty and anger at Frelimo has boiled over in Cabo Delgado, leading to the current civil war. But that is 1800 km from Maputo and Frelimo can ignore the local roots and blame Islamic State.

So it appears that the Maputo middle class and its civil society has accepted that Frelimo, however corrupt, remains the natural party of government. UNU-Wider in its report last week also accepts that, saying major change must come from inside Frelimo. Which suggests that elections will not be taken seriously and protest will remain token. *jh*

### Should Mozambique send election observers to the US?

Since Joe Biden was declared U.S. President-elect a week ago, outgoing President Donald Trump and his Republican allies have doubled down on their baseless allegations that the voting process was fraudulent and that Biden is "stealing" the election with "illegal" votes.

"Allegations of vote manipulation are a classic characteristic of elections in struggling democracies and authoritarian states", which looks very similar to Donald Trump and his Republican allies' "baseless allegations that the voting process was fraudulent and that Biden is 'stealing' the election with 'illegal' votes," according to *Foreign Policy* (10 Nov). But fragile democracies have developed election observation to verify elections. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/10/trump-biden-election-vote-fraud-refute/>) Could this work in the US? And as Mozambique bars observers, perhaps they could send them to the US for the next elections.

### 'Elections have become a conflict-generating mechanism'

"In 25 years of multi-party democracy, elections have become a conflict-generating mechanism; levels of corruption have increased, the political space is restricted to two parties instead of opening up to a large number of actors, institutions of sovereignty have almost all been partyised according to the interest of the ruling party, in a framework in which the state is finally unable to

emancipate itself from the clientelism," warns a new book *Multiparty Democracy in Mozambique* (*Democracia Multipartidária em Moçambique*) published by EISA (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Mozambique) Mozambique. "For the authors of this book, there is no doubt that to create a common space and a place to satisfy collective needs, a consultation between Mozambicans is more than urgent."

The book's 17 chapters cover not just elections, but a broader debate on democracy, decentralisation and civil society. The book, in Portuguese only, can be downloaded free from <https://bit.ly/EISA-Democ> (5 Mb).

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## Mozambicans must pay for knowledge about their country

Wider, which published (free) the excellent study of Mozambique (see previous newsletter), had to cancel a seminar on "The contribution of digital financial services to financial inclusion in Mozambique." But Wider said we could download the paper. However it costs \$45 to read and \$250 to have a copy of the paper. Academics come from abroad, do the research in Mozambique, and go away - and Mozambicans have to pay to know they discovered about Mozambique.

How many books, PhDs, and academic papers are written about Mozambicans with huge help from Mozambicans, but then Mozambicans never know about them and cannot afford to read them? Surely Mozambique should impose a requirement that reports of any research done in Mozambique should be available free or be published in Mozambique. *jh*

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"Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb), accessed XXX.

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### Important external links

**Cabo Delgado civil war** weekly report - Zitamar, MediaFax, ACLED - <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

**Covid-19** daily updated data and graphs <https://covidmoz.netlify.app/>

Previous editions of this newsletter: [bit.ly/MozNews2020](http://bit.ly/MozNews2020)

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Other Mozambique material [bit.ly/mozamb](http://bit.ly/mozamb)

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## There are six special reports on the Cabo Delgado war

Notes on the evolution of the Cabo Delgado war: Although the global should not be forgotten, the local is most important. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

How might military & economic intervention shape the war? 3 Sept 2020

<https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

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## Background reading

### Special reports

#### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - Pt - CIP - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

#### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

### **\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz-full>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

### **In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

### **Eight books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>**

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

### **Two more will be available shortly to download:**

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000

### **These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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### **Mozambique media websites, English:**

Club of Mozambique: <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar: <http://zitamar.com/>

Macauhub English: <http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/>

AIM Reports: [www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news](http://www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news)

### **Mozambique media websites, Portuguese:**

Notícias: [www.jornalnoticias.co.mz](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz)

O País: [www.opais.co.mz](http://www.opais.co.mz)

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

### **Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:**

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/>

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