

# MOZAMBIQUE News reports & clippings

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This is a personal project by Dr Joseph Hanlon, with no outside funding.

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**Editor's note:** The editor has been heavily involved in elections and writing a new book, so this newsletter has been infrequent. We will try in the next weeks to catch up. *Joseph Hanlon*

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## Frelimo names safe unknown as presidential candidate

After a long and convoluted battle, Frelimo has followed the model of Nyusi a decade ago and chosen a seemingly safe and controllable unknown as their presidential candidate. Daniel Chapo is a 47-year-old lawyer, appointed governor of Inhambane in 2016 and then elected to the post in 2019. He will be the first presidential candidate born after independence.

In the face of bitter infighting President Filipe Nyusi kept tight control of the process, delaying the nomination until last weekend. For the Frelimo elite the battle was not about governing the country, but about protecting the Frelimo oligarchs' business interests, particularly contracts with government and mining and gas companies. For Nyusi it was ensuring that his successor would not be able to do to him what he did to his predecessor, Armando Guebuza - jailing his son and restricting Guebuza's business interests.

The presidential candidate is selected by the Frelimo Central Committee (CC), based on a short list drawn up by the ruling Political Commission (CP). A majority of the CC was named by, and is loyal to, Nyusi, who ensured it constantly delayed in drawing up a short list.

Unusually, the several months of delay led to up to 40 names being put into circulation. Some senior party figures even covertly opened offices to promote their candidacy. Five political heavyweights were being promoted to the CC and in the press - former prime ministers Aires Ali and Luisa Diogo, former interior ministers Basilio Monteiro and Jose Pacheco, and former parliament speaker Eduardo Mulémbwè. Samora Machel Junior was being promoted by some senior figures. And Agriculture Minister and 2023 campaign leader Celso Correia had initially seen himself as a possible presidential candidate.

The CP met on Thursday 2 May to finally name a short list to give to a CC meeting the next day. The CP debate continued into Friday, delaying the CC meeting. Nyusi won, and the short list was three loyal apparatchiks:

- Roque Silva Samuel, party general secretary and thus CP member (Supported by Nyusi);
- Damião José, former party spokesperson and current CP member;
- Daniel Chapo, a member for the CC but not of the CP.

The CC was not pleased and after some debate Nyusi agreed that list could be sebt back demanding more names. Former presidents Joaquim Chissano and Armando Guebuza also pressed for a wider shortlist. The CP added two names from parliament:

- Esperança Bias, Speaker of Parliament and
- Francisco Mucanheia, Chair of the Committee on Public Administration and Local Authority, and an energy expert, previously close to Guebuza but now a trusted advisor of Nyusi.

So the longer list remained one of trusted apparatchiks and included none of the experienced party heavyweights. At this point CP member Damião José withdrew, leaving four candidates.

In the first ballot of four people, Chapo won 103 votes, Roque Silva 77, Francisco Mucanheia 46, and speaker Esperanca Bias only 3.

This was seen as a strong vote against Roque Silva, so he dropped out of the race, and resigned as party secretary general and thus from the CP. On the second round on Sunday night, had the backing of Nyusi and won with 225 votes.

Chapo has won some praise as governor of Inhambane, with good leadership and a focus on solving the problems of the population. Zitamar (6 May) quotes Eugênio Arão, a political analyst and university lecturer in Inhambane, to say that in all the years that Chapo has worked in Inhambane, he is not known to have behaved inappropriately. Savana (5 May) comments that Chapo "is apparently not a figure with a strong commitment to any wing within the party" but the bitter meetings over the weekend show he will inherit a deeply divided party. And he will be seen as a younger generation candidate. (Sources: AIM, Frelimo, Zitamar, Carta de Moçambique, Savana, O Pais)

## Opposition choosing candidates

On Sunday 5 May the second opposition party, MDM (Mozambique Democratic Movement), announced that it has selected as presidential candidate Lutero Simango, head of the parliamentary delegation and brother of party founder Daviz Simango (who died of Covid in 2021). The other candidate was Beira mayor Albano Carige, who withdrew.

Renamo has not yet chosen its candidate but will do so at a congress 15-16 May. Afonso Dhlakama led Renamo from 1979 through the war which ended in 1992, until he died of diabetes related conditions on 3 May 2018. Former guerrilla Ossufo Momade was elected president at a congress at Renamo's Gorongosa base on 17 January 2019 for a five year term, which some say has now been expired. Renamo has two dynamic younger people, Manuel de Araújo, who is mayor of Quelimane, and Venancio Mondlane, who was elected mayor of Maputo last year, but denied the victory by the Constitutional Council. In order to be named presidential candidate next week, he is marginalising Mondlane and Araújo and may block them from attending the Congress.

Lutero Simango and Ossufo Momade are much weaker campaigners than their late predecessors, and they are being challenged by younger and more dynamic local leaders. But it appears that both leaders are happy to remain as official opposition parties. MDM is effectively a family party which wins in and successfully runs Beira, and seems happy to stay that way. The younger generation in Renamo want the party to be a political opposition to Frelimo today, not a guerrilla opposition from three decades ago. But Momade seems happy to be leader of the opposition, receiving significant money from the government, with the main goal of organising the retirement of guerrillas.

Neither MDM nor Renamo leaders see their parties as an opposition which can win, whereas younger members say "we were born after the war and want to be an opposition for today that can beat Frelimo".

## Is Frelimo victory inevitable?

A victory for Chapo and Frelimo seems inevitable. In part this is due to the growing level of fraud and misconduct in the electoral system. The National Election Commission is on course to register a million more voters than there are voting age adults for the 9 October election. Renamo provided proof that it won local elections last year in Maputo and Matola, but the Constitutional Council simply gave the victory to Frelimo.

Second, the leadership of the Renamo and MDM opposition are too comfortable being the opposition. They are not motivated to do the serious political organising required to challenge

Frelimo nor to allow space for younger and more dynamic leaders. So both Frelimo and opposition are happy to ignore younger voters.

Third the international community strongly backs Frelimo, and will not challenge another fraudulent election. Their capitals want resources and investment opportunities, and do not argue if benefits from the projects go to Frelimo oligarchs instead of local people.

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## Elections

**CIP Mozambique Elections Bulletin** is published by Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) <https://www.cipmoz.org>; <https://cipeleicoes.org/eng/cip@cipmoz.org>.

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## Important external links

**Books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free:** <https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks>

**Flood, cyclone and weather:** weather <https://www.inam.gov.mz/>

rainfall [https://www.inam.gov.mz/images/DAPT\\_Previsoes/Manha/Previsao\\_Manha.pdf](https://www.inam.gov.mz/images/DAPT_Previsoes/Manha/Previsao_Manha.pdf)

**Daily flood and monthly dry season reports** - <https://bit.ly/Moz-Flood-2024>

**Cyclone trackers,** <https://bit.ly/Reunion-cyclone>, <https://www.metoc.navy.mil/jtwc/jtwc.html>

(which uses z time which is UCT - Coordinated Universal Time) and <https://www.cyclocane.com/>

**Two LSE working papers - World Bank questions its Mozambique 'success'** where oligarchs brought high inequality, poverty and corruption - <https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-208c> and **How the IMF and World Bank caused a resource curse and civil war in Mozambique** - <https://bit.ly/Moz-LSE-209>

**Minimum wage & exchange rate charts, tables 1996-2022** <https://bit.ly/MozMinWage2022>

Previous editions of this newsletter: <https://bit.ly/MozNews2023> and <https://bit.ly/MozNews2022>

My Mozambique archive: <http://bit.ly/Mozamb>

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## Cabo Delgado

**Cabo Ligado** weekly report on civil war <https://www.cabolidado.com/>

Archive with reports, detailed maps, and census data <https://bit.ly/Moz-CDg>

### Special reports on the war

Evolution of the war: global vs local. 27 Feb 2020 <http://bit.ly/CDelgadoOrigins>

Religion is shaping Cabo Delgado civil war. 30 April 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoReligion>

Intensifying argument over roots of war. 28 June 2020 <https://bit.ly/Moz-492>

Are the drums of war silencing any hope of peace? 26 July 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-496>

A history of violence presages the insurgency. 13 August 2020 <http://bit.ly/Moz-498>

Military & economic intervention. 3 Sept 2020 <https://bit.ly/CDelgadoIntervene>

Cabo-Delgado-Free-for-all. 20 Apr 2022. <http://bit.ly/Moz-593>

### Mozambique heroin transit trade

English - LSE - 2018 - <http://bit.ly/Moz-heroin>

Portuguese - CIP- 2018 - <http://bit.ly/HeroinaPT>

2001 first article- *Metical* - English and Portuguese <https://bit.ly/MozHeroin2001>

### Gas for development?

Gas\_for\_development\_or\_just\_for\_money?\_2015 <bit.ly/MozGasEng>

Gás\_para\_desenvolvimento\_ou\_apenas\_dinheiro?\_2015 <bit.ly/MozGasPt>

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## Background reading

### Special reports

Social protection report - 2017 Mozambique - <http://bit.ly/MozSocPro>

Special report on four poverty surveys: [bit.ly/MozPoverty](http://bit.ly/MozPoverty)

### **\$2bn secret debt - in English**

Secret debt trial (Aug-Oct 2021) press reports <https://bit.ly/Moz-secret-debt>

Kroll - Full report on \$2bn debt - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-Moz>

Kroll report summary - <http://bit.ly/Kroll-sum>

Key points of Mozambique parliament report - Nov 2016 - <http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt-En>

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique's \$2.2 bn debt - <http://bit.ly/3WQ-hanlon>

### **In Portuguese:**

Parliamentary Report on the Secret Debt (complete) [bit.ly/MozAR-debt](http://bit.ly/MozAR-debt)

**2018 Constitution** - <http://bit.ly/2KF588T>

### **Eleven books by Joseph Hanlon can be downloaded, free: <https://bit.ly/HanlonBooks>**

Zimbabwe takes back its land (2013) <https://bit.ly/Zim-takes-land>

Bangladesh confronts climate change (2016)

Chickens and beer: A recipe for agricultural growth in Mozambique (2014) is on <https://bit.ly/Chickens-Beer>

Há Mais Bicicletas – mas há desenvolvimento? (2008)

Civil War Civil Peace (2006): <https://bit.ly/Civil-War-Civil-Peace>

Moçambique e as grandes cheias de 2000 (2001)

Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000 (2001)

Paz Sem Benefício: Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução (1997)

Peace Without Profit: How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding (1996) <https://bit.ly/Peace-wo-Profit>

Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots (1991) <https://bit.ly/Shots-Moz>

Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (1984)

### **These are still available for sale:**

Galinhas e cerveja: uma receita para o crescimento (2014) (free in English)

Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South (2010)

Do bicycles equal development in Mozambique? (2008) (free in Portuguese)

Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (1986)

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### **Mozambique media websites, English:**

Club of Mozambique (free): <http://clubofmozambique.com/>

Zitamar (paywall): <http://zitamar.com/>

### **Mozambique media websites, Portuguese** (all with partial paywall):

Notícias: [www.jornalnoticias.co.mz](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz)

O País: [www.opais.co.mz](http://www.opais.co.mz)

@Verdade: <http://www.verdade.co.mz>

Carta de Moçambique <https://cartamz.com>

### **Mozambique think tanks and pressure groups, Portuguese:**

Centro de Integridade Pública: CIP <https://cipmoz.org/>

Observatório do Meio Rural: OMR <https://omrmz.org/>

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos: IESE <https://www.iese.ac.mz/>

Centro Para Democracia e Desenvolvimento CDD <https://cddmoz.org/> (some CDD in English)

Also CDD now controls Fórum de Monitoria do Orçamento - FMO (main debt group) <http://www.fmo.org.mz>  
and RMDDH - Rede Moçambicana dos Defensores dos Direitos Humanos (a human rights group).

To subscribe to all CDD publications: <http://eepurl.com/qO9l6v> (English or Portuguese).

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