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Local election fiasco

Fewer than 15% of voters turned out in the first-ever local elections on 30 June. The election was also marked by poor organisation which meant late opening of many polling stations. Even though the number of voters was far fewer than expected, the National Election Commission still took two days longer than the 15 allowed by law to compile and announce the results.

Excessive bureaucracy and lack of information reduced the number of candidates and of observers. There were also indications of fraud and intimidation.

Renamo and many of the smaller parties which stood in the 1994 national elections called for a boycott of the local elections, and used the two-week campaign period to promote the boycott in the same way as other groups campaigned for their candidates.

The boycott meant Frelimo candidates for president were unopposed in 19 of 33 cities. For assembly there were contests in only 6 cities.

Frelimo won the presidencies and majorities in the assemblies in all 33 cities and towns. But independent citizens lists will have significant numbers of seats in the assemblies of the three biggest cities: Maputo, Beira and Matola.

The election campaign ran smoothly, without violence, and with general good will -- although with

little enthusiasm, already pointing to a low turnout. Coverage by the national Radio Mozambique was balanced, and fair coverage was given to the boycott campaign. The state owned press was biased toward Frelimo but gave coverage to the opposition -- both those standing and those boycotting; the private press was largely against Frelimo.

On election day, polling station staff in general were well trained and carried out their jobs well, as they had done in 1994. Indeed, polling station staff seemed upset at the low turnout and poor organisation at a national level.

Problems with the local elections have led to promises by Minister of State Administration Alfredo Gamito that in the next three months there will be a wide-ranging and public debate about the electoral law for 1999 national elections. This will include discussions about the CNE (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*; National Election Commission) and STAE (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*; Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration), which came under heavy criticism, even by Frelimo.

"We have all witnessed the disorganisation of the election process. It was public and everyone saw it. And it was not due to a lack of resources," Amélia Sumbane, external relations secretary of the Frelimo Central Committee, told *Notícias* (18 July).

Inside

Fraud in
Dondo

page 3

Candidates
excluded

page 6

Diplomats
break the law

page 9

Toward 1999

page 11

Comment:

Why did people refuse to vote?

The very high abstention rate surprised everyone, including the boycott campaigners. It seems clear that people were actively refusing to vote; polling day was an official holiday, and people made good use of the free time, often walking past polling stations on their way to the market. But the reasons for the very high abstention are the subject of intense debate.

The boycott and the consequent lack of a contest in many areas, plus a lack of understanding of the role of the new local governments, played a role in reducing the vote. The very late opening of polling stations in Maputo and Beira had an impact -- when faced with closed polling stations, many people who were already unenthusiastic about voting simply went away and did not come back.

'A warning of serious danger'

Excerpts from a letter to the editor, *Notícias*, 14 July, 1998, from João Machungo

"... Some in parliament show a total lack of respect for the voters who [in 1994] left their domestic concerns and patiently formed kilometre-long queues and suffered while waiting to vote. Can this be a true democracy? And what can we expect from the general elections of 1999? Take care!

We have had a warning of serious danger from the 30 June local elections -- a warning not directed only at Frelimo, as some think, but at all politicians of this fine country ...

If Frelimo is to win the 1999 elections, it must make a series of radical shifts, and some of the changes will affect some of those who are trying to sabotage the party. ... Frelimo has to interest itself more in the people -- listen to the people and feel their needs. ...

Frelimo even needs to listen to the opinions of its grand opponents; it needs to accept criticism and not just listen to praise. ...

The leaders of the opposition must start by being more measured in their language, because arrogant speeches, shrill statements, and threats to do this or that will lead them to lose credibility. For example, anyone who threatens to return to the bush at this time simply blackens their own image. ... We want a country with men of peace."

But it is important to note that turnout was very low in Maputo, Beira and Nacala, where there were highly publicised contests. In Maputo the boycotting parties have little influence, and Renamo rallies to call for a boycott were as poorly attended as other political meetings.

In Beira Frelimo sent one of its big guns, Armando Guebuza, to organise its campaign, and STAE ran an advertising campaign to urge people to vote. Some high Renamo officials supported the independent campaign of former governor Francisco Masquil. Yet turnout was still only 10%.

A commonly heard comment of people who did not vote was: "We voted in 1994 and it did not make any difference; our lives have not improved." Economic issues and corruption were often cited: the elite has prospered but the people feel poorer.

Many people also criticised the failure of the "chiefs" to reach an agreement; some compared it to a fight between parents where children do not want to take sides.

For many people, abstention was a conscious political act. It was not support for the boycott, but rather a rejection of all political parties. This was a sophisticated use of the democratic process in which the people voted "no". It was a message to the political elite that the people were withdrawing their backing from an electoral process that had not brought them any gains.

Independent voice

Independent candidates for municipal president won 40% of the votes in Beira and Manhiça and 30% in Maputo, Inhambane and Nacala. Full results are printed at the end of this *Bulletin*.

Despite the boycott, one small party (PT, Partido Trabalhista, Labour Party) and one coalition of small parties (RUMO, Resistência de Unidade Moçambicana, United Mozambican Resistance) won seats on local councils. Four citizens groups also won seats: JPC, Juntos Pela Cidade, Together for the City; GRM, Grupo de Reflexão e Mudanças, Reflection and Change Group; OCINA, Organização de Candidaturas Independentes de Nacala-Porto, Organisation of Independent Candidates of Nacala-Port; and NATURMA, Grupo dos Naturais e Residentes de Vila da Manhiça, Group of Manhiça Natives and Residents.

Assembly seats in the six contested cities are:

Beira: Frelimo 27, GRM 17

Manhiça: Frelimo 8, Naturma 5

Maputo: Frelimo 42, JPC 15, PT 1, Rumo 1

Matola: Frelimo 36, Rumo 7

Nacala: Frelimo 28, Ocina 11

Xai Xai: Frelimo 28, PT 3

Full details of the election results also appear on the web site www.mozambique.mz/eleicoes.

Ballot box stuffing in Dondo?

There is strong evidence of ballot box stuffing in Dondo, apparently because of a mistaken belief that the election would only be valid if more than 50% of the registered electors voted.

In Dondo Frelimo was unopposed, so there were no poll watchers from other parties in polling stations.

Just before 6 pm at polling station 3680A in the 7 de Abril primary school, with no voters present, a staff member was seen putting a folded ballot paper into a ballot box. Another staff member, realising that they had been seen, put a pad on top of several other folded ballot papers on her table and covered the pad with her arms -- but three folded ballot papers could be seen sticking out beyond the pad, and another had fallen at her feet.

A closer look at the statistics for Dondo suggests this was not an isolated incident. By law, a record of the results (*editais*) must be posted at each polling station, and these were inspected where possible the following day. During the day the turnout in Dondo was low, with no queues and relatively few people voting. Many polling stations reported turnouts of 20% or less, yet adjoining polling stations reported turnouts of over 80%.

Voters are given numbered tickets as they enter the polling station; these tickets have no legal standing and are intended for control of queues. It is possible that when there were no queues, the door control staff stopped giving out tickets, but *Bulletin* writers elsewhere found that the number of tickets given out corresponded closely to the actual number of voters. For example, at the Centro Emissor polling centre in Dondo, no more than 110 people voted at any of the five polling stations, and the number of tickets handed out by 4.40 pm was always within two of the number of people said on the *editais* to have voted.

At Escola Primaria Macharote numbered tickets showed that no more than 20 people had voted at any polling station by 9.30 am. On our return at 5.20 pm staff refused to show the books of numbered tickets, but we could still see them and none showed more than 100 voters. There were no queues and no great surge of voters. Yet the posted totals showed that polling stations at the school claimed 200-434 voters -- enough to have caused queues for much of the day. Polling station 3721 showed a 91% turnout.

Contributors

This local election special issue of the *Bulletin* is based on contributions by Inez Hackenberg, Obede Baloi, Tamme Hansma, Guido van Hecken, George Siemensma, Lucia van den Bergh, Alfredo Mueche and Joseph Hanlon.

At primary school 7 de Abril, we were present from 5.40 to 6.40 pm. During this period, only 10 people came to vote at the 17 polling stations. Indeed, some polling stations closed at 6 pm on schedule, started counting, and reopened at 6.20 pm when someone came with a radio and told staff of the extension to 8 pm. By 6.30 pm, polling station 5303B had handed out 48 numbered tickets, but the *editais* showed 302 voters. Similarly, station 5309A, 48 tickets and 473 recorded voters, and station 5309B, 53 and 300.

Another indication of problems is a variation between the numbers of votes for president and for assembly. Throughout the country, voters were given two ballot papers and were watched as they deposited them in the two ballot boxes; anyone who only deposited one ballot paper was reminded of the second one. Thus the number of ballot papers in the two ballot boxes rarely differs by more than one. Two *editais* at Macharote showed differences of 22 and 5. Other *editais* in Dondo showed differences of 3 to 5.

There were also wide variations in the number of valid votes between president and assembly. In some cities such as Angoche where there was a choice for president but not for assembly, people did turn in blank votes for assembly. But in Dondo both ballot papers were identical with only a box for Frelimo, and therefore differences of more than 70 in valid votes must be seen as surprising.

On the day after the election, when we were checking the *editais*, we met a polling station president who we had seen the day before. He said the press should know that results had been falsified.

Finally, Dondo was the only one of the 33 cities which reported a turnout of over 50%.

None of this proves that ballot box stuffing took place. But the circumstantial evidence is very strong.

Guido van Hecken

- In Beira the *delegado de lista* for the independent candidate Francisco Masquil complained to a national observer that at polling station 5367B (Chota), four people were allowed to vote who were not on the electoral roll. Observers did not further investigate and no formal complaint was made.

Maputo 'errors'

The importance of parties monitoring the whole process was underlined by Mario Ussene who monitored the final counting and computerisation process for Juntos Pela Cidade.

He said that their delegados (poll watchers) had signed the final reports of each polling station, as encouraged by the electoral law, and had done their own parallel count.

The individual polling station reports (*actas*) at CNE/STAE in Maputo were correct and were the ones their delegados had signed, but Ussene found that when the results were being keyed in to the computers, the typists sometimes typed zeros for the votes at polling stations. Coincidentally, this only seemed to occur at polling stations where JPC had done well. Ussene raised this informally with STAE, and corrections were made. JPC's final vote was close to what their own count had shown, Ussene said.

Ussene said that this was not raised in the press at the time, and that no formal protest will be made about poor polling day organisation even though the late opening probably cost JPC votes.

"We want to participate — not to protest and object," he said.

Comment: Keeping watch

The importance of transparency and of party poll watchers (*delegados*) is underlined by both the Dondo and Maputo incidents. It is because the process is transparent throughout and can be monitored by parties that these two cases came to light.

Indeed, if the opposition had participated in Dondo, fraud would have been impossible, because you cannot stuff a ballot box if there are poll watchers from more than one party.

The incidents in Dondo and Maputo show that it is possible to collect evidence and to prevent misconduct. That means that vague allegations of fraud are unacceptable; claims must be backed up by proof. The opposition is now claiming that there was fraud in 1994, when this was clearly not the case.

Mozambique's electoral system remains more transparent and less subject to abuse than in many other countries. Parties will need to learn to use this transparency to ensure the credibility of the process, rather than trying to undermine it with false claims.

Pressure in Angoche

Strong campaigns by Renamo for a boycott and by Frelimo to encourage people to vote led to tension and some fear in a few places, including Angoche, Chimoio and Dondo.

In one of only two court actions in this election, 10 Renamo sympathisers were sentenced to 3 to 6 months in prison for taking voters cards away from people in Angoche, on the coast of Nampula province. Following this, Renamo repeatedly said that Frelimo had said that people would be jailed if they

did not vote. We could find no one who had been directly told this, but many believed the rumour.

Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama closed his boycott campaign in Angoche on 27 June, where he alluded to the rumour when he said "we will not let the police go after you."

The Frelimo response was to distribute *senhas* to the population. These were 7 cm square slips of paper torn from sheets of official government paper, with a stamp of the district administrator's office on them. In some cases the slips of paper were handed out door to door by neighbourhood secretaries, who are normally Frelimo party members, and had the address of the house written on them. The purpose of these *senhas* seemed unclear to everyone -- various people said they were to be turned in to polling station staff, to Frelimo poll watchers (*delegados de lista*) in the polling station, or returned to the neighbourhood secretary as proof of voting.

We saw a number of the *senhas* in polling stations, but staff were clearly refusing to accept them. In polling station 0038B (Mosseril primary school) a staff member told of one voter who demanded that the staff stamp his *senha*, because he was "afraid of the government". When the staff refused, he used the ink on his finger (which proved he had voted) to put his fingerprint on the *senha*.

When a poll watcher from the independent candidate came up to us outside one polling station (2018A, Emopesca) to complain about the *senhas*, the president of the polling station and the Frelimo poll watcher both tried to discourage him from talking to us.

Turnout in Angoche was slightly higher than elsewhere, and we could feel a sense of fear in some people. In some polling stations there were a higher than normal number of blank votes, which suggests that some people felt under pressure to vote.

In Dondo in Sofala province the *Bulletin* found a similar sense of fear in some people. At Consito voting centre, the presiding officer at one polling station came after us to talk, and said "people here are afraid". There had also been strong campaigns for and against voting. There was a widespread rumour in Dondo, which we could not confirm, that Frelimo had given out sugar to people, who were expected to "show their gratitude" by going to the neighbourhood secretary to show the ink on their index finger to prove that they had voted.

In Chimoio there was also some fear. A local journalist reported that Renamo members had gone to local bars where they bought people beer and then said "we will know from the ink on your finger if you have voted, and if we see that, we will cut off the finger." As Renamo had done similar things during the war, this was not seen as an idle threat. Another journalist said Renamo had threatened its own members to ensure they did not vote.

Lost keys & late start

Polling began late in all the major cities as a distribution system which had worked well in 1994 collapsed this time. Some polling stations did not open until late afternoon, and only then after officials broke open locks to get to the materials. Polling was extended for two extra hours -- from 6 pm to 8 pm -- to try to compensate, but the announcement was made so late that many voters and polling station staff were unaware of the extension.

Each register of 500 voters corresponds to a polling station (*assembleia de voto*); polling stations are then grouped into centres. Frequently schools are used, with each classroom holding a polling station.

All the materials for each polling station -- ballot boxes, voting booths, ballot papers, register, etc -- were pre-packed in a metal trunk, known as a "kit". The locked kits were to be delivered to polling centres the night before and guarded by police. In the morning, they were to be distributed to the polling stations with the keys. Polling was to start at 7 am.

Ballot boxes and some other materials were reused from 1994, while ballot papers and new materials

were printed in Europe and shipped to Mozambique. The last set of material, for Matola and Maputo, arrived a week late -- the evening before the election, and staff had to spend all night packing kits. Some kits were only distributed in Maputo after 11 am.

But the real delay in many cities was caused by a failure to distribute the keys. For example, at the 21 October primary school opposite Xipamanine market in Maputo, no one from STAE ever visited or brought keys. Finally at 2 pm the heads of the 13 polling stations met and most decided to break open the locks, so voting started at 3 pm. One polling station head was at first unwilling to break open the lock; his polling station (11961) only opened at 4 pm.

The head of polling station 6763a said: "Some people came in the morning and went away. They said: 'why is the government playing games with us.' We finally decided we had to break open the kits."

Although no instructions were ever given to break locks, this story was repeated throughout Maputo.

In Beira, Nampula, Matola and other places, polling stations did not open until late morning or even the afternoon because of problems with keys. There were also problems with late delivery of kits, even though materials had arrived on time.

Many kits were missing materials. Most common problems were a lack of glue to post the sample ballot paper and the final results, only one stamp pad for people to vote by fingerprint even though there were two voting booths, and no kerosene for the lamps (or in Maputo, no lamps). In Mozambique in June, it becomes dark by 5.30 pm and many schools, even in Maputo, have no electricity.

Ballot boxes are supposed to be sealed with plastic ties, but the ties were too thick to fit through the holes in the ballot boxes. President Joaquim Chissano was shown on television putting his vote into an unsealed ballot box.

Polling stations are supposed to be at the same place people registered. But in Beira, Nampula, Angoche and elsewhere there were cases of polling stations being unexpectedly moved, sometimes several kilometres; often voters could not be bothered to waste another hour and simply did not go to the new location. There were also reports of registers in the wrong place.

Some registers had missing pages, and there were numerous instances of people's voting cards not corresponding to what was written in the register. This probably resulted from the fact that all of the registers had been re-written by hand.

Hiring of STAE and polling station staff appears to have been poorly controlled. In some places, few people with experience of the 1994 elections were hired. In a few polling stations, the entire staff was

Who and What

The election took place in all 23 cities of Mozambique and in 10 towns [vilas]. The new local government structure is almost identical to the national government -- each city has an elected **municipal president** (also called the council president, and equivalent to a mayor) and an elected **assembly** (a local parliament). The municipal president then chooses local ministers (known as *vereadores*) who then head various departments. The municipal president and his ministers are called the municipal council. The assembly also elects a president (in an unfortunate confusion of terminology). The division of powers between the municipal president and the assembly are the same at local level as at national level.

The election was controlled by the **CNE** (*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*; National Election Commission) which is independent and has a five year mandate. Its president is Dr Leonardo Simbine and its members were appointed by Frelimo and Renamo. The election was administered by the full time staff of **STAE** (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*; Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration).

Angoche shows what is possible

While STAE was chaotic in the big cities, it often did well in the small ones. In Angoche the local STAE director had worked on the 1994 elections and he ensured that 80% of his polling station staff had experience either of the 1994 election or the 1997 registration campaign.

Polling stations opened on time in Angoche. All polling stations had lamps and paraffin. All staff received a packed lunch and were paid during the morning. During the afternoon, STAE made an attempt to transport polling station staff to their own polling stations so they could vote.

Angoche showed that it was possible to organise the process well.

from a single family, with at least one member below voting age.

On the other hand, the training of polling station staff was good and their conduct was widely praised.

Payments to polling station staff was delayed in some places; there were demonstrations in Maputo and some staff withheld election materials and results until they were paid.

Polling station staff complained that in most places STAE did not give them any food, even though they had to work from 4 am until past midnight. Staff assumed they would be given lunch since they were given lunch during training sessions. The STAE national office said no lunch was promised, but it also failed to tell staff they had to bring their own food. Polling station staff received MT 200,000 to MT 375,000 (\$17 to \$31).

There was also no planning as to how polling stations were to be set up. Sometimes tents had been erected, but in some cases staff arrived at 5 am to find that they had to construct huts. There had been no consideration of furniture, and staff had to borrow a tables and chairs from neighbouring houses; in some cases voting booths were put on the ground.

Staff could not vote

The law for the local elections only permitted people to vote at the polling station in which they were registered. In contrast to 1994, it made no provision for polling station staff and party poll watchers to vote at the polling station to which they were assigned. Probably more than 30,000 people working on the election lost their right to vote.

In some places, staff who were working near their own polling station simply took time off and went to

vote (which was easier due to the low turnout). In other places, staff ignored the new rules and followed 1994 procedure -- writing their names in the official record and voting where they were working. There was total inconsistency, with polling stations in adjoining classrooms of a school taking different actions.

Paper chase excludes candidates

Excessive bureaucracy, confusion about the rules, and a lack of information -- as well as unexpected problems with the electoral law itself -- reduced the participation by independent citizens lists and restricted observation.

Serious independent candidates in Nampula, Inhambane, Quelimane and elsewhere failed to assemble the required paperwork in time. In most cases rules were correctly applied, but bureaucracy combined with lack of information proved insurmountable for many would-be politicians.

Two requirements in the electoral law (6/97) proved difficult. The first is the requirement (art 115) that lists for assembly contain one-and-a-half times as many names as there are seats in the assembly. For Maputo, this means candidates for all 59 seats plus 30 supplementary candidates (*suplentes*).

This proved impossible for many small parties, and seems pointless if a small party only expects to win a few seats. Most European countries have no such requirement.

The UD, the only small party in the national assembly, wanted to have lists in all 33 cities and towns, but only found enough people to fill a list in Catandica, one of the smallest villages to have an election. For Maputo, the UD could only find 36 of the necessary 89 candidates.

The other problem was the requirement (art 3, 12) that every candidate submit seven pieces of paper:

- authenticated photocopy of an identity card;
- certificate that the candidate has no criminal record;
- proof of electoral registration, as well as, separately,
- an authenticated photocopy of the voters registration card;
- proof of residence for six months in the city in which the person is to be a candidate;
- a statement that the person is willing to be a candidate; and
- a declaration by the candidate that they are eligible to stand.

For people in small towns and cities, obtaining photocopies and having them authenticated (notarised) often requires a trip to the provincial capital. Many people had trouble obtaining the

"The delay is the results meant that the CNE itself did not meet the deadlines laid down by the election law, yet it excluded people who wanted to participate by imposing the deadlines very strictly".

Mário Ussene, candidate for "Juntos Pela Cidade", quoted in *Notícias*, 17 July 1998

certificate of no criminal record.

The law is clear and was passed a year before the election took place. The rules were published by the CNE in *Notícias*, the Maputo daily newspaper, on 21 February, with the deadline for submission of 16 March in the provincial capital or Maputo. With the delay in the elections, the CNE announced on 21 March a new deadline of 16 April.

But lack of information proved a severe problem, and led to errors by candidates. *Notícias* does not reach all parts of the country and arrives days late in others, which meant that many potential candidates had no official information or had it too late. There were many complaints of no one being present in the local offices of STAE (*Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*; Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration), or that they could not answer questions. STAE offices sometimes did not have copies of regulations and did not even post copies of announcements which had appeared as advertisements in *Notícias*.

The law allows several extra days for the correction of "formal irregularities" but the interpretation of this was unclear. Many candidates assumed they would have this as an extra chance to fill gaps in the paperwork, but the CNE in its 21 February statement said that provincial offices of STAE could only accept submissions if they contained "all of the documents required by law".

Several lists were rejected even though they were only missing a few pieces of paper. This links directly to the need for full lists; in many cases local groups had organised the required documentation for a nearly complete list -- for many more people than they had any hope of having elected.

Some flexibility was shown, but this, too proved confusing. In Nampula STAE accepted lists without the criminal certificate so long as the submission included the receipt to show the certificate had been applied for, but not if no receipt was included. Agueda de Sousa who attempted to stand for president in Nampula complained that it was hard to get information from STAE and that her application was rejected even though it was nearly complete.

In Quelimane, the complaint was different. Local members of the small party FAP decided to ignore the boycott supported by the national officers of their

party. On 14 April, three days before the deadline, they submitted their list to the local STAE. They complained to the *Bulletin* that their papers were accepted by STAE and they were only told after the deadline that some criminal record certificates were missing and so the application would not be submitted to the CNE in Maputo. The group argued that if it had been told on the day of submission, it might have had sufficient time to fill the gaps -- or they could have provided the receipts from the applications for the certificates, if they had been told that was an option.

● **Comment:** Ponderous requirements and unhelpful staff clearly benefit the big parties who are better organised; they can start earlier and have the resources to chase after missing bits of paper. The procedures were especially hard on genuinely independent candidates who have difficulty taking time off work to chase documents, and cannot afford to pay others to do it for them.

In the present-day conditions of Mozambique, with a very slow bureaucracy, transport difficulties, and generalised lack of information, it is simply impractical to demand seven pieces of official paper from each candidate.

As well as simplifying the rules, it should be a requirement that all regulations are posted in all STAE offices well enough in advance to be useful. And where flexibility is introduced, as with criminal record certificates, these changes should be clearly communicated to everyone.

Few observers

Observation is the key to preventing misconduct, but the CNE and STAE made observation by parties and independent observers difficult.

Independent observation by national organisations was authorised by regulations issued 20 January, which required applications 15 days before the start of the electoral campaign (1 May, later 1 June). Many groups started training and began organising observer teams, but awaited instructions as to how to apply for credentials. No information on observers was included in the electoral calendars published by CNE (on 6 February and 4 April).

Local STAE offices were unable to provide information, and said they did not have copies of the observer regulations. The OJM (*Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*; Mozambican Youth Organisation) centralised its applications for observers in Maputo, and officials went repeatedly to the STAE office where they were only given limited and insufficient information.

Only on Thursday 28 May did the CNE announce in *Notícias* that applications had to be submitted to CNE in the Maputo or to provincial STAE offices by

Monday 1 June. Applications required two things not specified in the 20 January regulations: a photo of each observer and "proof of Mozambican nationality" (which usually means a notarised photocopy of the identity card).

Even in Maputo, this was too short notice. FECIV (Fórum de Educação Cívica; Civic Education Forum) had intended to register more than 50 observers. "It was hard to find everyone and get photos and copies of identity documents during a weekend," said Domingos Bonate of FECIV.

OJM never registered anyone. FECIV registered only 13 of its people. Despite the late announcement, STAE in Maputo was relatively inflexible. It accepted applications on the Tuesday but rejected an application by FECIV for further people on Wednesday 3 June, Bonate said.

It was even harder outside Maputo. An NGO Coalition in Quelimane, FONGZA, had trained observers. Jorge Berto de Sousa said that they only heard the application rules on the radio on Sunday 31 May, and one day was simply too little time to collect the documents.

In the end only 212 observers were accredited for the 4132 polling stations. Of these, 97 were in Maputo city. Indeed, only two groups succeeding in registering observers outside Maputo -- the Christian Council (Conselho Cristão de Moçambique) with 79 people in six provinces, and the Catholic University (Universidade Católica de Moçambique) with 42 in Sofala.

The regulations also allowed the recognition as individual observers of "personalities of recognised experience and prestige". CNE never announced how this would be decided; two were approved and some rejected.

In Maputo, although lists were submitted by organisations, credentials had to be collected by the individual, and groups were not told this until the day before voting when credentials were finally ready. This meant some observers did not have credentials in time for the opening of polling stations.

With respect to press, no rules were ever published. Press credentials were issued in Maputo a few days before the voting; outside Maputo many journalists went around polling stations without official CNE credentials.

For party poll watchers (*delegados de lista*), the procedure was simpler and clearer. Parties only had to submit a list of names (and no photographs) and the deadlines (14 May and then 15 June) were included in the published calendar.

The problem was that each of the several thousand letters issued to party poll watchers was to be signed by CNE president Simbine and there were substantial delays in sending out the letters. In Nampula there was an accusation of party bias in Maputo. All letters for Nampula province delegados

were signed in Maputo on 24 June; those for Frelimo arrived with the plane on Saturday morning 27 June and were distributed over the weekend; those for independents in Angoche and Nacala arrived in Nampula on Sunday and agents of the candidates had to go to Nampula to collect them on Monday. By Monday afternoon the letters for the delegados of the independent presidential candidate in Nampula, Eugénio Fátima, had still not arrived and he went on the local radio to say his delegados would go into polling stations the next day without credentials; he finally received the letters at 8 pm -- too late to distribute that night to many of his delegados.

● **Comment:** Excessive centralisation combined with delays in providing information surely reduced the observation of this election. There is no reason why provincial STAE offices cannot be authorised to issue press, observer and delegado credentials. Similarly there was no reason why the original observer regulations could not have included adequate instructions on how to apply for credentials.

Observer praise

National observer groups generally praised the candidates, voters and polling station staff, while not giving the election a full stamp of approval.

So far, two groups have published reports -- FECIV (Fórum de Educação Cívica; Civic Education Forum) and AMACO (Associação Moçambicana de Apoio a Comunidade; Mozambican Association to Support the Community). Two others, UCM (Universidade Católica de Moçambique; Mozambique Catholic University) and CCM (Conselho Cristão de Moçambique; Mozambique Christian Council) spoke to the *Bulletin* informally.

All stressed the civility of the process and the lack of violence and intimidation. All cited the success and transparency of the counting process in each polling station. Three groups covered the campaign and said it went smoothly.

But all mentioned problems. All cited the very low participation. All cited the organisational defects.

Most felt polling station staff acted well; Feciv felt better training was needed. Many observers said that instructions on folding the ballot paper were wrong in many places, leading to the possibility of smeared ballot papers were people voted with fingerprint.

The two formal reports are both cautious. AMACO said: "we conclude the elections were free and transparent, but refrain from commenting on the justice of them."

FECIV only concluded that the "elections occurred in an atmosphere of civility, calm and order". It also said that the elections were free of intimidation or pressure, and that the count in polling stations was conducted transparently. But FECIV pointedly declined to comment on justice or overall transparency.

Diplomats break election law

Following a decision by the CNE not to have international observers, the diplomatic community went ahead and organised an observation which it called an "information gathering exercise".

As one diplomat commented: "We paid for the process and we wanted to see what was going on."

The note circulated by the donors Local Elections Working Group said "we do not propose to seek concurrence of the government and/or the CNE." The note called for "a 'less visible' international presence", in part because of "the risk of an international presence being construed as lending credibility to the elections."

The process was loosely coordinated, with different embassies being assigned to areas where they had officials or projects. Observers included diplomats and their families as well as aid workers. They were not given any specific instructions as to Mozambican election law and procedures, and some of the observers violated the law.

US observers were told to look at "voter turnout", "violence" and "voter interference ... intimidation or harassment."

Because the law had no provision for this kind of foreign observation, some areas remained fuzzy. Diplomats broke the spirit if not the letter of the law.

For example, US observers were advised to talk to voters and election officials "at the sites". But the US notes did not remind observers that it is illegal for anyone to say how they voted within 1000 metres of a polling station and for the press to interview voters within 300 metres of a polling station. (art 48, 57) Thus the intent of the law is to stop outsiders from talking to voters, in order to prevent intimidation and maintain secrecy. A few embassies told their observers to stay 300 metres away, but this was largely ignored.

The law is clear that outsiders cannot enter polling stations, but this was interpreted very narrowly by diplomats. At the 7 de Setembro primary school in Maputo, a US diplomat was seen standing in the doorway of a classroom talking to polling station staff. The same occurred with a Dutch observer at Mutaunha primary school in Nampula.

In many areas, where polling stations were outside, diplomats walked close to the table with the polling station staff and to the voting booths.

The law does not precisely define the area that constitutes a polling station from which outsiders are excluded. But the polling station staff manual (*Manual dos Membros das Mesas das Assembleias de Voto*) includes as part of the polling station a "distribution zone" where the auxiliaries help voters to go to the correct polling station and a "waiting zone" for the queue. Where there are many polling stations in a set

of school classrooms, the entire schoolyard was treated as distribution and waiting zones, and auxiliaries were posted at the school gates to keep out non-voters. Some embassies told officials to stay out of schoolyards, but this was often ignored.

Dutch threat?

Claims that the Dutch Embassy made an illegal threat to a potential candidate in Nampula have been denied by the embassy.

Two of the potential three candidates for president in Nampula were on the Dutch payroll. Dionísio Cherewa worked in Nampula for the Dutch embassy; the embassy said he resigned when he became a Frelimo candidate.

A potential independent candidate, Agueda de Sousa, works for an ORAM project funded by the Dutch through the agency SNV. The embassy confirms that it sent a letter to SNV telling it to instruct ORAM to hold a meeting to consider de Sousa's position, on the grounds that to be a political candidate was in conflict with her job working on land reform. SNV objected and declined to do this.

The exact text of the embassy letter is disputed. Supporters of de Sousa say the letter asked ORAM to discuss dismissing de Sousa. The Dutch embassy denied this, and said the letter only asked that her transfer to other work be discussed. The embassy refused to release the text of the letter, however.

de Sousa's application to stand was rejected by STAE Nampula; she began a protest, but then withdrew it. It is not known if concern for her job affected her final decision.

The election law (Lei 6/97 art 148) explicitly makes it illegal to "dismiss or threaten to dismiss any citizen from their job [or to] apply any other sanction" to a person for participating in an election campaign. The penalty is six months to two years in jail.

Even to ask for de Sousa to be transferred could be seen as threatening an illegal sanction.

Comment: at home?

Even if no diplomat broke the precise letter of the electoral law, actions were provocative and against the spirit both of the law and of the decision not to have international observers. How would these

diplomats react if Mozambican embassy staff, spouses, children and aid workers in their countries pushed as far into polling stations in their countries as the letter of the law allowed? If a Mozambican embassy told a local staff member that serving on a local council was incompatible with their job?

The international community was arrogant and disrespectful to do things in Mozambique which they would consider inappropriate at home.

The long road to elections

Local elections were first planned for 1996 and were repeatedly delayed. First, the 1994 local government law was declared unconstitutional, so it required a constitutional amendment, approved in October 1996. A new package of local government laws, approved by parliament in April 1997, required elections in 1997, and these were set for 27 December. This proved impossible to meet, and they were postponed until 29 May.

Renamo walked out of the National Election Commission in January and in March said it would not participate in the elections. There were problems with registration, so in March it was decided to delay the elections until 30 June.

Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama made clear that he did not trust STAE, which was appointed by government (which named Renamo members to senior STAE posts). Dhlakama wanted to return to the 1994 position in which STAE as well as CNE had nominated representatives of the political parties.

This dispute had continued since the passage of the original legislation. Government argued that STAE was purely administrative, could be adequately overseen by Renamo members in CNE, and that there was a need to move forward from the special

circumstances of the 1992 peace accord and first 1994 elections.

Renamo countered that the state apparatus was still dominated by Frelimo, that Frelimo was making party political appointments to provincial STAEs, and thus that the special post-war conditions still applied. "STAE is Frelimo because the whole state apparatus is Frelimo," said Renamo president Dhlakama.

The confusion over the lost registration books (see *Bulletin* 20) led Renamo to argue that STAE was incompetent, corrupt and biased. However, Renamo then refused to participate in the correction of the registration books, even when provincial STAE offices made serious attempts to involve them.

In March it appeared that compromise was possible. Diplomats and church leaders talked to the government and Renamo, and in a 17 March press conference Dhlakama said that he wanted participation in STAE at local level and in the corrections to the register, but showed flexibility about how that would be done.

One church leader commented: "We had high expectations because the parties showed flexibility to move beyond the impasse. But from one day to the next, the positions hardened."

Dhlakama again demanded changes to the electoral law and the politicisation of STAE. CNE head Dr Leonardo Simbine thought he had negotiated the return of Renamo members to the CNE when this was suddenly overridden by Dhlakama.

Dhlakama on 16 April announced a boycott of the election; he was joined by the leaders of 15 of the tiny parties. Dhlakama continued to believe that the international community would not allow the elections to go ahead without Renamo, and Renamo continued to select and train candidates and poll watchers. Some in Renamo and many members of small parties outside Maputo opposed the boycott and claimed they were not consulted by leaders in Maputo.

In the end, both the elections and the boycott went ahead. During the two-week election campaign, Dhlakama toured the country with leaders of some of the small parties to campaign for abstention.

Party leader convicted

Miguel Mabote, president of the PT (Partido Trabalhista, Labour Party) was sentenced to six months in prison for violating the election law, according to the weekly *Demos* (15 July). The jail sentence can be converted into a fine. Mabote was convicted of going to a polling station in Xai Xai on election day and publicly tearing up sample ballot papers which were posted there, and of creating a disturbance at the polling station. The PT won 3 seats in the Xai Xai assembly.

Diplomats, church divided

No one was pleased with the boycott by Renamo and the small parties. The European Union and US ambassador Brian Curran both said they "regretted" the decision. But Renamo's accusations and action divided both the diplomatic community and the church.

The United States strongly backed Renamo. US Ambassador Brian Curren issued a statement on 12 May saying: "the legitimate preoccupations of the opposition parties with reference to impartiality and transparency in the electoral process were not adequately taken into account by parliament when it

approved local government legislation last year, nor by the government in response to subsequent and repeated requests by the opposition. Therefore the USA will not continue to provide assistance to activities linked to the electoral process in cities where there is no real choice of candidates." Privately, US officials said some Renamo claims of STAE misconduct were valid.

The decision had little practical importance because the US was not a major donor to the process; some US-sponsored candidates forums were cancelled while others, including ones in Agoche and Matola, continued.

The main funder of the election was the European Union, and on 11 May European Commission representative Neves da Silva went on the radio to stress the EU's continued support. EU member states generally opposed the Renamo boycott and said the elections should go ahead without Renamo. EU diplomats rejected claims of fraud, saying Renamo had provided no evidence.

On 19 May Dhlakama appealed to the EU to reverse its position. Dhlakama said in a statement that "to support this process is contributing to instability in Mozambique; it is to support the farce, fraud and dictatorship of Frelimo."

This appeal was clearly rejected by the European Union in a statement on 29 May which "acknowledges the right of Renamo and other political parties ... not to participate in municipal elections."

Meanwhile, the Catholic Church was also divided. Bishops in a pastoral letter on 25 April warned that the local elections may not be free, just and democratic and warned Frelimo that to distort the elections in its favour would be "abusive and fraudulent".

Earlier in the month, the Archbishop of Beira, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, went much further and said that the elections would be fraudulent and that he would not vote.

But the rector of the Catholic University in Beira, Filipe Couto, said "the boycott of the local elections was not wise and may harm the boycotting parties. ... A system of government based on boycotts creates distrust in society. And the boycotting parties themselves begin to have internal problems that cannot be resolved."

"The absence of Renamo in the local elections suggests that the opposition feels well governed by Frelimo and sees no reason to try to replace Frelimo," said the Frelimo first secretary in Manica, António José Amélia.
Notícias, 16 July 1998

Forward to 1999

Installation of the new local governments, debate over possibly major constitutional changes, and planning for the 1999 national elections will all begin shortly.

Despite the low turnout, the new municipal administrations must start work. One official in the Ministry of State Administration (MAE), commented that "the new local governments will have to make a big effort to show that they are different. They will have to prove themselves. They will need to be visible and respond to local demands, in order to legitimate themselves."

The new local assemblies are expected to meet for the first time between 16 and 30 July and elect the assembly president. The new municipal presidents are to take office by 4 August. This calendar will be delayed by a few days by CNE's delay in announcing the results. Next, the assemblies have to work out their own standing orders and regulations; MAE has already prepared a model set of rules which the new assemblies can use as a starting point if they wish.

In August or September MAE plans a seminar for the municipal presidents, the assembly presidents, and the chief civil servants of the 33 new municipalities. This will set out the role of the new decentralised local government. Other specialised seminars will follow.

The first tasks of the new local councils and assemblies will be to approve a budget for the rest of 1998, and begin work on a five year plan (as required by law). By December they need a plan and budget for 1999.

A MAE official commented that "the first months will be spent by assembly members and the municipal president studying their own cities -- looking at income, expenditure, and problems."

The 23 existing cities already have functioning appointed administrations. The 10 towns (*vilas*) were administered as part of districts, but at the April 1997 MAE decentralisation conference in Inhambane the 10 district administrators were told to transfer responsibilities and staff and get the new municipalities running separately from the districts. MAE claims this has largely been done.

Thus the new municipal presidents and assemblies take over functioning cities. What they do not change will simply continue as in the past. For example, the local government already receives the receipts of the existing "reconstruction" tax paid by all Mozambicans; the new elected governments are expected to set the level of this tax and rename it the "personal municipal tax". But many will prefer not to tackle this in the first year, and allow the national government to set the level and collect the revenue for the new municipalities.

MAE has always argued that it is for the local councils and assemblies to take on powers and make changes as they see the necessity, and that it is not for MAE to impose a schedule. Indeed, MAE expects to see widely varying strategies taken by new municipalities.

New election law

National elections must take place before November 1999, and these will require a new election law. Minister of State Administration Alfredo Gamito has promised a wide ranging public debate on this starting in September, and the new law will need to go before parliament at its session starting in February 1999. The CNE and STAE are already established by law and should remain the same for 1999, but after their failure in local elections and opposition complaints, Gamito has made it clear that their structure is also open for review.

Donors delayed funding for local elections until the laws were passed in 1997. Donor procedures are so slow that donors were then unable to respond in time, and this was one cause for delay. Donors will now be under pressure to agree a programme to support the 1999 elections even before a law is passed.

STAE must also begin work on revising the register. This is now being computerised, but that process is unlikely to be completed in time for the national election -- which means again rewriting by hand all of the registers, which was one cause of errors in the local election.

Meanwhile, the debate on the new election law will take place at the same time as the debate on revising the constitution. This will occur 8 September to 15 October, according to Hermenegildo Gamito, head of the ad hoc parliamentary commission to revise the constitution (and brother of Alfredo Gamito). He said that 25,000 copies of the proposed changes will be printed and distributed widely throughout the country to generate debate. Gamito hopes there can be a national consensus on the changes.

The two issues are also linked, as constitutional changes may have an impact on a new electoral law.

What will donors demand?

The Renamo boycott, the low turnout, and the weaknesses of CNE and STAE have caused extensive debate in the donor community, but so far there are no coherent views as to what line donors will take. Donors are likely to set up an elections group at their Development Partners Group meeting on 6 August.

There is a realisation that donors have much less political power than they had in 1992-94 and a general desire to keep a lower profile.

Their room to manoeuvre is also constrained by an inability to threaten to withhold aid, for two reasons:

- Mozambique is seen by many donors as an almost unique African economic success, particularly in following World Bank and IMF programmes, and backing this is seen as much more important than issues of democracy.

- Donors cannot be seen to be withholding money from democratic national elections in 1999 or causing their delay or failure.

The annual "consultative group" (CG) meeting, the World Bank hosted donor meeting, will take place in September and, for the first time, will be in Maputo rather than Paris. Donors have already selected "strengthening sustainable democracy" as the theme, but this is seen more as linked to good governance and poverty alleviation than to the democratic process itself. In the 7 July draft of a statement for the CG meeting, the donors demand progress on three issues in the next year: "constitutional and election law reform", "removing red tape and bureaucratic impediments to private sector development", and "public administration reform".

The donor position on elections remains vague, demanding only that the constitutional review process "meet the genuine concerns of all political parties."

One question is if donors are prepared to pay the higher costs of a decentralised CNE and STAE with party representation at all levels.

The international community remains divided on the issue of elections. In 1995 donors issued a statement demanding consensus on the new local election law. This was widely seen as giving Renamo a veto. EU members, in general, do not want to return to the 1995 "consensus" demand. They are, in the words of one ambassador, "exasperated with Renamo's antics" and so use phrases like "genuine concerns" rather than "consensus". They also stress that Mozambique has moved on from 1992-94 and that Renamo must lose its special status. Several European embassies looked favourably on the independent candidacy in Maputo of Dr Phillippe Gagnaux, and see that as a way forward.

But the US has strengthened its support for Renamo. A US official said "the next electoral law must have consensus. That gives every major player, including Renamo, a veto. Renamo says it wants to return to the procedures of the 1994 election, and that does not strike me as an extreme demand."

The US feels that as a party to the 1992 peace accord Renamo still has a special position, and must be a participant in the 1999 elections. Therefore its demands must be accommodated.

But even the US is not will to demand that the CG make aid to Mozambique conditional on Renamo participation.

Teaching by example

Mozambican democracy is an import. In a part of Africa that looks to consensus for solutions to problems, a conflict-based multi-party system has no roots and few precedents. The recent Unesco conference in Maputo, held just days after the local elections, asked yet again if there is an alternative "African democracy". Whatever the answer, the present system is an import -- perhaps even an imposition -- from Europe and the United States. Consciously or unconsciously, many Mozambicans look to the actions of foreigners to define the rules of this new system and to help to understand how it works. In 1994 and more recently, the international community has taught Mozambicans three rules about democracy that they may not have meant to teach.

1. Renamo has a veto, but as the official "opposition" it is not expected to make constructive inputs to the resolution of problems. Since 1992, in the peace process, in the elections, and in parliament Renamo has enforced demands by threatening to walk out. This has been encouraged by the international community who, in their attempts to counter a Frelimo hegemony, have given a veto to Renamo. In meetings with the international community a month before the local elections, Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama said he was sure that the international community would not let elections go ahead without Renamo -- and he seemed sincere in his belief.

2. Parties are run by paid staff. The extensive funding for parties in 1994, as well as the payment for party poll watchers (*delegados de lista*), led to the obvious conclusion that party politics was a commercial or job-creating activity paid by donors. Initial reports that Dutch and US agencies would provide funds encouraged that view this year. In both Nampula and Angoche, independent candidates interviewed poll watchers as if they were hiring staff rather than involving activists, and were genuinely surprised to find they would not be able to pay them. In Matola, RUMO promised its activists a share of the donor funds it assumed it would receive. And, based on first hand experience, why should they have thought otherwise? The parties who had participated in 1994 realised sooner that there would be no money -- like good trade unionists, they refused to work if they were not being paid, so they decided to boycott the local elections.

3. Parties are built from the top down, based on leaders rather than policies. This is a more complex issue, because it is also encouraged by Mozambique's

presidential system and by the global media concentration on personalities. Nevertheless, the international community has tended to promote party leaders, rather than encouraging debate about issues and questions of how to run the country or city.

In responding to immediate problems in Maputo and to demands from their capitals at home, diplomats and donors have unintentionally created a distorted image of the multi-party democracy they hope to promote. In particular, party leaders are rewarded for having a high profile in Maputo, and not for building a mass base. There is no encouragement to develop financial autonomy. Indeed, having party militants and implantation throughout the country is seen as a left-over from the old days of socialism; the new democracy is about visible leaders in Maputo. When a serious independent candidate assumes he hires poll watchers instead of building a party cadre, it is a mark of a wide-spread and serious misunderstanding.

The failure to see a need to build the base was underlined in two ways. First was that the decision to boycott was taken in Maputo with no consultation; many members of the small parties were opposed, and members of one of the original boycotters (PT) actually put up lists in two cities. Many Renamo members, too, opposed the boycott. Second was the inability of the UD, the only small party in parliament, to find enough candidates to fill its lists; the UD had failed to use its four years in parliament to create a party machine.

And Renamo has failed to turn itself into a functioning political party. It was noticeable in the local elections that the only effective independent candidates were former members of Frelimo, who understood the need for party organisation.

It looks increasingly that if there is to be a "third force" -- an electoral group that is neither Frelimo nor Renamo -- as many diplomats hope, it will be a Frelimo breakaway. In parliament, it has been Frelimo which has been the real opposition to its own government, and not Renamo or the UD. And Frelimo remains the only political force that has a party organisation and that understands the importance of organisation.

Indeed, it may be that in their desperate attempts to promote a vocal opposition to Frelimo, some embassies are actually acting to keep Frelimo in power. The boycott of the local elections created the first space for a genuine political opposition to emerge; to force the 1994 opposition into a dominant position next year will be at the expense of a new and more legitimate opposition. Renamo and most of the

small parties have not, so far, proved a credible opposition -- they have been more interested in money and show than in the nitty gritty of government. This was underlined by Renamo's boycott of the CNE -- officially over procedural and protocol issues -- rather than working within the CNE to resolve what became serious problems with the electoral process.

The international community will surely use the fiasco of the 1998 local elections as a reason to try to impose new conditions on the government for the conduct of the 1999 elections. Even before the election there were sharp divisions as to where the problem lay, and these have not gone away.

A key question is: Should donors accede to Renamo's demand for a return to 1994 and the 1992 peace accord? Clearly there must be a reform of STAE and of CNE procedures, but the creation of an even more expensive, ponderous and politicised machine may not be the answer. The need is for decentralisation, de-bureaucratisation, and especially more transparency -- not a return to 1994 when the election went ahead because political deals were made in closed meetings in Maputo.

Embassies may wish to look more closely at the long term impact of their actions with respect to democratisation. Is their practice cutting across their rhetoric? Will their short term fixes and patches actually make it harder to build a genuine democracy here?

The Christian Council in its 20 May statement said that "whatever positions are taken by the international community, these should not be taken by Mozambicans to harden their positions." The international community should also take this to heart, and -- in contrast to the weeks before the local elections -- try not to take stands which increase and harden divisions in Mozambican society.

Joseph Hanlon

Land law moves ahead

The land law approved in July last year was developed through a particularly democratic process and wide debate involving civil society and peasant organisations as well as parliament and government. (See *Bulletins* 17, 19) Draft regulations for the implementation of the law were issued in June by the Interministry Commission on the Revision of the Land Law, and are now subject to a consultation being promoted, in part, by the peasant organisations. The draft regulations make explicit a key point in the law, that oral evidence in support of persons claiming occupancy rights has the same legal standing as paper titles. Competing claims to land are to be settled by determining who acquired the right to use the land first -- which clearly gives preference to

peasants using land over those who have arranged paper titles in recent years.

New Organisations

There are two new organisations relating to Mozambique.

- The Mozambique Study Group is an international e-mail network of Mozambique researchers. Contact Claire Melamed at cm12@soas.ac.uk for information, or to join send an e-mail to

mailbase@mailbase.ac.uk

with the text

join mozambique-study-group

followed by your names (on the same line, with no punctuation).

- The Britain-Mozambique Society aims to build better links between Britian and Mozambique, and was launched on 25 June. Contact is Kate Gifford, 82 Arlington Rd, London SW2 2TA

tel: +44 181 678 69 55

fax: +44 181 674 65 02

e-mail: angmoz@compuserve.com

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Local election results

The following three pages contain the local election results as distributed by the National Election Commission on 17 July 1998.

The first page gives the abstention rate in each of the 33 municipalities. Column headings are:

Eleitores = electors

Inscritos = registered voters

Votantes = actual voters

Abstenções = abstentions

The second page gives the votes for municipal president. The third page gives the vote for municipal assembly (party acronyms are spelled out on page 2). Column headings are:

Expres. = Expressos = number of votes cast

Em branco = blank (unmarked) ballot papers

Nulos = spoiled ballot papers

Válidos = number of valid votes (after excluding blank and spoiled ballot papers)

(Note that the paper as distributed by the CNE contained an error for Matola, which has been corrected here.)



República de Moçambique
COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES

RESUMO DO PROCESSO DE VOTAÇÃO

MUNICIPIO	ELEITORES			ABSTENÇÕES	
	INSCRITOS	VOTANTES	%	TOTAL	%
Angoche	34,693	8,784	25.32	25,909	74.68
Beira	209,493	21,570	10.30	187,923	89.70
Catandica	7,318	2,388	32.63	4,930	67.37
Chibuto	24,229	8,546	35.27	15,683	64.73
Chimoio	80,759	9,068	11.23	71,691	88.77
Chokwé	24,157	5,770	23.89	18,387	76.11
Cuamba	29,565	3,305	11.18	26,260	88.82
Dondo	31,204	16,734	53.63	14,470	46.37
Gurué	26,468	2,882	10.89	23,586	89.11
Ilha de Moçambique	23,653	2,987	12.63	20,666	87.37
Inhambane	26,921	5,097	18.93	21,824	81.07
Lichinga	38,136	5,817	15.25	32,319	84.75
Manhiça	19,802	3,723	18.80	16,079	81.20
Manica	12,463	3,782	30.35	8,681	69.65
Mandlakazi	5,549	1,109	19.99	4,440	80.01
Maputo	509,021	66,807	13.12	442,214	86.88
Marromeu	8,270	1,868	22.59	6,402	77.41
Matola	195,274	22,597	11.57	172,677	88.43
Maxixe	50,661	5,471	10.80	45,190	89.20
Metangula	4,224	1,379	32.65	2,845	67.35
Milange	9,212	1,477	16.03	7,735	83.97
Moatize	16,229	2,599	16.01	13,630	83.99
Mocimboa da Praia	21,391	2,947	13.78	18,444	86.22
Mocuba	36,687	7,935	21.63	28,752	78.37
Monapo	24,635	3,714	15.08	20,921	84.92
Montepuez	25,610	11,482	44.83	14,128	55.17
Nacala Porto	77,216	10,254	13.28	66,962	86.72
Nampula	149,460	12,026	8.05	137,434	91.95
Pemba	42,337	8,731	20.62	33,606	79.38
Quelimane	93,514	5,351	5.72	88,163	94.28
Tete	48,922	7,317	14.96	41,605	85.04
Vilankulos	12,608	3,135	24.87	9,473	75.13
Xai-Xai	45,849	10,007	21.83	35,842	78.17
Total	1,965,530	286,659	14.58	1,678,871	85.42

REPÚBLICA DE MOÇAMBIQUE
COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES
Eleição do Presidente do Conselho Municipal

MUNICÍPIO	TOTAL DE VOTOS				DISTRIBUIÇÃO DE VOTOS	TOTAL	%
	Expres.	Em branco	Nulos	Válidos	Candidatura		
ANGOCHE	8.784	677	603	7.504	JOSÉ CONSTANTINO	5.648	75,27
					ISIDRO ALI ASSANE	1.856	24,73
BEIRA	21.687	634	836	20.214	CHIVAVICE MUCHANGAGE	11.828	58,51
					FRANCISCO DE ASSIS MASQUIL	8.386	41,49
CATANDICA	2.383	112	144	2.132	JOSÉ DRAIVA CHICODO	2.132	100,00
CHIBUTO	8.546	841	293	7.412	BENJAMIM FRANCISCO MUCHANGA	358	4,83
					FRANCISCO BARAGE MUCHANGA	7.054	95,17
CHIMOIO	8.759	244	414	8.101	JOSÉ MEQUE	1.119	13,81
					DÁRIO H. T. B. JANE	6.976	86,19
CHOKWE	5.667	553	515	4.599	SALOMÃO TSAVANE	4.599	100,00
CUAMBA	3.305	216	339	275	TEODÓSIO SIMÃO MATA	275	100,00
DONDO	16.734	397	341	15.996	MANUEL CAMBEZO	15.996	100,00
GURUE	2.870	207	226	2.437	AMONE XAVIER MONGESSA	603	24,74
					JOÃO BERNARDO	1.834	76,26
ILHA DE MOÇ.	2.987	173	305	2.509	ABACAR ABDUL SATAR NAIMO	2.509	100,00
INHAMBANE	5.025	323	342	4.363	VITORINO MANUEL MACUVEL	2.745	62,91
					FELIZARDO XAVIER D. VAZ	1.471	33,71
					AMANO JOSÉ MARRENGULA	147	3,38
LICHINGA	5.795	466	438	4.891	CRISTIANO TAIMO	4.891	100,00
MANHIÇA	3.625	134	277	3.214	LAURA DANIEL TAMELE	1.887	58,71
					EUSÉBIO TIMBANA MANHIÇA	1.327	41,29
MANICA	3.473	211	124	3.138	MOGUENE MATERISSO CANDIEIRO	3.138	100,00
MANDLAKAZI	1.109	52	53	1.004	CASIMIRO JOÃO MONJANE	1.004	100,00
MAPUTO	66.807	1.241	1.583	63.983	MARIA ALICE MABOTA	1.568	2,45
					PHILLIPE ARTHUR GAGNAUX	18.441	28,82
					JEREMIAS CHICAVA	1.774	2,77
					ARTUR HUSSENE CANANA	41.595	65,01
					NEVES PINTO SERRANO	605	0,95
MARROMEU	1.868	98	178	1.592	PALMERIM CANOTINHO RUBINO	1.592	100,00
MATOLA	22.431	548	1.228	20.655	AFONSO ABÍLIO NHANTUMBO	2.953	14,30
					CARLOS A. FILIPE TEMBE	17.702	85,70
MAXIXE	5.460	666	793	4.001	NARCISO PEDRO	4.001	100,00
METANGULA	1.300	81	98	1.121	GABRIEL CATAUALA	1.121	100,00
MILANGE	1.477	98	210	1.069	HONÓRIO PEREIRA VAZ	1.069	100,00
MOATIZE	2.599	137	141	2.321	PAULINO MULAICHO JEQUE	2.321	100,00
MOCIMBOA DA	2.938	239	217	2.482	CAMISSA ADAMO ABDALA	2.482	100,00
MOCUBA	7.830	407	523	6.900	JOSÉ HERMÍNIO NANGURA	6.900	100,00
MONAPO	3.714	202	454	3.058	DANIEL HERMÍNIO BENTO	3.058	100,00
MONTEPUEZ	10.938	1.835	984	8.119	ALBERTO DAS NEVES PAISSENE	8.119	100,00
NACALA PORT	10.155	415	624	9.116	JOSÉ GERALDO DE BRITO	6.878	75,44
					JOÃO BAPTISTA MUSSA	2.238	24,56
NAMPULA	12.018	454	609	10.955	DIONÍSIO CHEREWA	8.999	82,14
					EUGÉNIO ESTÊVÃO FÁTIMA	1.946	17,76
PEMBA	8.731	413	386	7.932	ABUDO ANZA	539	6,92
					ASSUBUGY MEAGY	6.325	79,74
					MANUEL DE LIMA MÁRIO	1.058	13,34
QUELIMANE	5.337	330	350	4.657	PIO AUGUSTO MATOS	3.911	83,98
					ANTÓNIO MUEDO	740	16,02
TETE	7.317	570	499	6.248	LUCIANO NGUIRAZI	6.248	100,00
VILANKULOS	3.095	128	372	2.635	JORDÃO MUFUME	54	0,20
					SULEMANE E. AMUJI	2.583	99,98
XAI-XAI	10.007	666	492	8.849	FAQUIR BAY NALAGI FAQUIR BAY	8.849	100,00



República de Moçambique
COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ELEIÇÕES
Resumo dos dados das Assembleias Municipais

MUNICÍPIO	Total de Votos				Partido Col/Grupo	VOTOS	%
	Expressos	Branco	Nulos	Válidos			
ANGOCHE	8.478	1.547	423	6.508	FRELIMO	6.508	100,00
BEIRA	21.551	744	787	20.020	FRELIMO	12.043	60,15
					GRM	7.977	39,85
CATANDICA	2.386	140	518	1.728	FRELIMO	1.694	98,03
CHIBUTO	8.256	1.151	189	6.916	FRELIMO	6.916	100,00
CUAMBA	3.189	290	273	2.626	FRELIMO	2.626	100,00
CHIMOIO	9.068	662	320	8.086	FRELIMO	8.086	100,00
CHOKWÉ	5.770	593	487	4.690	FRELIMO	4.690	100,00
DONDO	16.074	521	316	15.237	FRELIMO	15.237	100,00
GURUÉ	2.882	561	182	2.139	FRELIMO	2.139	100,00
ILHA DE MOÇ.	2.943	268	241	2.434	FRELIMO	2.434	100,00
INHAMBANE	5.097	1.112	372	3.613	FRELIMO	3.613	100,00
LICHINGA	5.817	565	401	4.851	FRELIMO	4.851	100,00
MANDLAKAZI	1.062	55	54	953	FRELIMO	953	100,00
MANHIÇA	3.723	181	274	3.268	FRELIMO	1.980	60,59
					NATURMA	1.288	39,41
MANICA	3.774	316	141	3.317	FRELIMO	3.317	100,00
MAPUTO CIDADE	66.408	1.777	1.429	63.202	RUMO	1.191	1,88
					JPC	16.168	25,58
					FRELIMO	44.433	70,30
					PT	1.410	2,23
MARROMEU	1.868	136	162	1.570	FRELIMO	1.570	100,00
MATOLA	22.597	718	1.148	20.731	FRELIMO	17.066	82,32
					RUMO	3.665	17,68
MAXIXE	5.471	791	721	3.959	FRELIMO	3.959	100,00
METANGULA	1.379	80	98	1.201	FRELIMO	1.201	100,00
MILANGE	1.477	228	191	1.058	FRELIMO	1.058	100,00
MOATIZE	2.598	193	133	2.272	FRELIMO	2.272	100,00
MOCIMBOA-PRAIA	2.947	294	200	2.453	FRELIMO	2.453	100,00
MOCUBA	7.935	509	471	6.955	FRELIMO	6.955	100,00
MONAPO	3.683	301	396	2.986	FRELIMO	2.986	100,00
MONTEPUEZ	11.482	1.888	942	8.652	FRELIMO	8.652	100,00
NACALA PORTO	10.254	585	638	9.031	OCINA	2.605	28,85
					FRELIMO	6.426	71,15
NAMPULA	12.026	1.253	414	10.359	FRELIMO	10.359	100,00
PEMBA	8.465	1.313	335	6.817	FRELIMO	6.817	100,00
QUELIMANE	5.351	677	283	4.391	FRELIMO	4.391	100,00
TETE	7.243	724	479	6.040	FRELIMO	6.040	100,00
VILANKULO	3.035	383	236	2.416	FRELIMO	2.416	100,00
XAI-XAI	10.001	477	622	8.902	PT	851	9,56
					FRELIMO	8.051	90,44
TOTAL	284.290	30.729	13.876	294.381		249.381	