

Mozambique political process bulletin

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Editor: Joseph Hanlon (j.hanlon@open.ac.uk)

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Prins Hendrikkade 48, 1012 AC Amsterdam
Tel: +31 (20) 524 56 78 ; Fax: +31 (20) 622 01 30
e-mail: awepa@antenna.nl

Rua Licenciado Coutinho 77 (CP 2648) Maputo
Tel: +258 (1) 41 86 03, 41 86 08, 41 86 26 Fax: +258 (1) 41 86 04
e-mail: awepamz@zebra.uem.mz

Deadlock over law threatens 2003 municipal elections

Failure to move forward on revisions of the electoral laws is provoking serious questions about the ability to prepare adequately for the 2003 local elections. It will now be very difficult to approve the law in time and organise an updating of the electoral register, raising again the spectre of confusion and boycott that plagued the 1998 local elections.

The work of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Commission for the Revision of Electoral Legislation is totally paralysed. There are no serious negotiations within the Commission and neither Frelimo nor Renamo seems interested in breaking the deadlock.

Four laws must be revised, and the Ad Hoc Commission had planned to finish first drafts by the end of November, to allow public consultation in February 2002 and formal submission to the next session of parliament (AR, *Assemblea da República*) in March. So far, the commission has agreed only seven articles of the first law, and has only discussed 18 articles out of a total of 424, despite more than 50 meetings – as well as five groups of three deputies (MPs) each visiting all provinces to listen to the views there.

The mutual distrust between Frelimo and Renamo on election issues remains very strong, and both sides seem afraid to make any concessions. Renamo sticks

to maximum demands and Frelimo refuses changes in the present system because it fears these might be seen as an admission that there were problems with the 1999 elections.

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Renamo wants major changes in the law, while Frelimo will accept only minor revisions. Ad Hoc Commission chair Alfredo Gamito, a former Minister of State Administration, argues that the commission does not have the capacity to do a major redrafting. His suggestion that the four lawyers on the commission (two from each side) sit down to try to harmonise the proposals was rejected by Renamo; he is now likely to propose that a technical team of consultants be hired to do drafts based on proposals from the two sides, and to highlight agreements and differences.

The issue is likely to come before the full AR later this month.

One attempt to break the deadlock may take place in late December, when it is proposed that up to 40 deputies will attend an all-day meeting organised by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA). The format is still being discussed. It may involve facilitators in scenario planning, a technique used in South Africa and the Congo to draw out the implications of the positions taken by different sides. Or it may take the form of a seminar on election administration in other countries.

There has been a steady stream of international delegations attempting to mediate or encourage dialogue between Renamo and Frelimo, but this

seems to have been counter-productive. This has been seen as international pressure and has caused both sides to withdraw into more rigid positions. EISA may be more acceptable because it is African, although being Johannesburg-based makes it suspect to some people.

There seems to be no interest on either side to resume the Chissano-Dhlakama talks which broke down earlier this year, which means the deadlock will need to be resolved at lower levels.

Commission chair Gamito feels that there is still time to resolve the problems, and if the Commission works full time for the five months next year when the AR is not in session, it would be possible to present a draft law to a special session of the AR in October 2002. That will still provide enough time for registration and then local elections in 2003, he believes. But that requires the political will to move forward.

What is disputed?

The deadlock is the same one which has affected all debates about the electoral process - composition and functioning of the National Election Commission (CNE, *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) and its subordinate bodies. Renamo continues to demand "parity" - that the CNE have equal numbers of Frelimo and opposition members, with a neutral president. Frelimo wants to retain the present system of "proportionality" - that the number of members should be in proportion to seats in parliament, that the government should also appoint at least one member, and that the president of the CNE should be chosen by the President of Mozambique.

Linked to this is the Renamo demand for consensus decision making, while Frelimo wants simple majority votes. Consensus would give every individual member the ability to block decision-making and paralyse the CNE, and in both 1994 and 1999 elections Renamo CNE members did try to block urgent decisions. But majority decisions under proportionality would allow Frelimo and government-appointed members to simply ignore genuine Renamo concerns.

Renamo insists that the system be replicated at lower levels, with provincial and district election commissions with 11 members each.

Renamo's total distrust of the government and of Frelimo is also shown by its demand that the standing orders of the CNE actually be incorporated in the law, and that the present 26-article law be replaced by a new one with 150 articles.

On two areas, however, there seems some degree of agreement. Renamo has always wanted a large CNE, initially proposing 23 members, while Frelimo proposed 13. This gap has now been narrowed to 19 versus 17. The other area concerns the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, *Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral*). Under the present system, CNE only functions during election and registration periods, and when CNE is not operating, STAE is a government department. To Renamo this is not acceptable, and there is now

agreement that CNE needs some kind of permanent presence and that STAE should always be part of CNE.

More serious is the Renamo demand that STAE be politicised. Renamo says that there should be a non-party director, but at all lower levels in the hierarchy staff should be party nominated, and that if a supervisor is of one party, the next level down should be of the other, and so on. This too would be repeated at provincial and district levels. Renamo argues that the history of the one-party state until 1994 means that civil servants are all Frelimo and cannot be trusted to run an election. And there clearly is a Frelimo loyalty in some parts of the civil service. But in the north many civil servants are Renamo supporters, and most civil servants are not activists for any party. In practice, it would be impossible for Renamo to find party loyalists with sufficient technical skill to fill all the relevant STAE posts.

Clearly some way needs to be found to keep STAE as a technical secretariat, but to ensure adequate supervision to prevent party bias.

Comment

Technical or political?

There is wide agreement that some technical improvements could be made to the election laws, that there are issues such as registration that need further discussion, and that there are a number of errors and inconsistencies that need to be resolved. But at the request of Renamo, the parliamentary Ad Hoc Commission decided to start first with the CNE and try to resolve the contentious political issues before moving on to the technical ones. This has led to a deadlock which means that when there is a political solution, there may no longer be enough time to solve the technical problems. This has happened before, and is one reason why some of the same problems appeared both in 1994 and 1999.

Of course, political and technical are closely linked. Starting with the technical issues might have been a confidence-building process which could have made later political discussions easier.

Transparency is a technical solution but a political problem. If reports of CNE meetings were published, then it would be harder for Renamo to filibuster and harder for Frelimo to override legitimate Renamo concerns, because this would become public. With that kind of check, the actual composition of the CNE and its decision making rules become less important, because misconduct by either side would be public. Yet both sides actually prefer secrecy and want to ability to manipulate the process with no one knowing - and want the ability to blame the other side with the press having no independent way to check. Once both sides prefer secrecy, then the issues of membership and consensus becomes more important.

Similarly, there are a whole series of technical changes, proposed in the previous issue of the *Bulletin*

(Number 26, 10 April 2001) and by other organisations, which would reduce the number of errors and make the counting process more transparent. But neither party seems willing to agree changes which will further open up the process to the press and national and international observers.

Perhaps both sides are afraid to put their own shortcomings on view. This occurred in 1999 with computerisation, when both sides looked bad. The government appointee failed to have provincial computer systems checked and running in time, while Renamo failed to find computer experts who could make a coherent criticism or explanation of problems Renamo claimed existed.

Despite Renamo's failure to field sufficient people in 1999 - it could not find enough skilled people for senior posts on offer and could not find enough people with basic literacy to be poll watchers (*delegados de lista*) - Renamo remains convinced that if it has enough of its own people at all levels of the process it can prevent Frelimo from cheating. For example, its demands for 11-member district election commissions means it would have to find five people in each of 151 districts and cities - 755 literate and capable people who would be excluded from participation in Renamo's electoral activities. Increased complexity and a more ponderous election machine is likely to create more, not less,

opportunity for manipulation, so Renamo's demands seem counter-productive.

However, one of Renamo's demands responds directly to the problem of lack of people. Each polling station counts its own votes. The results are summarised in an *edital* which is posted at the polling station and submitted to the higher level for inclusion in the provincial count. Poll watchers are encouraged to write a copy of the results and submit it to the district or provincial party office, so that the party can do a parallel count.

Renamo recognises that a failure in the past has been that illiterate poll watchers could not write down the results, and it now demands that the polling station president write a copy of the *edital* for each party poll watcher present, so that the parties can collect together official copies of the results of each polling station. This is a sensible demand and a rational technical response to a real problem. Both sides should accept this proposal, and then move forward to see if there are not other technical ways to respond to Renamo concerns. If enough of these sorts of checks could be created, then Renamo might feel that its demands for politicisation of STAE and the creation of an unworkable consensus system on the CNE were less important, and a political solution might be easier.

[JH]

New seriousness in parliament

Parliament's return to its renovated building has been matched by a more productive attitude by deputies (MPs). Renamo has ended the disruption that occurred earlier this year. But perhaps more important was the consensus decision of the two parliamentary party leaderships to change the standing orders.

These changes took effect in the current parliamentary session, and mean that the full parliament (*Assembleia da República*) only debates laws in general, while detailed revisions are done in commissions. Previously the full parliament did line by line debates, which led bored deputies to make disruptive comments. In this session, the speeches have been more serious. Both parties recognise the importance of this, acknowledging that parliament sessions are broadcast live by Radio Moçambique and are widely listened to outside Maputo.

Several significant pieces of legislation have now been approved in generality and are being worked on in commissions, including a law to protect HIV-infected workers, a major change to the government financial system, and changes to the penal code.

Work in commissions, outside the public eye, has always been more co-operative and constructive, and this has continued. Thus this session of parliament is proving less tense and more constructive - except for the fraught issue of the election law. But it has increased the work of the commissions, which are

finding they do not have the trained and efficient back-up staff to keep up with the increased workload.

Another change is a new commission to receive petitions and complaints from the public, which increasingly sees the AR as an alternative means of redress against government mal-administration. A protest outside the AR on 28 November by ex-workers in the former East Germany was the third large demonstration outside parliament, and it handed in a petition to the petitions commission asking it to intercede with the government to help this group of workers. (The other demonstrations were a Renamo protest against the 1999 elections and a civil society demonstration to demand a law to protect HIV-infected workers — approved at this session).

Two other changes in the standing orders continue to provoke discussions. All bills presented to the full AR must have a report on the budgetary implications of the proposal. And the standing orders mean there is no parliamentary debate on the President's State of the Nation Speech. Previously the President stayed and responded to the debate.

First post-war Congress lets Renamo look forward

Renamo's first post-war Congress has left its president Afonso Dhlakama in tight personal control of the party. But the Congress also reflects a double transition - in the longer term it is finally shifting Renamo from a guerrilla movement to a political party, and in the shorter term Renamo is turning away from complaining about the 1999 elections and instead looking forward to 2003 local elections and 2004 national elections.

The Congress was held 28-29 October in Nampula with 640 delegates chosen at provincial meetings. Dhlakama was re-elected with only token opposition. But the delegates selected a 60-member national council in a very transparent way. Members were chosen by province; there were always more candidates than places; voting was done by secret ballot and the count was done in public, taking all night. Most importantly, the Congress delegates expressed their views about poor party organisation by not electing the two most recent secretary-general's of the party - José de Castro (Francisco Marcelino) and João Alexandre.

Dhlakama then took control, and the new National Council ratified Dhlakama's proposals for a ten-member, Maputo-based Political Committee. Most of its members, who include the two former secretary-generals, had not been elected to the National Council.

'Paralysed politics'

Far from being a success story, Mozambique is making "little progress towards democratic maturity", warns South Africa's Institute for Security Studies. "The paralysed state of Mozambican politics" is leading "towards a permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism", argues ISS Maputo liaison officer Andrea Ostheimer in an article in the ISS journal African Security Review.

(<http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/10No1/Ostheimer.html>)

Ostheimer criticises the tendency to characterise Mozambique "as a success story" and warns that Mozambique is still a simple "electoral democracy" and is not yet a more mature and complex "consolidated democracy". Furthermore, "Mozambique has hardly demonstrated much progress toward democratic maturity" and this is creating "high levels of political instability".

For Ostheimer, democratic maturity means that "beyond a formal party pluralism, the opposition has to have a real chance to take over power in the next elections. Ultimately, democracy thrives on the likelihood of power change."

She attacks both political parties. "The major opposition party itself has been constrained by its lack of political imagination, that can conceive of little other than its well-known boycott strategy." While the governing party has not yet "shown a sufficient commitment to democracy to accept a possible loss of political power."

The Council also ratified Dhlakama's choice of Joaquim Vaz as secretary-general. Vaz is perhaps best known as the author of the diaries captured by the government at Gorongosa in 1985 which showed that South Africa was continuing to back and supply Renamo, despite promising not to when it signed the Nkomati Accord the previous year. In recent years Vaz has been living in Portugal.

Until now, Renamo has retained the very personalised, centralised and hierarchic structure inherited from the guerrilla war. The party was disorganised, the roles of officials were not clear, and even small decisions were taken by Dhlakama. Although the president retains his almost total personal power within the party, the Congress has put in place a structure which should lead to better organisation and more broadly based decision-making.

With the Political Committee, Dhlakama appears to be trying to create a trusted advisory panel which will reduce his isolation. It will meet weekly, with the party secretary-general and the head of the parliamentary bench also attending. David Aloni is not a member of the Political Committee, but remains personal advisor to Dhlakama and effectively number two in the party.

Meanwhile, the National Council will meet in February, probably in Beira, and launch a series of provincial conferences to try to restructure the party at local level and improve organisation at the base. At provincial and district level there will also be councils and political committees.

The Congress also agreed to establish a National Judicial Council, which will be elected by the National Council in February and will be charged with internal regulation and auditing of the party.

The appointment of Vaz as secretary-general has caused some comment, as he is little known even within Renamo and has had no recent contact with Mozambique. Renamo sources argue that it was necessary to bring in an outsider to end the infighting within Renamo - that the secretary-general could not have been chosen from one of the factions. They also argue that Vaz has been chosen as an administrator and organiser - a manager rather than a politician, and someone who will put his priority on party organisation.

But diplomatic sources suggest that a substantial part of the cost of the Congress was paid by Portuguese businesspeople and that Vaz also represents a link with them. Thus his appointment marks an increase in right-wing Portuguese influence in Renamo. The other funding for the Congress came from the Netherlands (see next page).

Renamo had always argued that it was delaying the Congress because of lack of money, and it went to

great lengths to keep the costs of the Congress as low as possible. The meeting was held in a Nampula sports pavilion and food was simple.

Frelimo debates its leadership question

The very close election in 1999 and the announcement by President Joaquim Chissano that he does not want to stand again in 2004 has provoked substantial activity within Frelimo. The government has put a new emphasis on service delivery and on fighting petty corruption. Ministers and senior government and party officials are spending more time outside of Maputo, particularly in Nampula and the Zambeze River valley, to show their faces, to try to respond to local complaints, and in general to reverse the negative image of Frelimo which surprised senior party figures in 1999. So far, this seems to be winning a positive response.

Frelimo is holding its Congress in Maputo in June 2002, where it will elect a party president and candidate for national president in 2004. Frelimo has no clear procedures for electing a president. Its two previous presidents were murdered and a new president chosen quickly by senior party figures. A Central Committee meeting in December will begin the discussion of choosing the new president.

Frelimo needs someone who can keep the party together and win the next election. A meeting of party militants in September called on Chissano to reconsider his position and stand again. But many in the party feel that Chissano has acted in the wise tradition of Julius Nyerere; that he has made the right decision, and that new and more dynamic leadership is needed.

Frelimo has never lost an election and has no experience of opposition, but it is slowly becoming clear to the party that it will lose power in some municipalities in 2003 and may eventually be forced into opposition even at national level. Thus there are now initial informal discussions of how to keep a party machine operational in opposition. This question also informs the ongoing discussion about revising the constitution, with some in Frelimo wanting to shift some power from president to parliament while retaining a presidential system.

Dutch party support

The Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy is now one of the most important supporters of Mozambican political parties. The Institute is a foundation created by seven Dutch parties, and is starting the second year of a three-year \$1.5 million programme in Mozambique. Money is for capacity and party-building, but not for salaries, equipment or campaigning. Parties are told how much money is available, ranging in the first year from \$5000 for small

parties up to \$40,000 for the two large parties, and they must present proposals on how to spend the money. After the money is spent, they must provide reports and accounts. In the first year, Renamo spent its Dutch money on provincial conferences and part of the cost of its Congress. Frelimo used the money for five regional conferences. Some of the smaller parties are making use of the money to help build their party organisations.

Looking to local elections

After having ignored municipal elections in 1998, opposition forces are taking the 2003 elections very seriously. They realise the 33 cities and towns with elected mayors and assemblies have real power. Thus they can provide political and management experience for party members and they have real patronage potential to give jobs to party members. For the smaller parties and the non-party opposition, municipalities also provide a chance to build a political base in a few places without being overstretched by trying to cover the entire country.

Máximo Dias, secretary-general of MONAMO, said recently that the party would only stand in a some municipalities, perhaps as few as two, and it was looking a surveys in Nampula and Zambézia provinces to find the municipalities where it would have the most potential. He said MONAMO was also talking about reactivating its coalition with two other parties, which would allow a presence in a few more municipal elections.

For his part, Raul Domingos has been touring the country recruiting members for his citizens movement IPAD, which he created after being expelled from Renamo. Under the legislation in force in 1998, and likely to be continued for 2003, non-party citizens' lists are permitted to stand (in contrast to national elections, where independent presidential candidates are permitted, but only registered parties can present parliamentary lists). Thus IPAD could put forward candidates in 2003.

And the Renamo Congress confirmed that the party's priority for 2002 will be preparing for the local elections. In 1998, Renamo boycotted local elections.

Parties need local base to survive

Political parties must be active at local level if they are to survive in a multi-party system in which periodic elections lead to alternation between government and opposition, warned two members of the Portuguese parliament at an AWEPA seminar for political parties on 20-22 November.

In less than three decades of multi-partyism in Portugal (where under the dictatorship until 1974 political parties were forbidden) both major parties have held power for an uninterrupted period of about a

decade, with the other being the main opposition party during that period. The two MPs stressed that when you are forced into opposition at national level, you can still have party members who are mayors (*presidente do conselho municipal*) in some cities and have majorities on some local assemblies. In the experience of the speakers, voters do not judge parties only by their performance in national government or parliamentary opposition, but also by service delivery and sound policies at local level.

An example was cited from Portugal in the 1980s when a new party formed around a strong and popular leader won parliamentary seats, but was swept away at the next elections because it existed only in parliament and the capital, and had no local offices or

cadres and was never seen at community level. This happened to the UD in 1999 in Mozambique.

Finally, the Portuguese MPs cited the importance of local government for gaining training and experience in politics and management.

It clear at the seminar that many parties recognise the importance of municipal government and are planning to participate in the next local elections. This will therefore be an important focus of the AWEPA programme. Other focuses will be the strengthening of women's and youth leagues and the participation of women in party politics and local government. National and provincial cadres from Frelimo, Renamo and 23 smaller parties participated in the seminar, funded by Ireland.

Pushing public servants to actually serve the public

Substantial improvements in the way civil servants treat the public are promised under new rules which take effect on 15 January. The modernization includes clearer rules and procedures, ending many demands for notarized signatures, new time limits for decisions, encouragement of the use of e-mail, and an end to the long lunch period inherited from the Portuguese colonial authorities.

The Council of Ministers approved the new Public Service Regulations (Decree 30/2001) on 15 October. They apply not only to the civil service, but also to the 33 municipalities with elected assemblies and to autonomous public institutions.

The normal civil service working day will be 7.30 to 15.30. Workers will have only 30 minutes for lunch, which will be paid and be considered part of the 40-hour working week. But offices and public services must be open during the entire working days, and staff will be expected to ensure that they remain open to the public during the lunch period. Libraries, museums, schools, hospitals, etc will set their own hours, and staff will work a 40-hour week. In a concession to the power of provincial governors, they are allowed to change the working hours in their own provinces.

An important new concept is that every office dealing with the public must have a designated person with at least some public relations training and who knows the organization well enough to give basic information to a member of the public and to send them to the right person to respond to their request. Receptionists and telephone switchboard staff are also to be given public relations training.

The public face of the civil service is also to change. Grills and glass panels separating officials from the public are to be removed. In the entry area must be posted: information on where to go for different types to requests, a list of all fees, telephone numbers, and copies of all forms and standard letters (*requerimentos e declarações*). All staff must wear name badges. Lower level staff such as drivers, guards and receptionists will all have uniforms.

The new rules end the need for signatures and photocopies to be authenticated by a notary. Any form or letter which requires a recognized signature can simply be signed in the presence of an official as part of submitting documents; similarly, officials can accept photocopies if the original is shown. This service will be free and will cut out an expensive and time-consuming step in many bureaucratic procedures.

Another notable change is that all public services will be required to have special telephone line, to be known as the "green line", to be used only for incoming calls from the public.

There will again be complaint and suggestion books, as there were in the first years after independence.

For the first time, there are strict time limits. Information requests must be dealt with the same day, or passed up to a higher level. Complaints must be responded to within 30 days and senior officials and governors have to report regularly on complaints and action taken. Unless other laws set other times, civil servants have 10 days to do all the paperwork on any request and pass it on to the person who must take the decision. Any request not dealt with in 15 days is considered automatically rejected, and the applicant can begin legal action. This should reduce the tendency for difficult problems to sit on desks indefinitely.

There has already been a move in some laws for items not responded to within the given time to be automatically approved (the opposite of the automatic rejection of the new regulations) and all state institutions have until 15 March to provide a list not

only of where this is already established under other laws, but also of other areas which could be treated in this way.

All civil service units are expected to publicize their e-mail address and the regulations state the correspondence sent by e-mail has the same status as any other letter. Indeed, all applications and requests can be made by e-mail unless they require the authentication of documents or signatures.

There are strict conflict of interest rules preventing civil servants from taking decisions relating to families (including cousins) and their own businesses

Although the new rules say "transparency implies publicity for administrative actions", quite strict limits remain on what information can be given to the public and four levels of classification are established - state secret, secret, confidential and restricted - and every office must have an official "classifier of information.

And some things do not change. Any letter from a government official still requires a rubber stamp (*carimbo do serviço*) over the signature.

- Procedures for registering land have also been simplified, with a standard form, a clear list of requirements (including evidence of consulting the local community), and a published list of fees. All applications for land use must be approved or rejected within 90 days.

Can public sector reform beat corruption?

A 10-year public sector reform programme is being put forward as the way of beating corruption, as well as making the state apparatus more efficient and effective. President Joaquim Chissano's speech on 25 June 2001 to introduce the reform was largely devoted to corruption.

The process is being overseen by an Inter-ministerial Commission on Public Sector Reform (CIRESP - *Comissão Interministerial da Reforma do Sector Público*). The chair (*presidente*) is the Prime Minister, currently Pascoal Mocumbi, and the deputy is the Minister of State Administration, José Chichava; nine other ministers are members. Backup is provided by a technical unit, UTRESP (*Unidade Técnica da Reforma do Sector Público*). Public sector is taken to mean not just ministries, but also provincial, district and local government and public companies and institutions.

The process originated with the World Bank which is providing half the \$85 million funding and the initial documents are very similar to those used by the World Bank in other countries. It has five components: public service provision, policy formulation and monitoring, professionalisation of public sector staff, public finance management, and good governance and combating corruption.

Survey shows high corruption rates

Mozambique has one of the highest rates of corruption and crime in the world, according to a survey carried out earlier this year for the newly established Ethics Mozambique (*Ética Moçambique*). The survey of 1500 people in urban and rural areas in Maputo, Sofala and Nampula provinces (in the south, centre and north) showed that in the last six months 45 per cent had been the victim of corruption and in the past year 41 per cent has been the victim of an assault.

Demands for bribes were most common in the health services, where one person even reported the need to pay a bribe to obtain an anesthetic during surgery. The next most common demands were in education, followed by the police and then state and local officials.

Of money requested, 31% was for less than 100,000 Meticals (\$6 at the time of the survey), 45% was between 100,000 and 1 million Meticals (\$6-56), 22% was between 1 and 10 million Meticals (\$55-555), and 4% for more than that. These are substantial demands when the GDP per capita is still under \$300.

In a speech on 25 June, President Joaquim Chissano admitted that it has become common for state officials to demand payment to provide normal services - a school official demanding "a thank you" for enrolling a pupil, a nurse demanding a "small envelope" before treating a patient, or a policeman demand a "beer" in exchange for giving the driver back their driving license.

Chissano argued that there is no difference between this sort of petty corruption and "grand corruption". But anti-corruption efforts so far seemed aimed mainly at petty corruption. In his introduction to the survey, *Ética* coordinator Abdul Carimo Issá points to the murders of Carlos Cardoso and António Siba-Siba Macuácuá, who were both murdered to stop them investigating very high level corruption in the banking system.

As in all Bank programmes, it includes some privatization and outsourcing of services. Stress is put on reducing bureaucracy, simplification of systems, and decentralization. But in two aspects, the reform programme differs from Bank programmes in other countries - it does not call for an overall reduction in the size of the civil service, and it does call for significant increases in salary for more highly qualified staff, in order to compete effectively with the donor community and private sectors. The programme also recognizes that low salaries have led to demoralization and absenteeism, despite some increases in real

wages in recent years. A multi-donor fund is proposed to pay top-ups to higher level staff.

Training is seen as essential, with more than half of all civil service managers not having the educational qualifications their job requires. And it is clear that some people will be dismissed or retired. Agriculture Minister Hélder Muteia noted that in the past when a civil servant was not working well, the government simply put in an additional person, and sometimes a third, in the hope that "the sum of three incompetents might be competence".

The 10-year programme is divided into two parts, with the first three years aimed at what the World Bank calls "quick wins". Many of these are included in the

new public service regulations. Others include simplifications of import rules for used cars and posting a list of charges in all health posts.

The initial hope was that this would be seen as a single programme to which donors would contribute, but donors are already forcing it to be broken into projects and there is already some duplication and competition as donors shape the projects to suit their own interests.

- President Chissano's 25 June speech and relevant documents are published by Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique in *Estratégia Global da Reforma do Sector Público 2001-2011*.

Book reviews

Mozambique: the Tortuous Road to Democracy, by João M Cabrita. Palgrave (St Martin's Press), Basingstoke (England), 2000. English hardback only, UK£47.50.

History is always being challenged and re-written, and with this book Renamo makes its first serious challenge to the Frelimo version of Mozambican history. This book covers the 1960-1988 period (and thus not the stalemate, negotiations, end of war and subsequent events). Big chunks of the book are simply rhetoric, such as João Cabrita's basic assumption about "the totalitarian regime imposed by Frelimo" and his total rejection that Frelimo did anything good, even in health or education. But you get a sense that even Cabrita is not taking those parts seriously.

Where Cabrita has done new research, he is able to come forward with some genuine alternative lines – and some surprising agreement with the received history. He has used the US Freedom of Information Act to obtain 150 US documents from 1961-63 relating to Eduardo Mondlane, and showing his close links to the Kennedys and the US government.

Interviewing dissidents, he paints an alternative picture of the formation of Frelimo and of disputes in the late 1960s, including claims of "rampant tribalism", purges and even "summary executions".

The core of Cabrita's analysis is race and what he calls "ethnic group" (such as "Sena" or "Ronga"). He claims Frelimo's attempt to end tribalism and racism was nothing but "rhetoric" to serve as a cover for southerners to gain power, and he supports what he calls President Joaquim Chissano's "long-delayed blackening of the regime".

Cabrita is at his best on detailing Renamo's version of the setting up of the organisation and then its war against Frelimo. He is good on the ebb and flow of military control of areas, and the overwhelming impact on Renamo of Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops. He confirms and details the centrality of Rhodesian and South African support. He underlines Renamo's strategy to control the countryside and force the government back to the towns, and the use of what Cabrita calls "horrific" ambushes on buses and trains to stop the use of road and rail. And he raises interesting questions about the government's inability to create an effective anti-guerrilla strategy.

African Adventurer's Guide to Mozambique, by Willie & Sandra Oliver. Southern (Struik), Rivonia, Johannesburg, 1999.

This is a guidebook geared to those expecting to make long overland trips through Mozambique, with an emphasis on fishing, diving and birdwatching. The coverage is good and there are not too many mistakes, although I personally prefer the *Travellers Survival Kit* reviewed in the last *Bulletin*, which is better on other types of tourism.