

Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin



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Comment:

On the Angola road?

It has become a cliché to say that Mozambique is not Angola. But Mozambique is moving toward 27-28 October elections without satisfying three essential parts of the peace accord signed in Rome two years ago, and some worrying parallels with Angola are becoming apparent.

Mozambique will go into elections without a new unified army, as was specified under the peace accord. This means that no one can enforce the outcome of the election, even if it is declared free and fair. The UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has the largest and best trained army in the country, but it will not use it to force the losers to accept the election result.

Also in violation of the accord, both sides appear to have retained military forces, although on a much smaller scale than Angola, and to have major arms caches. Renamo appears to be keeping groups of demobilised soldiers together in zones it controls, including 500 men in Inhaminga. In early September it also revealed that it had violated the peace accord by failing to list more than 1000 soldiers -- 5% of its army -- and Frelimo rightly fears that it may have more hidden. With arms, soldiers and communication in place, Renamo could reconstruct a small army quickly.

On its side the government has kept some officers out of the new army and may also be

able to draw on demobilised soldiers. But Renamo's real fear is of the Police Rapid Intervention force. An effective and well trained riot control police which is now being used to break up mutinies and road closures, the rapid intervention force is absolutely essential to some minimal degree of order. But the UN Security Council team visiting in August discovered that it has heavy weapons and is receiving what is effectively military training. Under the peace accord the police remained under government control; without the new joint army this gives Frelimo the second most important military force in the country.

The third violation of the peace accord is that, as we report elsewhere in this issue, there are still two administrations in Mozambique. Renamo has retained effective control of its zones and continues to restrict access to government and Frelimo officials and even civic education teams.

Another parallel with Angola has been the consistent refusal of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to denounce violations of the peace accord. For example, ONUMOZ has publicly denied that there are problems with access in the face of ample evidence.

The final parallel with Angola is that the two sides have apparently not come to any

arrangement as to the post-election role of the loser.

This election campaign and the latter years of the war have been less a struggle over political ideas than a battle for power and access to resources through the state. It is extremely naive to think that either of the two armed parties will give up its demand for a share of money and power just because it has lost the election. Already one of the parties has been making wild claims about electoral fraud which might be used to renounce the results.

Much of the press discussion of, and international pressure for, a pre-election agreement has centred around a South Africa-style government of national unity -- which has proved unacceptable to key elements within Frelimo. But there are many different ways in which power- or cake-sharing might be agreed, including jobs, houses, contracts, commitments relating to future local elections, and long term financial support for the losing party.

Without some pre-election agreement, there will necessarily be a period of intense negotiation after the election. Since both sides have military forces, this could easily become "armed negotiations". The kinds of roadblocks and hostage takings which have occurred in the past few months could become much more serious if large number of armed men with proper officers and communication systems were involved. Renamo would have a base in zones it continues to control; Frelimo would have its base in the cities.

A return to war as happened in Angola is highly unlikely in Mozambique. But there is a real danger of armed negotiations extending over several months and degenerating into chaos and confusion.

Mozambique's registration process ran very smoothly and registration brigades deserve high praise; this suggests that the election will run smoothly as well. Angola's election process ran extremely well, but it was meaningless because the peace accord had not been carried out. As Mozambique goes into its elections without its Rome peace accord having been satisfied, is it going down the Angola road?

Joseph Hanlon

Feeble new army

"By the time elections are held, the defence capacity of the new Mozambique Armed Defence Force (FADM) will probably be minimal, with no operational air-force or navy and little heavy-weapons handling capacity", predicted United Nations Deputy Special Representative in Mozambique, Behrooz Sadry, two months ahead of elections.

Sadry added "FADM could, by that time, be able to undertake certain security tasks, principally protection of its own barracks and installations, and munitions depots -- but it would need far more logistical support than it has now, to be truly operational".

And the new army will be very small. Under the Rome peace accord it was to have 30,000 men, 15,000 from each side. By early September, only 11,403 people had gone into the new army, 3,715 from Renamo and 8,688 from government; only half of those will be trained before the election.

On 9 September, the fifth FADM infantry brigade, combining former government and Renamo opposition soldiers finished a four week crash-course training under Mozambican, British and Zimbabwean instruction at Manhica military training camp in Maputo province. Instructors at Manhica said it was likely to be the last infantry battalion trained ahead of October elections, although initial plans had been to train 15 battalions of 742 soldiers each by then.

The plans were laid before frustration and disillusionment tore through the ranks of government and Renamo troops alike; soldiers on both sides refused to join the FADM.

A British training officer at Manhica, Paul Daly, said on 9 September "There are still 1600 soldiers destined for FADM at Boane [training camp, Maputo province], but almost half of them are officers, and we may need most of the rest to make up a shortfall in numbers of the other battalions already trained".

One training officer at Manhica, who was among a first group of 540 Mozambican instructors trained by the British at Nyanga military camp in Zimbabwe, argued it was easy to understand why soldiers no longer wanted to join the FADM, given continued derisory wages (MT 73,000/month for a private, worth less than US\$ 12/month) and poor logistical conditions including shortages of soap, toothpaste and boot-polish.

At the FADM 5th Infantry Battalion passing out parade, Manhica Camp Commander Lt. Col. Mulumo

Mafavisse complained that "Life and training at the centre have been negatively affected by lack of weapons, uniforms, a doctor, medicines, roofing sheets, kitchen equipment and the late arrival of salaries".

As the newly trained troops paraded, one instructor ran round after them picking up dozens of ill-fitting caps which fell to the floor.

The Nyanga-trained instructor said "We don't intend to stage any protests, but we'll wait and see how the new government treats us after elections. As things are, demobilisation might be a better option".

According to observer sources from the nation's peace-keeping commissions, a keen FADM Supreme Command faced intransigence from certain hardline figures in the government military who opposed the new joint army. By September the FADM still had no approved budget, after its own proposals were modified by the Ministry of Defence, still run by the same ex-generals who ran it during the war.

Following the mutinies of soldiers wanting to be demobilised, government army hawks finally allowed the ONUMOZ to disable certain heavy weapons. But Sadry said ONUMOZ was to take custody of all heavy weaponry until either FADM had capacity to manage them, or until a newly elected Government took office.

1000 hidden Renamo soldiers

By early September 54,295 government troops and 18,635 Renamo troops had been demobilised, with an estimated 1600 still awaiting demob. But the numbers are confused because of more than 1000 Renamo soldiers who appeared after the 30 August deadline for registration, in blatant violation of the peace accord.

The soldiers were at locations which had been increasingly cited as secret Renamo bases: Namanjavira in Zambezia, with more than 700 unregistered Renamo soldiers, Sinjal in Tete with about 200, and Renamo's main base at Maringue where several hundred unregistered troops were mixed with 700 others who were registered but refused to hand over the weapons, and took UN staff hostage.

On the government side, only 200 disabled soldiers failed to register before the deadline.

Riots and police response

The absence of an operational new army ahead of elections means fears that the vacuum in national defence and security could encourage widespread instability during and possibly long after elections. These fears have been inflamed by the increasing

number of violent protests over recent weeks, staged by soldiers, ex-soldiers, guards, para-military and informal forces across the country.

In northern Nampula province alone, Governor Alfredo Gamito reported 90 "mutinies" in the last three months, causing the death of ten people including civilians and police.

In most cases, the rioters demanded pensions, demobilisation benefits, food supplies and other material goods, usually picking civilian victims as the target of their anger. They have been taking hostages, holding up traffic, and looting markets and warehouses. Humanitarian aid organisations have stopped work in some parts of the centre and north, after their workers were threatened and their warehouses stripped.

ONUMOZ increasingly washed its hands of many such disturbances, classing them as criminal rather than military activity and therefore a job for the national police. Government had a policy of trying to negotiate with the demonstrators rather than use force, but by being seen to give in to their demands it encouraged an increasing spiral of incidents.

Finally on 2 September, Interior Minister Manuel Antonio said the police would "no longer tolerate such criminality". "It is not a police job to mediate" and criminals would be dealt with as such, he said.

Antonio quickly backed up his word by sending in the Rapid Intervention Police (RIP) to disperse rioters in Zambezia, Nampula, Tete and Sofala. In some cases the RIP went in shooting, at least into the air.

The RIP are well trained and have proved highly effective in breaking up demonstrations. But they remain a controversial force. Some Renamo people genuinely fear them, remembering that a similar force in Angola was used against Unita after it rejected the election there and went back to war.

A UN Security Council delegation which visited Mozambique 8-12 August was erroneously taken to an RIP training centre where the policemen were undergoing military-style heavy weapons training.

In a series of statements 8 and 9 September, Renamo head Afonso Dhlakama accused the RIP of shooting indiscriminately at Renamo demobilised soldiers, and renewing his demand that the RIP be disbanded.

Except for the RIP, the national police force is generally held to be under-paid, poorly trained and ill equipped, and therefore unable to deal with potential widespread unrest. Without a new army, the RIP is the only available force.

A statement by the UN Security Council president after a Council meeting on 7 September "notes the importance of ensuring that the Mozambican police have the resources required to maintain security in the country, in particular in the post-election period." This can be seen as tacit UN acceptance of the importance of the RIP.

Verification begins

A verification process meant to cover all troop assembly areas, all military installations, bases of both sides and any other suspicious places to check for unregistered soldiers and undeclared weapons began on 30 August.

This process was meant to be conducted by joint UN/government/Renamo teams, but government and Renamo were unable to provide people for all verification teams so in some cases ONUMOZ went ahead without one or both of the others. The deadline for completing verification is 20 October, just a week before the elections. Initial inspection was only of government areas, because of Renamo's failure to submit a list of its official weapons dumps until 5 September.

One week into the process, head of the operation and UN Chair of the Cease Fire Commission, Colonel Pier Segala, said his team working in central Mozambique had found no unregistered arms. But a team in the north found one arms cache and the southern team had found four. All were large; "ten to fifteen lorry-loads", Segala said.

However, he denied claims from a foreign military source that three large, hidden arsenals had been found outside the former government barracks at Boane and Manhica, now being used as training centres for FADM. Colonel Segala said these deposits had also been reported and ONUMOZ was registering the weapons, although it did not plan to move them but to hand them over to the new government. However, he confirmed that the deposits, all on the outskirts of Maputo, contain firearms, rocket-launchers, grenades and land-mines, some of which are in new condition and some of which would be highly dangerous to move.

The foreign military source said "I would feel much better if ONUMOZ would seal off the weapons. At the moment, they are easily accessible". The source added "What worries me most is that the government seemed little concerned when these stashes were reported, suggesting they have many more".

The UN Secretary General in his 26 August report to the Security Council notes that "despite the demobilisation of a much larger number of troops than initially planned, the number of weapons collected by ONUMOZ is below what was expected. Weapons caches were discovered, some of which contained large quantities of arms. Contrary to the rules approved by the Cease-Fire Commission, the United Nations was denied permission to collect and disable weapons at unassembled locations on several occasions."

Access still restricted

Although access to Renamo-controlled areas has improved in recent weeks, in part because demobilisation means that Renamo can no longer physically prevent government and Frelimo officials from travelling in their areas, access is still restricted and impeded in violation of the peace accord. The report to the Security Council stressed that "unimpeded access by all parties to all areas of the country must be guaranteed."

It is often made clear that Frelimo and the government are unwelcome and they are restricted in various ways. Civic education brigades from the youth and women's movements (OJM, OMM) and other groups are reported to have been barred from some Renamo zones in Nampula, Zambezia, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane and Maputo provinces within the past three months. Frelimo and other parties have also complained of restrictions, especially in Sofala.

In Morrumbala town (sede) the editor of the *Bulletin* was sought out by the local Renamo head, Alfredo Machumba, who had seen AWEPA on the side of the vehicle. He came to complain that an AWEPA-trained OJM civic education brigade was working in his area and that this was not permitted because the OJM is Frelimo and Frelimo is not permitted to go around Morrumbala.

Machumba also went to the various non-government organisations (NGOs) in Morrumbala sede to tell them that they were not allowed to give rides to the OJM civic education brigade. The OJM did receive some rides, but Renamo exerts substantial control over the operation of NGOs in the district, so this "ban" may have had some effect.

As well as the "ban" on Frelimo violating the peace accord, Machumba was able to give no evidence that the OJM were not being neutral in its civic education programme and the OJM's work had been approved by the local election commission.

Restrictions on access increasingly appear to be the work on individuals within Renamo, but it is obvious that Renamo has not given a clear orientation to its officials not to restrict access.

Restrictions are normally bureaucratic and reflect a lack of cooperation rather than an outright ban. For example, it is customary in rural Mozambique for anyone arriving in a village to talk first with local officials to explain what they are doing and then ask "permission" for activities such as civic education meetings. Such a request is a formality and permission is always granted. But in Renamo zones such "permission" is often denied or delayed indefinitely; having asked permission party workers, civic education brigades and even low level government workers are reluctant to act without it. It takes a bit of courage and extra initiative to say

that under the peace accord they are free to work even without "permission", and to hold meetings.

In Cheringoma district in August, for example, the (Renamo-named) administrator of Inhamitanga stopped a mine clearance team from working because he had not been consulted first.

Two countries

Renamo-controlled zones in practice remain under a separate administration, in violation of the peace accord. Renamo-nominated administrators have been appointed for some districts and administrative posts which Renamo and the government agree were Renamo controlled. But the territorial administration commission works slowly and there are still disputes about some posts and districts.

In districts where Renamo-nominated administrators are installed, for example in Sofala, they have submitted lists of Renamo people to fill all other government posts from heads of education and health down to cleaners and drivers. So far, these lists have not been accepted. In Muanza district, for example, there are Renamo-named heads of agriculture and education. But the old government-named heads of agriculture and education still exist; they have been living in refugee camps for nine years while continuing to receive a salary for those jobs, and have even been named by government to the Muanza district election commission.

In Morrumbala district, where government controls the district town and Renamo largely controls the rest of the district, the Renamo "administrator" Andre Boaventura clearly has more power than the official district administrator. Boaventura explained that he had already restructured the administration in his area into the same form that the government uses (except for using local regulos or chiefs instead of secretaries) and is simply waiting for the government to take his teachers, health workers and other officials onto its payroll.

Throughout its areas, Renamo controls food aid, either distributing it directly or controlling NGO distribution. In areas such as Morrumbala, with the aid of NGOs Renamo has constructed schools and health posts. In Inhamitanga, the new district administrator of Cheringoma threatened to "take action" against NGO officials who disagreed with his inflated assessment of food aid needs.

The Cheringoma administrator holds government meetings in the Renamo headquarters rather than a government building. Renamo retains a group of 500 demobilised soldiers in Inhamitanga and Renamo officials have been using these demobilised soldiers to put pressure on government and United Nations officials. In Cheringoma, food aid is openly distributed to Renamo officials and demobilised soldiers as a

form of extra wage.

UN Special Representative to Mozambique Aldo Ajello told us recently that Renamo now only talks of "formerly-controlled zones", but in August two of the assessors to the governor of Sofala continued to talk of "Renamo controlled zones", and to emphasise the level of that continued control (while also claiming the zones were open).

Schools in Renamo zones, such as Muanza, still have slogans such as "Viva Renamo" on walls and timetables. The Renamo assessors to the governor of Sofala told us that schools in Renamo zones would not teach the government history lessons.

Renamo wants more cash

Renamo has spent all the money from the UN trust fund and is demanding more in order to fight the election campaign. The Security Council mission to Mozambique reported that "of the US\$ 14.6 million already pledged only \$ 13.6 million had been received, all of which had been expended." Nothing is left to fight the election or pay mounting bills.

Initially \$19 million was promised, but the remaining \$ 4.4 million seems not to be forthcoming, and UN Special Representative Aldo Ajello has been pressing donors to provide more money.

Meanwhile, Ajello admitted in early September that he had been paying Dhlakama personally \$300,000 per month out of the trust fund, as part of a secret agreement made at the time of the Rome accord. Dhlakama said then he would only sign if he received the money. Ajello argues that the money is not just for Dhlakama personally, but rather so that the Renamo head can act the part of a chief and dole out largesse to his supporters.

Prior accord?

"The Mozambican parties might wish to explore, prior to elections, the possibility of concluding an arrangement that would enable opposition parties to play a legitimate and meaningful role in the post-electoral period. Such an arrangement could also facilitate the establishment of a government that would ensure the consolidation of peace, political stability and national reconciliation," wrote the UN Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on 26 August.

This statement inflamed the Frelimo old guard who saw in it a renewal of the United States demand for a government of national unity -- ignoring other possible "arrangements". They fought hard through diplomatic and media channels to ensure that this suggestion did not appear in the final Security Council Presidential Statement, which in fact simply "encourages the parties to continue their efforts in

good faith to ensure post-election harmony on the basis of the observance of the democratic principles accepted by them in the General Peace Agreement" - a formulation the hardliners suggest means that accepting the outcome of the election is the only choice.

President Joaquim Chissano is hard-pressed to keep his divided party together. Younger elements see that Frelimo is over confident and may not do as well as it expects in the election, and thus they accept the need for some arrangement. The old guard expects Renamo to get only a derisory 20% of the vote which would show it need not be taken seriously, and has made it clear to Chissano that he will keep their support only if he does not make a pre-election deal.

Chissano's compromise is to suggest that any post-election government cannot be a coalition of parties, but must include individuals who are members of opposition parties. The hard liners accept that the number of such people will be dependent on how well the opposition does in the election.

But Renamo would be unlikely to accept a government in which their posts are in the gift of Chissano, and will want some party-to-party deal. Furthermore, it is not just a case of providing jobs for a handful of top Renamo officials. Hundreds of people have joined Renamo in the past year and taken posts as party officials, assessors to governors, administrators, etc. Renamo's political face is made up largely of those who took no part in the war; these people all expect jobs after the election.

Rumours continue to circulate that some sort of secret deal has been done, but so far the only evidence is that recently Dhlakama has been curiously silent on his demand for a government of national unity.

UN to stay on?

All ONUMOZ troops will be out by 13 December and the entire UN mission will be closed by the end of January, according to current plans. But there are growing hints that the UN and some donors want ONUMOZ to continue in some form. The Security Council mission said that "the United Nations should also have a post-election presence." The final statement by the President of the Security Council "calls on the Secretary General to report to the competent United Nations bodies on what further role the United Nations can perform."

Within ONUMOZ there is growing talk of a continued, if small, military presence, and the UN maintaining its role of donor coordination. Established UN agencies would, however, fight any extension of ONUMOZ.

Reluctant returnees

Refugee return to the centre of the country appears to be taking a very cautious, preliminary form. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) says that 15,000 repatriates from Zimbabwe are expected over the next three months.

Yet the accounts of ex-refugees and aid workers make it evident that returnees were merely edging back over the border, sticking initially to safe zones near the towns and major highways before venturing into the interior.

The principal reason seems to be a continued sense of economic and political insecurity, while the division between government and Renamo controlled territories remained strong and Renamo areas still harboured a commanding military presence.

Many people seem afraid to return to Renamo-controlled areas. Registration figures indicate that Morrumbala district has only half as many people as expected. For example, there is a group of refugees from Morrumbala who have returned from Malawi to Nicoadala, but openly say they are afraid to go back to Morrumbala.

Renamo-controlled Muanza and Cheringoma districts in Sofala registered fewer than one quarter of the number expected. The total population of Muanza is less than 5000 and Cheringoma has fewer than 17,000 people.

Before officially organised repatriation began, refugees in Zambia and Zimbabwe received fairly comprehensive information from UNHCR on conditions at home, including the location of infrastructure, danger from landmines and about which political authority (government or Renamo) was controlling which zone.

As elsewhere in the country, the majority of returnees express their desire to eventually return to their families' ancestral lands. But many returnees were clearly waiting on the election results before deciding which would be the safest area to settle in, and whether or not to brave it back to their places of origin.

Meanwhile, they maintain both social and economic ties abroad, particularly with Zimbabwe, where many returnee families still had relatives. Others felt they would stand good chance of finding work in Zimbabwe, if necessary.

Trade in some border regions of Manica is almost entirely with Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwean dollar is used as the most acceptable currency. Teachers at Honde, near the Manica border with Zimbabwe, said in August that many returnee children had dropped out of school to trade goods from Zimbabwe. The economic attraction of Zimbabwe is likely to persist, until infrastructure in Mozambique can be rebuilt and internal trade revives.

Two other factors suggest that population movements are likely to continue in Manica, long after elections. Returnees who spent long periods in the refugee camps of Zambia and Zimbabwe returned with a range of skills and crafts they learned in the camps, such as carpentry, tailoring, building, mechanics, and horticulture. As Renamo areas are generally more impoverished and isolated than areas that remained under government control, once freedom of movement is truly re-established it seems likely many people with such skills will move out of Renamo zones in search of work.

Returnees from Malawi who in general come back very much more impoverished than those who lived in the well equipped refugee camps of Zambia or Zimbabwe seem most likely to continue to the search for better off relatives at home. Some returnee families have already moved two or three times, since coming back to Mozambique, in search of lost relatives.

Elections

6.4 million register

Nearly 6.4 million people have registered for the election. This is 81% of the eligible population of 7.9 million as estimated by the National Election Commission and 84% of the 7.5 mn eligible estimated by the UN.

Registration opened on 1 June and was to close on 15 August. The deadline was first extended to 20 August, but Renamo argued for a further extension because brigades had started late in its areas because Renamo had failed to grant access. On 19 August registration brigades were told to stay in place and on 22 August a further registration period of 24 August - 2 September was announced. More than 850,000 people were registered during the extra periods, mainly returning refugees, demobilised soldiers, and members of the new army.

Smooth registration

AWEPA observers who visited Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala, Inhambane and Maputo provinces concluded that registration was smoothly and competently run everywhere they visited. The registration brigades took their jobs very seriously, worked well and, in general, knew and followed the rules. They seemed serious, well-trained, and committed to their work. AWEPA observers saw no example of improper or sloppy conduct by any registration worker.

Registration brigades were imaginative and resourceful in setting up their posts under difficult circumstances. Many simply worked under cashew

trees. Some used school classrooms. In Inhaminga the brigade worked in a destroyed railway wagon. In Lualaba the brigade had been forced to borrow tables and chairs from local residents each day, returning them at night.

Although some brigade were working in their home areas and members could go home at night, others were living in tents or specially constructed huts for three months. The brigades were remarkably good humoured about the difficult conditions, although we did see examples of brigades on strike in Caia and Quelimane.

Most registration posts AWEPA visited had completed their work and had few, if any, people arriving for registration by mid-August. In some instances brigades had finished their work in one or even two places and had been moved to other areas where people still had not been registered. District electoral commissions seemed flexible and well organised in terms of moving brigades.

Registration was largely completed and there was no need, in the areas visited, to extend registration beyond the initial 20 August deadline. Everyone who wanted to register was able to do so.

AWEPA observers saw and were told that it was common practice to set aside registration days for particular groups of people. Regulos or neighbourhood secretaries would then bring most of the people from their zone for registration on one or two days. This also facilitated identification, as the regulo or secretary could under the law provide testimony as to the identify of a person who had no identity document -- varying from one-third to two-thirds of those being registered.

Numbered tickets (senhas) were used effectively for crowd control. Where crowds were too large and people had to be sent home and told to come back the next day, the senhas allowed people to be taken in order when they returned.

Although a few registration posts still had large queues in mid-August, there was a consensus that by moving brigades into the areas everyone would be registered by 20 August. The queues were due to late registration in cities, underestimates of population in areas of dislocated people, and returning refugees in border ones.

Concern was expressed about the difficulties of access in Muanza, Cheringoma and Morrumbala districts, where brigades were being transported to some zones by helicopter. Remote zones of all three districts are Renamo-controlled. In Morrumbala, the (Renamo) vice-president of the district electoral commission assured AWEPA that all zones had already been reached by 20 August. In Inhaminga, the (Renamo) vice-president for Cheringoma said that only one pocket with perhaps 125 potential voters had been missed. In Muanza with a week to go they were still waiting to transport two brigades.

'We are like goats'

"We are like goats" said a man waiting to register in Nicoadala, as he made a motion with his hands to show how they had been sent to the registration post like a herd of goats. Most people say they are registering because they have been told they must.

When asked about the process, men often used vague phrases, saying that there would be a chance to "elect a president" or "choose our leaders"; few women would admit to knowing anything about the process. This reluctance to discuss the election is in sharp contrast both to other counties such as Malawi and Angola, and to earlier times when Mozambicans were often happy to discuss political issues.

This reluctance to talk reflects both the lack of civic education, which means most people are unsure what is to happen, and a genuine reluctance to talk about it. There is substantial fear that the election cannot bring anything good, and might serve to end the time of peace as it had in Angola. No one showed any excitement about the election.

The continued disruptions and mutinies by demobilised and about-to-be-demobilised soldiers (which also delayed AWEPA observer teams) has increased the worry and demoralisation of many ordinary people.

Civic education has been particularly weak. Before the election, there was virtually no government or election commission civic education, except for that done by non-government organisations. AWEPA, for example, trained teams from the youth, women's and trade union organisations (OJM, OMM, OTM).

Each registration brigade had a civic education worker who gave short explanations to people who came to register. Some also went to villages and neighbourhoods to hold meetings to tell people they had to register, although civic education workers repeatedly stressed they could have done more if they had had bicycles.

Although campaigning is legal in the period before the official campaign (which only grants additional rights, for example to radio air time), there is little evidence of any political activity in most parts of the country.

Two types of intimidation have been noted by registration observation brigades. It is widely reported that Renamo has told peasants in its zones that the ballot would not be secret because *curandeiros* (traditional healers) will know how people vote and that they must vote for Renamo. In Quelimane it is reported that Frelimo has put strong pressure on government employees to join the governing party.

And there is no free campaigning in some Renamo zones.

12 presidential candidates

The number of presidential and parliamentary candidates submitted to the National Election Commission (CNE) exceeded all expectations; 13 presidential candidates and 13 political groups presented documents. There is one new coalition, the Patriotic Alliance (AP - Alianca Patriotica), which combines MONAMO and FAP.

Each candidate must submit a series of documents including notarised copies of identify and voter registration cards proof of a clean criminal record, and a letter agreeing to stand. This is set out in the electoral law, but many parties did not notice this and complained that it was onerous to do this in a short time. Each presidential candidate also had to submit 10,000 signatures.

The start of formal campaigning was delayed from 12 September until 22 September as a result of the extension of the registration period.

Twelve men are fighting for the presidency of Mozambique. They are, for the two large parties:

Joaquim Chissano, Frelimo

Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo

For both coalitions:

Maximo Dias, AP

Wehia Ripua, UD

For five small parties:

Domingos Arouca, FUMO

Ya-Qub Simbindy, PIMO

Carlos Reis, UNAMO

Casimiro Nhamithambo, SOL

Padimbe Kamati, PPPM

Vasco Campira Mamboya, PACODE

And two independents:

Carlos Jeque

Mario Machel

The election commission rejected the candidacy of Neves Serrano of PPLM because he did not submit the proper documentation. His party was also the only one not to submit any parliamentary candidates.

13 parties propose candidates

Candidates were submitted by 11 parties and both coalitions. By mid-September the election commission had not yet ruled on their eligibility.

One coalition, the Alianca Patriotica, and six parties -- Frelimo, Fumo, Pacode, PCN, PPPM and Renamo -- handed in lists of candidates for all 11 electoral circles (provinces plus the city of Maputo), but with different numbers of candidates for each.

The greatest number of nationally and internationally recognised names appeared, not surprisingly, on Frelimo's lists. The top of Frelimo's list for each circle was headed by well-known and long time party stalwarts such as Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi

(Inhambane), Defence Minister Alberto Chipande (Cabo Delgado), Minister without portfolio Mariano Matsinhe (Tete), Labour Minister Teodato Hunguana (Maputo City) and Transport Minister and chief peace negotiator Armando Guebuza (Maputo province).

The reappearance in first place of all the familiar old names, however, disappointed many party members from the provinces, who claimed that they had proposed new blood at provincial level, only to see their own candidates seconded in favour of central party leaders.

Most of the top Frelimo names on provincial lists are people long based in Maputo. Meanwhile, some Frelimo members were surprised to see the prominence of names like Bonifacio Gruveta, Frelimo Party Secretary in Zambezia, heading the list for Zambezia province after a reportedly poor performance. Recent opinion polls testify to the growing popularity of Renamo in Zambezia.

In Sofala, Frelimo fielded Central Committee member Alcidio Nguenha, who springs from one of Sofala's elite families.

The Frelimo lists contained the names of several prominent media workers such as national radio director Manuel Tome (heading the list for Manica), national TV director Botelho Moniz standing in Zambezia and radio delegate Antonio Barros also in Zambezia.

It added some novelties which surprised the business and muslim communities, including businessman and owner of the nation's one private tv station, Carlos Klint (for Zambezia) and Nazir Lunat, son of muslim business magnate Yacob Lunat, standing in Inhambane.

Renamo's parliamentary efforts are concentrated in the centre and north. Renamo strongman and chief peace process negotiator Raul Domingos heads the list for Sofala province, where he was also sent to direct the central region election campaign. Second on the list is Renamo political delegate for the province, Manuel Pereira.

Renamo's list in Zambezia is topped by David Alone, well-known sociologist, Frelimo dissident and son of a local regulo (traditional leader). Renamo Secretary General Vicente Ululu, a Makonde from Cabo Delgado, heads the list for that province. Leading Renamo general, Herminio Morais, fronts the Maputo City candidates. In Niassa Renamo proposed only three candidates for the 11 potential seats.

The Alianca Patriotica also appears to have concentrated considerable efforts in Zambezia Province, where the list is headed by Monamo President and AP presidential candidate, Maximo Dias, and includes other Monamo and FAP party top leaders Guilhermino Fortes (Monamo), Jose Palaco (FAP President) and Joao Ironga (FAP). FAP Secretary General Raul da Conceicao heads the list for Maputo City.

PCN's Maputo City list is headed by Lutero Simango, PCN's top dog and son of the famous Frelimo dissident Urias Simango, followed by jurist Alice Mabota. Of PCN top leaders, Inacio Chire heads the list for Zambezia.

FUMO has concentrated its top candidates in the southern provinces. PIMO has meanwhile made its major efforts in the north, while virtually missing out the centre (no candidates in Manica and only four for Sofala). PIMO president and presidential candidate Ya-Qub Sibindy heads the Nampula list.

Registration and assignment of parliamentary seats

Province	Parliamentary seats	Total Registered	Number Expected	% of expected	Registered during extra days
Maputo city	18	459,166	486,685	94.4%	24,059
Maputo prov.	13	328,528	440,432	74.6%	12,712
Gaza	16	398,581	729,473	54.6%	46,720
Inhambane	18	471,524	687,559	68.6%	48,023
Sofala	21	530,006	683,904	77.5%	88,494
Manica	13	322,201	328,141	98.2%	56,505
Tete	16	397,260	464,601	85.5%	103,199
Zambezia	49	1,266,218	1,533,444	82.6%	140,065
Nampula	53	1,365,799	1,473,853	92.7%	207,479
Niassa	11	283,406	413,158	68.6%	36,674
Cabo Delgado	22	568,169	653,600	86.9%	93,831
TOTAL	250	6,390,918	7,894,850	81%	857,761

Parliamentary candidates proposed by parties

(not yet agreed by CNE)

Party	Number of Candidates										
	Map. City	Map. Prov	Gaz	Inh	Man	Sof	Zam	Nam	Tet	Nia	C.D.
Seats in parliament	18	13	16	18	13	21	49	53	16	11	22
Frelimo	20	14	16	21	11	19	48	52	14	10	24
Renamo	20	14	16	19	11	19	48	52	14	3	24
AP	11	7	11	10	7	18	34	22	5	8	12
FUMO	20	14	15	19	2	3	18	38	3	9	12
PACODE	4	4	15	4	2	13	7	2	1	-	13
PCN	14	11	6	10	11	19	34	43	14	1	20
PIMO	8	14	2	18	-	4	27	48	18	12	25
PPPM	20	13	18	17	14	27	48	49	14	11	21
PRD	21	23	-	8	28	22	20	52	-	14	24
PT	20	14	4	19	11	19	-	-	14	-	-
SOL	20	14	10	16	12	24	37	-	16	-	25
UNAMO	-	14	-	31	21	-	35	43	-	21	-
UD	14	11	10	22	-	17	48	2	2	3	13

- = no candidates

AP = MONAMO + FAP

UD = PALMO + PADEMO + PANADE + PANAMO