

# Mozambique political process bulletin



Issue 43 – 19 November 2009

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## Published by CIP and AWEPA

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
## Landslide victory for Frelimo and Armando Guebuza

President Armando Geubuza was re-elected on 28 October with a record vote of nearly 3 million, with the opposition vote falling below 1 million for the first time. Frelimo will have 191 of the 250 seats in parliament (Assembleia da República, AR), also a record in the four multi-party elections since 1994. Full results appear on pages 2, 10 and 11.

Afonso Dhlakama, guerrilla leader of Renamo in the 1980s and presidential candidate in all four elections, fell from his peak vote of 2.1 million in 1999 to only 650,000 this year. Daviz Simango, mayor of Beira and leader of a new party, MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, Mozambique Democratic Movement), gained 340,000, 8.6% of the vote, the largest ever for a third candidate, and established himself as the first credible opposition figure from a younger generation.

Turnout was 45%, similar to 2004, but much below the high levels of 1994 and 1999. In the presidential contest, blank votes, with no mark for any candidate, were 6% of the total – double the level of 2004 but similar to 1994 and 1999.

Presidential vote



### *A tainted election*

As in 2004, Frelimo's overwhelming victory is tainted by misconduct, unfairness, secrecy, and confusion – which was all totally unnecessary. The most professional of the international observer groups, The European Union, Commonwealth and EISA, all made strong criticisms.

In articles inside the *Bulletin*, we look at three areas of criticism: the lack of fairness and a "level playing field"; obsessive secrecy and lack of transparency; and legal and procedural confusions and incompetence. Finally, we also look at quite widespread ballot box stuffing and invalidation of votes for the opposition. Although not significantly worse than in 2004, there has definitely been no improvement, and criticisms made by observers in 1999 and 2004 are simply being repeated.

These problems cast a shadow over Frelimo's huge and genuine victory, and over the extremely good organisation of the electoral process by STAE (Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral; Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration).

Also in the presidential election invalid votes (nulos – mainly ballot papers marked for two candidates) were 4% of the total, significantly higher than in previous elections. We believe that at least 1% of all ballot papers – perhaps 40,000 or more –

are votes for the opposition which were tampered with by polling station staff – usually adding an extra ink mark to make them invalid.

There were also widespread indications of ballot box stuffing, with polling stations in Tete, Gaza and

## Details of 2009 Presidential vote

	Valid votes at polling station	Votes requalified (accepted) by CNE	Valid votes after requalification	% valid votes	% total votes
<b>Daviz Simango</b>	337 645	2 934	<b>340 579</b>	<b>8.59%</b>	7.73%
<b>Armando Guebuza</b>	2 962 974	11 653	<b>2 974 627</b>	<b>75.01%</b>	67.51%
<b>Afonso Dhlakama</b>	641 559	9 120	<b>650 679</b>	<b>16.41%</b>	14.77%
Total	3 942 178	23 707	3 965 885	100.00%	90.01%
Blank votes			264 655		6.01%
Votes considered invalid at polling station			199 280		4.52%
Votes requalified (accepted) by CNE			23 707		0.54%
Votes still invalid after requalification			175 553		3.98%
Total votes cast			4 406 093		100.00%

Nulos requalified (accepted) by CNE: 11.9%

**Turnout: 44.63%**

## Presidential Vote in four elections

Candidatos	1994		1999		2004		2009	
	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid	mn	% of valid
<b>Chissano</b>	2.6	53%	2.3	52%				
<b>Guebuza</b>					2.0	64%	3.0	75%
<b>Dhlakama</b>	1.7	34%	2.1	48%	1.0	32%	0.6	16%
<b>Domingos</b>					0.1	3%		
<b>Simango</b>							0.3	9%
<b>Others</b>	0.6	13%			0.1	2%		
		% of total		% of total		% of total		% of total
<b>Nulos</b>	0.2	2.8%	0.1	2.9%	0.1	2.9%	0.2	4.0%
<b>Brancos</b>	0.3	5.8%	0.3	6.5%	0.1	2.9%	0.3	6.0%
<b>Total</b>	5.4		*5.3		3.3		4.4	
<b>Turnout</b>		88%		*74%		**43%		45%

\* Estimated, to correct for 7% of polling stations excluded from the count.

\*\* Estimated, to correct for register book errors and polling stations excluded from count.

There were 10 small party presidential candidates in 1994 and in 2004 there were 2 minor party candidates in addition to Raul Domingos.

Niassa with nearly 100% turnout, and nearly everyone voting for Frelimo. The National Elections Commission (CNE) appears to have excluded 104,000 ballot papers (2.6% of the total vote) where ballot box stuffing was suspected, although this has not been confirmed because changes to results made by the CNE are secret. (See page 8 for more details)

In the parliamentary election, Frelimo won a majority in all provinces except Sofala, where Frelimo has 10 seats, Renamo 5 and the MDM 5. In Maputo city, MDM won 3 seats. In a decision which triggered some controversy, MDM was allowed to stand in only four provinces, and excluded from 7 because it did not present enough candidates. MDM claims it submitted documents for enough candidates but cannot show copies, while the CNE acts in secret and does not make records public, so

### Parliamentary seats in 4 elections

	1994	1999	2004	2009
<b>Frelimo</b>	129	133	160	191
<b>Renamo</b>	112	117	90	51
<b>Others</b>	9			8

it is impossible to know who is right. But the controversy means that although MDM's 8 parliamentary seats are not enough to form a formal party "bench" under the present rules, Frelimo will be under some pressure to change the rules and lower the number needed for a bench.

As well as the three parties which won parliament seats, there were 16 other small parties and coalitions standing in some or all provinces; together they won 3.7% of the vote.

## Déjà vu - An unnecessarily tainted election

Frelimo's massive victory and high quality organisation by STAE (Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral; Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) of polling day and the tabulation process have been overshadowed by unfairness and misconduct. Long term readers of this *Bulletin* will recognise that little has changed in response to harsh criticism of 1999 and 2004 elections; like a film being seen again, the same problems recur.

In this section of the *Bulletin*, we look again at lack of fairness, obsessive secrecy and lack of transparency, legal and procedural confusions and incompetence, and outright misconduct in hundreds of polling stations.

## What does 'level playing field' really mean?

The European Union, Commonwealth and EISA all said that this election did not provide a "level playing field" for all participants, and they all used the English phrase.

The phrase does not exist in Portuguese, and each of the three translated it differently: "igualdade em termos competitivos" (EU), "igualdade de condições" (Commonwealth), and "equilibrar o terreno do jogo, oferecer oportunidades iguais a todos os jogadores" (EISA). Those translate back to English as "equality in competitive terms", "equality of conditions", and "level sports field with equal opportunity for all players."

The usefulness of the concept of "level playing field" is that it is obvious that one football team should not have to always kick the ball uphill and the other side kick downhill. And the importance of the concept is that it says nothing about the football teams themselves.

And just as football teams can be strong or weak, rich or poor, so can political parties. "Level playing field" or "fair" can never mean that all parties are equal. Some are big while others are small, some are well organised and others have a totally shambolic organisation. Most important, in politics we need to accept that the party currently in government has a huge advantage.

And in Mozambique, Frelimo is a predominant

party which is likely to be bigger, richer and better organised than the opposition for some years to come. Just as every woman knows that in a man's world she must be twice as good as the men to succeed, so an opposition party in Mozambique will have to work three times as hard to win. But recently in Japan, and before that in Sweden, India, and Mexico, predominant parties have been defeated. Frelimo knows that as well as the opposition, so it will try to use every advantage.

The question, then, is not if the parties are equal, but rather if they have an equal opportunity to stand in the election and to present their case to the voters.

The issue is already recognised in the electoral law, which gives each party, large or small, equivalent radio and television time, ensures fairness in state-owned media, and even gives equivalent money to parties standing for election.

### When are tricks fair?

Inevitably, political parties try to trick each other, but at what point does inequality make the tricks unfair.

Frelimo used the Renamo-designed procedure for selecting representatives of civil society as members of the elections commissions to ensure that many of the people from “civil society” were sympathetic to Frelimo. It was all legal; Frelimo simply saw better than Renamo how to use the law to its advantage. Nevertheless, it left a bad taste in the mouth. And it created elections commissions whose sympathies were known and were assumed to be biased, and it was assumed that one party had an unfair advantage. The European Union in its preliminary statement noted “the general lack of trust in the independence of the CNE”. This linked directly to the CNE’s obsessive secrecy and lack of transparency – documents which were secret (but should have been public) found their way into Frelimo hands but not those of the opposition.

A common trick in many countries is one party to try to occupy a place where another party is to have a campaign rally. But in Mozambique, when the opposition tells the police where its rally is to be, and the police tell Frelimo, it suddenly becomes unfair, and the playing field is tilted. One party has an unfair advantage.

### **Changing the rules**

A key issue relates to the five documents that each candidate had to present – certified copies of birth certificate, identity card and voters card; a certificate of no criminal record; and a letter saying they agree to stand and are eligible. This had been required in all previous elections, but the two 2007 laws (7/2007 and 10/2007) relaxed this and required fewer documents. But law 15/2009 passed on 9 April this year in an attempt to correct various inconsistencies also reintroduced the need for more documents. Parties still had more than three months to collect the documents, but at that point inequality kicks in – inevitably, officials act quickly to give documents to Frelimo officials (who may also be their superiors in the civil service), whereas it may take weeks longer for opposition parties to obtain the same documents. Thus the combination of a law making it harder for candidates passed late in the day and an unsympathetic civil service suddenly tilts the playing field – the opposition is kicking the ball uphill.

The point was made by the Commonwealth that the failure of the CNE to work with parties to create a clear, consistent and transparent set of rules and procedures made the problem much worse. Frelimo, with more resources, could cover all eventualities; the new opposition party MDM (Movimento Democrático de Moçambique, Mozambique Democratic Movement) was left to guess as to how the law was to be interpreted. The CNE may have applied the rules equally to all, but by not telling the parties precisely what the rules were, they again gave advantage to the stronger party.

The playing field was tilted even further by the Constitutional Council ruling which accepted the CNE’s exclusion of the MDM from most provinces. The legal merits of the decision will continue to be debated. But apparently the only evidence used by the Constitutional Council was a single secret document, which has never been seen by the other parties to the case, and which is contradicted in fundamental ways by other documents issued by the CNE. When only one party is a dispute can present evidence to the court, that seems unfair.

### **When party and state overlap**

In a predominant party state such as Mozambique there is an inevitable overlap between party and state. The question of fairness or level playing field revolves around how those links and power are used. Do civil servants treat all parties equally, or is power abused?

One of our local journalists offended a district administrator with a report in the Bulletin. The district administrator telephoned the provincial STAE (Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) and demanded that STAE withdraw the journalist’s press credential. STAE is supposed to be a neutral administrative body. But district administrators are powerful both in the party and state apparatus, so provincial STAE withdrew the credential.

Use of state resources and cars is another part of the package.

Across the country, civil servants delayed issuing documents to opposition parties, and in a few places even refused to issue credentials to party polling station delegates. And out of the 90,000 polling station staff, 1000 or more thought that first their duty was to the ruling party and not to a fair election, and stuffed ballot boxes or improperly invalidated votes for the opposition – or stood by and said nothing when other members of the team did so. They assumed that Frelimo would protect them, and they would never be identified or prosecuted, and they are probably right.

### **No single item**

No single item makes the process unfair, or tilts the playing field too much. But taken together, the playing field for this election was on the side of a very steep hill, and the key observation groups are right to be critical.

To be internationally acceptable, some more balance and fairness will be required. And, at the end of the day, it is Frelimo which will have to make the political choice – is the risk of losing fair elections in 2013 and 2014 so great that it needs to ignore international criticism, or is it genuinely popular and able to win fair elections?

# Mozambican secrecy is very unusual

The Mozambican government – and even members of the National Elections Commission – apparently do not realise that the level of secrecy and lack of transparency in the Mozambican electoral process is not normal in democracies.

The problem starts with the electoral laws themselves, which give the National Elections Commission the right to change results, in secret, and without listing or explaining changes. The law does not require secrecy, but does not demand transparency, and has consistently been interpreted in the most narrow way by National Elections Commissions over the years.

In 1994 it could be argued that so soon after the war, there was still substantial distrust between Frelimo and Renamo, and that in order to smooth the transition from war to peace, it was necessary to allow space for political deals in secret. But 15 years later, expectations have changed. Mozambican civil society and international observers no longer judge Mozambique's elections by post-war standards, but by the standards of other democracies. Nor is it difficult to provide transparency; the smooth running of polling day shows that the CNE and STAE can successfully run a very complex operation. And, as Mark Stevens of the Commonwealth observer team noted, Mozambique is a member of the Commonwealth and that "elsewhere in the Commonwealth, such transparency is easily provided."

Basic information about the electoral process was never published. A complete list of approved candidates for national and provincial parliaments was never published, making Mozambique one of the few democracies in which citizens do not know the names of the people for whom they are voting. Amazingly, lists were given to observer groups, but were never made available to the voters.

Similarly, a full list of polling stations was never published. Lists (with errors) were published in *Noticias* and on the CNE website, but only of polling centres or locations. Thus the list says, for example, that the primary school in Impaca, Pebane, has 4 polling stations. But it does not give the polling station number or the register book number; even though such lists exist, they are kept secret.

The bizarre secrecy of polling station numbers made it more difficult for parties to organise their party delegates and for the Electoral Observatory to organise its sample count. The computerised records of the voting are available to observers and media, but the only way to access the information is by polling station number, which is secret. Of course, the party copy of the results sheet (edital) has the polling station number, so a party can verify the accuracy of the data. But it becomes difficult for us to check, for example, all the polling stations in Changara, Tete, where we suspect stuffing.

Going back to the very selection of civil society members of election commissions, there was never an explanation of why some were selected and

others were not. In South Africa, for example, selection of members of the election commission is a very public process.

Most CNE decisions and deliberations remain secret and were never published. Yet some were published promptly and others only after long delays. A key document relating to the vote tabulation process (Deliberação n.º 69/CNE/2009) was approved by the CNE on 27 September and was made available to those who knew it existed and asked for it, but it was not put on the CNE website until a month later, on 27 October, the day before the elections.

It is not just the international community and Mozambican civil society who complain about the secrecy. In its ruling on 19 January 2005, the Constitutional Council said "the principle of transparency of the electoral process is an essential element of its national and international credibility."

## Unjustified confusion and poor planning

When the present National Elections Commission (CNE) was appointed in 2007, it was clear that it had a huge workload to prepare a new registration and four elections – municipal, provincial, parliamentary and presidential. The law recognised this, and said that membership in the CNE was exclusive and full time – no other employment was allowed. But one of the first decisions of the new CNE was that the law did not apply to them, and CNE members could continue also in their previous positions.

Nevertheless the part-time CNE had two years to prepare for this year's elections, and nothing that happened in the past six months was unexpected. An early problem facing the CNE was that the existing election legislation has been built up over time, and in places is contradictory. With CNE help, parliament (Assembleia da República) passed a new law – which corrected some problems but created new ones.

Secrecy means we do not know if the CNE studied the laws and worked out how it was going to interpret the laws and resolve the various contradictions. Parties and media were left to interpret the laws as best they could. Where the CNE did agree a limited set of tabulation guidelines, it was three weeks before they were published on the CNE website. (And its website was down for much of the post-election period.)

A regulation was issued setting out the distribution of election funds, and then another method was used to hand out the money.

And the CNE made mistakes in documents and then sometimes simply changed them. The official list of parties standing in provinces had at least one error – a small party, UM, was listed as standing in Maputo city when in fact it was standing in Maputo province. Even the official declaration of results, Deliberação n.º 75/2009, as read out in a formal ceremony on 11 November, contained errors in key numbers – percentages of votes for presidential candidates – which were reproduced on front pages of most newspapers. Those errors were corrected before the statement was posted on the web and published in *Notícias* on 14 November, but other errors, such as the numbers of invalid votes, were not corrected – so the CNE’s own declaration of results has mistakes.

Sometimes the CNEs own documents were contradictory. The ruling which rejected the MDM lists for most provinces (Deliberação n.º 65/CNE/2009 de 5 de Setembro) says on page 6 in a section headed “procedural irregularities” (“Irregularidades processuais”) that “candidates lists without individual candidate’s files” (“listas nominais de candidatos propostos sem processos individuais”) were “defects” (“vícios”) which could be resolved in the five days allowed to the parties to correct such defects in submitted documents. But then on page 9 in a section of “overcoming procedural irregularities” (“suprimento das irregularidades processuais”), the deliberation says that the lack of a file is not a defect which can be overcome and that candidates without files were automatically rejected. This contradiction is crucial, because if the first statement was followed, MDM would have been able to submit the missing files.

There are 812 provincial assembly seats and 250 national assembly seats. Therefore, the CNE should have expected the submission of more than 5000 files, each containing five or six documents, and it was obvious to anyone familiar with the process that most of them would be submitted on the final day, 29 July. António Salomão Chipanga, a CNE member and coordinator of the CNE legal commission, in a briefing of observers from the diplomatic community on 23 October, admitted that the CNE was unprepared for the thousands of files which were

submitted 29 July, and that boxes of files were left scattered around the CNE. He even joked about a “wicked wind” (“vento maligno”) which apparently spread around some papers. The CNE had assumed it could check each submission as it was made and give parties an accurate receipt. In fact there was total chaos and no check was made before giving a receipt. The Constitutional Council in its ruling of 28 September (Acórdão n.º 09/CC/2009 de 28 de Setembro) said that accepting the files without checking was a “manifest violation of an essential part of the law”.

After two years of planning, how did the CNE not expect thousands of files with at least 10,000 documents on 29 July?

But the confusion did not stop there. The boxes of files were simply passed on to CNE members to check, with no pre-arranged system. Each team acted in its own way, and different decisions were made and letters sent to parties contained different kinds of information. The CNE was so overwhelmed that it did not give the parties the chance to appeal as set out in the law.

The same thing happened with the district and provincial counts. No instructions were given; district STAE teams sat with the law, a very limited CNE guidance note, and a pocket calculator and had to decide what to do. Some districts simply went through the polling station results sheets (editais) for each candidate and keyed the numbers into the calculator; others wrote them on tally sheets and added up the columns. The same lack of direction was repeated at provincial level.

The CNE and STAE made a big issue this year that if polling station staff altered ballot papers, they would be prosecuted and could be sent to jail. But the CNE did not set up a new system to review the invalid votes (nulos); the present system dumps all invalid ballot papers together, which destroys the evidence – making it impossible to prosecute.

Many of the problems in this year’s election came simply from lack of vision and planning. Too many decisions were ad hoc, trusting to the integrity and good will of members of the CNE. The result was a flawed electoral process.

## Where transparency, competence and trust come together

“The work of the National Elections Commission, as a public institution, must be public. It is the only way to ensure confidence. The CNE may be acting perfectly properly, but it must show that to the public by being transparent,” explained Mark Stevens of the Commonwealth observer team.

That approach has not been taken by the CNE. Some members take the opposite view, that they were appointed to this job because of their integrity, and any demand for more information and transparency is a personal attack on their integrity and trustworthiness.

Unfortunately, that has not been accepted. As the

EU observers noted, “there is a general lack of trust in the independence of the CNE, due in particular to insufficient measures to improve transparency”.

The candidates lists are one place where competence, transparency and trust come together. For at least a week after the deadline, the CNE was

still posting lists of candidates outside its offices in Maputo; some of the lists had errors or too few candidates. No other list was published, and the day before the election, the CNE was still editing the version to eventually be published in *Boletim da República*. Amazingly, there is no public record of the original candidates lists. So it is widely assumed that the CNE continued to change and amend the lists well after the legal deadline, as happened with the Beira Renamo list in 2003 local elections.

Thus a lack of competence or capacity meaning lists were not posted in time, plus a lack of transparency by not putting the original lists on the web, leads to total lack of trust and an assumption of bias.

Much the same occurred with the exclusion of the MDM from some provinces. Lack of transparency means that all we know for sure is that the secret internal *mapa de controlo* (activity log) given to the Constitutional Council disagrees with a letter sent by the CNE to the MDM. For Cabo Delgado, the letter

sent to the MDM says that three candidates were missing criminal records certificates (and these were supplied), yet the *mapa de controlo* says that the three submitted no files at all and thus were excluded. Lack of competence, in telling two groups two different things, combined with total lack of transparency, leads again to lack of trust and the assumption that MDM was treated unfairly.

It could have been the lack of planning and agreed systems that caused the problem of the contradictory documents. But this only leads to the assumption that the lack of transparency is an attempt to cover up disorganisation, rather than to cover up unfairness.

As the Commonwealth says, confidence is earned by showing the public that officials have acted properly, and not by simply repeating we are honourable men who act correctly in the public interest.

## Ballot box stuffing and cancelling votes for the opposition

As in 2004, there was ballot box stuffing, and it occurred in the same places – Tete, Niassa and Gaza. And there have been widespread cases of invalidation of votes for the opposition – Daviz Simango and Afonso Dhlakama for president, and Renamo and MDM for parliament. We believe there are indications of possible misconduct and fraud in perhaps 6% of polling stations – that is 750 polling stations across the country, which is a very large number. And these are frauds carried out by polling station staff themselves.

### Invalidation

Invalidation occurs when polling station staff add an extra ink mark to a ballot paper, making it look as if a person has voted for two different candidates, and thus the vote is invalid (*nulo*). Typically 2% to 3% of votes are invalid – people really do put multiple crosses or fingerprints on the ballot paper, or write words such as “thief”.

In its final declaration of results, the CNE said that some votes had been improperly invalidated by polling station staff, acting in bad faith, and said this was a criminal action.

The requalification of *nulos* is open to press and observers, and it soon becomes clear that there are



groups of ballot papers with an unusual characteristic – they have a second ink mark which is in a similar place on many sequential ballot papers. And all have the main mark for an opposition candidate. Many have a neat X or + for Daviz Simango or Afonso Dhlakama, and then a suspicious extra fingerprint somewhere else on the ballot paper. It is hard to believe that so many people voted for one candidate neatly with an X and then for another candidate with a fingerprint. It seems obvious that the mark is extra.

The photos come from a video taken by the MDM in polling station 0056 at EPC (primary school) Esturro in Beira. In that polling station there were 98 votes for Simango, 150 for Guebuza, 14 for



Dhlakama, and 124 nulos (an incredible 32% of the total vote). And the video shows that nearly all have a similar form – a neat vote for Daviz Simango and an ink mark somewhere else on the ballot paper. MDM accuses a named member of the polling station staff of adding the extra marks.

In 2004, 3.9% of presidential ballots were considered invalid (nulo) at the polling station, and roughly one-third of those were accepted as valid by the CNE, leaving 2.7% still invalid. Until now, this has been the normal ratio.

But this year, 4.5% of presidential ballots were considered nulo at the polling station, and fewer than 1 in 8 was considered valid by the CNE, leaving 4% still invalid – substantially more than in 2004.

Comparing the nulos in the parliamentary contest, we actually see fewer nulos than in 2004 and than in the presidential race this year. But the number which remained invalid after requalification was the same, 3.3%

The table compares presidential and parliamentary nulos and their validation in 2004 and 2009.

	Presidencias		AR	
	2004	2009	2004	2009
Nulos	3.9%	4.5%	4.8%	3.7%
Validated nulos	1.3%	0.5%	1.5%	0.5%
Definitely nulo	2.7%	4.0%	3.3%	3.3%

The low validation rate suggests that this year, many more of the ballot papers considered invalid at polling stations really were. There is no reason to think the voters are worse trained and more likely to spoil ballot papers, which suggests that the problem of polling station staff falsely invalidating votes for the opposition, usually with an extra ink mark, has become very serious indeed. It also appears to have been more common for the presidential vote, and could have affected 1% of the total vote – 40,000 votes for the opposition.

A further indication of this is that in Tete and Gaza only 1 in 19 presidential nulos were accepted as valid, and in Manica only 1 in 21.

A formal Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT), was conducted by the Electoral Observatory (Observatório Eleitoral) and EISA (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa) which made a very accurate estimate of the final result. Results were collected from a random sample of 967 of polling stations, 8% of the total. These results can also be used to look for misconduct.

And 3% of PVT polling stations had very high numbers of invalid votes, and another 3% are



suspect. Of the sample, there are 6 polling stations with over 30% nulos, 13 between 20% and 30%, and 12 between 15% and 20%. We consider the 29 PVT polling stations (3% of the total) to be highly suspect, because it seems highly unlikely that such a large number of voters did not know how to vote or spoiled their ballot paper. There are another 30 PVT polling stations with between 10% and 15% nulos, which are also suspect.

Of the 29 PVT polling stations with more than 15% nulos, 7 are in Sofala, 6 are in Tete, and 6 are in the city of Angoche, Nampula province, where there were complaints about putting extra ink marks on ballot papers for Renamo in past elections.

It is important to remember that this is based on a PVT sample of only 8% of polling stations, and thus the total number is likely to be 12 times as large.

## Ballot box stuffing

More than 104,000 votes were excluded by the CNE, apparently from polling stations with a turnout of near 100%, and in response to reports of ballot box stuffing. In Tete, 85,693 votes were excluded, 16% of the total votes. Of these, 74,555 were for Armando Guebuza. The change in Tete is a dramatic recognition of ballot box stuffing. Turnout is reduced from 66% as announced by the Tete Provincial Election Commission to 55% by the CNE; one-sixth of all Tete votes were thrown out.

The CNE made the change in secret, without any statement or explanation, so it is not possible to know precisely which polling stations were excluded. But it is known that 50 polling stations were excluded in Changara district, Tete, where ballot box stuffing was particularly gross.

Unexpectedly, 18,394 votes were excluded in Niassa, 9% of the total vote.

In the Niassa parliamentary contest, the CNE withdrew 11,130 votes for Frelimo. That was enough to shift one parliamentary seat to Renamo. In Tete, the removal of 68,610 votes for Frelimo was not enough to give Renamo an extra seat, but we think the ballot box stuffing was much worse, and that Renamo did have one seat stolen from it.

A similar analysis using the PVT can be done for ballot box stuffing. Normally some people on the register will have died or be too ill to vote or be away from the area. Thus any polling station with a turnout of over 95% is highly suspicious. And turnouts of over 100% are even more suspicious. In the PVT sample, there were 21 polling stations with a turnout of 100% or more, and 15 with between 95% and 99%. We think there is a good chance that in these 36 PVT polling stations (3% of the total), there was ballot box stuffing. A closer looks shows that of the



36, 21 were in Tete and 6 were in Gaza, areas where there has historically been ballot box stuffing.

Thus we estimate the 750 polling stations, each with 7 staff, have been involved in fraudulent and illegal activity – stuffing ballot boxes and invalidating opposition votes.

## The Bulletin

The *Mozambique Political Process Bulletin* has been published since the peace accord in 1992, and has covered all four multiparty national elections and the three municipal elections.

For this election, we maintained two special websites, [www.eleicoes2009.cip.org.mz](http://www.eleicoes2009.cip.org.mz) in Portuguese and [www.elections2009.cip.org.mz](http://www.elections2009.cip.org.mz) in English, which were updated daily.

We published 39 special election bulletins in English and Portuguese, distributed electronically to more than 3000 subscribers, and redistributed to many more. These special bullets are all posted on our websites, and contain substantially more detail about the election.

As well as a small staff in Maputo, we have had 113 journalists in nearly every district throughout the country. They sent reports during the campaign, reported twice on election day, and sent in the results from their districts and provinces. These were nearly all professional journalists who work for local newspapers or community radio stations, and also submitted reports to us.

Finally, experimenting with a system widely used in other countries, CIP and AWEPA set up telephone lines where ordinary people could send an SMS or telephone with reports of misconduct. More than 300 messages were received, largely about use of state cars by Frelimo and about violence in the campaign. These were not published until they were verified by our local journalists.

Our large team of journalists, plus the “citizen correspondents”, gave us very good coverage of the electoral process, and our material has been widely reprinted in the local press.

The Bulletin was first established in 1992 by AWEPA, then the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid, and now the European Parliamentarians for Africa. It is now jointly published with CIP (Centro de Integridade Pública, Public Integrity Centre), which has allowed a substantial expansion of the number of correspondents, and coverage in general. Joseph Hanlon has been editor of the Bulletin since its first issue, 17 years ago.

**Presidencial**

Provincia	Total de Eleitores		Total de Votos		Votos válidos - Valid votes										Em branco		Nulos		Afluência	
						Simango	Guebuza	Dhlakama	Simango	Guebuza	Dhlakama	Simango	Guebuza	Dhlakama	Blank votes	Invalid	Turnout			
Niassa	544 770	208 970	188 993	9 469	155 495	24 029	5.0%	82.3%	12.7%	10 789	5.2%	9 188	4.4%	38.4%						
Cabo Delgado	888 179	402 445	349 101	20 048	282 115	46 938	5.7%	80.8%	13.4%	38 446	9.6%	14 898	3.7%	45.3%						
Nampula	1 801 249	694 098	594 331	34 726	396 963	162 642	5.8%	66.8%	27.4%	66 137	9.5%	33 630	4.8%	38.5%						
Zambézia	1 770 910	603 399	502 810	34 642	273 056	195 112	6.9%	54.3%	38.8%	64 569	10.7%	36 020	6.0%	34.1%						
Tete	796 257	439 369	402 196	21 119	345 865	35 212	5.3%	86.0%	8.8%	14 386	3.3%	22 787	5.2%	55.2%						
Manica	648 969	293 135	260 449	19 288	183 388	57 773	7.4%	70.4%	22.2%	13 979	4.8%	18 707	6.4%	45.2%						
Sofala	772 630	364 721	323 478	83 939	166 825	72 714	25.9%	51.6%	22.5%	18 015	4.9%	23 228	6.4%	47.2%						
Inhambane	641 387	300 934	270 186	21 030	233 751	15 405	7.8%	86.5%	5.7%	16 870	5.6%	13 878	4.6%	46.9%						
Gaza	639 658	398 257	377 977	12 353	362 150	3 474	3.3%	95.8%	0.9%	10 084	2.5%	10 196	2.6%	62.3%						
Maputo Prov	616 208	295 256	280 196	27 078	241 308	11 810	9.7%	86.1%	4.2%	6 666	2.3%	8 394	2.8%	47.9%						
Maputo Cidade	695 372	369 404	357 085	53 225	288 283	15 577	14.9%	80.7%	4.4%	4 442	1.2%	7 827	2.1%	53.1%						
Africa	55 206	35 321	34 617	591	33 177	849	1.7%	95.8%	2.5%	262	0.7%	442	1.3%	64.0%						
Europa	1 154	784	759	137	598	24	18.1%	78.8%	3.2%	10	1.3%	15	1.9%	67.9%						
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 871 949</b>	<b>4 406 093</b>	<b>3 942 178</b>	<b>337 645</b>	<b>2 962 974</b>	<b>641 559</b>	<b>8.6%</b>	<b>75.2%</b>	<b>16.3%</b>	<b>264 655</b>	<b>6.0%</b>	<b>199 210</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>44.6%</b>						
Nulos validados - considered valid			23 707	2 934	11 653	9 120	12.4%	49.2%	38.5%						<b>Definitivamente nulo</b>					
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 871 949</b>	<b>4 406 093</b>	<b>3 965 885</b>	<b>340 579</b>	<b>2 974 627</b>	<b>650 679</b>	<b>8.6%</b>	<b>75.0%</b>	<b>16.4%</b>	<b>264 655</b>	<b>6.0%</b>	<b>175 553</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>44.6%</b>						

**Assembleia da República**

Provincia	Total de Eleitores		Total de Votos		Votos válidos (incluindo nulos validados) - Valid votes (including nulos considered valid)										Em branco		Definitivamente nulo		Assentos - Seats		
						Total	Frelimo	Renamo	MDM	Outros	Frelimo	Renamo	MDM	Outros	Em branco	Definitivamente nulo	Fre	Ren	MDM		
Niassa	544 770	209 521	187 451	152 351	24 567	6 371	4 162	13.1%	81.3%	13.1%	3.4%	2.2%	13 972	6.7%	8 098	3.9%	12	2			
Cabo Delgado	888 179	396 997	337 738	273 057	50 310	14 371	14 371	14.9%	80.8%	14.9%	0.0%	4.3%	50 754	12.8%	8 505	2.1%	19	3			
Nampula	1 801 249	688 026	580 326	381 066	164 969	34 291	34 291	28.4%	65.7%	28.4%	0.0%	5.9%	83 881	12.2%	23 819	3.5%	32	13			
Zambezia	1 770 910	598 303	498 301	267 305	203 507	27 489	27 489	40.8%	53.6%	40.8%	0.0%	5.5%	76 333	12.8%	23 669	4.0%	26	19			
Tete	796 257	435 822	399 700	348 711	41 253	9 736	9 736	10.3%	87.2%	10.3%	0.0%	2.4%	17 946	4.1%	18 176	4.2%	18	2			
Manica	648 969	293 012	256 717	182 248	64 103	10 366	10 366	25.0%	71.0%	25.0%	0.0%	4.0%	20 137	5.5%	16 090	5.5%	12	4			
Sofala	772 630	363 309	323 205	164 100	74 734	75 732	8 639	23.1%	50.8%	23.1%	23.4%	2.7%	20 137	5.5%	19 967	5.5%	10	5			
Inhambane	641 387	300 217	265 777	222 585	18 282	11 989	12 921	6.9%	83.7%	6.9%	4.5%	4.9%	26 756	8.9%	7 684	2.6%	15	1			
Gaza	639 658	400 959	379 306	367 511	5 354	6 441	6 441	1.4%	96.9%	1.4%	0.0%	1.7%	15 443	3.9%	6 210	1.5%	16				
Maputo Prov	616 208	295 739	274 802	242 891	21 319	10 592	10 592	7.8%	88.4%	7.8%	3.9%	3.9%	15 373	5.2%	5 564	1.9%	15	1			
Maputo Cidade	695 372	369 348	355 292	271 980	19 130	58 744	5 438	5.4%	76.6%	5.4%	16.5%	1.5%	8 283	2.2%	5 773	1.6%	14	1			
Africa	55 206	35 223	34 500	32 900	1 191	409	409	3.5%	95.4%	3.5%	0.0%	1.2%	398	1.1%	325	0.9%	1	3			
Europe	1 154	774	743	630	63	50	50	8.5%	84.8%	8.5%	0.0%	6.7%	18	2.3%	13	1.7%	1				
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 871 949</b>	<b>4 387 250</b>	<b>3 893 858</b>	<b>2 907 335</b>	<b>688 782</b>	<b>152 836</b>	<b>144 905</b>	<b>17.7%</b>	<b>74.7%</b>	<b>17.7%</b>	<b>3.9%</b>	<b>3.7%</b>	<b>349 499</b>	<b>8.0%</b>	<b>143 893</b>	<b>3.3%</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>8</b>		

**Membros das assembleias provinciais; members of provincial assemblies**

x = não concorre; did not stand

PROVÍNCIA	DISTRITO	PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS				
		FRELIMO	RENAMO	MDM	PDD	
MAPUTO	Namaacha	3		x	x	
	Boane	7		x	x	
	Cidade da Matola	39	5	x	x	
	Matutuine	3		x	x	
	Marracuen e	5	x	x	x	
	Manhiça	11	x	x	x	
	Magude	3	x	x	x	
	Moamba	4		x	x	
	Cidade de Xai-Xai	9	x	x	x	
GAZA	Mandlakazi	10	x	x	x	
	Distrito de Xai-Xai	12	x	x	x	
	Bilene-Macia	9	x	x	x	
	Massangena	1	x	x	x	
	Chibuto	12	x	x	x	
	Chicualauala	2	x	x	x	
	Chigubo	1	x	x	x	
	Chokwe	11	x	x	x	
	Guija	4	x	x	x	
	Mabalane	2	x	x	x	
	Massingir	2	x	x	x	
	INHAMBANE	Inhambane	5			x
		Funhalouro	2	x	x	x
Govuro		2	x	x	x	
Homoine		6	x	x	x	
Inharrime		6	x	x	x	
Massinga		14	x	x	x	
Maxixe		7	x	x	x	
Murrumbene		7	x	x	x	
Panda		3	x	x	x	
Vilanculos		9	x	x	x	
Zavala		8	x	x	x	
Jangamo		5	x	x	x	
Panda		2	x	x	x	
SOFALA		Beira	11	1	1	3
		Dondo	6		2	x
		Gorongosa	5	x	x	x
	Marromeu	5		1	x	
	Muanza	1			x	
	Chemba	3			x	
	Cherimgoma	2			x	

MANICA	Chibabava	4	x	x	x	
	Machanga	1		1	x	
	Maringue	3	x	x	x	
	Nhamatanda	9	x	x	x	
	Buzi	4		3	x	
	Caia	5	x	x	x	
	Chimoio	11	4		x	
	Manica	12	2		x	
	Guro	4			x	
	Machaze	3	2		x	
	Gondola	9	5		x	
	Macossa	1			x	
	Mussurize	5	5		x	
	Susundenga	7	x	x	x	
	Tambara	2			x	
	Barue	7	1		x	
TETE	Cidade de Tete	7	1		x	
	Moatize	2	7		x	
	Angonia	15			x	
	Cahora Bassa	4			x	
	Changara	7	x	x	x	
	Chuita	3	x	x	x	
	Mutarara	7	2		x	
	Zumbo	3	x	x	x	
	Magoe	4	x	x	x	
	Maravia	3	x	x	x	
	Tsangano	7	x	x	x	
	Macanga	4	x	x	x	
	Chifunde	4	x	x	x	
	ZAMBEZIA	Quelimane	4	2		x
		Ile	6	x	x	x
		Gile	4	x	x	x
Morrumbala		3	5		x	
Mopeia		3	x	x	x	
Inhassuge		2			x	
Lugela		3	x	x	x	
Chinde		2	1		x	
Namacurra		2	2		x	
Namarroi		2			1	
Nicoadala		4	2		x	
Pebane		2	2		x	
Gurue		4	3		x	
Alto Mulocue		2	4		x	
Mocuba		6			1	
Milange		4	8		x	
Maganja da Costa	4	2		x		
NAMPULA	Nampula	9	3		x	
	Nacala Porto	2	2		x	
	Ilha de Moçambique	1			x	
	Angoche	5	1		x	
	Ribaue	4	x	x	x	
	Monapo	7	x	x	x	
	Lalaua	2			x	

NIASSA	Malema	4			x	
	Erati	7	x	x	x	
	Meconta	3	1		x	
	Mecuburi	2		1	x	
	Memba	3		1	x	
	Mongicual	2			x	
	Mogovolas	4	2		x	
	Moma	7	x	x	x	
	Mossuril	3	x	x	x	
	Muecate	2	x	x	x	
	Murrupula	3	x	x	x	
	Nacala Velha	1	1		x	
	Nacaroa	3	x	x	x	
	Rapale	2	1		x	
	CABO DELGADO	Lichinga	9	1		x
		Dstr. de Lichinga	3	1		x
Cuamba		12	x	x	x	
Lago		5			x	
Maua		3	x	x	x	
Marrupa		3	x	x	x	
Mandimba		6		2	x	
Ngauma		4	x	x	x	
Mavago		1	x	x	x	
Mecanhelas		8	x	x	x	
Mecula		1			x	
Metarica		2	x	x	x	
Muembe		2	x	x	x	
Majune		2	x	x	x	
Nipepe		2	x	x	x	
Sanga		3	x	x	x	
CABO DELGADO	Pemba	6	1		x	
	Mueda	6			x	
	Montepuez	8	2		x	
	Mocimboa Praia	4	1		x	
	Macomia	4			x	
	Chiure	10	2		x	
	Muidumbe	4			x	
	Pemba Metuge	3			x	
	Ancuabe	5	x	x	x	
	Namuno	8	x	x	x	
	Quissanga	2			x	
	Palma	2			x	
	Balama	4	2		x	
	Meluco	1	x	x	x	
	Nangade	3			x	
	Ibo	1	x	x	x	
Mecufi	2			x		
<b>141</b>		<b>812</b>	<b>703</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>2</b>