

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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Cabo Delgado Studies

Several very good studies of Cabo Delgado were published in January. All but one are only in Portuguese.

Local people say why some back & join insurgents in Mocimboa da Praia

"Some support given by the population to the insurgents was justified by the lack of jobs, or by discontent with the irregular action of the municipal police, or by the existence in the group of armed men familiar to some of the people," explained the authors of a Universidade Rovuma (Pemba) study that interviewed 206 people who had fled Mocimboa da Praia. "Terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado (2017-2020): the causes of the phenomenon from the mouths of the population of Mocímboa da Praia" ("Ataques Terroristas em Cabo Delgado (2017-2020): as causas do fenómeno pela boca da população de Mocímboa da Praia") in Portuguese only is on <https://bit.ly/MozAtaquesMocim>

"The armed group, in the first phase, was composed mostly of young people from Mocímboa da Praia," notes the study. "The research data showed that Mocímboa da Praia became the epicentre of terrorist attacks due to its geostrategic location, the occurrence of ethnic conflicts (mainly between Makondes and Mwanis), the spread of Islamic extremism and the adherence of a significant number of local young people to the terrorist group. Most of these young people were convinced to join the group under promises of better employment, monetary payments and scholarships in foreign Koranic schools."

Four issues caused people to join or support the insurgents:

+ Failure of public policies: poverty, sense of exclusion, unemployment and illiteracy rate. When asked why people joined the insurgents, half said it was related to jobs. Some Mwanis say they are labeled as opposition and refused jobs.

- + Islamic radicalism.
- + Ethnic issues: Mwanis vs Makondes
- + Bad relations between the defence forces and the population: demanding money, looting, physical aggression and even assassinations of people suspected of being insurgents.

Most interesting is the way the fundamentalists used the grievances, especially about jobs, to groom and recruit young men. The lack of jobs meant many young men were just hanging around doing nothing. Suddenly in 2017 some of them became street traders, apparently funded by the fundamentalists to show they could create jobs. One interviewee said "many young people who did nothing but play cards suddenly became merchants". Some of them and others joined the insurgents because they offered jobs and money. Another interviewee said: "They convince you that there will be good life when you join the group they are training to fight against the government".

OMR: Not a religious conflict

"Although the discontent in Northern Mozambique is expressed in religious language and symbolism, all the webinar speakers agreed that this is not a religious conflict," reports the Rural Observatory (OMR, Observatório do Meio Rural) in its report of its webinar series How is Cabo Delgado, published 29 January. In English <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/download/7737> and in Portuguese <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/download/7738>

The report is a very good way to catch up on the Cabo Delgado civil war and has good articles on history, religion, the military stalemate, and resettlement. The article on the war is pessimistic: "The current scenario leads us to believe that, in the coming years, there will be a militarization of the Northeast of Cabo Delgado, with all the villages abandoned and the establishment of security corridors, a catastrophic scenario for the civilian population."

"Emerging youth in a situation of waithood, with strong difficulties of socio-economic integration, competes not only with older and established generations, but also among themselves, often for low-paid and socially not prestigious jobs. ... The coexistence of phenomena of poverty in an emerging consumer society and the frustration of the high initial expectations surrounding extractive activities contributed to the worsening of tensions. The situation is aggravated by the absence of formal channels for socio-political participation and negotiation, with feelings of absence of political representation, contributing to the development of a perspective of violence, as a legitimate vehicle for participation."

"With limited possibility for participation, young people are coerced into following the proselytizing of Muslim groups who have studied abroad, being exposed to Salafist and Wahhabi Islamic ideologies, increasing local cleavages."

OMR: social and economic development is best counter-insurgency strategy

"Although the conflict inevitably involves military intervention to provide security for the people and goods, the profound internal contradictions that exist require the implementation of a social and economic development plan, understood as the best counter-insurgency strategy, limiting the spread of armed conflict to other areas of the province marked by poverty and by historical relations of protest against the State," write João Feijó, António Souto and Jerry Maquenzi in a detailed OMR paper on how to move forward with development, published 27 January.. <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/download/7729> A linked paper by João Mosca and Jerry Maquenzi issued at the same time is on <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/download/7733>

IESE: vampires, lions, and structural violence

IESE (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos) has published a set of important reports relating to Cabo Delgado:

Vampiros, Jihadistas e Violência Estrutural em Moçambique: Reflexões sobre Manifestações Violentas de Descontentamento Local e as suas Implicações para a Construção da Paz, by Bernhard Weimer <https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/CIESE19-BernhardWeimer.pdf>

Protecção social em contexto de terrorismo: que implicações tem a insurgência islâmica nos mecanismos formais de protecção social em Moçambique? by Moisés Siúta <https://www.iese.ac.mz/ideias-no-137-msiuta/>

Cabo Delgado e o risco sistémico da guerra em Moçambique by Severino Ngoenha, Giverage do Amaral and Alcido Nhumaio. <https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/SNgoenhaEtAlDesafios-2020.pdf>

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More Covid-19 cases and deaths in January than all of last year

More than half of all total Covid-19 cases and deaths occurred in January, showing the extent of the Covid-19 explosion. In January Covid-19 caused 201 deaths, which is more than half (55%) of the 367 that the country has officially recorded since the beginning of the pandemic in March. There were 20,012 Covid-19 cases in January, which is 52% of the accumulated total of 38,654 cases. Hospitalisations due to Covid-19 rose sharply, causing increased pressure on health services. In January, there were 887 hospitalisations, while in the whole of 2020 there had been 801. The mortality rate has now risen to 1% - 1 in each 100 diagnosed cases dies.

In the first four days of February deaths rose to 15 per day and new cases to 950 per day. It is still largely a southern disease, but spreading. Of active cases, 53% are in Maputo city, 14% in Maputo province (mainly Matola), 7% in Gaza, 5% in Inhambane, and 6% in Sofala.

For comparison, the current rate of new cases in London is 309 per 100,000 population. For Maputo the rate is 37 per 100,000 population. So London has 8 times as many Covid-19 cases as Maputo.

Mozambique's middle classes rely on private hospitals, which are now full. One of the best, ICOR, told *Carta de Moçambique* (1 Feb) that when there is space, new Covid-19 patients must make a deposit of \$6,500 before admission, and in serious cases expect to pay four times that amount. [cost corrected]

Curfew announced for Maputo & Matola

A curfew was announced for the capital from Friday (5 Feb). This evening President Filipe Nyusi said no one can be on the streets from 21.00 until 04.00 the next day in Maputo, Matola, Marracuene and Boane. The curfew will last at least 30 days.

Nationally, there can be no conferences or religious services, and religious and conference buildings are closed. All private social events are banned, except weddings limited to 20 people; government events are limited to 50 people. Shopping centres must close at 19.00 and restaurants at 20.00 - which means restaurants must be empty of customers and workers by 20.00. All other previous restrictions continue; beaches and schools remain closed.

Privinvest Defence shows It takes two to tango

Privinvest argues that former President Armando Guebuza was aware of the payments of millions of dollars to members of his government and to people in his circle, including his son, Ndambi. In a brief but insightful comment, CIP director Edson Cortez writes that Guebuza "could not dance this tango alone. It was necessary for him to drag in people of his confidence and beyond with him." And he shows how Guebuza and Frelimo created the network of alliances and people who were themselves corrupted so could not say anything. Nyusi "may not have withstood the easy money. He joined the party and danced the tango where the orchestra leaders were Armando Guebuza and Iskandar Safa [head of Privinvest]. Nyusi received the crumbs, but they were enough to hugely discredit his image as current Head of State." In English on <http://bit.ly/PrivCortez> and the original Portuguese on <https://cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Para-dançar-Tango.pdf>

Correction: The first sentence of an article in yesterday's newsletter should have read "Privinvest puts most of the blame on Nyusi and not Guebuza". The corrected newsletter is on http://bit.ly/Moz_520

Court documents relating to Mozambique's case in London against Credit Suisse and Privinvest have been posted by CIP on <https://cipmoz.org/2021/02/04/documentos-do-processo-das-dividas-ocultas-em-londres-cl-2019-000127/> The full Privinvest defence is on <http://bit.ly/PrivDefence> (10 Mb!).

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Attempt to expel journalist Tom Bowker was 'illegal'

The decision to expel his the British journalist and editor Tom Bowker from Mozambique is "absolutely illegal", according to his defence team. The measure was taken by the migration service (Serviço Nacional de Migração - Senami) which is an "entity without legal competence" and was only "communicated orally". Senami can only act on written instructions from the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, Bowker did not have the opportunity to defend himself from an "arbitrary action," one of the members of the defence team said. (Lusa 2 Feb)

On 25 January at a meeting in Senami, Bowker had been told he had to leave Mozambique within five days, but with no written notification. *Ponto por Ponto* (PpP 4 Feb) reported he was still in Mozambique. It does appear that under pressure from diplomats and media, cooler heads have prevailed and the Ministry of Interior may never get around to issuing an expulsion order.

Gabinfo and its head Emília Moiane have not been sympathetic to foreign press. In 2018 the Council of Ministers issued a decree charging the highest fees in the world for foreign press. Foreign correspondents were to pay \$2,500 to \$8,300 for accreditation to cover the upcoming elections. Mozambican journalists will have to pay \$500 to write for foreign media. After a huge outcry, the decree was withdrawn.

In US or UK, anyone can be a journalist

The withdrawal of Tom Bowker's press card and then the attempt to expel him for not being an official journalist underlines the failure of senior government officials to comprehend that in the United States and Britain, press freedom means there is no registration of newspapers or journalists. Anyone can be a journalist and anyone can issue a newsletter or write a blog. In Mozambique, where officials want to control and register everything, this is beyond their imagination.

I have been a working journalist in the UK for 50 years. I have a press card, but it is issued by my union - the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) - which is one of 21 members of the UK Press Card

Authority, which is run by the media, not the government. The card is recognised by the police and public bodies.

But I do not need a card to be a journalist. When I go to a parliamentary select committee hearing, for example, I sit at the press bench and no one asks for proof I am a journalist. For printed publications, there are two requirements: the name and address of the publisher must be included in the publication, and a copy of the publication must be set to the British Library. And, of course, journalists and publishers are subject to libel, defamation, and official secrets laws.

But in the US and UK, anyone can be a journalist and anyone can publish - without registration and without asking permission. It is called press freedom. *Joseph Hanlon*

International Press Card

An international press card is issued by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), which is entirely run by journalists. For Mozambican journalists, the IFJ issues press cards on the recommendation of the journalists union Sindicato Nacional de Jornalistas (SNJ), not Gabinfo.

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Important external links

Covid-19 daily updated data <https://www.facebook.com/miguel.de.brito1> and <https://covid19.ins.gov.mz/documentos-em-pdf/boletins-diarios/>

Daily flood reports - <http://bit.ly/Moz-flood21>

Cyclone trackers, <https://www.cyclocane.com/> and <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>

Cabo Ligado weekly report on civil war <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

Previous editions of this newsletter: <http://bit.ly/MozNews2021> and <http://bit.ly/MozNews2020>

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

Cabo Delgado

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

Special reports on the war

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Background reading

Special reports

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>
Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Nine books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986) <available shortly>

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

Mozambique media websites, Portuguese (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz

O País: www.opais.co.mz

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)

Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (the main group following the \$2 bn secret debt - now run by CDD) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>

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