

# Mozambique peace process bulletin

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Editor: Joseph Hanlon

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Prins Hendrikkade 48, 1012 AC Amsterdam  
Tel: +31 (20) 524 56 78 ; Fax: +31 (20) 622 01 30  
Editor: j.hanlon@open.ac.uk e-mail: awepa@antenna.nl

Rua Licenciado Coutinho 77 (CP 2648) Maputo  
Tel: +258 (1) 41 86 03, 41 86 08, 41 86 26  
Fax: +258 (1) 41 86 04 e-mail: awepamz@zebra.uem.mz

## New election commission named as Renamo continues its boycott

Frelimo nominated its members of the National Elections Commission at a special session of parliament on 26 July. Although Renamo refused to name its members, the election commission will be able to operate and a by-election in Moatize can go ahead.

Both Renamo and Frelimo did name members to a 15-member ad hoc parliamentary commission to consider revisions of the election laws. It is chaired by Alfredo Gamito, who was minister of state administration until the elections last December. The commission will make its first report to the next session of parliament (AR. *Assembleia da República*) in October.

The Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE. *Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*) is a permanent body, but a new National Elections Commission (CNE. *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) must be named within 60 days of the opening of parliament by the parties in the newly elected parliament. They failed to do so during the first session, which ended on 5 May, but the two parliamentary parties – Frelimo and the coalition Renamo Electoral Union (Renamo UE. *Renamo – União Eleitoral*) – agreed to do so at a special session of parliament on 26 July.

Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama overrode that decision, saying he was only willing to allow Renamo to talk about changing the election law and would not participate in any administration of the old

law. So Renamo UE named members to the ad hoc commission, but not to the CNE. The law establishing the CNE (4/99) sets no procedural rules, so the CNE can function without Renamo.

Frelimo re-appointed all five of its eligible members of the old CNE:

- Jamisse Taimo (who will again be named president), a Methodist pastor and rector of the Higher Foreign Relations Institute (ISRI);
- António Muacoricu, chair of the Mosagrius development company;
- António Nombora, a jurist who will now be the only member who was on the two previous CNEs;
- Percila Sitói, a department head in the Ministry of Finance and Planning; and
- Machatine Munguambe, a former dean of the law school at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM).

The other three members now have government posts, and are replaced by:

- Filipe Manjate, former vice-minister of Justice and before that vice-minister of Social Action;
- Isadora Faztúdo, former vice-minister of Agriculture and Fishing; and
- José Grachane, a member of the National Gambling Inspectorate (*Inspecção Nacional de Jogos*).

The government will now appoint 2 members of the CNE.

## Moatize mayor's death forces by-election

The mayor (president of the Municipal Council) of Moatize, Paulino Mulaicho Jeque, died in March. By law, the technical election secretariat STAE must set a by-election (*eleição intercalar*) date within 15 days

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and the election must be held within 45 days after that. A date of 1 June was announced, but no election could be held without a CNE.

Now that enough CNE members have been named, the government will need to swear in the new members and announce a new date for the election.

STAE says it has already done the organisation necessary for the by-election. In particular, it has computerised the Moatize register, so this will be the first test of computerisation.

The by-election will be very expensive. The present electoral law requires that for any election, there must be national, provincial and district election commissions as well as a range of party-nominated technicians demanded by Renamo to ensure fairness.

Moatize is tiny, with only 12,811 registered voters. STAE estimated that the by-election would cost \$350,000, 80 per cent of which would be salaries for all of the people required by law. The Ministry of Planning and Finance rejected this initial budget, and a new budget of about half this has now been proposed.

Virgílio Chapata, a senior Renamo official in Tete, told the daily *Noticias* (24 July) that, for the first time, Renamo would not boycott a municipal election and that a Renamo-UE candidate would stand. Renamo would have a good chance of winning in Moatize.

- There is also the possibility of a by-election in Milange, where it is rumoured that the president wishes to resign.

- The law also requires that the electoral register must be updated annually. This was also impossible without a CNE, and it is unclear if an update will be done this year

## Renamo boycotts and marginalisation

Renamo is increasingly marginalised and without a strategy as it continues to reject the outcome of the December 1999 elections and to boycott political activity.

The Renamo boycott and continued claims of fraud come despite the conclusion of international and domestic observer groups that President Joaquim Chissano and Frelimo won a free, fair, and relatively well-run election.

Some questions continue to be asked by international observers, particularly about the more than 6% of polling stations excluded from the final count. (See *Bulletin* 24) But there is a consensus that no possible revision in the results would affect the outcome.

For that reason, Renamo and its president Afonso Dhlakama have been losing support even from their traditional backers in the international community. This was shown most clearly in May. Renamo had issued a statement calling on donors to boycott the flood reconstruction conference in Rome 3-4 May and not to give money to the "illegal"

## Rewriting the election laws

Rewriting the election laws requires tackling both political and technical problems.

The present laws contain several errors and conflicts. For example, the local government law calls for elections within 45 days, yet the electoral law requires a longer process for nominations and elections. And the method for calculating the number of parliamentary seats for each province is mathematically incorrect, as the CNE discovered last year. (See *Bulletin* 23)

But the overriding problems are political. The potential cost of the tiny Moatize election underlines just how cumbersome and expensive the electoral process has become. So far the donors have been willing to pay in order to keep Renamo participating, but even so the procedures added at Renamo's requests did not satisfy the opposition party.

This has led some in Renamo, including parliamentary leader Ossufo Quintine, to call for even more elaborate, time-consuming and expensive processes. He said the CNE should act only by consensus, giving Renamo a veto, and that party-nominated staff should be involved in the process (and be paid) for longer periods of time.

A counter view is gaining some support inside Renamo, however. Politicisation of election structures will always lead to the appointment of more people from the governing party, so that little is gained. Instead, the process needs to be made simpler and more transparent, it is argued.

government. In fact, more money was pledged than was asked for.

Dhlakama has repeatedly called the new government "illegitimate". He consistently demanded a recount of the December election results and negotiations with the government. In the first parliament session after the election, Renamo members took their seats each morning (allowing them to collect their salaries) but then walked out as soon as discussion began on what they considered government business.

There were some secret but authorised talks between Transport Minister Tomás Salomão and Raul Domingos, which were broken off in May after Renamo revealed that they were taking place. Renamo was demanding what Dhlakama called power-sharing ("*partilha do poder entre os dois partidos*"), including at least the right to appoint governors in the six provinces when they won majorities in the December elections. There were also persistent rumours that Renamo was demanding economic benefits, both for leaders (perhaps in the form of shares in privatised companies) and for the party.

With the breakdown of the talks and growing embassy discontent at the Renamo boycott, President Joaquim Chissano moved to further marginalise and disrupt Renamo. In early June, Chissano claimed in a speech that Domingos had asked for \$500,000 for himself to pay off a business

debt, \$1 million a month for Renamo, and \$10,000 a month for Dhlakama.

Domingos denied the President's version of events, but the revelation split Renamo. On 7 July the Renamo National Council suspended Domingos while the matter was investigated. Until now, Raul Domingos has been seen as the second most important person in Renamo. He led the Renamo team at the 1990-92 Rome peace talks and then was head of the parliamentary group in the 1994-99 AR. Renamo's failure to re-appoint him as head of the group this year, while keeping him on the AR permanent commission, was seen as a first step in downgrading a potential competitor to Dhlakama.

Then on 14 July Chissano announced new governors for all 10 provinces, without consulting Dhlakama and without making any concessions to Renamo.

Although power-sharing and the right to name governors had never been a serious possibility, Dhlakama's policy had been based on gaining at least some concessions from the government.

At a 17 July press conference, Dhlakama was outraged and said that the appointment of the governors meant that Frelimo and Chissano had said "no, no, no" to power sharing. As a result, "the Renamo Electoral Union and Dhlakama will no longer cooperate in the maintenance of peace in this country," he said.

He said "I will no longer appeal for calm in the unfavoured sectors of the population. Since January, thousands and thousands of people have wanted to demonstrate and start violence, but I have always said, please, no and no. We are trying to resolve this situation peacefully." He later went on to say that "I will no longer appeal to the people to avoid violence. That is to say, from today people can start acts of violence as they have wanted to do since January. I am not calling on anyone to be violent, but I will no longer stop my supporters from demonstrating against the despotism of Chissano."

After the press conference, Dhlakama told the weekly *Savana* that he was calling on foreign investors to stop investing in Mozambique.

## Renamo non-payment campaign provokes Frelimo over-reaction

In the provinces where Renamo UE won a majority of the votes, Renamo has been organising campaigns to urge people not to pay fees and taxes to an "illegitimate" government. Market fees, in particular, are an important source of revenue for local government. There have been press reports of a number of arrests of Renamo organisers.

The then governor of Niassa, Aires Bonifácio Aly, was quoted in *Noticias* on 30 May as saying that Renamo was acting illegally by encouraging people not to pay taxes, not have their children vaccinated, and to not send their children to school because they would only be taught about Marxism at Frelimo schools. This is inciting civil disobedience and

## Renamo has 'lost everything'

"With the nomination last week of all the governors, it is clear that Afonso Dhlakama has lost all that he wanted to gain: lost the possibility to force a recount of the vote, lost his demand for an early election, and lost the possibility the president might nominate some governors suggested by Renamo. Thus, Dhlakama has lost every that he had been crowing were the political victories of Renamo," wrote *Savana* in an editorial on 21 July.

The independent press, which is often more sympathetic to Renamo than Frelimo, was highly critical of Renamo and frustrated with the way its only strategy seems to be boycotts. The daily *MediaFax* on 21 July commented that boycotts have proved ineffective – like "trying to stop the wind with your hands". The boycott of local government elections in 1998 only gave total Frelimo control, when Renamo could have won some cities. Walking out of the CNE during the last hours of the count left Frelimo members to do what they wanted. Abandoning parliament sessions leaves Frelimo to do as it wishes.

*Savana* on 21 July asked "why has Renamo lost everything?" The answer is that "it is not organised to win anything". It has wasted an entire year and "is not preparing for municipal elections in 2003 or general elections in 2004."

"Renamo's agenda is totally determined by Frelimo," commented *Savana* on 14 July. "Renamo is not even thinking about a political programme of an alternative government, capable of galvanising the country to prefer it as a real alternative in government to Frelimo".

rebellion and would be resisted with force and "administrative measures", he said.

Clearly Renamo organisers are trying to provoke government officials to overreact, and some are doing so.

In the only serious incident, so far, between 4 and 8 Renamo supporters were killed by police in Aube in Angoche district, Nampula, on 5 May. The incident apparently began when a Renamo organiser was arrested for trying to convince market traders not to pay weekly market fees. A large number of Renamo supporters attacked the police station to try to free their man, and the police opened fire on the crowd.

• Renamo has not yet found a way to participate as a practical opposition on the ground, and sees the role of an "opposition" as simply to oppose anything the government does. A tiny example occurred last year in Marromeu. The newly elected mayor (council president) and assembly saw that one of the most strongly felt concerns was that women did not like going down to the river to get water because they were attacked by crocodiles, so the council proposed to build shallow wells in several neighbourhoods. Renamo has a majority in the town, but it boycotted the local elections in 1998, so the mayor and assembly are Frelimo. Renamo

## **New governors named**

Only one governor kept his post when President Joaquim Chissano announced his new list on 14 July. The popular José Pacheco remains in Cabo Delgado. Four governors move: Aires Aly (Niassa to Inhambane), Felício Zacarias (Manica to Sofala), Rosário Mualeia (Nampula to Gaza) and Soares Nhaca (Maputo to Manica).

Five governors are new: Abdul Razak Noormahomed (Nampula, formerly vice minister of health), Tomás Mandlate (Tete, formerly education ministry senior official), David Simango (Niassa, was Maputo city education director), Lucas Jeremias (Zambézia, was health ministry senior official) and Alfredo Namitete (Maputo, was head of SATCC, Southern African Transport and Communications Commission – part of SADC).

None are natives of the province of which they are governor. No women were appointed.

organised local men to oppose the construction of “Frelimo” wells, even though local women clearly supported the project.

• The Attorney General’s office in early August asked the Standing Commission of parliament to lift the immunity of two Renamo deputies (MPs) to allow criminal proceedings against them. Manecas Daniel and Jose Manteigas of Zambézia province are accused of inciting people to violence during the 1999 elections campaign. The head of the Renamo parliamentary group, Ossuto Quitine, denied that any crime had been committed.

## **New law planned for districts**

Districts and localities are to be governed by new and clearer legislation: a draft of a law (*anteprojecto*) was agreed by the Council of Ministers in June.

Mozambique is following two parallel and sometimes conflicting paths on local government. In 1998, 33 municipalities were created, the 23 cities plus one town (*vila*) in each of the 10 provinces. They have been given substantial autonomy and have elected presidents and assemblies.

However, at local level the rest of the country is governed by a centralised and hierarchic system of province, district, administrative post and locality in which all officials are appointed centrally and are directly accountable to the next level up. The new legislation will lead to increased local autonomy.

Other towns will eventually be made municipalities and be granted similar self-government in future years; until then they remain part of districts.

Mozambican officials talk of the new municipalities as part of a “democratic decentralisation” which involves a real shift of power. By contrast the governments of districts, administrative posts and localities are defined as “local state organs” (to emphasise that they remain part of the central state) and the process affecting them is called “administrative deconcentration”.

The civil service’s almost military command structure is continued in the new draft law. The district administrator is appointed by the Minister of State Administration and is “senior director” (*“dirigente superior”*) of the territory. The administrator “represents the state and directs the execution of the government programme, the economic and social plan, and state budget in the district.” The administrator is expected to carry out instructions from the provincial government and “is personally accountable” to the provincial governor for all administrative actions in the district.

Below the district administrator are chiefs of administrative posts (named by the Minister of State Administration but reporting to the district administrator) and below them chiefs of localities (named by the governor but reporting to the chief of the administrative post).

But the draft law proposes substantially more autonomy. Districts (but not posts and localities) will have their own budgets and, as now, be expected to raise some of their own revenue through charges for services and fees for licences such as for market trading. The new law will explicitly give districts many of the same responsibilities as municipalities, such as for local streets, markets, cemeteries, rubbish collection, water and sanitation, public parks and sports grounds, etc. But district governments are also expected to carry out central government plans and provincial instructions; elected municipal governments cannot be directed in the same way.

As at present there will be district directors subject to dual authority, to the district administrator and to their ministry. But the number may now be reduced, with directors covering several different areas and being accountable to several ministries.

The “district government” will be composed of the administrator, the directors, and the chiefs of administrative posts. A new “district council” will be composed of the district government plus the president of any municipal council in the district, plus “community authorities” and representatives of economic, social and cultural organisations in the district. The district council will be a “consultative organ” convened by the district government, and will meet every three months.

At administrative post and locality level there will be no directors and no formally defined “government” as such, but there will be a consultative council with community leaders and representatives of organisations. These will meet more frequently, every two months at post level and monthly at locality level.

## **New decree recognises ‘traditional chiefs’**

“Community authorities” (*“autoridades comunitárias”*) and their links to local state organs are the subject of a short decree (15/2000) approved by the Council of Ministers on 20 June.

The decree defines “community authorities” as “traditional chiefs and other leaders recognised as such by their respective local communities”. Local state bodies are expected to articulate with

community authorities and to “ask their opinions on how best to mobilise and organise the participation of local communities in the realisation of plans and programmes for economic, social and cultural development.”

The decree goes on to say that “the objective of this collaboration between local state bodies and community leaders is the mobilisation and organisation of the population for their participation in implementation of local development tasks.”

Collaboration with community authorities is to be in a wide range of areas, including “land use; employment; food security; housing; public health; education and culture; peace, justice and social harmony; civic education; environment; and transport and communication”.

The new decree does not relate to elected local government, but will surely be seen as a model for cooperation there as well.

The new decree is very brief. A technical committee in the Ministry of State Administration is now writing the regulations which will give more details.

The definition of “community authorities” as “traditional chiefs and other leaders” is clearly intended to allow the inclusion of those neighbourhood secretaries and other leaders introduced by Frelimo in the late 1970s and early 1980s and who have gained local credibility, as well as religious leaders, senior teachers and nurses, and even traditional healers.

Speaking to the daily *Notícias* (10 July) the Minister of State Administration José Chichava said that district and locality administrators should not wait for the regulations and the new law on local state organs, but should immediately set up “community councils” which would include these “community authorities”.

Chichava also stressed that “community authorities” would be involved in tax collection, and that any income they received would be based on the amount of tax which they collected.

## Government makes a start on corruption crackdown

Although it is not a full-scale, official campaign, a few highly publicised actions suggest the government is now moving against corruption.

The issue clearly cost Frelimo votes in the December national elections. And at the closed dinner on 8 June at the Consultative Group meeting in Paris, donors all hammered the government about its failure to tackle corruption. Corruption in Maputo may not be as bad as Brussels or Boston, but it has been growing and is a deeply felt issue.

Most dramatic was the dismissal of the attorney general (*Procurador-Geral*) and his deputies by the President at the beginning of July. This followed a very public dispute about the blocking of investigations into a \$14 million fraud at the time of the privatisation of the retail banking arm of the Bank of Mozambique to become BCM, Banco Comercial de Moçambique.

The fraud occurred in 1996 and there have been no prosecutions. In an unprecedented speech in parliament on 14 March, former minister Eneas Comiche, who is now BCM chair, accused the attorney's general's office of blocking the investigation. The press took up the reports and accused the attorney general's office of being corrupt. A deputy attorney general then publicly accused some of his colleagues of disrupting the BCM investigation and he was suspended by the attorney general for denigrating the office of the attorney general.

At the beginning of July, the attorney general and all deputies were dismissed, and a Maputo judge, Joaquim Madeira, appointed to be the new attorney general. At the formal swearing in of Madeira on 19 July, President Chissano made clear he expected the new attorney general to “create a new climate” in the prosecutor's office.

Several governors have also begun publicly cracking down on corruption in what seemed like a coordinated series of announcements. In Manica in April, then governor Alberto Zacarias suspended

district administrators for taking cattle intended for peasants. (See box on next page)

In Nampula in June, then governor Rosário Mualeia announced that a local construction company would be prosecuted for leaving two health centres half built after being paid most of the money.

In July Agriculture Minister Hélder Muteia expelled four forestry department officials in Sofala province for pocketing \$20,000 in fees paid by companies for logging licences.

All three cases are examples of very common forms of corruption. The most commonly asked question is whether this is the start of much broader prosecutions and dismissals, or only a few cases to try to assuage public discontent.

The press remains unconvinced. A journalist from the normally docile government-owned daily *Notícias* (15 July) challenged Minister of State Administration José Chichava during a visit to Zambézia. The article claimed that embezzlement of funds by district officials was common and systematic, and went unpunished. The newspaper even claimed that a district administrator had been caught stealing \$10,000, including money intended for pensioners, and he was unpunished and was simply transferred to work in the Quelimane municipality offices.

Chichava responded that anyone who stole public money would be punished, and that President Chissano had said that one of the great challenges for the next five years was to curb corruption.

Meanwhile, the daily *Metical* has been stressing the total failure to clean up the justice system which it considers totally corrupted, where many judges can be bribed. And there is a backlog of thousands of cases, which is getting longer rather than shorter. *Metical* was particularly critical of President Chissano's decision to keep the minister of justice, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 25 – Aug 2000 – 5

## **Corruption is not bad faith**

The extent to which corruption has come to be accepted as normal is shown by the case of 50 cattle in Manica. The cattle were from a European Union-funded aid programme and were supposed to be distributed to peasants. The governor Felício Zacarias took the unprecedented step of calling a press conference on 20 April to say all 50 had been taken by officials or their wives, and he distributed to the press a list of who took the cattle: four district administrators, one municipal council president, and 11 provincial agriculture officials. The four district administrators were eventually suspended.

But the response of the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Hélder Muteia, showed both how much this sort of corruption is treated as normal, and the difficulties with aid projects. He went to Chimbanetsi to investigate and reported at a press conference there on 26 May that the problem was that the donor agency had demanded that the peasants pay between \$50 and \$80 for each animal, and that no peasant had enough money. Only cattle farmers who also had state salaries could afford to buy the animals.

Thus the district servants who took the cattle intended for peasants were not acting in "bad faith", Muteia said, and were not acting deliberately to harm the peasants. Nevertheless, they would be punished for damaging the image of the state.

who it considered were, but to not re-appoint the vice minister, Filipe Manjate, who it considered one of the few good people left in the ministry.

Perhaps the first indication of a change in the justice system was the conviction of an Administrative Court judge Alfredo Chambule, of murdering his daughter's boyfriend. Many saw the case as a test of whether or not judges and other senior officials had impunity. Chambule was convicted and sentenced to 8 years in prison.

The appointment of new governors could also be seen in an anti-corruption context. None of the 10 provinces has as a governor who is a native of the province. The amount of corruption is lessened and their are fewer easy channels for corruption if a governor has no family links in the province.

## **Pay rise prevents general strike**

A last minute agreement to increase the minimum wage headed off a general strike planned for 26-28 July. Under government pressure, the minimum wage had fallen from an equivalent of \$38 per month in 1987 to below \$10 in 1995, and then had risen steadily from 1996 to reach \$36 when the minimum wage was set at 100 Xucineticals last year. But inflation had pushed it back to \$28 when three way (labour, business, government) negotiations began this year.

Business offered a 15% rise while unions demanded 20%. When no agreement was reached, government proposed a 16% rise to 522,000 mt (\$32). This was accepted by the trade union

federation OTM, which called the general strike. It soon became clear that the strike would have wide backing, and at the last minute the government agreed to a rise of 26% in the minimum wage, to 568,980 mt (\$35) per month, and this was accepted by OTM. However, government wages above the minimum wage raise only by 16%. The agricultural minimum rises from 352,350 mt to 382,625 mt (\$24).

## **First local finance reports**

The 2000 national budget gives the first indication of the spending of the 33 city and town councils elected in 1998. These towns and cities raised 69% of their own revenue, through fees. Central government transfers, still only on a per capita basis, accounted for the remaining 31%.

The 33 councils had total current spending of \$12 million and capital spending of \$16 million (of which \$4 million and \$11 million were in Maputo). The town which had the smallest revenue and spent the least was Metangula, in Niassa, which had revenue and expenditure of \$31,000, of which 75% came from central government.

Moatize, where the by-election should have been held, spent \$76,000 (one-fifth of the cost of the proposed election), of which it raised 48 per cent.

Without comment, the central government has removed one source of local revenue. Municipalities were to receive 30 per cent of the national tourism tax (on hotel bills, etc), which would have helped local governments to pay for infrastructure required by tourists. But in the 2000 budget, the government abolished the tourism tax because there is already value added tax on all tourist expenditures.

No provision had ever been made to transfer part of the tax to local government, but it leaves a potential revenue gap for coastal and other tourist cities.

## **Mozambique web pages**

The number of Mozambique-related web pages is growing rapidly.

The best directory of them is created by Wim Neeleman and has a new web address:

<http://www.mol.co.mz/>

It has subdirectories on economy, elections, tourism, human rights, etc. The list is updated regularly.

Also very good is the Mozambique web page produced by the university computer center – CIUEM - Centro de Informática da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

<http://www.mozambique.mz/>

The Mozambique News Agency (AIM) does a daily news summary in Portuguese, with an archive going back to the beginning of the year:

<http://www.sortmoz.com/aimnews/>

[Portuguese/menu\\_de\\_noticias.htm](http://www.sortmoz.com/aimnews/Portuguese/menu_de_noticias.htm)

For up to date information on the floods and their aftermath, in Portuguese

<http://www.mozambique.mz/cheias/index.htm>

and in English

<http://www.mozambique.mz/floods/index.htm>

Addresses, telephone & fax numbers (and some web pages and e-mail addresses) for all ministries:

- Even the telephone directory is on-line:  
<http://t.dia.moz.gov.mz/>

## Book reviews

### UN report highlights regional differences

*Mozambique National Human Development Report 1999* / *Mozambique Relatório Nacional do Desenvolvimento Humano 1999*, UNDP & SARDC, Maputo, July 2000. (Editor António Gumende, Co-editor António Francisco) Available from the UNDP office in Maputo.

Perhaps the most important book to be published this year in Mozambique, this report graphically shows the large differences in Mozambique and outlines in stark terms just how Maputo-centred the economy and growth is.

Just a few statistics comparing Maputo city with the poorest and least development province, Zambézia, tell the story:

- A girl child born today in Zambézia province is likely to live to be 55 years old; a girl child born in Maputo city will live to be 61, and a girl child born in the industrialised countries will live to be nearly 80.

- Maputo city is classified as "medium human development" with a UNDP human development index of 0.60 (on a scale from 0 to 1), which puts it on a level with Botswana, Egypt or Algeria. Zambézia has a human development index of 0.176, far below even Sierra Leone, which has the lowest national index in the world (at 0.252).

- Per capita income in Maputo city is \$1426 – 12 times the Zambézia level of \$134. And at the present rate of growth, Zambézia will never catch up, because growth in Zambézia is the lowest in the country. In the two years 1997-98, per capita income in Zambézia increased by 532 (29%) while in Maputo it rose \$352 (25%). In other words, Maputo city's increase was triple the entire per capita income of Zambézia.

- Maputo, with 6% of the population, accounts for 34% of the national GDP, while Zambézia, with 19% of the population, produces 11% of the GDP.

The report also produces a Human Poverty Index disaggregated by province, which shows much sharper divisions than the government's own study published five years ago (reviewed below). Both studies show about 60% of Mozambicans living in poverty. The government study showed a range from 48% in Maputo city to 88% in Sofala. The UN study shows a range from only 21% of Maputo city's residents living in poverty to 68% in Cabo Delgado. The government study showed poverty concentrated in the centre and the two provinces (Tete, Sofala and Inhambane), with 80% living in poverty, while the UN study shows a clear increase in poverty as you move north, from 37% in Maputo province to 52% in Inhambane, only 55% in Sofala to 65% in Zambézia and 68% in Cabo Delgado.

The report also challenges the growing emphasis on peasant farm income by arguing that wage labour is far more important than previously stated as a source of income and that the number of wage labourers is significantly understated. Raising wages and creating jobs must play a more central role in any development strategy.

The IMF and World Bank repeatedly stress Mozambique's high rate of growth, but this report shows that too much of that growth is staying in Maputo. More intervention will be required if the gap between Maputo and the rest of the country is not to continue to grow.

*Understanding Poverty and Well Being in Mozambique, the First National Assessment (1996-97)*, Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF), Eduardo Mondlane University, and International Food Policy Research Institute, Dec 1998. (Available from MPF, also in Portuguese.)

Based on the 1996-97 National Household Survey of more than 8000 families, this is the first attempt to determine levels and depths of poverty. It takes into account families' own production. The study develops different poverty lines for urban and rural areas in each province, based on essential food and non-food consumption. This ranged from a poverty line of 3359 MT per person per day in rural Nampula (in late 1996 this was 29 US cents per day) to 8714 MT in urban Maputo province (then 75 US cents per day). By contrast, the UNDP Human Development Report defines human poverty not by income or consumption but by levels of deprivation relating to malnutrition, access of clean water, etc. This report also does a very interesting provincial breakdown of poverty and extreme poverty.

The report is interesting because it challenges the traditional links between female headed households and extreme poverty. And it is useful for a whole range of other inquiry data ranging from education to how many cashew trees families have.

*Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, Government of Mozambique, 16 Feb 2000, incorporating the *Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty*, Dec 1999. Available on the IMF website:  
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pfp/2000/moz/01/index.htm>

Rushed through without public consultation to meet IMF demands, the interim PRSP is now subject to public debate before it will be agreed as a final document later this year. Both documents recognise the regional differences highlighted in the UN Mozambique Human Development Report, but do not explain how the actions proposed will redress those imbalances. The Action Plan provides detailed, albeit modest, targets for the next five years. But these are nearly all for continuations of ongoing policies.

- The 29 March 2000 Decision Point Document for the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative is also available on-line:

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2000/moz.pdf>

## Election literature

*Eleitorado Incaptável*, ed Carlos Serra. Livraria Universitária. Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. 19999.

Carlos Serra's excellent study of the 1998 local elections, reviewed in *Bulletin* 23, has now been published as a book.

*Mozambique Election Update 99*. Electoral Institute of South Africa. [jpottie@eisa.org.za](mailto:jpottie@eisa.org.za). <http://www.eisa.org.za>

EISA's equivalent of this *Bulletin*. Issue 5 (April), for example, has an interesting and detailed article on the national election campaign in Manica.

## Chissano names new government

President Joaquim Chissano has named a larger cabinet, with 24 ministers. Three are women. Only 6 ministers retain their posts, while 2 shift to new ministries; 4 vice-ministers are promoted and there are 12 new faces.

Several ministries have been rearranged:

- Agriculture & Fishing becomes Agriculture & Rural Development, while Fishing becomes a separate ministry.
- Industry & Commerce are in one ministry, while Tourism is separated into its own ministry.
- Culture becomes one ministry and Youth & Sport another
- Education remains a ministry, but a new ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology is created

The Social Action Ministry becomes the Ministry of Women & Social Action.

## List of new ministers

Taken in part from:

<http://www.mozambique.mz/governo/membros.htm>

The 24 ministers and their previous positions are:

- Prime Minister (*Primeiro Ministro*), Pascoal Manuel Mocumbi: no change
- State Administration (*Administração Estatal*), José António da Conceição Chichava; member of Maputo local assembly (city council)
- Agriculture & Rural Development (*Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural*), Helder dos Santos Felix Monteiro (formerly Muteia); was vice-minister.
- Old Soldiers (*Agentes dos Antigos Combatentes*), António Hama Thay
- Interior, and Minister in the Presidency for Defence & Security Affairs (*Interior: Ministro na Presidência para Assuntos da Defesa e Segurança*), Almerino da Cruz Marcos Manhengo; no change.
- Industry & Commerce (*Indústria e Comércio*), Carlos Alberto Sampaio Morjado; was member of National Election Commission (CNE) and vice-president of the national airline LAM (*vice-Presidente do Conselho de Administração das Linhas Aereas de Moçambique*).
- Environment (*Coordenação da Acção Ambiental*), John William Kachanilla; was Minister of Minerals and Energy.

• Culture (*Cultura*), Miguel Costa Mkaima; was director of National Art Museum (*Museu Nacional de Arte*)

• Defence (*Defesa Nacional*), Tobias Joaquim Dai; was retired general and secretary-general of the Defence Ministry.

• Education (*Educação*), Alcido Eduardo Nguenha; was member of parliamentary Permanent Commission (*Comissão Permanente da Assembleia da República*) and head of the Pedagogic University.

• Higher Education, Science & Technology (*Ensino Superior, Ciência e Tecnologia*), Lídia Maria Ribeiro Arthur Brito; was recently appointed academic vice-rector of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM).

• Justice (*Justiça*), José Ibraimo Abudo; no change.

• Youth & Sport (*Juventude e Desportos*), Joel Matias Libombo; was vice-minister.

• Women & Social Action (*Mulher e Coordenação da Acção Social*), Virgília Bernarda Neto Alexandre dos Santos Matabele, was deputy-leader of Frelimo bench in parliament.

• Foreign & Cooperation (*Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação*), Leonardo Santos Simão; no change.

• Public Works & Housing (*Obras Públicas e Habitação*), Roberto Costley-White; no change.

• Fishing (*Pescas*), Cadmiel Muthemba

• Planning & Finance (*Plano e Finanças*), Luísa Diogo; was vice-minister.

• Minerals & Energy (*Recursos Minerais e Energia*), Castigo José Correia Langa; was vice-minister.

• Health (*Saúde*), Francisco Ferreira Songana; doctor and was head of Beira central hospital.

• Labour (*Trabalho*), Mário Lampião Sevene; was member of parliament.

• Transport & Communications (*Transportes e Comunicações*), Tomás Augusto Salomão; was Minister of Planning & Finance.

• Minister in the Presidency for Parliamentary & Diplomatic Affairs (*Ministro na Presidência para os Assuntos Parlamentares e Diplomáticos*), Francisco Caetano Madeira; no change.

• Tourism (*Turismo*), Fernando Sumbana Junior; was director of Investment Promotion Centre (*Centro de Promoção de Investimentos*)

## Vice-ministers

• State Administration, Aiuba Cureneia

• Agriculture & Rural Development, João Manuel Zamith Carrilho

• Environment, Francisco Mabjaia

• Culture, Luis António Covane

• Defence, Henrique Alberto Banze

• Justice, António Eduardo Munete

• Foreign & Cooperation, Frances V. Rodrigues and Hipólito Pereira Patrício

• Construction & Housing, Henrique Constantino Cossa

• Fishing, Alfredo Massinga

• Plan & Finance, Manuel Chang

• Minerals & Energy, Esperança Bias

• Health, Aida Theodomira Libombo

• Labour, Adelaide Ancha Amurane

• Transport & Communications António Fernando

• Women & Social Action, Luciano de Castro