

MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

542 6 May 2021

Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

To subscribe or unsubscribe: <https://bit.ly/Moz-sub>

This newsletter can be cited as "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings"

Articles may be freely reprinted but please cite the source.

Extensive links and privacy statement at the end of this newsletter.

In this issue

Drugs

+ illicit trade moved out of war zone

War

+ Recruits impoverished and angry

+ Feijó study available in English

+ New Pemba bishop hits Nyusi

+ US training "to defeat ISIS"

Drugs

Experts say illicit trade has shifted out of war zone

Contrary to predictions and claims, "trafficking networks have shifted to new and safer routes ... outside the insurgent-controlled area, which is highly militarized." Contrary to perceptions and predictions that insurgents would gain funding from illegal trade, "our research in northern Mozambique in January and February 2021 has found there is little evidence to suggest that illicit economies have in fact become a major source of income for the insurgents," according to a 28 April report the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). This is the international agency that has become the best informed experts on Illicit Economies in Eastern and Southern Africa.

The full report is on <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/esaobs-risk-bulletin-17/>. It contains a good and detailed map of trafficking routes, below, and in clearer form on <http://bit.ly/Moz-traffic-map>

"The ongoing fighting has had a knock-on effect on the ... various trafficking routes - for heroin, rubies, gold, timber, wildlife - and migrant-smuggling routes - which have long been entrenched in Cabo Delgado for decades."

After extensive research, "no evidence was found linking the ASWJ [Ahlu-Sunna Wa-Jama'a insurgents, known locally as al Shabaab or machababos] with the dhow-based drug supply route." And GI-TOC explicitly criticises the 11 March claim by US government counterterrorism envoy John Godfrey of "a nexus between terrorism finance and narcotics trafficking in Mozambique."

There are three drug routes, and all have changed in response to the war cutting roads. The main traditional route has been dhows travelling from the Makran coast of Pakistan to offshore of northern Cabo Delgado, where drugs are sent in small boats to beaches to be picked up by vehicles. The drug shipments, now half heroin and half methamphetamine, have moved south to beaches around Pemba, Nacala and Angoche. "One heroin trafficker know to the GI-TOC who had previously been based in Mocimboa da Praia had since moved south to Nacala."




FIGURE 1 Illicit flows through northern Mozambique as of February 2021.

NOTE: In comparison to our research findings from 2020, several key illicit flows have shifted so as to avoid the area of insurgent activity in Cabo Delgado. Several illicit flows marked on the 2020 map below – such as flows of drugs to Comoros and Mayotte, and some goods flows out of Zanzibar – are not marked on the 2021 map above. This is not to suggest that such flows are not ongoing, but that our latest research did not confirm their continued viability.

The second route is larger shipments in containers, and some traffic has shifted from dhow to container. Containers arriving in Pemba from Pakistan sometimes contain heroin and those from Brazil carry cocaine. "These high volume traffickers reputedly enjoying support from senior party and government officials."

There is an implicit agreement that this is a transit trade, and that the heroin goes on to South Africa and none stays behind in Mozambique. So local demand in Cabo Delgado has always been supplied by a third route, in vehicles going from Tanzania across the Unity Bridge and through Mueda. This, too, has moved west, crossing into Niassa and then through Lichinga.

People smuggling used to also go down the coast in dhows with people dropped on beaches on moonlit nights. Now the route has shifted west and is by road via Malawi. GI-TOC investigators discovered a long-standing other route, by air. On Nairobi to Pemba LAM flights, after the plane has boarded, empty seats are filled with people being smuggled, and who are not registered. On arrival in Pemba, they are admitted by a trusted immigration officer.

Gemstones now appear to be exported via Malawi and flown to Asia, often as part of the illicit wildlife trade which includes lion teeth and claws and live pangolins from the Niassa reserve. But the ivory trade seems to have been stopped and GI-TOC found no evidence of ivory moving through Pemba or Malawi. There is some artisanal gold mining in insurgent controlled areas of Mocimboa da Praia and insurgents probably benefit from this.

Civil war

Recruits impoverished and angry

Investigations about illegal trade by GI-TOC also generated information about the war itself. "The fact that the profits from both licit and illicit markets in Cabo Delgado were being channelled to a narrow political and military elite left people in the region impoverished and angry and contributed to the growing insurgency. For example, some early recruits into the organization were reported to be drawn from the communities of artisanal miners operating in Montepuez," especially after 1996 legislation criminalised most artisanal mining and 3600 miners were arrested in 2017. "Initial recruits from the area were attracted by ASWJ's [insurgent's] rhetoric of rejecting a predatory government that they felt was excluding them from mineral resources on their land," the GI-TOC reports says.

War supplies and new recruits are carried at night on dhows the 200 km from Mtwara, Tanzania, to Mocimboa da Praia, according to local sources in January. Small islands in the Rovuma estuary are also used as logistic bases. There has also been active recruitment among the youth of Zanzibar and some have travelled to Mtwara to join the insurgents.

Reports

An English translation is now available of the key report by João Feijó of the Rural Observatory (OMR), "Characterization and social organization of machababos [insurgents] from the discourses of kidnapped women", on <http://bit.ly/Moz-Feijo-Eng>

The most complete list of past present and future private military and security companies and present and future foreign troops in Mozambique is on Defence Web (SA, 7 Apr) on <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/featured/an-overview-of-foreign-security-involvement-in-mozambique/>

New Pemba Bishop says Nyusi should pay more attention to Cabo Delgado

"If I were president, my concerns would be different. Cabo Delgado would be high on the agenda. I would be talking about this every day. I would delegate other functions. To inaugurate a school, I have ministers, vice-ministers, prime minister. I would dedicate myself to a cause that really affects national sovereignty. It is necessary to find effective results very urgently and not to minimise a problem like this," said António Juliasso, the new bishop of Pemba.

The original interview (in Portuguese) was published on 27 April by *Observador* (Lisbon) but is behind a paywall, on <http://bit.ly/PembaBishop-Obs>. But a free copy is posted by Macua.blogs on <http://bit.ly/Pemba-Bishop-Macua>

"If you ask a young person which way the country is going, there is great dissatisfaction. If you ask them about their future, they find it difficult to say anything about it. In my opinion, clear paths must be shown: in which direction we are going. When you see that a few are benefiting more and more and so many other young people don't have the possibility and don't see these possibilities, they are vulnerable to all sorts of things."

"How can a corrupt person fight against himself?" The Bishop was particularly critical of corruption at the top. "In practice corruption spreads further and further, reaching the highest spheres. ... This cannot be hidden. Everyone knows it. In several mandates, the presidents of Mozambique have proposed to fight against corruption in a forceful manner. Instead of fighting, things got worse and worse. Everyone understands this, the evil has been diagnosed for a long time. But you don't see an effective fight. Sometimes it is very difficult for the one who is in the problem to fight against himself. How can a corrupt person fight against himself?"

G7 calls insurgents ISIS but also stresses root causes

The G7 Foreign and Development Ministers meeting in London discussed Mozambique. They issued a balanced statement, calling the insurgents "an ISIS affiliate" but also calling on Mozambique and the international community "to tackle the root causes and drivers of conflict and instability." The G7 is the seven most industrialised countries, and the EU foreign minister joined the discussions.

The full paragraph on Mozambique is: "We are deeply concerned by the escalating conflict in Cabo Delgado, and the increasing terrorist attacks by an ISIS affiliate. We urge Mozambique to hold accountable those responsible for human rights abuses and violations in Cabo Delgado. We encourage Mozambique to continue to work with the international community to resolve the humanitarian impact of the insurgency and to tackle the root causes and drivers of conflict and instability, and to prevent a further escalation of violence. In this regard, we welcome the Government of Mozambique's work to respond to the humanitarian and security situation in the north and for the Government's timely consideration of international support. We express our solidarity with the Government of Mozambique and its people in standing up to violent extremism."

"Timely consideration of international support" is thought to be a prod to Mozambique to accept SADC and other military support proposals.

US says it trains Mozambique "to defeat ISIS"

A dozen US Special Operations Forces soldiers on Wednesday (5 May) completed two months of training Mozambican marines "on tactical skills, combat casualty care, marksmanship, and executing a mission while avoiding damage to civilians and property". The press statement for the US embassy continued: "This training exercise reflects the United States Government's

commitment to support the Government of Mozambique's efforts to defeat ISIS." A second training exercise will be held in July.

At the margins of the London G7 meeting on 5 May US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor. A US State Department statement said they "underscored the need ... to cooperate on climate ambition and regional security issues such as the ongoing violence by ISIS-Mozambique. "

Guebuza-Nyusi battle becoming more open

The intense battle between current President Filipe Nyusi and former President Armando Guebuza for control of Frelimo - and thus of the choice of the next President and of substantial resources - is becoming more open and public.

Isálcio Mahanjane, one of the Guebuza family lawyers, on 24 April posted on Facebook a note headed "they distracted us with the tuna and stole Cabo Delgado from us", blaming Nyusi for the Cabo Delgado war. Convoluted as only Mozambican writing can be, Mahanjane seems to accuse Nyusi of creating the mess in Cabo Delgado, and creating the secret debt crisis to cause a distraction to cover his actions. The implication is that Guebuza's secret debt project would have created a coastal protection system, which Nyusi stopped, and intervened in other ways that caused the war. <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007004417468>



This newsletter's editor has also been drawn into the dispute. The front page of Magazine Independent is a response to my comments in a CIP webinar suggesting that ending the war requires negotiations between the big beasts in Frelimo - both to end damaging internal fighting in the military and government, and to agree between the oligarchs to take a smaller cut and allow more money to go to job creation as a way of ending the war. This issue is not regime change, but change within the Frelimo regime - a change from confrontation to some kind of modus vivendi at the top.

This also triggered a response for the Nyusi praise singers. Chief praise singer Egidio Vaz on Facebook 4 May accused me of "disinformation" and being a "mercenary". He says my interest is "in dividing Frelimo for the sake of 'regime change'". The last few weeks, Joe has purposely said a lot of wrong things, including the idea that the gas project was a monopoly of the Frelimo party 'elite'."

Apprentice praise singer Lenon Arnaldo argues that "Frelimo should not allow a foreign citizen to speak about the country and its leaders based on assumptions/rumours, which ultimately aim to create instability or social upheaval in the country, to set in motion the western agenda: REGIME CHANGE".

In fact, the issue is not regime change. Rather it is change within the regime, to stop the destructive hostilities inside Frelimo.

ARTICLES MAY BE FREELY REPRINTED but please cite the source: "Mozambique News Reports and Clippings".

To cite for academic purposes, treat as a blog or a newspaper. Normal citation format would be: "Mozambique News Reports & Clippings, number XXX", DATE, bit.ly/Mozamb, accessed XXX.

Important external links

Covid-19 daily updated data <https://www.facebook.com/miguel.de.brito1> and <https://covid19.ins.gov.mz/documentos-em-pdf/boletins-diarios/>

Daily flood reports - <http://bit.ly/Moz-flood21>

Cyclone trackers, <https://www.cyclocane.com/> and <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>

Cabo Ligado weekly report on civil war <http://bit.ly/CaboLigado>

Previous editions of this newsletter: <http://bit.ly/MozNews2021> and bit.ly/MozNews2020

Downloadable books: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

Cabo Delgado

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

Special reports on the war

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

Gas for development?

Gas_for_development_or_just_for_money?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasEng

Gás_para_desenvolvimento_ou_apenas_dinheiro?_2015 bit.ly/MozGasPt

Background reading

Special reports

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: bit.ly/MozPoverty

Minimum wage and exchange rates 1996-2018 -- <http://bit.ly/MinWage18>

\$2bn secret debt - in English

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

In Portuguese:

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) bit.ly/MozAR-debt

2018 Constitution - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

Election study collaboration: We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

Nine books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)
Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986) <available shortly>

These are still available for sale:

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

Mozambique media websites, English:

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>
Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

Mozambique media websites, Portuguese (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: www.jornalnoticias.co.mz
O País: www.opais.co.mz
@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>
Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>
Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>
Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)
Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).
To subscribe to all CDD publications: <http://eepurl.com/gO9l6v> (English or Portuguese).

This newsletter is distributed on dev-mozambique list by JISC. We hold only your e-mail address and never share our subscription list with anyone. **To subscribe or unsubscribe:** <https://bit.ly/Moz-sub>