

Mozambique peace process bulletin



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Cease-fire holds, but election delay likely

After a few initial violations, Mozambique's 15 October cease-fire is holding. Most main roads are open and there is regular bus service between Maputo and Beira for the first time in a decade.

The United Nations Security Council seems determined to avoid the fiasco caused in Angola by trying to monitor the cease-fire and elections on the cheap. On 16 December it approved a \$331 million budget and a force of more than 8000 for Mozambique -- 15 times the number of people it put into Angola. Aldo Ajello has been named interim special representative of the UN Secretary General, with responsibility not only for monitoring the cease-fire and election, but also for humanitarian assistance.

Ajello spent nearly a month in New York in his eventually successful effort to gain a strong UN presence. That period was matched by an almost total political paralysis on the ground in Mozambique. Implementation of the peace agreement has now fallen more than two months behind the very tight schedule imposed by the accord.

That timetable is now widely seen as unrealistic and will need to be extended. For example, Renamo and government military forces were to have been in assembly points by 14 November 1992 and demobilisation was to have been 40% complete by 12 January 1993; by early January Renamo had not yet presented its list of assembly points.

"In light of the recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until all the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented," UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali told the Security Council on 3 December. Thus it is generally forecast that the election will be postponed from October 1993. Because the rains begin in November, the earliest probable date is

April 1994. Some political parties have already called for delays of one to two years.

The UN operation has only been agreed through 31 October 1993, although the Security Council requested a report by 31 March on the "precise timing" of elections, which suggests a postponement is desirable. However, the high cost of the UN operation makes an extension beyond April 1994 unlikely.

January will see a major three-way diplomatic tussle as Ajello, the Mozambique government and Renamo try to establish their relative power. So far, Renamo has refused to allow government access to areas it controls. The government still has not provided housing to Renamo which it promised in March 1992, and Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama has refused to go to Maputo without housing for his staff. Without the presence of Dhlakama, other Renamo officials cannot take decisions, blocking implementation of the accords. Ajello has tried to act unilaterally, but government officials have blocked this.

Meanwhile, as in Angola, ordinary people have moved faster than politicians and military men. Tens of thousands of refugees and displaced people are already returning home so they can plant before the rains. Commerce and movement have been resumed in wide areas of Mozambique.

Peace at last

Mozambique president Joaquim Chissano and Renamo president Afonso Dhlakama signed a general peace agreement in Rome on 4 October 1992. It came into force on the cease-fire day, 15 October 1992 (known as "E-day"). The accord includes seven protocols and four related documents, and is outlined in more detail in

appendix II of this newsletter. It also sets a very precise timetable (appendix I).

There is to be a new joint army of 24,000, an air force of 4000, and a navy of 2000. Each side will contribute half of each force. All other armed people are to be demobilised within 180 days.

A Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) has overall responsibility for the entire process. Under it are a Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), and a Reintegration Commission (CORE). The CCF will oversee the cease-fire and demobilisation, CORE oversees the reintegration of those who are demobilised, and CCFADM will control the creation of the new army forces. Membership of these commissions is set out in appendix III.

Also there is to be a joint Renamo-government commission on civil administration, and government appointed commissions on elections, police, and internal security.

In many respects, the accord mirrors the Bicesse accord in Angola. On three key issues, however, there are significant differences. The Rome accord specifies that elections must be held within one year of the signing, that is by 4 October 1993, compared to 18 months in Angola. Although election rules will be similar to those in Angola, several differences will make it more difficult for minor parties to gain parliamentary seats in Mozambique.

The Rome accord gives Renamo rather than the government effective administrative control of Renamo controlled areas.

And it gives a much larger role to the United Nations.

Getting the show back on the road

Aldo Ajello arrived in Maputo on 15 October to find that there had been no contact between the two sides since the 4 October signing in Rome, and that nothing had been done to set up the commissions which were supposed to be functioning on 15 October. Ajello met with Chissano, who was ready to move forward, and Dhlakama, who refused further action until he was given housing in Maputo. Renamo refused to appoint members to the joint commissions. And in what was seen as a direct slap in the face to Ajello, after his meeting with Dhlakama Renamo forces captured four towns in violation of the cease-fire.

Ajello gambled by publicly calling a meeting of both sides for 26 October, with no prior commitment that they would attend. Both did, and by 3 November Ajello had agreements to setting up the four key commissions and housing for Dhlakama. After the Control and Supervision Commission (CSC) met on 4 November, Ajello went to Washington and New York to lobby for the approval of a large UN force. United States objections to new spending and the Security Council emphasis on Somalia kept Mozambique off the agenda for nearly a month. But

the return to war in Angola changed the mood at the UN, and the operation was finally agreed on 16 December.

Ajello called it a "miracle" to get approval so quickly. But the permanent UN representative in Maputo, Eric de Mul, had publicly expressed concern at what he saw as the delay.

With Ajello out of Maputo, the peace process stagnated. The Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) finally met on 25 November and the CSC only met for the second time on 2 December. But Ajello argued that without the full UN mandate, nothing else was possible.

With his return to Maputo in mid-December, Ajello began informal meetings with both sides to speed up the process. The CSC met several times, and on 30 December Ajello met jointly with Renamo and Frelimo to propose a revised timetable.

Two major stumbling blocks remain. Renamo refuses to allow the government access to zones it controls. And Renamo president Dhlakama refuses to come to Maputo until adequate housing is provided.

Renamo Secretary General Vicente Ululu arrived in Maputo on 22 December to open a Renamo office, but Ululu and the other Renamo officials in Maputo such as CSC delegation head Raul Domingos and foreign secretary Jose de Castro do not have decision making power and defer to Dhlakama. Progress will be slow until he arrives.

No access yet to Renamo zones

Although Renamo officials and guerrillas are moving freely through government controlled zones, government officials have been barred from entering Renamo zones. Renamo officials have come to government controlled towns to ask for food and medicines, but health workers employed by the Ministry of Health have not been allowed into Renamo areas.

There are reports of people not being allowed to leave Renamo zones in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and of people not being allowed to leave government areas to go to farms in Renamo zones in Zambezia. In Maputo province local administrators are trying to restrict the movement of Renamo soldiers.

The accord accepts the authority, laws and "institutions" of the present government of Mozambique, and ensures free movement of all Mozambicans. But it also accepts that until a new government takes office after elections, "public administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of Renamo." Further, it accepts the need for a national commission composed of four Renamo and four government representatives to "facilitate collaboration" between the Ministry of State Administration and administration in Renamo areas.

Renamo foreign secretary Jose de Castro told me that the Rome accord clearly divides Mozambique into two zones. Traders and others are already free to enter Renamo areas. But the national commission, not yet

established, must set the terms of access for government officials to Renamo controlled areas.

He added that just as I need permission to enter Mozambique as a foreign journalist, so I need separate permission to enter Renamo controlled zones.

Neither the government nor Ajello accept Renamo's view of its total control of its areas. "Renamo does not understand the peace accord. We must explain to them that if they don't open their areas, nothing else in the accord works," Ajello told me. In a statement on 15 December the government said that Mozambique is one state and not "two states or two territories".

Demining of roads and access to Renamo areas for humanitarian aid has been held up for more than four months by the dispute over access. The accord makes the CCF responsible for mine clearing but also allows free movement of people for humanitarian purposes under UN or ICRC flags without military escort. The government expected both sides to present lists of mined areas, and that tri-partite UN-government-Renamo teams would then oversee the demining. Renamo will not accept this.

Unicef and ICRC then contracted a Lonrho-linked security company, DSL, which arrived in Maputo 3 December to begin demining roads in Renamo areas. The government objected and demining has not yet begun. "It is not acceptable for the government to intervene in an agreement between the Red Cross and Renamo," de Castro said.

Government officials say Renamo is trying to gain something now it failed to win in Rome: the specific right to deal independently with international agencies. Thus the government will not allow Renamo to have independent links with agencies now, even on humanitarian issues.

A similar battle is being fought over assembly points. The government gave its list of 29 assembly points to the UN and expected that when Renamo gave its list of 20, tripartite groups would view both sets. Renamo refused to make its list public, saying its 20 are to be visited only by the UN. Government officials complain that the UN has already made informal inspections of its 29 sites simply and could do this because there is free movement in government controlled areas. This has led the government to refuse any further releases of lists, for example of mined areas, unless Renamo releases similar lists at the same time.

Two questions are also being raised about administration in Renamo areas. First, Renamo does not appear to have a separate set of civilian administrators. Will Renamo guerrillas be allowed to leave assembly points to return to Renamo zones as administrators? Will Frelimo officials expelled by Renamo when they occupied the areas be allowed to return?

Second, concern is being expressed about Renamo control of polling stations in its areas. Each polling station is to be presided over by a Ballot Board chosen from people who will vote at that polling station. This is different from Angola, and could lead to the naming of only pro-Renamo people to run polling stations. As in Angola, each polling station will have party

agents, but they, too, must be registered to vote at that polling station.

How grand a house for Dhlakama?

Housing for Renamo has become a focus of tension and foot-dragging. Protocol 3 signed in Rome on 12 March commits the government to finding Renamo "accommodation" in all provincial capitals.

Renamo argues that Frelimo officials have had 15 years to find houses and offices. The government still controls rented housing, and it has a responsibility to find houses and offices for Renamo officials of a standard at least as high as their Frelimo counterparts. This is politically and symbolically important to Renamo since it wants to be seen as equal to Frelimo.

But it has practical content too. Dhlakama has publicly stated that if he loses the election, he expects to be leader of the opposition. UN officials say privately that unlike Jonas Savimbi in Angola, Dhlakama actually accepts he is likely to lose the first election. But at 38 years old, he has time to build a political base and run again. This requires that he have a sound base in Maputo. It is widely reported that the Italian government is offering him substantial money to set up businesses. But if he is not likely to move into the presidential palace, he needs an imposing house in Maputo from which to mount future campaigns.

The diplomatic community argues that when Protocol 3 was signed in March, a number of houses linked to former east bloc embassies were available and could have been held for Renamo. Instead, they were distributed elsewhere, in at least one case to the US embassy.

Finally, under UN and international pressure, the government agreed in November to give six houses and several flats to Renamo. On 18 December Renamo was given the former Yugoslav embassy at the corner of Av Friedrich Engels and Rua Mkunya Kiliido. But this was only the third house to be agreed. De Castro complained that when Ululu arrived, he had to give Ululu his house and had nowhere to live. Dhlakama said he would not go to Maputo until his staff were properly housed.

UN approves huge operation

After a month of intense negotiation and lobbying, the UN Security Council on 16 December established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, which has the acronym ONUMOZ (although this corresponds to neither English nor Portuguese).

It will be much larger with a much broader brief than UNAVEM II, the UN operation in Angola. UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stressed that ONUMOZ will have four interlinked components:

+ **Political**: to facilitate implementation of the agreement and chair the CSC.

+ **Military**: to "monitor and verify" the cease-fire, concentration of forces, and demobilisation; "to authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures"; and "to provide security for United Nations and other international activities".

+ **Electoral**: "to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process".

+ **Humanitarian**: "to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations".

A budget of \$331 million is proposed and more than 8000 people will be involved. Dr Boutros-Ghali argued that "there seems no alternative" but for ONUMOZ to take over security of the Beira and other corridors, and he proposes five self-sufficient infantry battalions of 850 people each to do this. In addition there will be an engineer battalion supported by private companies for mine clearing and road repair. ONUMOZ will have its own air force of 24 planes, a communications unit, three logistic companies to provide supplies, and a military medical unit.

ONUMOZ's verification function would be carried out by 354 military observers in the 49 assembly points, as well as "at airports, ports and other critical areas, including Renamo headquarters."

A civilian technical unit will implement the demobilisation programme and distribute food and medicines to assembly points.

ONUMOZ plans an electoral division with 148 international election officers and 1200 observers for the election itself (compared to 400 in Angola). The UN intends "to play the main coordinating role for the provision of technical assistance to the whole electoral process." It also intends to verify that political parties enjoy freedom of organisation and access to the media, and will even monitor the contents to news broadcasts to check on fairness.

Finally, there is to be a new UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) which replaces, and is at a higher level than, the former office of the UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO). It is headed by Bent Bernader who will be deputy to Ajello.

In order to prevent local conflicts, the UN stresses the need to give similar assistance to everyone: demobbed soldiers, returned refugees and local people in need.

ONUMOZ -- observers or peace keepers?

The UN has overstepped its mandate and there will be a continuous confrontations with Ajello, government officials are saying privately. "We are not a protectorate of the Security Council; we are a member of the United Nations," a high official said. "The UN is here as observers, not as a peace-keeping force."

The reality is somewhere in between, because the accord gives the UN the roles of both "monitoring and

guaranteeing the implementation of the general peace agreement." And the UN chairs the three most important commissions. Thus it is an actor and not just an observer.

But in parliament on 17-18 December, Narciso Matos MP warned that the UN could become "a state within a state". Foreign Minister Pascoal Mocumbi stressed that the UN force in Mozambique was different from the ones in Yugoslavia and Somalia. It is for the government and Renamo to ensure peace and if the two parties do not respect the accord, the UN cannot intervene to restore peace, Mocumbi said.

Government sources allege Renamo is keeping soldiers in Kenya, Malawi and South Africa and that in the name of the accord, the UN with sophisticated firepower will paralyse the government's ability to respond to a Renamo attack like the ones in October.

Beira corridor security has become the first battle. Zimbabwean troops should have left by 14 November (E-day + 30), but Ajello obtained Dhlakama's agreement to their remaining. He then organised for a battalion of 1200 Italian troops with their own engineers, logistics support and helicopters to arrive in January to guard the Beira corridor and the Tete-Chimoio road.

The Mozambique government objects on four grounds:

+ Ajello and the UN not only did not ask, but did not even tell the Mozambique government what it planned to do.

+ New foreign troops must be approved in advance by the CSC.

+ Withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops is linked to other things that should be done by E-day + 30, including all troops in assembly points and all weapons under UN control. Zimbabweans cannot leave until this has happened and cannot just be substituted by Italians.

+ There have been no incidents on the Beira corridor and such a large force is not needed.

On Friday 18 December Ajello informed the Mozambique government that an Italian military plane with an advance team of 13 people was in the air on the way to Beira. The government refused it permission to land, and it had to turn back.

The next battle will be over the police. In his report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali admits the accord does not provide any role for the UN in monitoring the police, but "experience elsewhere suggests that this could be desirable." The Mozambique government says that one of its victories in negotiations was to keep control of the police and it will not give that up.

But here there are worrying parallels to Angola. As in Angola, the Mozambique police have built up an anti-riot unit which could become an important military force under government control. And as in Angola, Renamo is allowed its own police force to protect its "top leaders"; Unita used such a provision to create a large private army.

Ajello says he will not allow the Renamo police to number more than 50 men. But the government may have to concede some UN role in monitoring the police.

Another battle will be over UN observers at ports and airports, which the governments says are unnecessary.

Finally, the Rome donors conference shifted control of aid away from the government and to a committee of donors, in which Ajello and the Italian government will play key roles.

For his part, Ajello will have some difficulty forcing the increasingly antagonistic UN agencies to cooperate. Already, the World Food Programme has refused to join UNOHAC, while Unicef and the World Health Organisation are refusing to attend health coordination meetings where the other is present.

Four towns taken and retaken

In the only serious violation of the cease-fire, Renamo forces between 17 and 20 October unexpectedly occupied four towns: Angoche, Maganja da Costa, Memba, and Lugela. The government quickly retook the first three. But Lugela was only recaptured on 21 November, by which time the Cease-fire Commission was in operation. It criticised the recapture, saying the government should have allowed the UN to talk Renamo out of the town.

The government rejects this, saying Lugela is strategically important for control of much of Zambezia province. It alleges that Renamo has kept troops outside the country, and that the government has told Renamo about its bases without finding out the locations of Renamo bases. Thus Renamo control of Lugela shifted the military balance dangerously.

Privately, it was accepted that the government needed to oust Renamo forces in order to demonstrate that there was still a military balance.

Child soldiers

Renamo continues to deny that it has child soldiers. Such reports are "pure government propaganda" according to Raul Domingos. TV film of the children was the result of "technical tricks".

But there are now widespread reports, from foreign non-government organisations as well as on local television, of armed children in Renamo units. Some estimates are that such children account for up to one-third of Renamo fighters.

NGOs are concerned that Renamo's continued denial that child soldiers exist will make it difficult to set up rehabilitation programmes for them. They fear that one reason Renamo is refusing access to its areas is to hide the armed children, and that they may be secretly sent home without any proper reintegration programme.

Children with no other experience other than war could form armed bands wandering the countryside, warn some NGO officials. There are already reports of armed children who said they were from a Renamo base stopping traffic and demanding food on the main north-south road in Gaza.

But the attacks raised some questions. Some sources suggest that the raids were not directed against the government, but were a sort of coup attempt against Dhlakama. It is argued that there is a split between the Kenyan-trained, hard line Renamo forces north of the Zambeze River and the more moderate South African-trained people under Dhlakama in the south. Under this argument, newly arrived Kenyan-trained troops went into battle in attempt to sabotage the peace accord.

More than 100,000 to be demobilised

Demobilisation of 100,000 or more soldiers, many with wives and children, will require a major logistic and political effort. Neither side has accurate figures for the size of its army. The document for the 15-16 December Rome donors conference estimated that 107,000 men were to be demobilised at a cost of \$83.5 million.

Renamo claims 21,000 men. The World Bank estimates 15-21,000. Western military sources say Renamo has fewer adult soldiers than the 15,000 it can put into the new army. So all Renamo demobilisation will be voluntary.

The government has given estimates for its forces ranging from 60,000 to 150,000. These include reserve forces, part-time soldiers, and 30,000 or more people in militias and territorial forces. This also includes some retired "antigos combatentes" -- veterans of the liberation war -- of whom 7-10,000 are in Centros de Producao dos Antigos Combatentes and who still receive salaries.

The World Bank suggests the government has 85-116,000 soldiers, while the military claims a payroll of 92,000 soldiers. But foreign military attaches suggest there are fewer than 50,000 active soldiers. Since 1990 the Ministry of Finance has been trying to obtain some control over the military budget. It wanted a list of soldiers so as to pay them directly, but the military successfully resisted this. The military payroll has provided a major opportunity for corruption. Friends and retired soldiers have been kept on the payroll.

Many soldiers are owed many months of back pay, which has sometimes been stolen by their commanders. Major incidents recently have not been cease-fire violations, but actions by soldiers demanding back pay and/or demobilisation pay. Major roads have been blocked and there has been fighting in Beira and Maxixe. Jurg Frieden in a paper to a conference on post-war Mozambique estimated that "many thousands" of already demobilised soldiers "have been living around the barracks for months or even years waiting for payment of salaries in arrears and for transport back to enrollment centres."

Soldiers are being promised back pay, six months additional pay, and transport home for them and their families. Most government soldiers are conscripts who will also be happy to accept that and go home.

Gulamo Taju of the Centre of Africa Studies warns there are many soldiers in the 25-35 age range who have been in the army for 10 years or more, and who have been socialised only to obey orders and use physical violence. They have little schooling or non-military training, and are likely to receive little help, so they will have serious problems integrating into rural life.

The government surely has more than 15,000 career soldiers who would prefer to stay in the army, and will demand more than six months pay to leave. There is also strong pressure from former soldiers to get something from the demobilisation. The government has said it will deal directly with the 1000-2000 people above the rank of major. They will probably receive land and money.

But many other have totally unrealistic expectations of housing and jobs, which was promised in the military service law of 1978, and of extensive retraining. But there are no jobs, and no money for retraining.

There is a fear that the army may slow demobilisation if these demands are not met.

Francisco Minuire, president of the association of the demobilised, warned in a speech on 9 December that many ex-soldiers have not turned in their guns. "without adequate special treatment for the demobilised, we will cause more wars. ... We sincerely don't mean to threaten, but the demobilised could disrupt the elections" and even the government. The millions of dollars promised in Rome should go directly to the demobilised, he said. "But this money won't get to the demobilised, but will go instead for tractors, pumps and buses for high officials."

"I was demobilised in 1986 and I still don't have a job. And Lonrho has taken my father's land. That isn't right. The state has an obligation to help me," Minuire said.

Private armies

Thousands of people in private armies also must be demobilised, but the peace accord gives no details as to how this will be done. The Department of Protection of Economic Projects of the Ministry of Defence has circulated a document to all companies under its jurisdiction saying they are to demobilise immediately and receive six months salary and transport home. This has caused at least one strike, of the security force at a cotton project in Nampula.

Draft election law expected in January

A draft election law is to be circulated to political parties in early January. This could be followed by a meeting of parties and then a special session of parliament, perhaps in February, to agree the law. That session will also approve the setting up of an election commission, and approve laws on access to media, financial assistance to parties, and foreign election observers.

The peace accord specifies an election similar in most respects to the one in Angola. There will be separate presidential and parliamentary votes conducted at the same time. The president must receive more than half the votes and if no one does there is to be a run-off election within three weeks. Parliament is to be elected by proportional representation.

The parliamentary vote will be different from Angola in two ways. First, there is to be a national threshold, and parties must receive between 5% and 20% of the national vote (to be determined in the election law, almost surely at the lower end to allow smaller parties some access). Second, party lists will be on a provincial rather than a national basis.

As in Angola, there will be advance registration. And as in Angola there will be individual polling stations for each 800 voters with a staff of five -- president, secretary and three scrutineers. Each party and presidential candidate will be allowed observers at each polling station. And each polling station will count its own votes.

A government technical committee on elections has been functioning since October 1991, and has been working on draft procedures since the election rules were agreed in Rome in March 1992. Its members went to the Angola and US elections. The committee is drawing up the draft law, and expects to become the technical committee for the National Election Commission to be set up under the peace accords.

In Angola, once people registered they could vote anywhere, and polling station staff came from all over the country (so long as at least one person spoke the local language). The Mozambique peace accord specifies that provinces are to be the election districts, but that individuals must be registered and vote at a specific polling station and that all election staff and party observers must be registered at that polling station. The accord says refugees and displaced people should be registered at the home polling station, but does not say how this is to be done.

Because of the problems caused by large numbers of refugees and displaced, as well as the organisational difficulties, the technical committee has proposed the compromise use of provincial districts. People would register as residents of a province and be able to vote anywhere in that province. As in Angola, voters would receive plastic registration cards with their photographs. Refugees and displaced could then register at special registration stations as residents of their home province.

Similarly polling station staff and party observers would only need to be from the province, not the actually polling station. Registration staff will be chosen from pupils, teachers, and other literate people from the area. Polling station staff would be chosen from registration workers and presented to local people for approval.

Based on observation of the Angola election, Mozambican officials propose several technical changes. Index fingers will be dipped in indelible ink only after voting, to reduce spoiled ballot papers. Ballot papers will be larger with bigger pictures and fewer confusing lines.

All ballot papers will be widely publicised before the election. Mozambican officials feel that illiterate people should be able to see the form of the papers in advance and learn where their preferred parties are on the ballot paper and what the symbols and pictures area. They feel that one reason for the large number of spoiled and blank ballots in Angola was that the ballot paper had been kept totally secret before election day.

However, to prevent pressure on voters, the same rules on assistance will apply as in Angola -- only the blind and physically disabled will be allowed assistance in actually marking their ballot paper, thus assuring that the ballot remains secret for nearly everyone.

As in Angola, each polling station will receive a prepacked kit with ballots, ballot boxes, ink etc.

But there is a dispute between UN election officials and Mozambican officials. The UN wants more polling stations and a one day election, while Mozambique wants a two day election as in Angola. And the UN wants cardboard ballot boxes to keep costs down, while Mozambique wants tamper-proof metal ones as in Angola.

For the Rome donors conference, Italy proposed that the election would cost \$77 million.

Five parties registered

By the end of 1992, 21 parties had announced their existence, but only five had completed registration formalities: Frelimo, Unamo, PPPM, PCN, and Fumo. Under the peace accord, Renamo must register as a party, but is allowed to operate before registration.

Two factors will determine if parties other than Frelimo and Renamo gain seats in parliament. First will be the level of the national threshold (at least 5%) which would have excluded all but Unita and MPLA in Angola. This will force the small Mozambican parties into coalitions. If a "third force" is to emerge, it must involve most of the main new parties.

Second, the election will be won or lost in Nampula and Zambezia provinces, which have 40% of the country's population. Several of the new parties are concentrating their efforts there and largely ignoring the capital, Maputo. (The election arithmetic means that a party gaining more than 13% of the vote in Zambezia and Nampula would pass a national 5% threshold, and gain seats in parliament.)

Unamo (Uniao Nacional Mocambicana; Mozambique National Union) emerged as a split from Renamo in Zambezia with a top Renamo commander, Gimo Phiri, as president and Carlos Reis as secretary. Reis and Phiri then split, and Phiri formed UDEMO (Uniao Democratica de Mocambique; Democratic Union of Mozambique). Unamo under Reis registered in early 1992 under older, more difficult legislation, and became the first opposition party. But is has been weakened by the split.

PCN (Partido de Convencao Nacional; National Convention Party) is headed Abel Mabunda. Number two is Lutero Simango, the son of Uria Simango, the

disgraced 1960s vice-president of Frelimo who was later secretly executed. Seen as potentially the party of the intellectuals, half of the 70 delegates to its founding conference had intermediate or higher education. Its members are younger and have a long term perspective, talking initially of only gaining a presence in parliament.

The other three parties which have shown a significant presence have roots abroad. PPPM (Partido do Progresso do Povo de Mocambique; People's Progress Party) was launched in Lisbon where president Padimbe Kamate runs an import-export business. PPPM and PCN were, respectively, the third and fourth parties to register.

FUMO (Frente Unidade de Mocambique; Mozambique United Front) was founded in Portugal by Domingos Arouca, an Inhambane lawyer with an anti-colonial and anti-Frelimo history. It submitted registration papers in December.

MONAMO (Movimento Nacionalista Mocambicano; Mozambique Nationalist Movement) was founded by Zambezia lawyer Maximo Dias in Rhodesia in 1979. He had been a leader in GUMO (Mozambique United Group), the only political party authorised by the colonial authorities in 1973. Monamo held its first congress in Maputo with 100 delegates in May, and it has issued more publicity material than most other parties.

MONAMO, FUMO and PCN are reported to have had talks on forming a coalition.

So far, all the other parties are tiny, formed by people from the small Mozambican elite but with few members. They include: CODEMO (Democratic Federation) founded by Zambezia businessman Domingos Cardoso; COINMO (Independent Congress) and FAP (Patriotic Action Front) which held an illegal peace demonstration of 30 people in October 1991; PADELIMO (Democratic Party for the Liberation of Mozambique) based in Kenya; PADEMO (Democratic Party) formed by Wehia Ripua, a former Frelimo guerrilla and foreign ministry official; PAFEMO (Federal Party) wants to convert the ten provinces to autonomous states, but split with former police official Neves Serrano forming PPLFCRM (Liberal Federal Progressive Party of Mozambique Religious Communities); PALMO (Democratic and Liberal Party) is attempting to be the party of small black businesspeople, but it split with a faction forming SOL (Social-Liberal and Democratic Party); PAM (Farmers Party); PANADE (National Democratic Party) headed by Jose Massinga who confessed in 1981 to be an agent of the US Central Intelligence Agency; PREPFUMO (Revolutionary Party for a United Mozambican People); and RECAMO (Chiefs and Peasants) which wants to restore traditional leaders.

First opinion poll

Mozambique's first opinion poll, of 1095 people around main markets in Maputo, was conducted in September, before the peace accord. It found that 59% would vote for Frelimo, while 28% did not know and only 1% would support Renamo. Another 643 people (mostly women) refused to participate.

Corruption was an issue, but in the opposite way that might be expected. Frelimo had already "filled its pockets" and now could govern well, while if another party won the elections, then good government would be delayed until the other party had time to "fill its pockets".

Respondents seemed well informed: 90% listed to radio and 70% watched television. Most could identify at least one of the new parties.

Mozambique is not Angola

The collapse of the Angola peace process shocked everyone involved with the Mozambique peace. Repeatedly in public and in private officials say they want to learn the lessons of Angola.

Most importantly, the UN has accepted the lesson that the process cannot be done cheaply. Ajello commented that in Angola "we tried to spend less, then we spent more and still lost everything." The UN also accepts that military changes must be completed before the election.

There are a number of other causes for optimism in Mozambique. In Angola, Unita and the MPLA had a history of antagonism going back 25 years. In Mozambique, Renamo is a post-independence phenomenon.

The government is also making more of an effort to accommodate Renamo and other opposition forces. "We must do everything to ensure that what happened in Angola does not happen here," President Joaquim Chissano told a rally in Pemba on 28 November. In particular, this means that all demobilised soldiers, whether from the government or Renamo, must be welcomed home and helped to reestablish themselves.

So far, the government press seems open to articles about Renamo and other opposition parties.

Diplomats also point to key differences between Unita and Jonas Savimbi on one hand and Renamo and Afonso Dhlakama on the other. Unita is a powerful military force which could dream of winning power in Angola; Renamo is weaker and officials know that although they cannot be beaten, they also cannot win and could easily spend the rest of their lives in the bush.

Savimbi comes from an older generation and this is his last chance to become president; many of his backers told him he would win. Thus going back to the bush to try to overturn the election may seem to him the only choice.

Dhlakama is 38-years old and does not assume he will win the election. But in the past two years he has been exposed to the international community and is said to have developed political skills. He wants to play a political role and sees himself as leader of the opposition at first. He is said to feel that Savimbi committed political suicide, and that he would not follow that road.

Timetable

Occurred in 1992

Due Date	Actual	Event	
E-day	15 Oct	15 Oct	Begin deployment of UN forces
E-day	15 Oct	15 Oct	End of hostile propaganda
E-day	15 Oct	---	Cease fire due
		15 Oct	Cease fire declared
		Late Nov	Cease fire effective
E-day	15 Oct	---	CSC, CCF, CORE, CCFADM due to begin operation
		4 Nov	First meeting of CSC and naming of CCF, CORE, CCFADM.
		mid-Nov	CCF first meeting.
E+15	30 Oct	---	Government due to create police and security commissions (COMPOL, COMINFO)
		early Dec	Government begins consultation with parties on membership of COMPOL, COMINFO
not specified		Nov	Begin demobilisation of private armies
E+30	14 Nov	15-16 Dec	Rome donor conference
not specified		16 Dec	ONUMOZ mandate approved by Security Council

Likely schedule revision 1993-4

Due Date	Likely	Event	
Military			
Sgn+7	12 Oct	Jan	List assembly points
E-day	15 Oct	Feb	UN present in all assembly points
E-day	15 Oct	Jan	UN to begin verification
E-day	15 Oct	Jan	Inventories of troops, arms, etc.
E+1	16 Oct	Feb	Creation of joint military command
E+6	21 Oct	Jan	Complete separation of forces
E+30	14 Nov	Jan-Mar	Foreign forces withdrawn
E+30	14 Nov	Apr	All forces to assembly points
E+30	14 Nov	May	Define troops to demob and to join FADM
E+31	15 Nov	Feb *	Begin demobilisation
E+31	15 Nov	May	All weapons under UN control
E+180	12 Apr	Oct	Complete demobilisation
by election		Nov **	Complete formation of FADM

Political

E+15	30 Oct	Feb	Government to create commissions on police (COMPOL) and state security (COMINFO)
E+15	30 Oct	Feb	Create joint commission on local administration
E+60	14 Dec	Mar	Create National Election Commission
E+60	14 Dec	Oct	Approve foreign election observers
E+60	14 Dec	Jan	Publish draft electoral law
E+90	13 Jan	Mar	Assembly to approve electoral law
by 21 Aug	Feb 94		Election campaign begins
by 5 Oct	Apr 94		Election

Notes

Although based on discussions with UN and Mozambican officials, the "likely" dates are the author's own guesses and have no official standing.

* Demobilisation of soldiers who want to leave will surely begin even before concentration of forces is completed.

** Although the accord says that the new armed forces must be created before the election, all parties seem to agree that this must occur before the campaign begins.

Appendix II

Key points of the peace agreement

Protocol 1

Signed 18 October 1991

Agreement to continue negotiations and to involve the United Nations in supervising any final accord.

Protocol 2

Signed 13 November 1991

Set criteria for political parties. Parties cannot promote the sectoral interest of a particular social class or group and must be non-regional, non-tribal, non-separatist, non-racial and non-religious. Parties (including Renamo and Frelimo) must register by submitting 2000 signatures. Parties must have a democratic structure. Parties to be granted special privileges, including tax exemption.

Protocol 3

Signed 13 March 1992

Guarantees freedom of the press and access to the media, freedom of association and expression, and the right to the use of public places and facilities. "All citizens shall have the right to move throughout the country without having to obtain administrative authorization."

The UN to help in the return of refugees and the displaced.

Also sets detailed rules for elections. Presidential and parliamentary elections are to take place at the same time, within one year of the signing [that is, by 4 October 1993], although "this period may be extended". There is to be a National Election Commission, one-third of whose members

are nominated by Renamo. Voters and candidates for parliament must be at least 18 years old; presidential candidates must be over 35. Voters must be registered on "electoral rolls in their places of residence" with special provision for registration of refugees. Polling stations, known as "voting assemblies", will have a chair, vice-chair and tellers, as well as delegates of the parties and presidential candidates. Parliamentary elections shall be by proportional representation with provinces as electoral districts. But to have MPs, parties must meet a national threshold of between 5% and 20% of the total vote, with the final percentage to be agreed later. The president requires a majority of votes cast; if no one gains a majority there must be a run-off within three weeks. The UN and other bodies are to provide observers and technical assistance.

"The government undertakes to assist in obtaining installations and means so that Renamo may secure the accommodation and transport and communications facilities it needs to carry out its political activities in all provincial capitals."

Protocol 4

Signed 4 October 1992

Calls for the formation of joint Mozambican Defence Force (FADM), with an army of 24,000, and air force of 4000 and a navy of 2000, with the government and Renamo each providing half.

There is to be a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) for the general peace accord, a Cease Fire Commission (CCF), a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), and a Reintegration Commission (CORE). All four should be formed on E-day -- the date the accord comes into force [15 October 1992]. Until the new government takes office, the command shall be by one officer of equal rank each from Renamo and the government, and shall be named one day after E-day.

Foreign troops are to be withdrawn [by E-day + 30, 14 November, under Protocol 7], although the CCF and CSC may adopt measures deemed necessary to "ensure the security of trading routes". Private and irregular armed groups to be disbanded, except where authorised by CSC.

Demobilisation of troops not to be included in FADM to begin 30 days after E-day and to be completed 180 days after E-day. CCF to plan, organise and supervise the demobilisation. CCF to collect, register and dispose of or destroy weapons, uniforms, etc.

The UN "shall assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilisation process". The UN will chair the CCF and Core. [Protocol 5 says the UN will also chair the CSC.]

The State Information and Security Service (SISE) established by the government in August 1991 shall continue to operate under the direct authority of President Chissano, but with a special National Information Commission (Cominfo). The existing police "shall continue to perform its functions under the responsibility of the government", but with a special National Police Affairs Commission (Compol). Compol and Cominfo will ensure SISE and the police do not violate citizens' rights. They will be established within 15 days of E-day and each have 21 members, including six appointed by Renamo and six by the government.

Protocol 5

Signed 4 October 1992

Within 60 days of E-day [14 December] the National Election Commission will be established, Renamo and the government will agree on foreign observers to be invited, and an election law shall be adopted.

The CSC will be chaired by the UN and will "guarantee the implementation of the provisions contained in the general peace agreement". CCFADM, CCF, and CORE shall be subcommissions of the CSC. "The entry of foreign troops or contingents into Mozambican territory shall not be permitted except in the cases agreed by the CSC".

The UN is to be asked "for its participation in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the general peace agreement, in particular the cease-fire and the electoral process, with immediate priority to coordinating and making available food, medical attention and all other forms of support necessary at the assembly and billeting locations for the forces."

"Renamo shall be responsible for the immediate personal security of its top leaders. The government of the Republic of Mozambique shall grant police status to the members of Renamo assigned to guarantee that security."

"The laws and legislative provisions of the Republic of Mozambique, as well as the civil and political rights ... shall be respected and guaranteed in all parts of the national territory."

"Public administration ... will continue to obey the law in force and be conducted through the institutions provided for by law." However, "institutions provided for by law for the conduct of public administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of Renamo." "The relationship between the Ministry of State Administration and the administration in the areas controlled by Renamo shall be conducted through a national commission" made up of four members each of Renamo and the government and in operation by E-day + 15. "The government undertakes to respect and not antagonise the traditional structures and authorities where they are currently defacto exercising such authority."

Exercise of democratic rights and freedoms, the right to freedom of movement, the "performance of party work by all political parties", and access to "officials of state institutions" is guaranteed in all parts of the national territory.

Protocol 6

Signed 4 October 1992

Defines the timetable for the separation, concentration and demobilisation of forces. There are to be 29 assembly points for government forces, normally existing barracks or bases, and 20 for Renamo. The local Renamo or government commander shall "run" the assembly point and be responsible for maintaining order and discipline and for distributing food. The UN is to "verify the cease fire" and "supervise" assembly points.

Protocol 7

Signed 4 October 1992

Italy to call a donors conference no later than E-day + 30 [14 November; actually occurred 15-16 December].

Other documents

Four other documents are considered as "integral parts" of the peace accord. They are:

Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990, which accepts the two sides as "compatriots and members of the great Mozambican family".

Agreement of 1 December 1990 to create ceasefires in the Beira and Limpopo corridors and establish a Joint Verification Commission.

Declaration of humanitarian assistance of 16 July 1992 which guarantees access to people in need and ensures freedom of movement for persons "under the flag of the United Nations or the International Committee of the Red Cross engaged in humanitarian actions and not accompanied by military escorts." The parties agree to further negotiation with a view to opening roads and access routes. "Coordination and supervision of all humanitarian assistance operations carried out under this declaration shall be the responsibility of a committee presided over by the United Nations" and made up of the mediators, observers to the Rome talks and the ICRC.

Joint declaration of 7 August 1992 by Chissano and Dhlakama, giving Renamo the right to operate freely as a political party and agreeing to conclude an accord by 1 October. Also agree "to accept the role of the international community, particularly the United Nations, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the general peace agreement, particularly the cease-fire and the electoral process."

Appendix 3 Membership of Commissions

Membership seems confused. This list gives the countries as stated by President Joaquim Chissano 16 Dec 1992, with notes on differences from the list given by the UN Secretary General on 3 Dec 1992.

CSC: Supervisory and Monitoring Commission

UN (chair, Aldo Ajello), government (Armando Guebuza head, Teodato Hunguana), Renamo (Raul Domingos head, Jose de Castro), OAU, Italy, France, Portugal, UK, and the US [these five were official observers at the Rome talks], plus Germany [which was invited to join the CSC on 2 December].

CCF: Cease-Fire Commission

UN (chair, Lt-Col. G. P. Sinha), government (Brig. Jose Aleixo Malunga), Renamo (Maj-Gen. Hermino Morais), OAU, Italy, France, Portugal, UK, Egypt, Nigeria, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. [Zimbabwe and Kenya were added later; the US is on the UN list for the CCF but not on the government list.]

CORE: Reintegration Commission

UN (chair), government (Eneas Comiche), Renamo, EC, Italy, France, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, South Africa, Netherlands, Spain and Germany. [The UN version of this list adds Portugal, Switzerland and the US.]

CCFADM: Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force

Government (Lt-Gen Tobias Dai), Renamo (Mateus Ngonhamo), UK, France, and Portugal.