

# Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin

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## Local elections in May?

Electoral registration will take place in November while May 1998 is the most probable date for local elections in 33 cities and towns. This follows a confused period in which registration and election dates were announced and then withdrawn.

It proved impossible to organise elections this year. Donor money was not available in time, and the permanent election administration technical secretariat (STAE - *Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral*) could not organise and train registration and election staff in time.

Donors have come in for heavy criticism for only beginning their own very slow processes to release money once the election laws were signed by

President Joaquim Chissano. At a 5 September press conference, Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi said "we counted on donor contributions announced as 'pledges' but when we came to the moment of truth, donors said their bureaucratic mechanisms were delaying the release of the money, and we were obliged to alter the dates" of registration and election.

Dr Mocumbi explained that now dates will only be announced when money is confirmed as available.

Registration will take place throughout the country, not just in the 33 municipalities having elections. Registration for the 1994 national election remains valid and forms the basis of the register. In November, people who are not registered or do not have a card will be asked to register; those who still have cards will be asked to confirm their registration, but this is not required. Training of registration staff has already begun and they should be in place around the country by 31 October.

Registration could start on 1 November and continue to 30 November, but STAE would prefer 15 November to 15 December.

Civic education staff have begun training and a registration education campaign should start 13 October.

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### Chronicle of the delay

The election and local government laws were passed by parliament on 30 April and clean copies were only sent to President Chissano in late May. He signed the laws on 31 May. The laws require the first local elections to be held in 1997 and for the Council of Ministers to announce the date at least 180 days in advance. This left a very small window, and on 10 June the date of 27 December was announced for elections, with electoral registration starting 18 August, just five days after the end of the national census, and ending 5 September.

The Saturday after Christmas was an unpopular

choice. And although it was the latest possible date, both donors and the election secretariat STAE said it would be impossible to organise elections in time

But there was strong pressure for elections in 1997. On 6 June Renamo issued a statement accusing Frelimo of having decided to delay elections to give them more time "to clean up the poor image of the government". In fact, top Frelimo officials were anxious to move ahead with elections in 1997, and the Renamo statement made them even more reluctant to delay.

Delaying elections to next year requires changes in two laws; there was a hope that a special parliamentary session in July would do so. But neither Renamo nor Frelimo was willing to take the first move, and nothing was done. On 30 July, Frelimo secretary general Manuel Tomé said delay was "impossible".

But donor pressure was building and donors met with government ministers and Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama. Donors felt there was not enough time for civic education, for STAE to prepare, nor for small parties to organise. Finally on 5 August leaders of the three parliamentary benches agreed to a delay. New legislation will be submitted to the 28 October - 12 December parliament session, allowing a date in the first half of 1998.

It is agreed that elections should not be held during the March-April parliament session, which leaves February (pushed by Renamo) and May (preferred by Frelimo). Donors and STAE prefer May; it allows more preparation time, and February is still in the rainy season. Thus May seems the most likely choice, but no date will be announced until November.

Meanwhile, registration was being rushed because of the need to finish well before an election. By early August registration staff were still not being trained, partly due to lack of money. But only on 13 August – five days before the registration was due to start – did the Minister of State Administration Alfredo Gamito announce a postponement. Registration can be rescheduled without new legislation.

## Election commission starts

The 9-member National Election Commission (CNE – *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*) was named in July and has begun work. The CNE will preside over all elections for the next five years.

President Chissano named as president Dr **Leonardo Simbine**. He is a lawyer and secretary general of the Ministry of State Administration (MAE, *Ministério da Administração Estatal*). He was the Frelimo-nominated vice president of the 1994 CNE. The Council of Ministers nominates one member who is to be a technical expert; it named **Fernando Macamo**, deputy national director of local government in MAE.

Frelimo named four members: **Rufino Nombora**, a

lawyer, former state secretary for justice, and member of the 1994 CNE; **Angélica Salomão**, a medical doctor, national director for health, and member of the 1994 CNE; **Alcinda Abreu**, dismissed as social welfare minister earlier this year; and **Carlos Manuel**, a lawyer and MAE official.

Renamo named three members: **Francisco Xavier Marcelino**, formerly Jose de Castro, secretary general of Renamo, and the Renamo vice president of the 1994 CNE; **João Francisco Almirane**, who had been a member of the Renamo delegation to the Rome peace talks in 1992; and **Juliano Victória Picardo**, coordinator of the Renamo youth league.

The position of the CNE is now confused. By law it only operates from 15 days before registration opens until 15 days after it closes, and from 90 days before the election until 30 days after results are announced. When the CNE is in operation, it directs STAE; when CNE is not in operation, STAE is under MAE.

The changing of dates now leaves the CNE in a legal limbo. As Simbine is already a MAE official with some responsibility over STAE, he will continue to play a role even when the CNE is not formally constituted.

There was tension and pettiness between CNE and STAE in the 1994 elections and this has continued between Simbine and STAE head Arménio Correia. For example, Correia and STAE was using furniture from the office of the 1994 CNE, and Simbine unceremoniously took it back. Donors feel that Simbine is reluctant to recognise the technical problems faced by STAE. But relations seem to be improving, as both realise they have to work together.

## Donor funds

UNDP, the European Union and the government have agreed a \$19 million budget for registration and elections. Of that, \$11 mn will be paid by the EU, \$3 mn by the government, and \$5 mn from a UNDP trust fund (Norway \$1.4 mn, Switzerland \$1.2 mn, Sweden \$800,000, Austria \$700,000, Denmark \$550,000 and Canada \$500,000).

There was no shortage of pledges; indeed, elections are popular and there was competition by countries to give money, in part so that they could maintain political leverage over the project. Through the Trust Fund mechanism, the UNDP also maintains a hand on the purse strings and can exert pressure.

Trust Funds are notoriously slow to set up – the 1994 Mozambique election trust fund took six months to organise and another three months to actually begin spending money. This time UNDP moved at record speed, having the trust fund agreement ready by 27 June and the first money in early July. The EU agreement was signed on 15 July. But both were too late to allow STAE to hire staff and buy equipment for an August registration campaign.

Of the major donors, only the United States is refusing to cooperate with other donors. It is putting \$1.3 mn through US non-government organisations.

Donors meet regularly in a Local Election Working Group chaired by Denmark; it is part of the Development Partners (formerly Aid for Democracy) group. So far, donors seem satisfied and have imposed no conditions on their money; they have not used their leverage except to push for the delay.

Donors accept the Mozambican government view that there should not be a major international observation process like that in the 1994 national elections. But they do want some arrangement made to allow locally based foreigners working for NGOs, embassies and projects to participate in a lower key foreign observation of local elections. CNE President Leonardo Simbine confirmed that the CNE would put forward regulations for observation by Mozambican organisations, and will discuss foreign observation.

There is strong donor opposition to their funding of political parties as happened in 1994, and there will be no trust fund for political parties. Only the Netherlands seems to be considering funds for parties, and only for 1999 national elections.

In 1994 party agents (*delegados de lista*) were paid by donors, and there was much criticism that most were only there to earn the money. Some did not even vote for the party they were supposed to represent. So far, there has been no discussion of paying party agents in the registration or elections.

## NGO activities

Three international non-government organisations are supporting civic education for the local elections. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has a \$750,000 USAID-funded programme. It is supporting this month's STAE training of civic educators and is providing 4000 kits for those trained. NDI recently created a Mozambican NGO, AMODE (*Associação Moçambicana para Desenvolvimento da Democracia*); the founder members are NDI's 10 provincial coordinators, and NDI district staff are also members. NDI sees itself shifting from direct civic education to providing technical support to AMODE.

AWEPA is training civic education trainers and activists of Mozambican NGOs at regional and provincial levels. It is giving 10 provincial seminars on the role of municipalities to party cadres and candidates. AWEPA has produced civic education materials published jointly with STAE. A detailed "Basic guide to local government" will be published.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung is producing civic education materials and a political glossary translating 400 key terms into four local languages. It has also started theatre and video projects in the four provinces in which it works: Nampula, Sofala, Gaza and Maputo.

## After NGO lobbying

# Land law increases peasant rights

Peasants gained significant new rights in a land law approved in July by parliament (*Assembleia da República*, AR).

In response to the most active lobbying by civil society seen so far in the new multi-party parliament, the AR made three key changes to the draft law submitted by the government. These changes:

- + increase the rights of women,
- + give a greater role to "traditional" leaders, and
- + partly restrict the way the Council of Ministers can give permission for land use.

The last two changes reversed revisions which the Council of Ministers had made in the bill last year before submitting it to parliament. Both involved compromises between government and parliament which will require further new legislation next year.

The land law was drafted and revised many times over a two year period as part of wide consultation in one of the most open and democratic processes in many years in Mozambique (See *Bulletin 17*, November, 1996 for more details). The key points are explained in the box on next page.

The two largest organisations representing peasants, ORAM (*Organização Rural de Ajuda Mútua*, Rural Organisation for Mutual Help) and UNAC (*União Nacional de Camponeses*, National Peasants Union), described the new law a "good" and as a "victory for peasants". Lorena Manguane of ORAM said "the old law was written in offices without an understanding of peasants; the new law was written by the people and responds to our reality."

Both ORAM and UNAC intend to publicise the law as widely as possible, and stressed the importance of telling peasants that they must be consulted before any titles granting use rights (effectively leases) are issued for land near theirs.

Conceição Quadros, technical director of the Land Commission, said the law would be translated into local languages to help make it more accessible to local people. She also stressed the importance of non-government organisations in making peasants aware of their rights to remain on land they occupy.

## Renamo opposed

The land law was subject to more than a week of intensive debate in parliament. Renamo opposed the bill because it continued state ownership of the land and it limited the role of "traditional" authorities.

"The people must enjoy the right to private

property," and this must include land, argued Dr David Aloni, deputy leader of the Renamo parliamentary party. "The people have a right to own the land they inherited from the ancestors." He also argued that privatising land was in keeping with the new market economy, and that state ownership of land was "communist".

The constitution and the new land law prevent private ownership and the mortgaging of land. Instead, people have "use rights". These are permanent for individuals and communities already in occupation, and for home-owners. People and companies can apply for up to 100 year leases to use other "unused" land.

The position taken by Frelimo is that privatising land would lead to landlessness, as happened elsewhere. "What happened in Brazil, where land was sold to the exploiters, will never happen in Mozambique," Helder Muteia, chairman of the parliamentary Commission on Agriculture and Local Power, told a rally of peasant farmers organised by ORAM on 12 July during the parliamentary debate.

In general, peasants associations backed Frelimo on this and opposed land privatisation.

But Renamo calls for a bigger role for "traditional" leaders and "customary" practices in issues of land received strong backing from peasant groups. "Peasants know customary law is not perfect. But they know and understand it, and find it easier than dealing with bureaucrats and courts. Peasants want to settle their problems meeting under the cashew tree," explained Ismael Ossemame of UNAC.

In the end, the majority Frelimo party made major concessions to peasant and Renamo demands, and the draft law was amended. (See page 8 for details.)

Nevertheless, Renamo voted against the revised law. "We were disappointed with Renamo; this is so much better than the old law and is in the interests of the peasants," said ORAM lawyer Janete Assulai.

## More rights for women

As submitted to parliament by the Council of Ministers, the draft law already strengthened the position of women by stressing the equality of men and women with respect to land titles. The Council of Ministers also justified its removal of references to "customary" law on the grounds that "traditional practice discriminates against women".

In his defence of tradition, Renamo deputy Luis Boavida said that discrimination was a myth invented by ignorant foreigners "who don't know the black African tradition".

Peasant organisations and trade unions were present during the entire debate. During the morning coffee break parliamentary deputies and the public mix freely, and this is a good time for lobbying. After

## Key points of land law

Under the new land law:

- + Land remains the property of the state; communities, individuals and companies only gain use rights (leases).
- + Use rights can be transferred but cannot be sold or mortgaged.
- + Use rights are gained by occupancy or by the grant by the state of a title (lease).
- + Title documents showing the right to use land can be issued to communities and groups as well as to individuals and companies.
- + Communities or individuals occupying land for more than 10 years acquire permanent rights to use that land, and do not require title documents.
- + Courts must accept verbal evidence from community members about occupancy.
- + Titles for use cannot be issued for land already occupied by someone else.
- + Titles for use rights are only issued if there is a development plan; titles are issued provisionally for two years and made permanent (for up to 100 years) only if the projected development is being carried out.

Renamo claims that women were not discriminated against, Janete Assulai talked during the break to some Renamo deputies, and she said this had some effect on their rhetoric.

In the end, lobbyists gained both points, more rights for women and more power for traditional authority. On inheritance rights, the parliament added a clause saying inheritance must be "independent of sex." And the new clause of "customary practices" says they cannot be "contrary to the constitution" – which guarantees (article 67) that "men and women are equal before the law in all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life."

"Our society is accustomed to putting women in second place. We must shift the mentality. It is important to repeat gender equality in all new laws to accustom people to the new thinking," said Assulai.

## Land grants

Under the old law and regulations, the position of who could grant titles to use land (leases) was confused, leading to conflicting titles and delays in issuing titles. The original Land Commission draft set up a clear hierarchy, from local councils giving leases

## ***Local communities and land***

The new law defines a "local community" as "a group of families or individuals ... that has the aim of safeguarding common interests through the protection of living areas, farming areas whether cultivated or fallow, forests, sites of cultural importance, pasture, water sources, and areas of expansion."

Local communities can have use and occupancy rights and can gain collective titles.

Before any title is issued, "local communities must be consulted to confirm that the area is free and has no occupants"

"In rural areas, local communities participate in:

- a) management of natural resources,
- b) resolution of conflicts,
- c) the titling process ...,
- d) the identification and definition of the limits of the land they occupy."

on small plots to the Council of Ministers for big developments.

The Council of Ministers reversed this and in its version kept total power – the system of the old law. Civil society and parliament reacted angrily to this. There have been widespread complaints about land titles being given to high officials and their families. Renamo's David Aloni said "the country is being divided up in favour of a new bourgeoisie of the party in power in Maputo [Frelimo], flagrantly prejudicing the population in violation of customary rights and private property in general."

Members of parliament, even of Frelimo, are also unhappy about the agreement in secret for major land grants to South Africans in Niassa and to James Blanchard III near Maputo.

In the end, parliament imposed even tighter allocation restrictions than those proposed by the Land Commission:

+ in urban areas, land use requests are dealt with by the new municipal presidents (mayors) or district administrators;

+ use of non-urban land up to 1000 hectares can be authorised by a provincial governor, but the local community must be consulted;

+ between 1000 and 10,000 ha, use can be authorised by the Minister of Agriculture and Fishing, but the relevant governor and local communities must be consulted; and

+ the council of ministers approves uses above 10,000 ha, but the restriction imposed by parliament is that this can only be done as part of an agreed land use plan, and that the principles for defining and

approving land use plans must be defined in a new law to be submitted to parliament.

Frelimo parliamentary deputies had wanted big land grants to be approved by parliament, but in private discussions ministers rejected this. The compromise is that the Council of Ministers retains the right to make deals with foreign investors and to make grants to themselves and their families, but it will need to be much more transparent in future.

Several ministries and agencies and the Land Commission are already participating in discussions of how to draw up a new law on land use plans, and it seems likely that initial proposals will demand some sort of community partnership. Further NGO lobbying will be needed on that issue. A draft law may go to parliament in the final session of 1998.

## **Consultation & Regulations**

"The new law requires consultation with the community. But how is this to be done? Who speaks for the community? Who can say 'this peasant lives here'?" asks Ismael Ossemame of UNAC.

Parliament added a clause to the land law requiring that a new law be brought forward which sets out "the representation mechanisms of local communities with respect to use rights." This may be done late next year, and will be controversial because it must deal with "traditional authorities" (see page 8).

In addition, consultation is an issue for the regulations that accompany any new law in the Mozambican/Portuguese legal system. Discussion documents on the new regulations have been in circulation to ministries since March (even before the law went to parliament) and discussions will now intensify. UNAC and ORAM are observers at the Land Commission technical committee and will participate in these discussions. Conceição Quadros, chair of the technical committee, hopes to have draft regulations ready for an open meeting in Maputo in February

Consultation mechanisms are already the hottest issue in the discussion of the regulations. "How can we give real power to the peasants, who cannot forever be dependent on foreign NGOs with money to defend them? We need a system which peasants can use to defend themselves" comments Ossemame.

The new regulations will try to do this, and will probably involve some sort of local land commissions. The regulations will also require some on-the-spot inspection to prove that land is not occupied.

Three other issues will be important in the regulations:

+ ORAM wants a much less bureaucratic and less expensive way for peasants to register land titles. Getting an individual title costs at least MT 5 mn (\$500, which could be better used by a poor family as investment in the farm) and takes several years.

+ The new law calls for the "identification and definition of the limits of land occupied" by rural communities, and officials see this as a way of using cheaper mapping methods to protect peasant land. But peasant organisers want the regulations to ensure that this does not result in peasants being squeezed into tiny reserves.

+ Many applications are for huge tracts of land and involve grandiose plans. Officials want to ensure that applicants must prove they have the money to carry out the plans, and that only as much land is granted as is necessary for the project. A hunting or tourism project might get a full land use title only for the land on which it is to build its buildings, and get a more restricted permission to use other areas for tourists.

## Resolving conflicts

War and the flight of millions of refugees, plus the confused process of issuing titles (leases), means that there will be many conflicts in coming years between different people claiming the right to use land.

The new law clarifies the position in several ways. It confirms the rights of peasants occupying land, insists that they must be consulted in the issuing of any new titles, and ensures that a court must take into account aural testimony of peasant's land occupancy. This latter point is important because under the old law a paper title took total precedence; ORAM reports that in Liberdade near Inhambane a peasant farmer has been told by a court to leave land he was farming for 20 years because someone else has obtained a title.

The new law does not nullify titles issued improperly on land already occupied by someone else. But ORAM plans to demand that titles be revoked when the land is not developed according to the plan under which it was granted. João Muthombene, president of ORAM, argues that land has been registered by high officials speculatively in the past few years; they hoped that the government would cave in to US pressure and privatise land and they could then sell their titles. Now, they cannot sell and cannot carry out the false development promises, so their titles will become invalid.

But where there are genuine conflicts, the case will go to court. Conceição Quadros says that courts will give heavy weight to antiquity of rights, and if a peasant can show she was living in a place when the title was granted to someone else, then the court will probably allow the peasant to stay. But Quadros admits the need for some kind of guidance note for the courts on these issues.

Muthombene feels that the main issue is the "spirit of the new law" which gives more rights to peasant occupiers. He feels this has shifted the legal balance, and will lead to more attempts at negotiated settle-

ments; ORAM has already been asked by Lomaco to participate in negotiations over land near Maputo.

A particularly complex issue is land occupied by refugees, who after a decade or more in a new place do not want to go back to what was once "home". The new law gives full rights to people who occupy land for ten years "in good faith", but Quadros notes that "refugees know that every tree and piece of land has an owner, and that they were borrowing land from someone else, so they are not there 'in good faith'." If the previous occupant fled the country, they may have a claim, but if the previous occupant simply moved to the nearest city and tried to return at the end of the war, the refugees may need to move.

Finally, in many places people claim rights they do not have. Letters from officials are not titles, for example. Some people have requested land concessions and then used the application as evidence of a "right" to use land. Quadros notes that what is called "precarious" occupation – that is, without legal right – and has no standing in court. So even where peasants have been pushed off land, they may have the right to reclaim it.

### ***Huge claims, few grants***

There have been massive requests for land concessions, but so far few have been granted. A study by Greg Myers and Julieta Eliseu showed that in Zambézia in the past decade, 3.8 million hectares have been applied for – one third of the entire province, and two-thirds of all arable and forest land. But titles have only been granted on 50,477 ha.

There has been some confusion about applications and grants. Myers and others head their charts "Land Concessions" and refer to applications that way in their reports. That leads a casual reader to think these are grants or titles, and some huge numbers have been repeated in the international press. But the small print shows they are only applications, not actual grants.

Nevertheless, the size of the applications has worried peasant leaders. Speaking at a seminar in June in Mocuba, ORAM Zambézia representative Lourenço Duvane noted that many of the applications are for very large tracts of land, and are made by a tiny handful of companies and individuals. The applications for over 100 ha, which total at least 2.5 mn ha, have been made by only 350 individuals and companies. If granted, Duvane warns, this could mean "0.1% of the families controlling 40% of the arable land in Zambézia."

# By evicting peasants, Boers test new law

Conflicts in Niassa following South African violations of the Mosagrius agreement presents the first test of the new land law.

Mosagrius is a controversial political project agreed by the presidents of South Africa and Mozambique to allow Afrikaans farmers linked to the conservative Freedom Front to settle in Niassa.

In July two South African families arrived in Sanga district and one in Majune district. They occupied peasant land and evicted local farmers, showing maps issued by Sacada (South African Chamber of Development of Agriculture in Africa). Peasants complained to the local chiefs, who informed district administrators who told the governor.

In mid-August, Governor Aires Bonafacio Aly went to both Sanga and Majune where he said the presence of the South Africans was a total violation of the agreement. He ordered an immediate halt to land clearing and to any further settlements.

An annex to the Mosagrius agreement signed on 6 May 1996 by Sacada and a variety of Mozambican parties, including Celina Cossa, president of the União Nacional de Camponeses, promises Mosagrius 100,000 ha in Sanga, 100,000 ha in the Rio Lugenda valley (mainly Majune district), and 20,000 ha along Lake Niassa for ecotourism. But it stresses that these areas are still to be defined "jointly with representatives of the government, Mosagrius and local authorities and people" and must be land not occupied under "customary rights".

The governor spelled this out at public meetings last year in Majune and Sanga. People complained when they saw these promises breached.

A whole set of agreements and laws has been broken. Land is supposed to be demarcated and given to Mosagrius, which then allocates it on the basis of specific development plans and with the requirement that for each three South African families, there must be one from a local farmers group AAGICONI (*Associação Agro-Industrial e Commercial do Niassa*).

Sacada is accused of violating these norms by sending farmers to settle without plans and without consulting either Mosagrius or Mozambican government officials, and of taking the best land before giving any to Mozambican partners. A commitment of Mosagrius was to open up more remote land; instead, the South Africans are trying to take land close to the road and nearer to the provincial capital, Lichinga – precisely the areas already occupied by local people.

And yet, the South Africans are not unpopular. When the governor wanted to force a family in Majune to leave Niassa, the people said no – they had nothing against the family and simply wanted them to move to unoccupied land. Local people had not objected to several other South African families who

arrived at the same time and took land which was, indeed, unoccupied.

Local people have unrealistically high hopes that the South Africans will promote development. Local people expect the Boers to bring jobs, provide marketing facilities for local production which cannot now be sold, and offer help to local farmers. Already 300 people have been hired for land clearing, although there are complaints that they are being paid below the minimum wage.

Mozambicans at all level, from governor to peasant, expect the Afrikaans farmers to integrate into the local community. So far, this has not happened, with the South Africans apparently trying to set up self-sufficient enclaves similar to the Portuguese colonial settlements of 50 years ago.

## *Mapping with the people?*

A emergency team from Dinageca (*Direcção Nacional de Geografia e Cadastro*) was expected to arrive in Niassa 16 September to spend a month mapping out land occupied by communities in areas requested by Mosagrius. The team was expected to include representatives of local people as well as social scientists to help people identify the land they see as theirs.

This will be the first test of the new land law definition of "local community", of community consultation and participation, and of the concept defined in the land law of "identifying and defining the limits of land occupied by local communities."

The definition of local community is broad, including "areas for expansion." Officials stress they want local communities to think to the future, not just for population growth, but also to more modern farming methods when families may want 10 ha instead of the 2 ha they use now.

The Nucleo de Terra da Niassa, a group of non-government organisations active in the province, will also be monitoring the brigade to ensure that peasant voices are heard.

## What role for 'traditional' leaders?

Can unelected "traditional leaders" and discriminatory "customary law" have any role in a modern democracy? This has been hotly debated this year with respect to both the land and local government laws.

The new land law requires that the government (probably next year) bring in a new law which will have to deal with "traditional authorities" and land.

The very terms are debated, because "tradition" and "custom" have changed radically in this century, under the influence of both colonialism and Frelimo. It is clear that in many rural parts of the country, communities do have people they consider to be "traditional leaders" and to whom they defer for certain kinds of advice and decisions. The titles these leaders go by, and their precise status in society, varies very widely across Mozambique. And it is equally clear that in cities, among young people, and in some rural areas such leaders have no authority.

Similarly, so-called customary law, even if rapidly changing to reflect modern society, is still accepted in many rural areas, and the decisions of traditional leaders are important in settling local disputes. They play a key role particularly with respect to inheritance and land allocation in many rural areas.

The hotly debated question is how much formal recognition should be given to "tradition" and "custom". This became an issue in the 1980s. Frelimo had marginalised "traditional leaders" as feudal. Renamo threw its weight behind the *regulos* who had been nominated by the colonial state as local chiefs and as the lowest tier of the colonial administration – they were sometimes hated but often had substantial local prestige and respect.

In the late 1980s Frelimo recognised that its hard line had been unpopular, and that it had to give some status to "traditional leaders". The debate began, particularly in the Ministry of State Administration (MAE). A series of studies coordinated for MAE from 1991 by anthropologist Dr Iraé Lundin and funded by the Ford Foundation and USAID argued for giving official status to these leaders. The 1994 local government law had an entire article on involving traditional authorities, and draft legislation formally recognising traditional authority was submitted to the Council of Ministers in March 1996.

By then, the strong arguments of some Frelimo leaders against recognising "traditional leaders" had regained their force. They said it was a colonial/feudal system, it led to a colonial form of a separate "native" law, "customary law" discriminates against women, and it is impossible to create any structure which would be applicable throughout the country.

The Council of Ministers rejected the draft traditional authority bill. In September 1996 the Council of

Ministers withdrew references to "traditional leaders" and "customary law" from the draft land law. The 1994 local government law had been considered unconstitutional, and in late 1996 parliament passed a new local government law with only a weak clause saying that local authorities "may listen to the opinions and suggestions of traditional authorities, recognised by their communities as such" – but they are not required to do so.

### Land law recognises 'custom'

When the land law came before parliament in July this year, there was a major – and successful – push by peasant organisations to put "traditional authorities" and "customary law" back in.

"Customary law discriminates against women, but formal law discriminates against all the poor and illiterate, which is an even bigger percentage of the population," comments Ismael Ossemame of UNAC. Thus setting aside areas where "customary law" is respected gives more power to peasants, who can solve many problems locally.

Janete Assulai of ORAM says simply: "We never work in an area without first talking to the 'traditional authority'. Sometimes it is a *regulo* (chief) who still exists and has power; in other places it may be a healer or other sort of leader."

The final version of the land law contains an ingenious compromise.

+ First, it specifies that rules for inheritance of land must not discriminate by sex; this is key, because under "customary law" women (including widows) often cannot inherit.

+ Second, it gives occupancy rights to individuals and groups occupying land "according to customary norms and practices that are not contrary to the constitution" – which again means customary law will need to shift to avoid discrimination.

+ Third, it requires that local communities "participate" in a range of issues, and that in doing so local communities may use "customary norms and practices". But parliament's demand for a new law setting out "the representation mechanisms of local communities" will force some sort of legal statement on "traditional authorities".

UNAC, ORAM and the Land Commission are all discussing some kind of community land committee, rather than a single individual. This would allow the involvement of several respected local leaders.

Nevertheless, the door is open for two kinds of major disputes – disputes within a community as to who is the rightful leader, and boundary disputes between leaders.

## Will régulos be tax collectors?

Meanwhile, debate continues within MAE as to the local government role of "traditional authorities". In many areas, district administrators are already meeting regularly with traditional leaders and encouraging them to mobilise people to carry out tasks such as keeping roads open and participating in the national census held in August.

But is this role to be formalised? Minister of State Administration Alfredo Gamito earlier this year noted that "the dominant opinion is to not integrate traditional authority into the structure of the state; let them stay with traditional tasks and the state stay with modern administrative tasks."

However at a seminar in Inhambane in April which dealt with traditional authority and decentralisation, Gamito suggested a return to the colonial system of having traditional leaders collect taxes. They could be paid a percentage of those taxes.

## Oxford warning that demobbed are threat to peace

Reintegration of demobilised fighters was simply "buying off the belligerents [and may] not buy lasting security even if it buys short-term quiescence," warns a report issued in June by the prestigious Refugee Studies Programme in Oxford.

Based on extensive interviews last year in three provinces, authors Chris Dolan and Jessica Schafer say that "it is not encouraging to hear of the high level of frustration and latent violence just below the surface. ... The widespread persistence of grievances about the economy does not bode well for the future. Further, the constituency of demobilised soldiers with particular grievances must be seen as vulnerable to manipulation by someone with an agenda and the capacity to initiate further violence."

The study was funded by USAID and it implicitly seems intended to test the impact of the US 1993 veto of broader support programmes for demobilised fighters. The report shows that in the short term, simply giving soldiers two years of demobilisation money was quite effective.

The social reintegration of ex-combatants has been remarkably rapid and successful; most have married and most have been effectively re-integrated at family and local level. They used a significant amount of their demobilisation money to smooth their re-entry into communities, to pay for ceremonies and to help

their entire family.

But the authors warn that "reintegration is not simply a social process, but also an economic and political one." They note that the little economic support that was provided went mainly to urban areas. Thus demobilised soldiers who "did disperse to rural areas were penalised for having done so" and that "programmes failed to help the demobilised to develop their agricultural base". The urban bias also means "discrimination against Renamo demobilised for benefits and lack of development of Renamo-held areas."

The report notes that some ex-combatants wanted to go into business and had the skills to do so, but could not obtain credit. By contrast the micro-projects that were supported were ineffective and "misguided."

"The sight of these micro-projects failing was particularly painful given that they had been promoted in preference to projects which could have catalysed the backbone of the informal economy, household agriculture. It is striking that these critical obstacles to development were noted several years ago when post-war reconstruction was being planned, but little appears to have been done."

The study also contradicts the views of leading politicians about prosperity outside Maputo, and instead sees "economic stagnation". It notes the 'lack of visible reconstruction efforts in many areas' and points out that "rural areas are trapped in a vicious circle: lack of roads leads to lack of market opportunities which lead to lack of cash and in turn the inability to buy consumer goods".

"The population uses the term 'democracy' to stand for the fulfilment of a wide range of aspirations. ... 'Democracy' did bring elections but it brought no great change in the standard of living of the majority. Disappointment on this account is now strongly expressed in all quarters."

The report says economic security is a central concern of the demobilised and a growing area of discontent. Public works schemes would have been particularly useful, giving work to ex-combatants while reducing bottlenecks in the rural economy and thus aiding everyone in rural areas, including the demobilised.

The report also notes that ex-fighters have "a deeply felt need for compensation" for their "lost" years. Many soldiers felt they lost out on education when they were forced by both sides to fight, and low levels of education does reduce their chances of earning a living.

+ **The Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Mozambique**, by Chris Dolan & Jessica Schafer, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, England, 1997.

## PM warns of threat to peace

"Existing social inequalities and regional asymmetry could endanger the climate of peace, calm and social harmony that is the basic prerequisite for balanced and self-sustaining socio-economic development," Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi warned donors on 17 May at the Paris Consultative Group meeting.

Mocumbi also noted that "the national private business class, which is still nascent and lacking in financial resources [has] been penalised by the restrictive policies that help to slow down inflation, particularly in the decapitalised rural areas."

In an otherwise upbeat and self-congratulatory speech, it was a harsh and undiplomatic warning that all is not well, and was as close as Dr Mocumbi could safely go toward criticising the IMF's continued neo-liberal policies in Mozambique.

In language less coded than usual, Mocumbi was pointing to three negative aspects of IMF and World Bank policy:

+ In an unrestricted free market, resources normally flow to the most developed areas. Thus the overwhelming emphasis on the market has further concentrated development in Maputo, at the expense of the north and rural areas in general.

+ All over Africa, adjustment has meant sharply widening income gaps, and this has occurred in Mozambique as well. But many of the poor are demobilised soldiers with guns, and violent crime seems to be increasing.

+ Restrictions both on the volume and direction of credit have prevented the reopening of rural commercial networks. This also makes it hard for domestic companies to compete with foreign ones for contracts, for example in the Maputo corridor.

Planning and Finance Minister Tomaz Salomão added his own note of caution when he warned donors in Paris that the elimination of corruption is dependent on "an increase in salaries to levels which give dignity to the civil servant and meet their cost of living."

This was a direct challenge to IMF spending curbs, which have forced the salaries of more than half of all civil servants to below the poverty line.

Mocumbi's and Salomão's appeals come at a time when the IMF has, for the first time, conceded ground to the World Bank and donors. This year alone, Mozambique is being allowed to spend an extra \$90 million in donor money, and special funds are being established to channel money to rural commerce. But the government clearly feels it needs – and can get – more, if donors keep up the pressure.

No public statements have been made, but published and internal documents show that the IMF has loosened its grip on Mozambique. The two key

problems have been limits on the amount of aid Mozambique can spend and restrictions on credit.

Aid spending is limited in two ways. One target agreed with the IMF is "deficit before grants". Since the government cannot run an overall deficit, "deficit before grants" must be less than total grants, and thus is effectively the amount of aid that the government can spend. The second key is the requirement for an increase in "international reserves" – in effect, dollars in the bank. These two are linked, because donors have in recent years offered Mozambique more aid than the IMF would allow it to spend, and the IMF has insisted that this extra aid simply be kept in the bank as extra reserves.

The table below shows what has happened over the past three years, and what the IMF demands are for the next two.

### IMF controlled amounts (\$ million)

	Deficit before grant	Capital expen- diture	Total foreign reserves
Actual:			
1994	434	358	127
1995	310	319	160
1996	268	298	290
Programme:			
1997	360	353	371
1998	390	379	462

What the table shows is that the amount of aid the government could use fell sharply – by \$166 million per year in just two years. This caused a fall in capital expenditure of \$60 mn per year – which means war damaged roads, schools and health posts in rural areas are not being repaired. The donors were still willing to give money, so the IMF insisted it be put in the bank.

London-based experts on the IMF in Africa say that the Fund is being much harder on Mozambique than on many other African countries, such as Uganda, where the IMF does not use deficit before grant as a cap on aid.

The increase in foreign reserves over those two years is accounted for by cuts in spending on war repairs. Last year, Jeffrey Sachs, director of the

## ***Not so keen on democracy***

The IMF is not enthusiastic about democracy. One of three "structural performance criteria" imposed on Mozambique is that "momentum of privatisation is not lost in the face of political opposition." In other words, privatisation goes ahead no matter what parliament says.

And in a confidential June document, the Fund sees local elections only as a problem. It warns that local elections are a "program risk" because of the danger that "the political environment becomes tense".

Harvard Institute for International Development, wrote that "there is no clear need for a rapid and substantial build-up of foreign exchange reserves" in Mozambique.

For more than two years, the donor community has been pushing for a more expansionary policy, which would allow more money for investment and concentrate less on simply curbing spending. The first public step was the October 1995 statement by donors criticising the IMF. In October 1996 the World Bank's vice-president for Africa, Callisto Madavo, told a Maputo press conference that the Bank would press this in negotiating the annual joint IMF-World Bank "Mozambique Policy Framework Paper" (PFP).

The Bank stuck to its word, and when the PFP was issued on 8 May 1997, it really did allow a substantial increase in spending. Deficit before grant rises more than \$90 million this year, with a increase of more than \$50 mn in capital expenditure plus an unexpected increase in current spending which will be used to increase civil service salaries.

But, in effect, donors who claimed they wanted to give more to Mozambique have been told to "put up or shut up", because foreign reserves will still have to increase by more than \$90 mn – less than last year, but still substantial – and this must be funded by donors.

As well as allowing Mozambique to spend more aid and to increase civil service salaries, the IMF has also allowed Mozambique to set up three special funds which will direct money to disadvantaged parts of the private sector. Thus the IMF has backed off on its most dogmatic free market policies which argued that the market was the only "efficient" way to allocate credit.

+ One special fund will allow the government to use receipts from privatisation (which the IMF had previously said had to remain in the bank and could not be used) combined with donor and NGO funds to create an Economic Rehabilitation Fund (FARE) to

provide credit for small rural enterprises.

+ The second fund will be used to pay off debts incurred by private firms for assets destroyed during the war. These debts make it impossible for many small traders to take new loans.

+ The third fund will assist the rural commercial network.

Finally, the IMF is allowing Mozambique to spend some of the money which is being saved through debt relief, again reversing a previous restrictive policy. Debt relief counts as "aid" and therefore is covered by the cap on "deficit before grant". Fund officials have always argued that debt relief was simply a way of writing off unpayable debts and was never intended to allow new government spending. Thus, international NGO campaigns which say more Mozambican children could attend school if debt was written off are not actually accurate.

Donors objected to this, and last year Denmark and the Netherlands agreed to pay Mozambique's debts to the IMF itself, if the IMF would allow the government to spend an equivalent amount on health and education. The IMF reluctantly agreed and a special Foreign Debt Alleviation Fund was established. This will now also be used for other debt write-offs.

Thus two years of donor pressure wrung important concessions from the IMF. But as Ministers Mocumbi and Salomão indicated to donors in May, the concessions are still too small. As the table shows, spending next year will still not have returned to 1994 levels. War damage will remain unrepaired, and the rural economy will still be restricted.

Donors will need to push in two ways. First, to ensure that money saved from debt relief can be used for social expenditure. And second, to allow further increases in deficit before grant and to not demand such a large rise in foreign reserves.

More growth is possible, if donors push the IMF to allow further expansion.

## ***Documents on local government***

**Guia Básico sobre as Autárquias Locais**, by Joseph Hanlon. (Portuguese only, preliminary version only, available from AWEPA)

An explanation of the nine laws and the constitutional amendment agreed in 1996 and 1997 which allow for the creation of municipalities with elected governments. The basic guide is organised by topic, such as "finance", "division of powers" and "avoiding conflict and corruption", and brings together the material from various laws relevant to that topic. For example, 12 articles in two of the new laws impose conditions on the new municipalities about documents and other items which must be made public; these

references are collected in one section of the guide in an attempt to show press, public, and new local officials everything that must be publicly available.

**Synopsis of the Legal Framework Governing Local Elections and Local Councils in Mozambique**, by Mark Simpson, UNDP governance unit. (English only, available from Marc de Tollenaere, UNDP Maputo) A good detailed analysis of eight of the laws, going through them in order, article by article.

**Divulgação: Principal Legislação sobre Autarquias**, published by Assembleia da República with funds from SUNY/USAID (Available from AR, SUNY or AWEPA).

Full Portuguese texts of the eight laws approved in the first 1997 session of the assembleia. Does not include the constitutional amendment or the original enabling law (2/97).

**Manuais de Educação Cívica** (Portuguese only, published by, and available from, AWEPA and STAE.) There are manuals at three different levels. **Democracia, Descentralização e Eleições Autárquicas** (by Joseph Hanlon) is a detailed look at democracy, political parties, separation of powers, decentralisation, the first local elections, and possible organisational problems to be faced by the new municipalities. **Democracia, o Município e as Eleições Autárquicas** (by Ana Mendonça) is a short guide for activists making the key points about democracy, forthcoming elections and the new municipalities. **As Eleições e o Município - "Exemplo de uma Vila"** is a cartoon book (*banda desenhada*, by Lucia van den Bergh and José Tique) for general readers.

**As Autarquias Locais - Resumo Ilustrado**. (Portuguese, to be published in November by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.)

An interesting illustrated guide to the local government enabling law (2/97). Friedrich Ebert will also publish a cartoon book for general readers.

**MAE Especial**. Quarterly journal of the Ministry of State Administration local government directorate (Ministério da Administração Estatal, Direção Nacional da Administração Local).

Launched last year, this journal provides useful background articles on the thinking going into the decentralisation process and creation of the new municipalities.

**Democracia em Moçambique - Percepções do Processo**, by Eduardo A B Saraiva, published by National Democratic Institute, Maputo, 1996.

Rather obvious vox pop comments relating to democracy and local elections, based on focus groups in eight places in Mozambique.

## ***New books & reports***

**The State, Violence and Development - The Political Economy of War in Mozambique**, by Mark Chingono, pp 291, Avebury, Aldershot (England), 1996, £39.95, ISBN 1-85972-077-3.

Writing on Mozambique is still dominated by people from Europe and the US, and with the end of the war there is rising tide of northern PhD students and other researchers looking to Mozambique for subject matter. Thus it is good to see a few southern Africans researching and analysing Mozambique. Mark Chingono, who spent his teenage years in Manica, returned to Chimoio in 1992 to look at how ordinary people responded to the war. He stresses the people responded in very different ways, and some profited. He notes that peasants often opposed Frelimo's "authoritarian modernisation project" and backed Renamo, only to then suffer Renamo oppression which forced them to flee back to government controlled areas.

The most fascinating part of Chingono's study is of Chimoio market traders, where he discovered an immense mix of survival strategies. Families mixed formal and informal sector, legal and illegal commerce, trade and wage labour. Theft, smuggling and black market currency dealing fuelled the economy; many risked their lives to trade between Frelimo-controlled Chimoio and Renamo-controlled rural areas. There was extensive child labour and immense poverty, with people working all day on a citrus farm and being paid a sack of oranges, which they then sold in the market; but some people prospered and became wealthy. "Violence appears to have been the midwife to the emergence of a specific kind of capitalism, a hybrid arrangement, which has taken root in trade rather than in production," he notes.

Chingono comes to some controversial conclusions. "The social and political disintegration engendered by the war seems to have been a necessary condition for the autonomy of the market and civil society, and for an alteration in the overall distribution of power. ... In the anarchy created by the war the hitherto disenfranchised have found unprecedented opportunities to carve out a social and political space for themselves and to demand more freedom."

But he warns that "the evidence from Chimoio suggests ... that the existence of a civil society does not necessarily mean that of democracy. On the contrary, some emergent organisations of civil society are based on hierarchical and authoritarian structures and tend to foster dependent patron-client relations" - particularly traditional authority, churches and non-government organisations.

The war, Chingono argues, "redirected Mozambican society," and not all of the consequences were bad.

But he notes that poverty and the "idiocy of rural unemployment" drove many young men to join the rebels. "To avoid a replay of this scenario, it is imperative to address the needs of the poor."

**Confronting Leviathan – Mozambique Since Independence**, Margaret Hall & Tom Young, pp 262, Hurst, London, 1997, ISBN 1-85065-116-7.

The first serious attempt to look at the past 40 years of Mozambican history proves to be an unhappy marriage of two very different half books. Margaret Hall has produced an interesting and detailed look at the armed struggle, 1974-75 transition, the growth of Renamo, and the 1988-92 settlement process.

Unfortunately, Tom Young has failed to fill the spaces in between. He has followed the contemporary fashion of discourse analysis, trying to evaluate Frelimo's policy making process almost entirely through published documents and second hand sources. Comments about the reality on the ground are often sweeping, flippant and wrong – for example the thousands of left technicians (*cooperantes*) who went to work in Mozambique in the early post independence period are dismissed as "carpetbaggers", which is a misreading of both Mozambican and US history.

The book draws intelligently on a vast range of documentation and is copiously footnoted (I am cited frequently - J.H.), yet it seems to float in a curious isolation. It ignores the vital international context set out well in Hans Abrahamsson & Anders Nilsson's *Mozambique – The Troubled Transition*. It also has no feel for reality on the ground; further interviews in Mozambique might have been a useful balance to the long hours spent by the authors in the library. Thus it presents decision makers acting largely in isolation and motivated by personal and political goals, rather than in response to a much more complex domestic and international context. This is encouraged by the order of the chapters, which often gives context only after the discussion of a decision.

The book's title makes the over-ambitious claim to tell the story of "Mozambique since independence". In fact, the book is more narrowly a history of Frelimo and Renamo, and it's very extensive use of sources makes it a good annotated bibliography.

Whatever quibbles one may have, it is hard to fault the authors' conclusions that "Mozambique has become an experimental laboratory for new forms of Western domination", and that the west will have as much difficulty imposing liberal capitalism as Frelimo had in imposing socialism.

**Democracy, Civil Society and the State – Social Movements in Southern Africa**, ed by Lloyd Sachikonye, pp 193, SAPES Books, Harare, 1995, \$18/£9.95, ISBN 1-77905-028-3. (Distributed by African Books Collective, 27 Park End St, Oxford OX1

1HU, England; abc@dial.pipex.com)

Eugenio Macomo of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane has written the chapter "War, Adjustment and Civil Society in Mozambique". He joins others in pointing to the incompatibility of structural adjustment and democratisation – how can people vote for a party which accepts an imposed policy of curbing social expenditure and which makes most people poorer. He notes that "the old alliance between peasants and workers has been superseded or replaced by the alliance between bureaucrats and technocrats with international capital. This means that internally a new national bourgeoisie is rising, with peasants and other social classes being marginalised."

Half of Macomo's chapter looks at the organised churches; he is particularly good on the way in which the war led to a transformation in church-state relations starting in 1982. And he asks if, after two decades of war and poverty, the churches can "stem this tide of criminality or rebuild the morality of the society".

**Paz Sem Benefício – Como o FMI Bloqueia a Reconstrução de Moçambique**, by Joseph Hanlon, trans by Maria de Lourdes Torcato, pp 212, o Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, 1997, MT 90,000.

Portuguese translation of the Joseph Hanlon's "Peace Without Profit – How the IMF Blocks Rebuilding in Mozambique".

**Cotton is the Mother of Poverty**, by Alan Issacman, pp 272, James Currey, Oxford, England, 1996, £14.95, ISBN 0-85255-621-7.

Disputes about peasant cotton in Nampula province are in the news again. Many argue that the exclusive concession system is a return to the colonial era, in some cases involving the same companies. This book, 15 years in the writing, is THE definitive study of colonial cotton, and is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the present day debate. The book's title is a common peasant adage and goes part way to explaining the current hostility to the crop.

**Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique**, by Chr Michelsen Institute, pp 141, Evaluation report 4.97, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, POBox 8114 DEP, N-0032, Oslo, Norway, 1997.

An excellent review not just of Norwegian aid, but of assistance in general to the peace process in Mozambique during 1990-95. The report details some major successes and highlights some dramatic failures.

An unusual and very useful aspect of the report is a "grassroots" chapter based on interviews of aid recipients by a Mozambican team. It proves one of

the most critical chapters, with people on the ground complaining that aid agencies concentrated on buildings (which in many cases were never used) in accessible areas along roads, when the population wanted services and people (health workers rather than health post buildings) in less accessible areas. The report notes that "aid programmes were organised without any proper consultation with the population." The report also notes "most demobilised soldiers ... were highly disappointed. Grand promises were made but little delivery followed."

The report is most interesting in discussing the complex interaction between aid and politics. Norway was praised for two instances where it took a political lead: when Norway simply started mine clearance in 1993 at a time when demining was delayed by UN infighting, and at the 1995 Consultative Group meeting when Norway took the lead in rebuffing a US-led attempt to make aid conditional on power sharing. One of the strong criticisms is for the refusal of Norway to join in the 1995 donor letter criticising IMF policies, even though these policies in some instances contradicted Norwegian policies.

The report is critical of aid to returning refugees: "massive international aid devoted to the return process was in some measure superfluous".

**The Changing Status of Mozambicans in South Africa and the impact of this on repatriation to and re-integration in Mozambique**, by Chris Dolan, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, England, 1997.

Only 13% of Mozambicans expected to return voluntarily from South Africa after the end of the war actually did so, in sharp contrast to those in all the other neighbouring states, and this report explains why. It is highly critical of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (and its implementing partner MSF-F) for:

- + totally misunderstanding the views of Mozambican refugees,
- + poor planning,
- + failure to provide adequate information, and
- + "the refusal to listen to local advice".

The study concludes that UNHCR was "ill-equipped" for its role and that its "interventions both at an implementation and at a policy level have in fact reduced the prospect of durable repatriations from South Africa."

**New Departures: Supporting People-first Tourism in Southern Africa**, by Elizabeth Dodd, pp 20, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA), 28 Penton St, London N1 9SA, £3.50.

Tourism in southern Africa is growing very rapidly and has the potential to create tens of thousands of jobs in Mozambique. But the history of Kenya and other tourist destinations is that large foreign companies

dominate and reap the profits. This useful booklet sets out a strategy for SADC regional tourist development in which local people have a bigger role and gain more of the benefits.

**Debt Relief for Mozambique: Investing in Peace** by Oxfam International, August 1997. (Available from Oxfam, 1511 K St NW, Suite 640, Washington DC 20005, or in Maputo from Graham Saul, CAA, 633 Av Patrice Lumumba).

The most accessible document on Mozambique's \$5.5 billion foreign debt, it also explains why the debt is unpayable and is restricting Mozambique's development.

## **AWEPA**

### ***Parliamentary exchanges***

AWEPA continues to support visits by members and staff of the Mozambican parliament to other parliaments, mainly funded by the European Union. In the past two months:

- + members of the Defence Committee visited South Africa to meet with their counterparts in CapeTown and with security and defence specialists to discuss regional security;
- + members of the Economic Affairs Committee met counterparts in Harare; and
- + five staff members are now on a placement with the Portuguese parliament to gain in experience in support of committees.

CNE President Leonardo Simbine, STAE staff, and a member of parliament went to Norway to view elections there.

In October, there will be workshops in Maputo for the Social Affairs and Gender Committee and the Defence Committee.

### ***Civic education and political parties***

Seminars stressing decentralisation and local elections are being carried out throughout the country with more than 50 organisations, including churches, trade unions, youth organisations, and human rights and development groups. Trained activists have already begun work in several provinces.

AWEPA is helping to prepare political party cadres and candidates for their role in the local elections and in the new municipalities. A national seminar in September was attended by 17 parties; 10 provincial seminars will be held in November.

AWEPA's civic education and political parties work is funded by Nordic governments and Dutch and Irish NGOs.