

# Mozambique peace process bulletin



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## Local elections delayed

Parliament forced the government to withdraw its package of three bills for local elections, on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The three parties in parliament, in consultation with the government, will agree a new elections timetable before the end of this session in late December. It is unlikely that the first local elections can now be held before 1997.

The Municipalities Law (3/94) approved by the old one-party parliament on 13 September 1994 calls for elections of mayors and city councils in at least the ten provincial capitals and Maputo city at a date set before 1 October 1996.

The government's package of three bills covered the actual election, setting up a national election commission, and registration. But the parliamentary legal affairs committee unanimously ruled the bills unconstitutional. The ruling effectively says that the original Municipalities Law is unconstitutional, which

was surprising, as the committee is chaired by Ussumane Aly Dauto, who was justice minister when the Municipalities Law was passed, and who now accepts that he allowed an unconstitutional law to be passed. (See page 7 for details.)

The government decided to go ahead with the bills, arguing they were constitutional. But it decided to withdraw them on 8 November, after two days of debate, when it became clear that not only was Renamo opposed to the bills as unconstitutional, but that some Frelimo MPs agreed with Renamo and thus the bills would be defeated.

This was remarkable and unexpected for two reasons. First, Frelimo MPs were prepared to stand up to their own party in government. Second, Renamo MPs put constitutionality over their own repeated demands for early elections. Both are marks of the rapidly growing maturity of the new parliament.

## Dual administration continues

Renamo continues to rule some of the areas it controlled at the end of the war three years ago, and to exclude government officials. The problem is most serious in Manica and Sofala provinces in central Mozambique, and in Nampula province in the north. Two incidents in Sofala in October increased tensions.

In Maringuè, Renamo's war-time capital in Sofala, the first visit by provincial governor Felisberto Tomás on 10 October provoked a major confrontation. Two officials sent by the governor to prepare the visit were beaten and expelled. The governor decided to go in

any case, but the party was met on the road 25 kilometres from the town by the district administrator, Nobre Meque, and the five local policemen, telling them to turn back.

Meque is a Renamo member nominated for the post by Renamo and appointed by the government under the terms of the 1992 Rome peace accord. But he and the police had been driven out the night before by Renamo, who burned the tents that housed the policemen and who said they would kill Meque if he allowed the governor to visit.

Meque told the Beira daily *Diário de Moçambique* (13 October): "they say I have been bought by Frelimo because I don't obey the orders of Renamo. I am a government official and I have one boss – I cannot obey two masters."

**Donors challenge IMF – see p 9**

## *Dhlakama accuses police*

Renamo members are being murdered by the police at the rate of more than two a week, claimed Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama at a Maputo press conference on 14 November. Since the October 1994 general elections, the police had assassinated "more than 120" Renamo members, he said. He refused to name any of the victims or provide any evidence. "There is no national reconciliation in Mozambique", he concluded.

Governor Tomás and the journalists continued and did visit the town, where Tomás gave a speech to several hundred people.

But it was an expedition to a foreign land: Renamo retains total control of the area. The daily *Noticias* (13 November) said Renamo has 1,000 armed men there. They were never demobilised and are in bases at Catema and Massala, 15 and 40 kilometres from Maringué. Men guarding weapons there told *Noticias* they were just awaiting orders to distribute the weapons and return to war. Renamo President Afonso Dhlakama denied the report.

The Maringué visit follows Renamo's beating and kidnapping of Rui Frank, the Frelimo party head in Gorongosa, also in Sofala, on 3 October. This highly public incident, done in front of journalists, seemed intended to be a formal expulsion of Frelimo from a district where Renamo received more than three times as many votes as Frelimo in the election last year.

The kidnapping led to a public protest by the new (and vociferously non-party) Human Rights League. In a statement on 19 October, League president Maria Alice Mabota said that "after receiving orders from their leader, men of the security guard of [Renamo President Afonso] Dhlakama invaded the district administrator's house" in Gorongosa where they "committed corporal offences" against the administrator's heavily pregnant wife, and threatened to kill the administrator. They then "severely beat" Frank, tied him up, and took him from the house.

Dhlakama was speaking in Gorongosa on the day of the incident. Frank says that with his arms and legs bound, he was taken to the rally and shown to the crowd by Dhlakama. Still bound, he was then taken to the provincial capital, Beira, where he was put into a hotel room and then released.

## **Dual administration:**

### **Confusion and conflict**

Although reconciliation and reintegration moves forward in some places, there have been a number of incidents in which Renamo has expelled or excluded government officials – including some nominated by Renamo. There have also been several reports that Renamo still maintains groups of armed men.

And Renamo has been encouraging traditional leaders to not cooperate with the government; traditional leaders supported by armed men allegedly

Dombe for several days in July.

In Manica, Sofala and Nampula provinces, local Renamo officials have been telling people not to cooperate with the government, urging refusal to: pay taxes, send their children to government schools, help the police or attend meetings.

In Nhampoca in Sofala, Renamo expelled a vaccination team which it said was giving "harmful Frelimo vaccines." Renamo has also tried to rename the local school there after its first leader, André Matsangaissa.

In Maringué in November, Renamo expelled four primary teachers sent there in July.

Concern is growing about the continued problems of dual administration. The Ministry of State Administration has set up an investigation headed by José Guambe, national director for local administration, which is visiting some of the districts concerned.

## **Is Frelimo too rigid?**

As well as the obvious desire of some local Renamo officials to keep control of their areas, two other factors seem to be fuelling the continued conflict. One is the parsimoniousness by some Frelimo officials unwilling to give Renamo any more than legally required. The other is a genuine lack of understanding about the winner-take-all, European-style election system imposed on Mozambique.

Under the peace accord, the government agreed to name Renamo nominees as district and locality administrators in certain zones formerly controlled by Renamo. In Chapa locality in Cabo Delgado, the Renamo-nominated administrator died, and Renamo asked to nominate the new one. Governor Jorge Nuanahumo refused, pointing out correctly that Renamo no longer had the right. But it seems a provocatively legalistic decision.

*Domingo*, the outspokenly pro-Frelimo Sunday newspaper, said it had information that Nampula Governor Rosário Mualeia had sacked a district administrator "for being a friend of Dhlakama".

As well as administrators, Renamo had also demanded the appointment of lower level officials, and the integration into the state apparatus of its teachers, health workers, and police. Here the response has been extremely variable. The Ministry of Health is already retraining 257 former Renamo health workers, even though two-thirds have less than six years of schooling. And the Ministry of Interior has agreed to retrain and integrate into the police 141 ex-guerrillas nominated by Renamo.

But the Ministry of Education has steadfastly refused to integrate into the state system any Renamo teachers who are not fully qualified – which few are. In some parts of Manica and Sofala, Renamo teachers are continuing to teach in places where the government has still not been able to send trained teachers. People who have visited the schools say that many of the teachers are committed and, despite their own lack of training, are doing an acceptable if rudimentary job. All are teaching without pay, and some have gained strong support from local parents.

There is obvious confusion throughout the country about the significance of one party winning the most votes in a district or province but losing the election. In some speeches, Dhlakama has been saying that Renamo "won" in those areas and should nominate governors, administrators and other officials. The Frelimo government in those areas is "illegal", he says. In some places, particularly in Nampula where Dhlakama drew large crowds during an October tour, people have been calling for new elections because Renamo "won" but Frelimo remains in power.

Mozambique is a country which has always – in pre-

colonial, colonial, and one party poor independence eras – had single strong leaders and a rigidly hierarchic system. Last year's elections were the first multi-party ones ever, and many saw it simply as a way of selecting a new chief. Thus people are genuinely confused in a province where a majority of MPs are Renamo and a majority of people voted for Dhlakama, yet Frelimo and Chissano run the province.

Local elections will compound the problem, because there is no history in Mozambique of national and local governments being in the hands of different parties – something which often causes tension in Europe where there is a lot more experience.

Finally, there may be over sensitivity on both sides to criticisms and statements that are part of a robust multi-party process. Manuel Lole, Renamo's national mobilisation chief, justified the kidnapping of Rui Frank because he was telling people not to go to Dhlakama's rally. Furthermore, "Frank told the population that president Dhlakama is a bandit, thief and assassin. Sincerely, these words are not reconciliatory and transcend the boundaries of political action. Thus, we had to take measures," Lole told the independent weekly *Savana*.

Urging people to stay away from a rally or calling the opposition leader a thief and assassin would not be considered beyond the political bounds in many European countries. But are they in an African state where respect for elders and leaders is still important?

It is also clear that many people cannot understand why the MPs they elected are giving speeches saying the government is bad or incompetent. Are they not part of the government?

What is apparent is that many people do not understand the adversarial system of government which has been imposed on them, and which goes against many of their traditions. The limits of political action and the role of the opposition in this new system are not clearly defined or understood. Because the system is such a sharp break from tradition, there is a need for substantial civic education.

## Coup plot?

Rumours of a coup plot, perhaps involving former Renamo guerrilla commanders and their old South African backers, flew around Maputo the weekend of 28-29 October.

The rumours followed a sudden and unplanned visit by South African vice-president Thabo Mbeki and Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad on 27 October to meet Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi in Maputo and Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama in Nacala. The independent weekly *Demos* reported that there had been Mozambican military movements along the Swazi and South African borders at about the same time. *Demos* reported that earlier in the month Dhlakama held a meeting with former Renamo guerrilla generals, both inside and outside the new joint army.

President Chissano and the new joint army both distanced themselves from the reports without denying them. *Savana* dismissed the coup as "fiction" and argued that the rumour itself had been started to create instability.

Dhlakama dismissed coup reports as "an invention" of Mozambique's intelligence service, SISE, and claimed that SISE had circulated the reports to "foreign secret services." SISE, in turn, denied Dhlakama's claim.

No arrests or changes in the army have been reported, so if there was a "plot", it cannot have been very serious.

Mbeki was reported by the South African press and widely believed in Mozambique to have gone to see Dhlakama after a request from Chissano to South African president Nelson Mandela. Mbeki had been one of those who pushed Dhlakama back into the election after his election-eve withdrawal last year, and he is believed to have pressed Dhlakama this time to stay within the peace process.

But the rumour and Mbeki's visit were vivid reminders of the rising tension caused by the Rui Frank kidnapping and increasingly outspoken statements by Renamo on the illegitimacy of the Frelimo government in zones where Renamo gained most votes.

As *Demos* commented, the rumours "showed the extreme fragility of the new democratic order."

## Renamo needs money

"The international community is just playing with us," complained Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, and is trying to starve Renamo until it disappears. In an interview in the Sunday newspaper *Domingo* (10 September) he suggested that although he was committed to peace, there were people in the party who might return to war if Renamo did not get more money from the international community.

*Domingo* estimates that Renamo has debts of \$5 million, including \$600,000 to a Portuguese public relations company. Renamo receives \$85,000 per month from the state budget, which Dhlakama says is only two-thirds of the party's running costs and allows nothing for investment.

Renamo members are being forced to move out of houses in Maputo they have been renting because the party can no longer afford to pay, Dhlakama said. Indeed, *Noticias* reported that one reason there is a financial crisis at the state-owned glassware factory, Vidreira, is that Renamo has not paid its \$6000 per month rent on a Vidreira-owned housing complex in the Maputo suburb of Costa do Sol since the election

houses.

In July, Dhlakama appealed to the European Union for money. In October, Spanish ambassador Francisco Viqueira said the EU was looking into the possibility of liquidating Renamo's debts and helping all political parties in Mozambique. But he added that the EU had been informed by the United Nations that there is still some money in the UN-run trust fund set up to help transform Renamo from a military into a political organisation.

## Parliament: Home of consensus

In sharp contrast to the tensions between the parties outside and the sharp disputes that marked the first parliamentary session last December, consensus is now the word inside parliament. Cooperation is close between parties and between MPs. Few issues actually come to a vote: both sides have withdrawn bills which would otherwise have been defeated. The standing committees largely work by consensus.

This has led to divisions and some tensions between the two parliamentary parties and their respective non-parliamentary leaderships. One Frelimo MP complained that the government still thinks in a one-party way and can simply tell Frelimo MPs what to do, while the MPs themselves are now thinking in a multi-party way. "We are changing because we work with Renamo and influence each other," the MP commented.

Hélder Muteia, the Frelimo chair of the Agriculture and Regional Development Committee, said: "We are not just legislators: we have to monitor the government and keep a critical distance from it. We want to be constructive critics and the government must react to comment from outside."

## Avoiding conflict

Both parties seem anxious to avoid conflicts in parliament, and often have withdrawn bills rather than have them defeated.

Renamo withdrew a series of bills considered unconstitutional by the Legal Affairs Committee. At the special session before the regular October session, it withdrew bills to set up a Council of the Republic to advise the president and to formally establish the Constitutional Council, after it was ruled these are the responsibility of the President and not parliament. At the ordinary session, it withdrew bills on renaming cities and on redrawing boundaries.

Similarly, Frelimo forced the government to withdraw the local government bills.

Where Renamo is opposed to a bill, it has chosen to remain silent, and neither speak nor vote. This occurred with the new foreign currency exchange law and the bill to adopt the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and establish maritime courts.

Two of the 39 articles in the maritime bill had been considered unconstitutional by the Legal Affairs Committee, and Renamo argued that the whole bill should have been withdrawn, as was done with the

one article that would have allowed the government to ratify maritime conventions, in violation of the constitutional clause that gives this power exclusively to parliament, and reworked another article so that the government could "regulate" instead of "legislate" on matters arising from the law.

But this provoked the only angry debate in the first month of the third session of parliament. The head of the Renamo parliamentary group, Raul Domingos, declared that voting on the bill was "an affront to the constitution" and that Frelimo's behaviour was "a new version of the one party state". He went on to launch a bitter attack on Frelimo's history in government, which drew an equally bitter attack by Sergio Vieira who said Renamo "prided itself on the most brutal violations of human rights, of the constitution and the law". The parliamentary speaker Eduardo Mulembwe brought this exchange to an end by quoting the old adage that "people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones".

## 'MPs remember the people'

So far parliament has largely dealt with bills submitted by government and with its own internal organisation. But where it has been free to act, it has shown itself close to public thinking.

A law on petitions from the public was put forward by the standing Legal Affairs Committee and approved by parliament in October. The constitution gives citizens the right to petition the government but sets no rules. The new law gives citizens broad rights and imposes tight constraints on government. A "petition" is any complaint, request or proposal to any government department or agency. It can be made in any form and requires no tax payment (ending the system in which requests must be on special paper with fiscal stamps). No one can be penalised for a petition. And government must reply within 60 days.

Under the new standing orders, the government comes to parliament to answer questions three times in each session. Frelimo's first questions to its own government were pointed, raising issues which were the subject of widespread public discussion: privatisation and who benefits, the soaring cost of living, criminality and drugs, IMF negotiations, and education (especially corruption). As *Savana's* headline said: "This week, MPs remembered the people."

Frelimo decentralised the drafting of its questions. Each of the 11 provincial groups of Frelimo MPs meets weekly during the session, and each group was told to draft a question. The heads of the 11 groups then met to combine the different questions into a shorter set.

MPs showed themselves not quite aware of how to use the question system, however. Neither Renamo nor the UD submitted their questions in time, and Renamo's two "questions" were actually statements.

The government was only prepared to answer the last two of the Frelimo questions at its first questions time. But the education replies provoked such a lengthy debate – 40 MPs asked to speak and there was extensive criticism of the education system by Renamo – that there was no time for Finance Minister Tomas Salomão to answer the IMF question.

# New respect

A subtle change has occurred, involving a new respect for constitutionality. In debates throughout this session of parliament, MPs from all three parties have expressed a genuine commitment to the constitution as the supreme law of the land.

For its part, Renamo may want to change the constitution, but it is not prepared to bypass it.

On the other side, some Frelimo MPs who were formerly in government admit that in the past they did not look too closely at the constitution when drafting laws, and that only now have they come to realise the importance of the constitution. And they are critical of present government ministers for not understanding that this change in attitude is genuine.

## Constitutional revision

At the request of Renamo, the third regular session of parliament was preceded on 11-13 October by a special session to consider constitutional and procedural issues. Two ad hoc committees were established to propose changes to the constitution and a new national anthem.

The constitutional committee must report at the next session of parliament on how it will consult the public; it must make its final report by February 1997. Renamo wants to reduce the power of the president and make other changes, but constitutional amendments require a two-thirds vote in parliament and thus the agreement of both Frelimo and Renamo.

The constitutional committee has 31 members: 16 Frelimo, 14 Renamo and 1 União Democrática (UD). Chair is Hermenegildo Gamito (Frelimo) and secretary is Jafar Gulamo Jafar (Renamo).

The national anthem contained the words "Viva Frelimo" which are no longer sung, but the song clearly must be changed. The ad hoc committee has 8 Frelimo, 6 Renamo, and 1 UD. Chair is Almeida dos Santos Tambara (Renamo) and the secretary is a musician, Roberto Chitsonzo (Frelimo).

A Renamo proposal to change the composition of the Permanent Commission of parliament from the present 15 members (8 Frelimo, 5 Renamo, 2 UD) to 20 (10 Frelimo, 8 Renamo, 2 UD) to more accurately reflect the balance in parliament was rejected in one of the few contested votes.

The UD, which has only 9 seats in the 250-seat parliament, refused to take up its places on the two ad hoc committees, claiming it should have seats in the same proportion as on the Permanent Commission, which it claimed would give it 5 of the 31 seats on the constitutional committee. Instead, it was given 1 seat, in proportion to its seats in the assembly.

## Standing committees: Hard at work

Much of the parliamentary action has taken place in the seven standing committees (*comissões*) set up at the March-May parliamentary session. Most met

than simply consider bills submitted to parliament, and raised issues which are often of more direct public interest than the bills debated in parliament.

The chairmanships and secretaryships of the committees are distributed between the three parties. Frelimo as majority party was able to choose which committees it wanted to chair. Each committee has 15 members and each party selected its members for the committees and named the chair or secretary where appropriate. MPs were able to decide if they wanted to be members of standing committees or not; many chose not to because of business or political commitments taking up some of their time.

Both Frelimo and Renamo tried to choose members and especially chairs with related experience. In the Agriculture, Regional Development, Public Administration and Local Power Committee, chair Hélder Muteia (Frelimo) is a veterinarian and members include a farmer, an agricultural technician, a former teacher at the Agronomy Faculty, an economist, and a former government official involved in development. The chair of the Economic Activities and Services Committee, Chico Francisco (Renamo), is a hydrogeologist, while members include business people, two former railway workers (the committee also covers transport), a former provincial director of industry and energy, and a former worker at a coal mine. "We have relevant practical experience," Francisco said, which means people take the committees more seriously. Committees have the expertise to go more deeply into issues, which means "discussions do not degenerate into political debates," explained Francisco.

The committees have shown a high degree of interparty cooperation and professionalism. "Clearly there are some political differences. But so far we have never voted in our committee: we always decide by consensus," said Muteia.

The government has not tried to direct Frelimo members on committees. When the local government elections bills were presented, Frelimo members were told that they were free to discuss the bills – which were then rejected.

## Casting the net wider

The committees' priority has been consideration of bills proposed by government or opposition for the next session, but they have also moved on to begin discussions of future legislation. Most committees have summoned ministers in related areas to give evidence, and most have done so.

For example, the Agriculture Committee talked to the Agriculture Minister about the new land law, which is now under discussion but which will not go to parliament until the second session next year.

The International Relations Committee took evidence from a range of ambassadors. Several committees talked to aid agency representatives.

Most committees are sending individuals or small groups to visit relevant locations: often individual members will undertake visits in their home provinces during the breaks between sessions.

public. At the request of an East Timor solidarity group, the International Relations Committee supported the creation of a parliamentary interest group on East Timor. The Economic Activities and Services Committee looked at the problems in LAM, the national airline, at the request of its trade union.

The report of the Economic Activities Committee notes that its first sessions "were essentially an initiation – a first contact with economic realities."

## Raising hot issues

Privatisations and agricultural marketing are two of the hot issues discussed by committees. The Economic Activities Committee has been openly critical of the privatisation programme, warning that there has been "a lack of transparency", there has been a failure to give preference to Mozambicans, workers are not always being given the 20% share they should get, and in some cases people who have won the bidding for companies have not kept the companies running and have even "turned factories into warehouses".

Committee chair Francisco has taken a particular interest in the Beira corridor and its railway and port, which he says shows that state companies can be profitable – "they prove that you don't need to privatise to end inefficiency and make a profit."

The Committee also warns of the "danger of the extinction of the national textile industry."

Both the Economic Activities and Agriculture committees have looked at agricultural marketing and warned that the (IMF-imposed) credit squeeze means that traders are unable to buy peasant produced maize and other products. The Agriculture Committee warns that traders are paying peasants less than the official minimum price for maize, it also calls for a new agricultural finance system.

## Varied rules

Each of the seven committees has written its own standing orders; there are considerable variations. On the issue of open and closed meetings, for example, the Agriculture, Economic Affairs, and Plan & Budget committees say meetings are open unless the committee decides otherwise, while the other four committees say nothing. Only two – Defence and Legal Affairs – have set up formal subcommittees. After a discussion in parliament, it was decided to harmonise the seven sets of standing orders.

## Parliament: Limited facilities

Parliament has been working with very limited facilities and equipment, and despite a year of discussions there has still been little practical help from the donor community: photocopiers from Switzerland and the United States, a fax from Switzerland, three computers from AWEPA, and office material from the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The overstretched parliamentary staff has done remarkably well considering the lack of resources, but

accuse staff of poor work – Alexandre Vasco told parliament that many staff are "incompetent".

The seven standing committees are all demanding more facilities – each wants their own computer and photocopier, their own meeting room, and a room for documents. The International Relations Committee says it needs three staff in order to function.

In the longer term, parliament will have support from Denmark (\$1.9 mn) and China (\$6 mn) for major improvements to the parliament building. In 1988 China had promised to build an entirely new parliament building, but this has now been scaled down to \$6 mn for rehabilitation of the present one.

The present building is a converted cinema. Plans include changing the seating into a semi-circle, building offices for the party leaders and committee heads and secretaries, building three meeting rooms, and building an apartment-hotel to house up to 100 MPs from outside Maputo.

## Good press

Press coverage of the new parliament has been generally well done and press-parliament relations are good. Radio and TV report parliamentary sessions in daily news programmes; TV also has a weekly hour-long summary of the week in parliament. As well as reporting the sessions, the daily *Noticias* has also been interviewing MPs on the topics of the day.

Press registration was smooth and simple. A press credential was given to any journalist submitting a letter. The credential entitles the journalist to one copy of all documents and to free access to the parliament building. MPs and journalists are able to mix freely during the hour-long daily coffee break.

All standing committee sessions have been open to the press and public, and journalists have attended some of them. Radio Mozambique regularly asks standing committee members onto its "Open Line" programme, and RM plans to name a special correspondent to deal only with standing committees.

Regular parliamentary correspondents have telephone numbers of committee chairs or secretaries and party spokespeople, who they contact when they have been unable to attend meetings. Indeed, committee members often contact the press to report on what has happened at a meeting.

## More information

Much more information has been made available because of the multi-party parliament and a much more open post-election government.

For example, the Ministry of Planning and Finance submitted a 70 page report on how it was following the 1995 plan, which showed that for the first half of the year government spending had been kept below the very low level that had been planned.

And in a detailed report, the attorney general admitted that the crime rate is rising, there are human rights violations including people being detained illegally, and there is a "rapid expansion" of corruption.

## Donors, MPs combine

The government's bills for local elections were defeated by an unusual combination of donor pressure and a new spirit of independence by the parliament. The decision to delay local elections was all the more surprising, because both donors and the Renamo opposition had been pushing for early and wide-ranging local elections.

Minister of State Administration Alfredo Gamito said in the Sunday newspaper *Domingo* (12 Nov) that a major reason to withdraw the bill was donor demands for all-party agreement on any local election law. Pushing ahead for a law Renamo did not support would mean no donor money to run the election.

But as soon as the bills were presented, it was clear they had no chance of passing. The parliamentary legal affairs committee had ruled unanimously the bills were unconstitutional, and MPs seemed genuinely offended that the government had made no concession and proposed no changes to the bills. Frelimo MPs on the legal affairs committee, who had already called the bills unconstitutional, made clear that they could hardly be expected to change their mind just because the government decided to press ahead. Thus the government would not have had a majority.

Renamo had three political reasons for opposing the bill. First, it had earlier withdrawn bills after the legal affairs committee found them unconstitutional. Thus, with some political glee, it took a hard line on government measures considered unconstitutional.

Second, Renamo has been pressing for an early revision of the constitution. Thus it was happy for another argument to support the need to amend the constitution – in this case to permit local elections.

Third, although Renamo has publicly pushed for early local elections in all districts, it was coming to realise that it would have trouble organising for them, and privately would be happy with a year's delay.

## 'Designating' mayors

The key constitutional issue hinges on interpretation and language. The constitution talks of two types of local government bodies: "representative" bodies, such as councils, which are "elected", and "executive" bodies and officials, including district administrators and mayors, which are "designated". When the 1990 constitution was drafted, this distinction was made because the drafters intended that mayors and administrators would still be nominated by central government, even if councils were to be elected.

The question was: Even if the constitution's drafters did not intend it, could mayors still be elected? Supporters of the bill argued that election was a possible form of "designation"; opponents said that by making a distinction between the two, the constitution made clear designation meant nomination and not election.

Implicit in the debate is that if the local election bill is unconstitutional, then the 1994 Municipalities Law is too. Jafar Gulamo Jafar (Renamo), the Legal Affairs Committee secretary, confirmed this during the

now have to decide if it is possible to amend the 1994 law, or if the problem is so basic that a constitutional amendment is required to allow election of mayors.

The other constitutional issue relates to another bill in the package, to set up a new National Election Commission (CNE), similar to one which ran presidential and parliamentary elections last year. However, part of the Rome peace accord included the waiving of the section of the constitution covering the election machinery to allow an independent CNE. That waiver is no longer in force, and the constitution assigns supervision of elections to the Constitutional Council, and before it is appointed, to the Supreme Court. The law must be redrafted to take this into account, although this is not a fundamental problem.

## Gradualism

It would be "utopian" to expect to be able to hold local elections everywhere in the country next year, argued Alfredo Gamito, the Minister of State Administration.

The government's policy set out in the 1994 Municipalities Law is that when districts have a basic set of conditions – such as a small town hall with basic equipment (a typewriter, a safe for tax revenues, etc.), a small trained staff, housing for officials, and places where councillors can stay during meetings (as many districts are too large for councillors to go home at night between meeting days) – they will be called "municipalities" and elect a council and a mayor (for cities) or an administrator (for districts). The law defined the ten provincial capitals and Maputo city as "municipalities" already, and said a local election date had to be set before 1 October 1996.

The Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) from last year's elections had been reappointed, with Arménio Correia as director general. It was planning for registration in March and elections in September in these 11 cities. Elections in remaining districts would be in 1997 and 1998.

The second phase would have been 18 districts – 12 which contain places already designated as cities (Chókwè, Dondo, Mocuba, Nacala, etc.) and the six districts being assisted under the Swedish pilot district (PROL) programme (Lichinga district, Mocimboa da Praia, Monapo, Angónia, Búzi, and Boane).

Elections in these 18 would have taken place in 1997. If there was pressure from parliament and sufficient donor money, then these 18 could have been added to the September 1996 list.

Elections in the remaining 102 districts would have been in 1997 and 1998.

The principle of "gradualism" in elections had three roots. First, the government felt there was no point in electing councils for districts that had no functioning administrative structure. Second, a gradual approach allows elections to be more Mozambican-run and less donor-dependent (although even elections in 11 cities will need \$22 million in donor funds). Third, starting in cities that already have functioning administrations will be a good test of the whole decentralisation process and allow changes in the law and regulations before elections in other municipalities.

parliament will cover all districts, and determine if elections will be phased or all at the same time.

## Donor demands

Donors have made local elections a high priority. The independent weekly *Demos* (1 November) published the text of demands to the government issued by the Aid for Democracy (AfD) donor group in September.

The six point statement is not signed by individual donors and does not even identify the source, because it is a collection of individual donor demands. It is somewhat confused and contradictory, and not all AfD donors support all six points. But donor representatives said they felt the need to have something in writing to give to government, even if it was not a fully agreed statement.

The first point, which does have widespread donor support, is "Consensus: The most important factor which will determine the degree of donor support ... Consensus should be reached in parliament as soon as possible regarding the way in which the elections will be conducted."

Donors said that they would not support an election if the law had been pushed through parliament over Renamo opposition. Thus Renamo has an effective veto, and Gamito cited donor views when he withdrew the bill. At least some donors say they will accept a delay until 1997, so long as it is agreed by Renamo and Frelimo.

The first point also talks of consensus of "extra parliamentary parties", but this has less support.

Second, the donors effectively support gradualism. "Donors believe the elections should be held promptly in as many districts as possible" but if they are not held in all districts in 1996, then "a timetable should be announced".

The fourth point partly contradicts the second. It opposes gradualism and the structure of the 1994 Municipalities Law. "Existence of a tax base or a requirement for the local entity to be declared a municipality should not be preconditions to representative local government."

The United States, Britain and Germany are the main donors opposed to gradualism and the 1994 law, and the fourth point reflects their view. The European Union and the Like Minded Group have generally supported the phased approach, and the second point rather than the fourth reflects their view.

The third point is that "elections should be held at minimum cost. ... Elements which are not cost effective or verifiable by political parties and other monitors should be avoided and will not be supported."

The other two points are self-evident. Fifth, that "powers and responsibilities given to local government should be carefully delineated". (This is the core of intensive donor-funded activity already under way within the Ministry of State Administration.) Sixth, "local authorities should be accountable to local voters." (This is already covered in the 1994 law.)

Gamito's statement that he was withdrawing the law because of donor conditions drew an angry editorial from *Domingo* (12 November). "The donor community has returned to showing a firm hand and imposing

lessons that *Domingo* draws are not new: those who hand out the 'bread' continue to define the rules of the game and always do it to benefit those who support donor interests."

Privately, donors agree. They admit that such a statement made by foreign countries about their own local elections would be totally unacceptable. But they stress that Mozambique must accept such impositions because it is dependent on donors for more than half its budget. One donor representative commented: "the 1994 elections only took place because of donor pressure, and there will be local elections only if donors keep up the pressure now."

From their side, the Mozambican government is taking a put-up or shut-up line. If donors want the first elections in more than 11 cities, they will have to pay the costs. And if they expect elections across the entire country, then they will have to provide some money to rebuild town halls destroyed in war – which so far donors have refused to do and which IMF spending restrictions make it impossible for the government to do.

## Proposed laws: Local elections

The election law put to parliament were never debated because of the issue of constitutionality of electing mayors, but the technical details seem unlikely to change. The proposed law was similar to the law for the 1994 national elections: some of the problems that appeared last year were corrected, with the major exception of invalid votes (see next page).

The elections of the mayor (or district administrator) and municipal council take place at the same time, and both are elected for five years. The mayor or administrator must receive a majority of votes; if no candidate receives a majority, then there is a second round between the two candidates with most votes. The mayor or administrator can only serve two terms.

The council is to be elected by a list system, with distribution of seats again by the Hondt method. But unlike the national elections, there is no minimum threshold; since councils will be large – 35 to 71 members – this gives more chance to small parties.

Voters must be registered in the municipality where they vote, but candidates need not be registered there. Judges and magistrates, soldiers and members of the security forces, and ministers of religion and heads of sects cannot stand for election unless they first take leave from their post. The proposed law also excludes heads of companies and proprietors of businesses that have continuing contracts with the municipality, which could exclude many local business people.

All candidates have the right to time off work during the 25 day election campaign.

All nationally registered parties have the right to put forward candidates and lists, and to form coalitions. Independent candidates for mayor and local citizens' lists for council require signatures of 2% of registered voters – which ranges from as few as 1000 in the smaller cities to more than 10,000 in Maputo.



procedures, restrictions on posters and campaigning, and rules for party agents (*delegados de lista*) are largely the same as last year. Again, results must be posted at each polling station.

Several problem areas in the national election have been at least partly resolved in the new proposal:

- bureaucratic requirements for candidates are simplified;
- tasks are more equally distributed to polling station staff (last year, the presiding officer had too many responsibilities); and
- press is still allowed inside polling stations, but they are no longer permitted to take photos close to the actual voting booth.

## More invalid votes?

Invalid votes caused the biggest single problem in the national elections last year; more than 600,000 ballot papers had to be reconsidered by the National Election Commission (CNE). The law required the cross or fingerprint to be at least partly inside a tiny square on the ballot paper, which meant that marks on the candidate's photo or name were invalid, even though the intent of the voter was clear. The CNE eventually included more than half these "invalid" votes, because it considered the law too restrictive and decided to accept all ballots where the voters' intention was clear.

In its final report, the CNE said the law should be changed to allow any mark within the rectangle containing the name and symbol of the party or candidate.

But the draft local elections law uses the identical wording which caused so much trouble last year.

Unexpectedly, the proposed law requires that voters make a cross in a box, and does not allow for voting with a fingerprint as was used by many illiterate voters last year. (Nevertheless, the list of required supplies for a polling station includes a stamp pad and ink for fingerprints.)

Together, these would increase even further the number of invalid votes.

## Election commission

The government proposed setting up a permanent National Election commission of 13 members named by parliament. The president would have a 7-year term and the other 12 members a 5-year term.

In presenting the law, the Council of Ministers wrote: "Benefiting from the experience of the first version of the National Election Commission, it is intended to reduce the number of members to 13 and increase their functionality, to speed up decision-making." Decisions would not need to be unanimous, but could be by a majority of those present.

registration opens until 15 days after it closes, and from 45 days before the start of the electoral period until 45 days after the elected officials take office.

The CNE would name provincial election commissions of seven members and district election commissions of five members. But the Council of Ministers stresses that "the principal decisions will be taken at central level" and that the CNE can override any decisions of provincial and district commissions.

MPs, members of the government, judges, members of the Constitutional Council, and "members of provincial or local organs" cannot be members of the CNE. At least five members must be lawyers.

The proposed law stated that, once named by parliament, the CNE was to be "autonomous and independent of all state authorities." The Legal Affairs Committee ruled this violates the constitutional provision that the Constitutional Council is responsible for running elections. (Until this Council is appointed, the Supreme Court has the job) The law will need to be redrafted to make the CNE subordinate to the Constitutional Council.

## Registration

A single register would be maintained for all elections. All Mozambicans aged 18 and over would be expected to register, to confirm their registration annually, and to change their registration if they move. The proposed registration law uses the same Portuguese word as the previous and proposed election laws, *dever*, which means a "duty" to do something but falls short of making it compulsory. Photo ID cards would continue to be issued to those who register. Because the registration law referred to the CNE, it too was withdrawn.

## Donor politics: Opposition to IMF

Donor representatives in Maputo issued an unprecedented statement attacking IMF policies.

The issue came to a head during the visit of an International Monetary Fund official, Sérgio Leite. During a 23 September televised press conference, Leite took the unusual step of publicly criticising a 37.5% increase in the minimum wage that had just been agreed in three-way talks between government, industry and labour. Although only half the rate of inflation and leading to a minimum wage of less than US\$ 1 per day, Leite called the increase "excessive" and said it was being given too soon. He repeated his view during a 26 September meeting with donors, which was reported in detail the following day in the independent daily *MediaFax*.

“great efforts”, including cutting government spending even more than planned, and had satisfied most of the conditions imposed by the IMF. Nevertheless, inflation was still rising too rapidly, and this required further cuts in credit and spending; thus he opposed the rise in the minimum wage.

Further, Leite warned that the IMF might be forced to declare Mozambique “off-track”, which would have had automatic and disastrous consequences. Some aid would stop automatically, and Mozambique would not be allowed to negotiate further debt reductions later this year. Finance Minister Tomás Salomão was summoned to Washington for further negotiations.

This caused widespread concern among donors in Maputo, leading to a statement issued on 6 October and sent to the IMF and World Bank, as well as to the government. The statement said “the donor community is impressed with the commitment made by the new government’s economic team to implement an ambitious reform agenda. A disruption in financial support could jeopardize further progress.” It also appealed, in technical language, for the programme not to be declared off-track.

And in an unusually open criticism of IMF policy, it continued: “While we endorse the demand management approach of the IMF and the government to combat inflation, we are deeply concerned about the lack of a supply response in the Mozambican economy. Decoded, this means: making the world’s poorest country even poorer in order to reduce demand will not rebuild a war-torn economy; something must also be done to increase production.

In the end, the statement was signed by only five donor ambassadors or representatives in Maputo, but they were key ones: United States, European Union, United Nations, Netherlands, and Switzerland. Nordic donors helped draft the statement, but were stopped from signing at the last minute by their capitals, who felt statements about the IMF should not come from ambassadors in Maputo; privately, however, they made clear their continued support for the statement.

One donor said: “inflation cannot be fought simply by monetary and fiscal measures – by controlling the money supply and government spending – as the IMF

### **‘IMF rules Mozambique’**

“In contrast to what we would like to believe, the rulers of Africa are not the various African states. ... The rulers of Africa and of Mozambique are the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. ... Their programme is to integrate Africa into a system of economic neo-colonialism which takes no account of the needs of people. What counts is the free market; its god is money.”

*Nova Vida* (November 1995), published by the Mozambican Catholic Church

“The IMF is not a development agency, it is an audit agency. You cannot leave development to the auditors. Development is much more complex – you need a vision.”

Abdul Magid Osman, former Finance Minister

## **Parliament looks at donors**

Parliament has also been looking at donors. The Agriculture Committee in its report warned that international organisations have failed to give priority to agricultural marketing, and that “sometimes they promote the importation of food to the detriment of national production.”

And Renamo proposed a bill which would require every donor, both government and non-government, to declare to parliament the value and recipients of all aid and whether it was grant or loan, as well as the location and executing institution of all projects. The International Relations Committee said that aid was an issue for the executive branch and parliament did not have the power to demand such information, and the bill was withdrawn.

believes. The IMF doesn’t understand the Mozambican economy; it is using the wrong model.”

The statement worked. Soon after it was released, the government confirmed the increase in the minimum wage. The IMF did not declare Mozambique off-track; Salomão later said this was partly due to the donor statement.

But the price was high. The donor statement specifically called on government to “increase budgetary allocations to education and health” but Salomão was forced to promise the IMF further cuts in health and education spending. Mozambique must also cut back on donor-funded rebuilding of war damaged infrastructure, such as roads, because this spending is considered by the IMF to be inflationary. And government must put aside money to pay debts to Russia, even though there is no repayment agreement with Russia and no demand for payment.

The IMF made no concessions on the supply side. Donors expect to press this when the IMF team returns to Maputo in early December.

## **CG delayed**

The World Bank-convened donor Consultative Group (CG) meeting in Paris which normally occurs in December has still not been scheduled. The 1994 meeting had been delayed until 14-15 March 1995, because of the elections. Now the 1995 meeting will be delayed until March 1996 or even later.

The more supportive donors see this as helpful to the government – it has enough donor funds committed until mid-1996, and this will allow government more space to meet the targets it committed itself to in March.

They also want to allow government to present a budget to parliament at this session, before it is given to donors at the CG; although they admit government will still need to negotiate the budget with donors before going to parliament, some donors feel that democratisation requires that parliament be allowed at least a token say in the budget.

Donors now accept that they forced government to commit itself to an over ambitious programme at the March 1995 CG. The 6 October donor statement also

few key areas which, taken together, will enhance the chances for economic recovery." There must be defined "a more limited set of priorities within the existing policy framework."

The statement went on to identify for government the four economic priority areas on which expected action is demanded before the CG:

- tax and custom reform.
- financial sector reform.
- private sector development, and
- combating corruption."

Roberto Chavez, the World Bank representative in Mozambique, in a *Domingo* (5 November) interview, said that in all four areas "things are moving very well."

Democratisation and decentralisation will be the non-economic priority areas for the CG.

## Donor scandals

Two very different donor scandals have arisen in recent months. In one, Sweden is holding back aid funds and delaying seed for the currently planting season because of a \$ 2.3 million corruption scandal in the emergency seeds and tools programme (PESU). According to *MediaFax* (28 September) \$ 1.1 mn was never spent and remained in a bank account. \$ 614,000 was paid to a joint Swedish-Mozambican company which allegedly overcharged for goods supplied, and \$ 485,000 was paid to the Swedish-backed Mozambican company Agro-Alfa which went bankrupt without delivering. The government blamed Nordic confusion, but agreed to repay the money.

In the other, the United States is accused of threatening the withdrawal of aid if Mozambique did not sign an unfavourable contract with the US firm Enron for the exploitation of gas at Pande, in Inhambane. Minerals Minister John Kachamila told the *Houston Chronicle* "there were outright threats to withhold development funds if we didn't sign and sign soon. Their diplomats ... pressured me to sign a deal which was not good for Mozambique." Kachamila also accused the embassy of a "smear campaign" by telling the press he would not sign the contract because he wanted a big kickback. US Ambassador Dennis Jett told the *Chronicle* "The role of international trade to the US is tremendously important. We see other governments helping their businesses, and we aren't going to stand by and not help ours."

## Joining the Commonwealth

Mozambique has become the 53rd member of the Commonwealth, and is the first country to be admitted which is not a former British colony. But all of its neighbours are members, and they pushed Mozambique's application. The Commonwealth has had an aid programme with Mozambique since independence to compensate for attacks by two renegade members of the Commonwealth, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa.

Membership leads to name changes: an embassy of one Commonwealth country in another Commonwealth country is called a High Commission, and the ambassador becomes the High Commissioner.

## New land law soon

Land tenure remains one of the most fraught issues in Mozambique, but the new Agriculture Minister, Carlos do Rosário, is moving rapidly to resolve it.

Under the constitution, land is owned by the state, which can grant use rights; present occupants are supposed to have priority. The practice is extremely confused, because conflicting use rights are being granted by many different people and agencies – the Council of Ministers; individual ministers including Agriculture, Mining, Industry and Tourism; provincial governors; provincial departments to agriculture; district administrators; and city councils. Peasants are not supposed to be pushed off land they occupy, but sometimes they are; in other cases they have been able to fight back and win the right to stay.

Land has also become highly political. White South African farmers have been given land in Niassa province. Ministers and generals and their families have been allocated large tracts of land. In areas it controls, Renamo has granted land rights as well as timber and mineral concessions.

Individuals as well as peasant associations have been able to obtain use right titles to land they occupy, but it is an expensive and complex process.

Rosário made land a priority. He reactivated the Land Commission, which began meeting regularly in mid-1995, and set it the target of having draft revisions of the land law by the end of the year.

A new land policy was drafted and approved by the Council of Ministers in September. A draft law should be ready on schedule by Christmas. During the first six months of 1996, the Land Commission is planning an extensive national consultation exercise on the draft; in that period it will also write the regulations that go with the law, and revise the draft law.

The package will be presented to a major conference in June. After revisions, it will go to parliamentary standing committees in time to be presented to the October 1996 session of parliament.

The agreed land policy rejects privatisation of land (as pushed by some donors) and accepts the present constitutional ban on land mortgages and sale of land. It defines four categories of land:

- Type A: Commercial land where the present land titles system will remain, and where infrastructure (including irrigation canals, tree, etc) can be

### ***Is land part of the deal?***

The red carpet has been rolled out for former backers of the opposition. James Blanchard III and the daughters of Jorge Jardim have met with President Joaquim Chissano and been encouraged to invest in Mozambique.

Blanchard, a right-wing US businessman who was one of Renamo's biggest private backers in the 1980s, is planning to take over the Maputo Elephant Reserve and the adjoining Machangula peninsula for a major tourist development.

Meanwhile, the Renamo head in Sofala, Manuel Pereira, proposes a joint venture with an Italian company for 250,000 hectares in southern Sofala.

• Type B: Communal land for the family sector, where access will be controlled by some form of traditional rights. Formal titles will not be needed, and sale and mortgages will not be permitted.

• Type C: Protected areas, such as parks and beaches.

• Type D: Virgin land available for development.

Peasants in commercial areas will be encouraged to form associations to gain titles and protect their rights.

Many issues remain to be resolved, including who will decide which land fits into which category. But a revised land law could be on the books in one year.

## Which 'traditional' leaders?

The debate about "traditional authority" is growing because traditional leaders are to have a role both in local government and in land allocation. There have been numerous press articles. The Ministry of State Administration is doing studies and holding a series of seminars in various parts of the country to consider this issue, and expects to report in mid-1996.

In many parts of rural Mozambique, there are leaders of families, clans and larger groups whose authority is recognised by the people under them. But there are also many disputes, some going back more than a century. Not only did Renamo, Frelimo and the colonial authorities substitute "traditional" leaders with others more compliant, but so did pre-colonial rulers. In Buzi, for example, there is still a dispute between the lineages of chiefs put in a century ago by Ngungunhana and those who were displaced.

Some people are calling for government to establish a commission which would take evidence locally and issue rulings as to who should be considered the "traditional" leader.

Lawyer Leonor Joaquim argues that "traditional law needs to be dynamic" to take into account issues such as gender equality, and that the state must have a role in any institutionalising of traditional authority.

Adelino Ivala, president of Assana, the Nampula Development Association, argues for a "synthesis of traditional and modern systems" that brings together democracy and traditional authority. And he warns of the danger of giving "traditional chiefs" dictatorial power which they never had before; chiefs always needed to gain agreement of clan and family heads, and this must be institutionalised, Ivala argues.

Attitudes of traditional leaders toward government is proving highly variable. Older chiefs in some areas are demanding that the government give them the uniforms and salaries which they had in colonial times. But in other places, chiefs are keeping their distance from government.

## AWEPA: Seminars

Parliament has moved unexpectedly rapidly to set its own agenda and take effective control of its affairs. Several seminars seem to have been important in propelling this process, including four by AWEPA.

250 MPs participated in a seminar in March shortly after the opening of the second session of parliament. For many new MPs, it was their first information on the

seminar was a simulation of a new law: MPs were divided into new parties, the press, and pressure groups. They had to work together, looking for compromises in committees and considering the interests of several groups in society.

The most important result was diminishing tension between the three parties. "The seminar helped us to move away from conflicts between the parties; it broke down differences," commented Rui de Sousa, a Renamo MP. But he noted, too, that "democratisation takes time; there is a long learning process."

In September there was a special seminar for parliamentary staff, to help them cope with the demands of the new multi-party parliament despite their lack of equipment and training.

A three day seminar in Pemba for all Cabo Delgado MPs – plus provincial and local government, community and traditional leaders – included an intensive debate on decentralisation and the relative powers of MPs, national government and provincial officials.

Marcos Juma, a UD MP and one of the vice presidents of Parliament, in his summing up of the seminar stressed that they had learned it was not simply a case of MPs giving orders, demanding information and making promises that are impossible to keep; rather it was an issue of questions and answers, and learning what was the responsibility of the province rather than parliament. Increasing the information flow between province and parliament was seen as critical.

Finally, in October just before the opening of the third session, there was a special seminar for five of the seven standing committees.

In a small way, the seminars may have tempered a growing arrogance on the part of MPs. Zeganius Kameeta, a vice president of the Namibian parliament, reminded the MPs in Pemba that they cannot use material limitations as an excuse for not acting for their constituents. "I have no office, no telephone paid by the government, and my house is my office; this clearly complicates the life of my family. But I cannot wait for all my privileges before I start work – the problems of the people don't wait," Kameeta said.

## Civic Education

AWEPA begins a new program of civic education in February, in coordination with STAE (Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration) and will work with four sets of non-government organisations:

- CCM (Christian Council) and member churches;
- OMM (Mozambican Women's Organisation) and other women's groups;
- OTM (Organisation of Trade Unions) and independent trade unions; and
- OJM (Youth Organisation) and other youth groups.

With most of those partners an intensive civic education program was done in 1993/94, before the national elections, on basic rights, democracy, the peace process and the elections. These working groups will also organise the new training.

Subjects will include: basic rights and democratic principles; post-election situation; possible influence of civil society; and decentralisation, separation of powers, and local elections.

After a period when little was published about Mozambique, there has been a relative flood of books and reports. This is a brief round-up of recent publications.

## Three essential books

Together, these three books provide a good basic library on Mozambique:

**Mozambique: Eleições, Democracia e Desenvolvimento** ed by Brazão Mazula; pp 672; 1995. <MT 300.000 or \$26 at BIP Maputo.> (Portuguese only, although an English edition is planned)

The first serious attempt to produce a largely Mozambican view of Mozambique today, this book is too long and too expensive, but still essential reading.

The first district level statistics on the 1994 election are published here, with an initial attempt to discuss ethnic and regional issues. Luis de Brito has a particularly interesting series of maps showing results by district. As expected, Frelimo dominated the three southern provinces and northern Niassa and Cabo Delgado, while Renamo dominated Manica and Sofala. But the maps show a complex picture for Tete, Zambézia, and Nampula. In both Tete and Nampula, there are districts where Frelimo gained more than twice the votes of Renamo, and others where the opposite was true. In Zambézia, Renamo won all but two districts, but in many districts its margin was small.

de Brito also shows that Frelimo received double the vote of Renamo in urban areas, whereas in rural areas the two parties were virtually equal. And he gives the first data on recounted invalid votes.

Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco provides the best summary I have seen of 20 years of economic change. He argues that there are more similarities than differences between the two main policies: central planning (1975-85) and structural adjustment (1985-95). Both depend on rapid change, both were aid dependent and imposed from outside by the main donor, both were "magic solutions" rooted in rigid dogma based on pure faith with no evidence that they would work, neither tackled the structural problems inherited from colonialism which meant that both state and market were weak, and both failed.

Former Information Minister José Cabaço analyses some of Frelimo's historic errors and provides new information on power struggles within the Frelimo military which compromised the war against Renamo.

And former Air Force commander João Honwana suggests that instead of amnesia, Mozambique needs a South Africa-style "truth commission" to identify perpetrators of the worst atrocities during the war.

**Mozambique: The Troubled transition** by Hans Abrahamsson & Anders Nilsson, pp 285, Zed, London, 1995, £15.95, ISBN 1-85649-324-5; **Mozambique em Transição** by Abrahamsson & Nilsson, pp 365, PADRIGU Gothenburg and ISRI Maputo, 1994 <\$9 at BIP Maputo.>

This book is the best record of the past five years. It is most important for its look at the chaos caused by aid, structural adjustment and what it calls "wild west

capitalism". Abrahamsson and Nilsson argue that "the structural adjustment programme is ... starting at the wrong end," because it is trying to adjust an economic structure that does not exist, rather than supporting efforts to build that structure. In particular, the book documents the failure to promote rural development.

The authors also try to put Mozambique's recent history into the broader context of rapidly changing world politics. They note that when Mozambique gained independence, Frelimo's goals seemed much more plausible than they do in retrospect – in 1975 the US, the Soviet Union and South Africa were more friendly than they became in the early 1980s.

**A History of Mozambique** by Malyn Newitt, pp 679, Hurst, London, 1995, £16.50, ISBN 1-85065-172-8.

The first detailed history in English of Mozambique going back to the 16th century. Although, only 35 pages are on the post-independence period, Newitt tries to put recent conflicts into a longer term context. "However suspect its methods and however suspect the motives of the Western businessmen, church leaders and academics who have espoused its cause, Renamo was essentially a Mozambican phenomenon, comprehensible only in terms of the history of the country – a history which has etched patterns of action and reaction which modern Mozambican society finds itself unconsciously repeating." That history is one of warlordism and banditry, with a few warlords eventually gaining economic power and respectability. Drought and ecological stress also recur frequently.

Newitt is a good story teller. He keeps his history relevant by drawing on modern concepts of gender, environment and economics, and by linking events in Mozambique with those in the rest of the world and with similar events earlier and later in Mozambique.

## The peace process

**Kalashnikovs and Zombie Cucumbers: Travels in Mozambique** by Nick Middleton, pp 225, Phoenix (Orion), London, 1995, £5.99, ISBN 1-85799-274-4.

Ignore the overstretched title. This is an unexpected, perceptive and readable book about travels through Mozambique in 1992 and 1993 which gives a real feel for the horrors of war and the optimism of peace. No surprises for the old Mozambique hands, but an easy read to introduce newcomers to the complexities.

**Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices** by Cameron Hume, pp 162, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, 1995, ISBN 1-878379-37-2.

**No Democracy Without Money: The Road to Peace in Mozambique** by Alex Vines, pp 73, Catholic Institute of International Relations, London, 1994, £1.50.

Read together, these two studies provide the best account so far of the two-year long Rome peace talks – although they leave many gaps. Cameron Hume was the deputy chief of the United States mission to the Vatican and represented the US at most of the Rome talks. His book is a detailed diary of what took place.

gives the background and identifies the players.

Hume makes clear that he and the United States played a major role in the talks. In particular, he admits the unworkable one-year timetable from cease-fire to elections came not from government or Renamo, but from outsiders – a “US observer”. “Italian defense experts” and UN observers.

Vines reports on efforts to block US attempts to gain a bigger role in the talks.

Hume and Vines both note the important role played by Lonrho's Tiny Rowland.

Both help to explain what became two important issues during the two years of ONUMOZ – the continued distrust between the two sides, and Renamo's demands for money – by stressing how much was done by the mediators and how little was accomplished in face-to-face talks between the two sides, and by showing the importance to the settlement of Renamo's desperate need for money.

**International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)** ed by W Kunhe, B Weimar and S Fandrych, pp 60, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany. (English with German summary.)

Five months after elections, several key players gathered in New York to claim credit for the success. This report of the one-day seminar shows how different are the perceptions of what happened. And it has admissions about previously hidden opinions.

The United Nations and Aldo Ajello, head of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), came in for unexpected attack. Helmut Rau, the German ambassador to Maputo, said the UN delayed the start of the peace process, gave the wrong mandate to the military component, failed to demine and disarm, and should have provided “something comparable to an after-sales service”. General Pier Segala, the chair of the Cease Fire Commission, admitted the UN was not ready for demobilisation and that delays by the two parties “proved to be face-saving for the UN.”

Ajello admitted he failed to disarm Renamo. For the first time, he admitted he supported pre-election efforts by the United States to force Frelimo into a “power sharing” agreement as had been done in South Africa. (Frelimo consistently refused, and it convincingly won the election.) Still stung by criticism from Mozambique's independent press, Ajello used the meeting to argue, in effect, for press censorship.

Roger Carlson, director of USAID in Maputo, actually bragged that donors refused to fund a programme for vocational training and other support for demobilised soldiers, because “that depended on strengthening Mozambican institutions” – which the US was unwilling to do.

In the end, the failure to do anything for demobbed soldiers except give them money may prove to be the biggest error of the peace process. That money runs out in 1996 and many will have no way of earning a living. Some sensible UN officials had wanted to ensure that they had other skills than killing, but competing UN officials mobilised donors, including the US, to oppose the programme.

(Based on a review in *International Peacekeeping*)

**math of Conflict** by Alex Vines, pp 26. Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, London, 1995, £10.

A short and expensive summary of events in Mozambique and Angola, with a superficial comparison. Useful for those with no knowledge of southern Africa. Does warn about the problem of demobbed soldiers without an income.

**Freedom of Expression and the vote for peace** by D Cammack, pp 30, Article 19, London.

A recap of Article 19's earlier report on media and the elections, plus suggestions for changes in the press and defamation laws. The report also calls for the government to relinquish financial interests in the print media and to enact a freedom of information law.

## Academic and other

**Mozambique Perspectivas Económicas** ed by Carlos Castel-Branco, pp 258, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1994. <\$5 at BIP>

This report of a March 1994 seminar provides useful background on Mozambique's economy. Castel-Branco's article in Mazula (above) is more up to date.

**Literacy, Power, and Democracy in Mozambique** by Judith Marshall, pp 313. Westview, Boulder, Col USA, 1993. ISBN 0-8133-8140-1.

A readable study of the context and implications of literacy training at Companhia Industrial de Matola.

**Pitfalls in Development Aid**, pp 44, Irish-Mozambique Solidarity, 13 Carlisle Street, Dublin, 1995. ISBN 0-9519326-2-4.

Articles by Joseph Hanlon and Niall Crowley on improving the quality of aid, in response to Ireland's decision to make Mozambique a priority aid country.

## AWEPA Publications

*The Report of AWEPA's observation of the Mozambique Electoral Process*, by Joseph Hanlon with photos by Pieter Boersma, is now available in English and Portuguese from AWEPA in Maputo and Amsterdam.

Several other reports will be available shortly:

- *E muitos participaram!*, by Obede Baloi. A study on civic education and the role of NGOs (Portuguese only).
- National Elections Commission report on the 1994 elections (Portuguese and English).
- Parliamentary regulations and rules for MPs.
- *Quem e quem na Assembleia da Republica*. (Who is who in parliament).

### Where is AWEPA?

AWEPA's new Maputo office is not on most maps. Rua Licenciado Coutinho is in the Coop. It is a small street which leaves Av Lenin opposite the buildings PH6 and PH7. Going from Praça OMM toward the baixa, it is the first right turn.