

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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## Three key ministers replaced as Nyusi clears the decks

With one eye on Cabo Delgado and the other on the Frelimo party congress next year, President Filipe Nyusi replaced three key ministers - defence, interior and "casa civil" - on 9-11 November. All three were named when Nyusi had not consolidated his power and seemed compromise political nominations. Nyusi asserted his power when he brought in Rwandan troops in July, apparently without approval of the Frelimo party.

Defence and Interior ministers were only appointed as part of the new government in January 2020 and proved unsuccessful in reforming corrupt, poorly paid and trained police and army. At the time the paramilitary riot police were fighting the Cabo Delgado war and the 2000 appointments put the army in charge. Insurgents captured Mocimboa da Praia in June 2020; it was recaptured but taken again by insurgents in August 2020. Military forces regularly captured and then could not hold towns and key roads. Palma fell in April. Rwandan forces arrived in mid-July, captured the key Awasse road junction 10 days later and captured Mocimboa da Praia 10 days after that - putting Mozambican forces to shame.

Jaime Neto had been named Defence Minister in January 2020; he was an academic and member of parliament with no military experience, in the hope that an outsider could clear up the mess. Amade Miquidade, who was named Interior Minister in 2020, had been Deputy Director General of the security services, SISE. But neither could impose management.

Cristóvão Chume is the new Defence Minister. Chume is a professional soldier, was head of the army, and worked with Nyusi when he was Defence Minister. Chume is hands on - he was with the Mozambicans troops accompanying Rwandans in the capture of Mocimboa. Speaking at the swearing in on 12 November, Nyusi stressed the need to modernise the armed forces. Chume has also been given the task of working more closely with local militias, which until now had been under Interior. In effect, the war is now entirely under Defence.

Arsénia Felicidade Félix Massingue is the new Interior Minister, and is the first woman to hold the post. She was national director of immigration (Senami) and before that she had been Provincial Police Commander in Inhambane, Manica and Nampula. She has had further training at the Superior Police Institute in Portugal.

The president said he wanted to see modernisation of all the services supervised by the Interior Ministry, including the National Crime Investigation Service (SERNIC), and the National Immigration Service (SENAMI). She must show "zero tolerance" of corruption. This points in particular to the ongoing kidnappings, which are facilitated by people in SERNIC.

Both face huge tasks to clean up corrupt and dysfunctional ministries. Arsénia Massingue on 17 November said "It is our duty to reverse the situation to create order, public safety and tranquillity". The use of the word "reverse" rather than something like "improve" shows she recognises just how bad it is. And Chume was the head of the army that sacked Palma after it was re-occupied.

Nothing has been said, but it appears Rwanda, with its much more professional army, will have a hand in the reorganisation.

**Former interior minister Amade Miquidade** has been appointed Mozambique's new High Commissioner to Rwanda.

## And in the Presidência heading for the Congress

The Presidência has two key offices - "casa militar" which is the Presidential Guard and security, and "casa civil" which is the administration of the Presidência and serves as gatekeeper to the President, and has informal links with ministers and other state institutions. "Casa Civil" is headed by a Minister in the President's Office and will be absolutely key in Nyusi building up his machine going into the Frelimo Congress next year. The dismissed minister Adelaide Amurane had been a minister in various portfolios for 27 years, and was a political appointee who was retained in the President's office from the Guebuza administration. Going into the Congress, Nyusi clearly needs his own person.

Nyusi has named Constantino Bacela, one of the most successful businessmen of recent times. He is a discreet businessman who in recent years has won many tenders for the supply of goods and services to the Mozambican state, from vehicles to public works in roads and water supply through to the maintenance of Maputo Ring Road (@*Verdade* 12 Nov). Such contracts require good party links and satisfying many party interests. *Evidências* (11 Nov) claims he is also a member of SISE.

## Choosing the new candidate for 2024.

The key meeting is the Frelimo 12th Congress, to be held 23-28 September 2022, at the Party School in Matola. The 12th Congress elects the new Central Committee which immediately meets and elects the new Political Commission, which is the ruling body. Late in 2023 the Central Committee will select the presidential candidate, perhaps with nominations from the Political Commission. The Congress will be the test of the power of the various factions. Before the Congress, Guebuza and Nyusi factions will push to have their delegates elected to the Congress, in order to control the Central Committee and choice of the Presidential candidate. There will also be local elections in October 2024, which will be a test of the two factions and of the opposition.

Nyusi remains president of Frelimo until after the presidential elections. No rule requires the Frelimo president to be the same person as the national president, but Frelimo is allergic to having two heads and the former president is normally eased out quickly by the Central Committee to ensure that the President of Mozambique and of Frelimo are the same person.

If Nyusi thinks he has the power, by claiming a military victory in Cabo Delgado and gaining control of the party, he might try to use the Congress to call for an amendment to the constitution to allow him to stand again. Frelimo has always opposed this, and it is unlikely that Nyusi will be allowed a third term. So Nyusi's goal will be to control the choice of the next president, to give him some protection, and prevent his successor doing to him what Nyusi did to Guebuza.

## **Nyusi promised to "do everything to remove the last obstacle," but what is it?**

President Filipe Nyusi promised to "do everything to remove the last obstacle," until "complete security and tranquillity" is restored in Cabo Delgado. He had gone to South Korea for the launch of the Coral Sul floating LNG platform, and was speaking Monday in front of representatives of ENI and other Area 4 companies, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. (DW 15 Nov)

But Nyusi carefully did not identify the "last obstacle".

South Africa's Institute of Security Studies is considered conservative and linked to the military, but its Tuesday (16 Nov) webinar Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique had some harsh messages for Nyusi as to what the obstacles are. There was a broad consensus of speakers that the war does not have a military solution. The military can only create space for negotiation. And the insurgents must be treated as stakeholders and part of the negotiation.

"There is no military solution to an insurgency," John Stupart, Director of *African Defence Review*. "The Mozambique government goal is still 'kill all the insurgents.' That has never been done."

Speakers agreed that the swift Rwandan gains will not end the war, and that insurgents are just drifting back into the bush, to homes, or to camps for displaced people, waiting to return and fight again.

Anton Mifsud-Bonnici of Marlow Strategy said the gas companies no longer trust the government of Mozambique, and will not accept just a military solution. They want a local dialogue in which civil society and stakeholders are heard. They want negotiation. And they want evidence that government is addressing corruption, grievances and the disconnect between the leadership and the people.

Dominance and importance of Islamic State was widely dismissed. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, ISS Senior Researcher and their Project Leader in Cabo Delgado, says local people they have interviewed do not cite ISIS. "The perception on the ground is that this is largely local" with local fighters speaking local languages.

For her, "the root cause is poverty and unemployment," exacerbated by greed and the failure to share the profits and jobs of rubies and gas. "We all know the long term solution is to create employment to counter the insurgency. There is a need for a redistribution of wealth. LNG is aggravating the sense of injustice in the population." Event chair Kevin Richie summed up by saying "poverty and unemployment are fundamental to all explanations of the insurgency".

Several speakers were pessimistic. Liesl Louw-Vaudran said their interviews shows local civil society thought government only wanted to protect the gas, and had no interest in local people and the resources curse.

Stupart warned that outsiders could turn the insurgency into part of the global war on terror, and that increased outside support could be very profitable for key Mozambicans. Thus some key people see the goal as attracting money from the World Bank, IMF, EU and others. And all that aid will be top down, again without involvement of local people.

**"Hope and opportunities for young people is the central problem of new conflicts for Mozambique,"** said the archbishop of Beira, Claudio Dalla Zuanna, at the Catholic University in Beira. Most young people cannot find job opportunities to build a future. "They will easily be lured by any kind of answers that may seem viable" and that may lead to "terrorism or organised crime", he said. "Peace is about justice and opportunities that young people can have. ...In Cabo Delgado one of the central issues is to give opportunity to people, especially young people."

## COP26

# For Mozambique: more coal and gas and worse cyclones, droughts, floods

COP26's failure to restrict fossil fuels gives the go-ahead for expanding coal and developing gas in Mozambique - but at a high price.

Perhaps the one gain from the conference is the agreement that COP26 "recognizes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5°C compared with 2°C and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. ... Limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45% by 2030 relative to the 2010 level." But the final report admits that pledges so far will actually lead to a 14% *increase* in greenhouse gas emissions above the 2010 level in 2030. This will lead to a temperature rise of 2.4°. António Guterres, UN secretary-general, said 1.5°C was "on life support". COP26 requested (watered down from "requires") that countries would return next year to COP27 with stronger pledges, but big emitters including the US and Australia have already refused.

Mozambique will gain money from the coal and gas, but will it be enough to pay for protection against the climate emergency? Cyclone Idai which hit Beira just two years ago was one of the worst tropical cyclones on record to affect Africa, but is now the new normal. Droughts in the south will create water shortages and crop failures. Intense rainfall will create local floods.

Adapting to the impacts of the climate emergency will be expensive. In flood prone areas that requires raising the levels of roads and building hills and shelters above likely high water level. In cyclone areas, strengthening houses and other buildings and improving drainage will be essential. Improved water collection and storage will be necessary in drought areas.

But who will pay for adaptation? Mozambique is using coal and mineral revenue to pay current expenditure. And donors won't pay.

At least the COP26 Glasgow Climate Pact is brutally honest. It "notes with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly \$100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation has not yet been met" and hopes countries will meet the 2020 goal by 2025.

For years developing countries have been pushing the issue of "loss and damage" - that the advanced countries should pay for the damage being done by the century of greenhouse gases and climate change that was the basis for their development. COP26 gives more prominence to loss and damage, but the US and EU led the developed countries in opposing any suggestion that they had any liability to pay for past damage. A bit of aid for Cyclone Idai but nothing to adapt to future cyclones.

So Mozambique can earn money from its gas and coal, but not enough to adapt to the damage being caused.

The power of the fossil fuel lobby in the negotiations was huge. An end to coal and to fossil fuel subsidies had been touted before the conference, but that idea was smashed. Although the first draft initially called for countries to “accelerate the phasing out of coal and subsidies for fossil fuels”, this phrasing was watered down in the fourth and final draft to request that countries “accelerate the phasing out of *unabated* coal and *inefficient* subsidies for fossil fuels”. China, India and South Africa had insisted coal must continue. “Unabated coal” is coal burning without carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Carbon markets are essential for the fossil fuel industry and Mozambique gas, allowing them to buy “carbon offsets”. First set out in the Paris Agreement, ground rules for trading carbon were finally agreed in Glasgow. The worst and biggest loopholes were closed, but there is still scope for countries and companies to game the system.

The final approved version of the Glasgow Climate Pact is on <https://unfccc.int/documents/311127>

## Ammonia looks like an alternative to hydrogen

Ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>) is one of the most common industrially produced chemicals, 175 mn tonnes per year, with most used to make fertilizer. But it has been used as a fuel - in the second world war Belgium could not get diesel, so it converted its buses to run on ammonia.

Hydrogen has been promoted as the miracle non-carbon fuel, but it has major problems of storage and distribution. Ammonia is produced from hydrogen, and has two advantages. It becomes liquid at -33°C and there are major shipping and storage systems for liquid ammonia. Furthermore the energy density of ammonia is higher than hydrogen, so it takes less space to store. Green ammonia uses electricity from dams or windmills to electrolyse water and generate hydrogen. Next nitrogen is taken from air, but it has two problems. First, although it does not produce carbon, NH<sub>3</sub> is a nitrogen compound and thus combustion produces nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>) which are greenhouse gases. And NH<sub>3</sub> is corrosive.

At the moment the main interest for NH<sub>3</sub> is for gas turbines, mainly used for electricity generation and huge cargo ships. Australian Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) plans to convert the 75-metre offshore supply ship MMA Leveque (built in 2010) to ammonia next year. The company has 100 ships transporting ore and plans to convert them all over the next decade.

In Japan, Mitsubishi has developed an ammonia fuelled gas turbine. Germany's MAN Energy Solutions and Korean shipbuilder Samsung Heavy Industries are part of an initiative to develop the first ammonia-fuelled oil tanker by 2024. There is extensive ocean shipping of ammonia and ammonia tankers may be among the first vessels to use the chemical for fuel, in the same way that today's liquefied natural gas carriers burn some of their own cargo while sailing.

Port operators and fuel suppliers must build vast “bunkering” infrastructure so ships can fill ammonia tanks wherever they dock. Norway will have the first bunkering terminal, and fertilizer manufacturer Yara in February announced a new division producing green ammonia for marine fuel and fertilizer.

**Comment:** Ironically, Yara is the fertiliser company Mozambique drove away from the Cabo Delgado gas project. It is the problem of a Frelimo leadership obsessed with short term cash gains instead of longer term development. Yara was prepared to use Cabo Delgado gas to produce ammonia and fertiliser and set up a national distribution system that would have transformed Mozambican agriculture. But Mozambican officials decided there was more cash in hand if it simply sold its share of the gas back to Total, so it scrapped the Yara contract. Not only was the chance to raise peasant incomes thrown away, but also the chance to use Yara to develop green ammonia using electricity from a dam and set up a bunkering terminal. Imagination and development are seen as the bad old socialist ways, whereas quick money is the new capitalist way. *jh*

**People in the richest 1% of the global population** are set to have per capita consumption emissions in 2030 that are still 30 times higher than the global per capita level compatible with the 1.5°C goal. The footprints of the poorest half of the world population are set to remain several times below that level per capita level compatible with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement. *Carbon inequality in 2030*, Oxfam, 5 Nov <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/carbon-inequality-2030>

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**\$2bn secret debt trial: Daily press clippings in English (and a few in Portuguese) on** <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>. The trial is being broadcast live on STV <https://play.stv.co.mz/>

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## **Important external links**

**\$2bn secret debt trial** (Aug-Oct 2021) press reports <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>

**Exchange rates 2006-21 & minimum wages 1996-2021** <https://bit.ly/Moz-Exch-wage-2021>

**Covid-19** daily updated data <https://www.facebook.com/miguel.de.brito1> and <https://covid19.ins.gov.mz/documentos-em-pdf/boletins-diarios/>

**Daily flood and monthly dry season reports** - <http://bit.ly/Moz-flood21>

**Cyclone trackers**, <https://www.cyclocane.com/> and <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>

**Cabo Ligado** weekly report on civil war <https://www.caboligado.com/>

Previous editions of this newsletter: <http://bit.ly/MozNews2021> and [bit.ly/MozNews2020](http://bit.ly/MozNews2020)

**Downloadable books:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books> Election data: <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>

My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

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## **Cabo Delgado**

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

### **Special reports on the war**

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

### **Mozambique heroin transit trade**

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

### **Gas for development?**

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasEng](http://bit.ly/MozGasEng)

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 [bit.ly/MozGasPt](http://bit.ly/MozGasPt)

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## **Background reading**

### **Special reports**

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

### **\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Secret debt trial (Aug-Oct 2021) press reports <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

### **In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)  
**2018 Constitution** - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

**Election study collaboration:** We have detailed election data from 1999 through 2014 and are inviting scholars to use this data collaboratively. <http://bit.ly/MozEIData>  
Election newsletters are on <http://bit.ly/2H066Kg>

**Nine books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <http://bit.ly/Hanlon-books>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)  
Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>  
Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)  
Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)  
Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)  
Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)  
Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996)  
Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991)  
Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)  
Apartheid's 2nd Front (1986) <available shortly>

**These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)  
Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013)  
Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)  
Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)  
Beggars Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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**Mozambique media websites, English:**

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>  
Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

**Mozambique media websites, Portuguese** (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: [www.jornalnoticias.co.mz](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz)  
O País: [www.opais.co.mz](http://www.opais.co.mz)  
@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>  
Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

**Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:**

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>  
Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>  
Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>  
Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)  
Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>  
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).  
To subscribe to all CDD publications: <http://eepurl.com/gO9l6v> (English or Portuguese).

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