Poverty Observatory in Mozambique:

Final Report

António Alberto da Silva Francisco

Konrad Matter

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Comments welcome:

**konrad.matter@gersterconsulting.ch
aasfrancisco@gmail.com**

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADEL	Local Development Agency
AIMO	Mozambican Industrial Association
AMAZ	Water Consumers Association
ASA	Open Society Association
BdPES	Balanço do PES (Balance of Economic and Social Programme)
CCM	Mozambican Christian Council
CIP	Center for Public Integrity
CS	Civil Society
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CTA	Confederation of Mozambican Economics Associations
DFID	UNK Department for International Development
DNPO	National Division for Planning and Budgeting
DPPF	Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance
FDC	Foundation for Community Development
FOPROZA	Provincial Forum of NGOs in Beira
G20	Group of Civil Society Organizations
GMD	Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (Mozambican Debt Group)
GoM	Government of Mozambique
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IAF	Household Survey (Inquérito de Agregados Familiares)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	National Statistics Institute
MF	Ministry of Finance
MPD	Ministry of Planning and Finance
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finance
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
OE	Orçamento do Estado (State Budget)
Okhalihana	Forum of Civil Society in Nampula
PAP	Programme Aid Partnership
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PES	Plano Económico e Social (Economic and Social Plan)
PO	Poverty Observatory
PPO	Provincial Poverty Observatory
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
RAP	Relatório Anual da Pobreza (Annual Poverty Report, prepared by G20)
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
UCODIN	Unit for Integrated Development Coordination in Nampula
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UTRESP	UNidade Técnica da Reforma do Sector Público
WB	World Bank

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SUMMARY

This consultancy on the Poverty Observatory (PO) in Mozambique is one of the case-studies aiming at generating knowledge and extract lessons learned about citizen participation and social accountability processes in PRSP implementation and monitoring. The consultancy was carried out by two consultants, one international, Konrad Matter (PhD, Gerster Consulting) and a local Mozambican consultant, António A. da Silva Francisco (PhD, UEM).

The PO in Mozambique was formally set up by the Mozambican Government in April 2003, as a tool for both the Government and its international partners to follow-up the implementation of the PARPA monitoring, evaluation and consultation processes.

From the onset the PO has been defined as a consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and actions specifically assigned to public and private sectors within the context of PARPA. Indeed, the consultative nature of the PO is its single most important feature for one to understand its merits, demerits and potentials.

Thus, the consultants identified and defined the research problem around the following key research question: *What is the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique, and what is its role as far as citizen participation and social accountability processes in PRSP/PARPA implementation and monitoring are concerned?*

Since the PO was launched in 2003 it has held five more plenary sessions at the national level. While the initial setting of the PO did not contemplate the replication of this initiative at the provincial level, since 2005 most of the provincial governors have responded positively to the demand from CSOs and some international cooperation agencies to stage Provincial Poverty Observatories (PPOs) as well. As part of this consultancy, the consultants were able to focus their attention not only on the PO at the national level, but have also included the PPOs of Nampula and Beira cities.

Based on the evidence the consultants collected, the interviews conducted with key stakeholders and the consultants' own considerations and evaluation, this study concludes that in spite of the weaknesses found in the existing PO in Mozambique, this initiative has the potential for a more participative implementation and monitoring of PARPA. The consultants found that the motivation and demand for CS-participation in PARPA implementation and monitoring are well supported by the secondary information gathered and the interviews/meetings conducted with key stakeholders.

The findings of this case study support the view that strengthening citizen participation in the implementation and monitoring of PRSP and other public policies and programmes can be highly positive, useful and relevant for the development of Mozambique. Positive, because public administration in general and Government in particular need to be made accountable to their constituencies, chiefly to those citizens who are supposed to benefit most from programmes like PARPA. Useful, provided that the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) instruments become effective and efficient mechanisms, producing the results desired or intended with minimum use of time, money and effort. Relevant in the sense that they have the potential to counteract the widespread sense of exclusion and alienation from the political and economic decision-making processes the have-not citizens often experience. In the case of Mozambique, this is corroborated by the increasingly poor turnout of voters in national and

municipal elections, and by the overwhelming number of informal entrepreneurs, mostly very poor, who are extralegal and excluded from the formal economic system.

A fair assessment of the PO in Mozambique – the way it has been conceived and run – comes to the conclusion that it is more an event than an effective and efficient M&E mechanism. This conclusion rests not only on the fact that the PO meets once a year, and for one day plenary session only, but chiefly because of what is done and not done in the period between the annual plenary sessions. Indeed, rather compelling evidence supporting this conclusion is the absence of operative and relevant outcomes produced by the six POs held so far. Overall, such outcomes generated no feedback and mutual commitments, which eventually should induce significant social reforms and enable citizens to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

In short, the answer to the key question set for this study is the following: The PO in Mozambique, though not legally established, is a legitimate first step and tool for citizen participation in PARPA implementation and monitoring. However, the PO has not evolved into an effective participatory mechanism, not so much because of being informal and depending on ad hoc procedures, but chiefly because it has been restricted to a consultative body with no channels for feedback, social accountability, checks and balances and other forms of citizens' empowerment and participation.

As it is set up now, the PO provides no assurance that citizens' concerns and ideas are seriously taken into account. The fact that the PO structure is led by the Government only, rather than by an independent or at least a partnership mechanism, converted it into a Government instrument for public hearing and uncommitted consultation, which in practice often turns into a window-dressing ritual, where people achieve nothing but "participating in participation". In turn, what the two main power-holders, the Government and its international partners achieve, is the comfort that they have gone through the requirement of involving the so-called ultimate beneficiaries in their programmes and projects.

In these circumstances, the consultants recommend that the role and function of the PO in Mozambique should be deeply and comprehensively reviewed, starting from its very concept and goal. This seems to be the precondition to ensure that the PO becomes an operative mechanism for genuine social accountability of poverty reduction strategies. It should allow its members to enter into a true partnership, where issues are negotiated and agreements with mutual commitments are reached. The same cannot be said of a consultative body, the more so when such a body is not complemented and supported by mechanisms for feedback and accountability. For this very reason past POs have seldom and only sporadically been able to generate the data and M&E means for an adequate assessment of PARPA performance, its achievements as well as its bottlenecks.

One specific recommendation both the Government and international cooperation partners should consider is to share with the CSOs their past positive experience of partnership, through such mechanisms like the Joint Review between the Government and its international cooperation partners. It is true that since 2005 the CSOs have been invited to attend the Joint Review meetings. However, so far CSOs have been there as mere observers and not as active partners. So, the process of sharing this particular experience needs to go further, and for that stakeholders need to build trust among each other.

The consultants raised this particular issue to the interviewees. While the overall reaction to the idea of creating more effective synergies between the PO and the Joint Review was very positive, some Government and donors' representatives expressed reservations. Such reservations are not unfounded. Above all, they reflect the low trust the CSOs currently enjoy in the Mozambican society. This fact needs to be faced and tackled because it is something stakeholders can change and improve. A significant number of interviewees argued that the best contribution the Government as well as international cooperation partners can give to CSOs is to allow for their true empowerment and thus create conditions for them to become trustful.

The PO could set up a flexible but operative system of public feedback, where citizens, service beneficiaries and stakeholders at all levels were invited to submit feedback on any aspect of the service delivery and performance of the Government. But in order to avoid that such a system turns into the sort of discredited "complaints book" found in many public offices, the PO would have to establish creative channels for effective public accountability.

The consultants agree with Rasappan's (2006: 7) recommendation to regularize and formalize the PO with the objective to transform it into a more formal mechanism/process with a specific purpose, processes and follow-through actions. But such a step cannot be seen as panacea or a substitute for the much needed rethinking of the concept of the PO itself, which in the end determines the quality and, in particular, the intention, integrity, suitability and outcomes of the PO.

Summing up, the consultants believe that PARPA should be treated as strategic public good. By public good is meant that its success can have multiplying benefits, not only for the have-nots and most vulnerable people but across social borders, generations and population groups. As all public goods, PARPA tends to suffer from under provision, not so much in financial terms but for the simple fact that they are public. From the individual's perspective, it is often the best and most rational strategy to let others provide the good and then to enjoy it, free of charge and without contributing to its value.

However, also in the case of PARPA/PRSP it is not enough just to appreciate citizen participation for meaningful participation to happen. Stakeholders need to make things work proactively. The drive or motivation to meaningful participation in the case of the PO must come from the stakeholders themselves. This attitude should also be encouraged by surrounding organizations. Finally, successful citizen participation needs investment in time, thinking energy, design effort and money.

PART 1
INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

1. As part of the knowledge partnership on "Social Accountability for Poverty Reduction Strategies", between the World Bank and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), a series of case studies have been documented internationally. The partnership initiated in April 2004 and seeks to support participation and social accountability (SAc) processes in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) implementation and monitoring by strengthening the capacity and practice of PRSP country actors and development partners. In particular, the partnership is aiming at strengthening accountability relationships between Governments (administration and elected bodies), citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) and private sector actors, at the national, regional and local levels.

2. In this context, a case study on the so-called Poverty Observatory (PO) in Mozambique was selected, with the objective to generate knowledge and extract lessons learned about its experience on participation and social accountability processes in PRSP implementation and monitoring, as well as provide relevant information to the ongoing Country Social Assessment (CSA).

1.2. The PO Study

Objectives

3. This case-study on the PO in Mozambique was chosen as it was believed to provide an innovative consultative mechanism for Government, civil society, and other key stakeholders to fight poverty by means of supporting participatory monitoring and evaluation of PRSP (known in Mozambique as PARPA)[1]. The overall objective of the consultancy was to gather information, analyze, and document the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique through a case study paper.

Methodology

4. The study was carried out by two consultants, one international[2] and a local Mozambican.[3] The methodology comprised the review of existing written information on the PO in Mozambique, and on similar experiences in other countries, as well as a series of interviews with key actors of the PO in national and local Government, civil society and the donor community.

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[1] PARPA is the "Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta", the "Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty" as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is called in Mozambique.

[2] Konrad Matter (Ph.D, Gerster Consulting, Switzerland).

[3] António Alberto da Silva Francisco (Ph.D and Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics of the University Eduardo Mondlane).

5.   As part of the overall methodology the study was undertaken in three main phases, each one leading to very specific deliveries. In Phase 1 two deliveries have been prepared and shared with the client, namely: 1) A review of relevant secondary literature and the research methodology for the case study, mostly undertaken by the local consultant;[4] and 2) A brief review of relevant international literature, undertaken by the international consultant.[5]

6.   For Phase 2, the main tasks set up by the Terms of Reference (ToR) included conducting interviews with key stakeholders, a number of them jointly by the local and the international consultant, prepare a summary report of interviews, review summary report with international consultant, World Bank and SDC, and incorporate suggestions into a revised summary report.[6]

7.   Phase 3 of this study consists of writing up the present study report focusing on key issues underlying the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique.

Scope and limitations of the study

8.   The case study's focus is on the aspects outlined in the ToR, which summarize the key issues underlying the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique, grouped in four main areas, namely: a) Institutional assessment and process mapping, b) Stakeholders' participation; c) Monitoring and evaluation; d) Impact assessment (for details, see Box 1.1).

9.   Considering the circumstances of this study, the consultants are confident that the relevant questions outlined in the ToR can be answered with reasonable assurance and accuracy. There are some aspects, though, particularly aspects concerning citizen participation in general, which were beyond the scope of this study. However, as far as the specific ToR are concerned, the primary evidence and secondary information gathered seem enough and of satisfactory quality to support the findings, conclusions and recommendations presented in this report.

10.   It needs to be acknowledged that the bulk of the primary information gathered for this study comes from what can be called 'anecdotal evidence'. That is, evidence based upon a relatively small number of selected interviews, and thus relatively weak as a basis for generalisation and for drawing reliable conclusions.

11.   As it is well known, anecdotal evidence runs the risk that details of the interviews or stories may get changed in the retelling. But more importantly still, the fact that conclusions are drawn from isolated or purposive cases, means that the research lacks the rigour of controlled and systematic scientific methods.

12.   In any case, it is also known that the appropriateness of anecdotal evidence depends on the context and the type of anecdotal evidence available. Indeed, not all anecdotal evidence is inevitably unreliable. In this particular case, the consultants have good reasons to trust in the sources of the evidence they have gathered.

Main Audience of the Case Study

13.   The audience of the PO case-study includes World Bank and SDC staff, donors, and Government officials and civil society organizations interested in this sort of experiences and the lessons derived from them.

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[4] Francisco, A. and K. Matter, "Preliminary Review of the Relevant Literature and Research Methodology Report on the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique", January 2007.

[5] Matter, K., "Literature review on international experience of participatory PRS monitoring", January 2007.

[6] Francisco, A. and Konrad Matter, "Poverty Observatory in Mozambique: Phase 2 of the Study: Interviews, Meetings and Additional Material", Report 2, March 2007.

14.   But more importantly, the consultants expect that the main audience of this case-study will be the very representatives of Mozambican CSOs, particularly those who are increasingly committed to transform instruments such as the PO in Mozambique into meaningful mechanisms for citizens' participation.

Problem Statement and key Research Question

15.   In a nutshell, the key question regarding the research problem, or research situation, on the PO in Mozambique, can be stated as follows:

16.   ***What is the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique, and what is its role as far as citizen participation and social accountability (SAC) processes in PRSP implementation and monitoring are concerned?***

17.   Associated with the key research question are the sub-questions outlined in the ToR and the questionnaire that guided the collecting of primary information in Phase 2 of the study. Box 1.1 summarizes the relevant questions that are addressed in this final report.

1.3.   Report Structure

18.   This final report of the case study on the PO in Mozambique is organized in four main parts. Part 1 comprises introductory aspects, such as the background, objectives, methodology, scope and limitations, main audience and the key research question of the study.

19.   Part 2 presents a conceptual framework borrowed from Arnstein's typology called "The ladder of citizen participation". The consultants regard this as useful for three reasons. First, Arnstein's typology provides the analytical framework which was missing in the first deliveries of this case study. Secondly, the ladder pattern of eight levels of citizen participation allows placing the specific analysis on the PO in Mozambique in a broader context, which may be operationally useful to generate the desired knowledge and identify the important lessons learned about citizen participation and social accountability processes in PRSP implementation and monitoring. Thirdly, the ladder of citizen participation may help clarifying perceptions as well as expectations on PRSP's performance and drawing recommendations for improvements.

20.   Part 3 consists of an analysis of the PO, basically following the questions on the key issues as formulated in the ToR. It starts with a snapshot of citizen participation in Mozambique, in order to place the PO in the broader social and the political context. The context analysis is followed by a critical assessment of the PO, first how it is conceived in the official discourse and then how it is perceived by the interviewees and in the secondary literature.

21.   Part 4 presents the conclusions and recommendations. The annex contains the bibliographic references and the meaning of the acronyms of the key actors mapped in the Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.

BOX 1.1: KEY ISSUES UNDERLYING THE POVERTY OBSERVATORY IN MOZAMBIQUE

Institutional Assessment and Process Mapping: 1) What is the legal, institutional, and organizational framework of POs (*de juri* and *de facto*)? 2) How has the process of formulating and monitoring the implementation of PARPA taken place (in theory and in practice)? 3) What are the linkages, gaps, and tensions between POs at national, provincial and district levels? 4) What are the recommendations to improve the legal, institutional, and organizational framework of POs? 5) What are the recommendations to improve the linkages between POs at national, provincial and district levels? 6) What are the recommendations to improve the role of POs in the process of formulating and monitoring the implementation of PARPA?

Stakeholders' Participation: 7) what is the role of CSO in the Poverty Observatory? How civil society is represented in the POs (at national, provincial, and local levels)? 8) How is the G20 constituted? How representative is the G20? How inclusive is the G20? 9) Are the social groups excluded? How is the participation of ordinary citizens? 10) How independent from Government is the CSOs participating in the G20? Does the PO undermine CSO autonomy (agency) to provide independent perspectives to the PO? 11) What is the analytical research base for SOS/G20 contributions to the PO? Does CSO gather independent information to monitor PARPA? 12) What is the cost of CSO participation in POs (time and resources)? Are there resource barriers for CSO participation? 13) What are the factors that impact the quality of CSOs participation in POs? 14) What are the concrete recommendations to improve civil society voice and agency in the PO?

Monitoring and Evaluation: 15) How stakeholders have agreed on the indicators and processes to monitor the PARPA; 16) How baselines were prepared and used to monitor the PARPA; 17) What roles provincial poverty observatories play, also for the outcomes at national level; 18) What are the learning mechanisms generated by the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique; 19) How the macro enabling environment (including the General Budget Support scheme) affected the Poverty Observatory legal provisions and political setting; 20) What were the lessons learnt during the process, and how these lessons were incorporated by the Poverty Observatory, the Government of Mozambique, and CSOs; 21) What were the recommendations to improve the Poverty Observatory.

Impact Assessment: 22) what is the extent to which CSOs/G20 are able to influence the PARPA? 23) How the impact of CSOs/G20 is measured? 24) To what extent the Poverty Observatory achieved its own objectives and how it functions in practice.

Source: Terms of Reference for Mozambique Case Study

PART 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2. "Citizen Participation is Citizen Power": A Conceptual Framework

2.1 Theoretical weaknesses in existing analyses of PRSP citizen participation

22.   The ToR for the present study provided no clear or explicit guidance as to the analytical framework likely to adequately help understanding the PO in Mozambique. Because of this and also because the consultants expected that the secondary information, directly associated with the PO in Mozambique, would be sufficiently informative as to the relevant conceptual framework, in their first deliveries they only highlighted some operational concepts found relevant in the literature.

23.   Two key operational concepts highlighted in the first deliveries were the following: social accountability and participation. With regard to the former, the local consultant stressed the point on how the term social accountability is perceived in Mozambique. He called particular attention to the fact that although the word 'accountability' is increasingly used in a growing range of contexts (e.g. in development issues on democratization, participation, empowerment, governance, and so forth), this in itself has not motivated most authors to try making its meaning more explicit and clear to readers.[7] This is particularly odd, chiefly because the English word 'accountability' has no direct corresponding term in Portuguese language. The closest word to 'accountability' found in Portuguese is 'responsibility', a word that also exists in English, but like in Portuguese, has a relatively broad meaning and a more or less loose association with the social force that binds people to the course of action demanded by that force.

24.   For the purpose of better informing the preliminary literature review prepared in Phase 1 of this study, the local consultant identified two components in the term social accountability: answerability and enforceability. Accountability means *answerability*, i.e. the traceability of actions performed or the obligation of power-holders to justify their decisions and actions, which requires information to be available for external actors to monitor the performance of power-holders, and the capacity to carry out such analysis. Moreover, accountability also means *enforceability*, that is: to compel observance of or obedience to, or even impose a kind of behaviour. Enforceability does not necessarily mean sanctioning or punishing, but at least can mean the right to require and enforce corrective measures and changes in policy and action.

25.   There are at least two main implications of the above twofold meaning of the term 'social accountability' for this study on the PO in Mozambique. In part, the participation in PARPA should be aiming at providing information to and consulting citizens, about the implementation processes of specific poverty reduction policies and programmes. Additionally, and certainly more important though, is the idea that accountability implies an effort to enforce corrective measures and make the different actors accountable for the improvement of the respective policies and action (Driscoll et al., 2004; Eberlei, 2006; Eberlei et al., 2007; Francisco, 2005; Francisco and Paulo, 2006; Hodges and Tibana, 2005; Macamo, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Mosse, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Septro et al., 2005; UTRESP, 2005; Vaux et al., 2006).

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[7] In the first delivery the concept of 'accountability' was defined as the principle that individuals, organizations and the community are responsible for their actions and may be required to explain them to others, including being liable or even obliged to bear the consequences for failure.

26. With regard to the concept of 'participation', in another delivery prepared during Phase 1, the international consultant stressed its importance for the present study. Participation in general and participatory monitoring in particular is eminently political. It is not only a technical process for data collection that can lead to public debates on Government action (Eberlei et al., 2007: 16). It takes place in a highly contested political field where the vested interests of numerous parties are at stake. (Eberlei et al., 2007: 24, Eberlei, 2006: 26 ff). Even the process of selecting indicators and setting up a monitoring system is a complex procedure of political bargaining. The process has the potential to stimulate a debate on development priorities and strategies (Eberlei et al., 2007: 8).

27. In the first two deliveries of Phase 1 of this study, both consultants drew attention to Eberlei's (2006) review of international experiences with participation in PRS implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In particular, attention was called to Eberlei's view on the role of civil society in a democratic environment and his argument that meaningful participation can be seen as the successful transformation of societal communicative power into governmental administrative power.

28. For Eberlei (2006: 5) participation is potentially "meaningful" if it is rights-based, integrated in structures within the political environment of a given country, and if it has empowered and legitimate stakeholders. "In most PRS countries, these standards are at best only partially fulfilled", concludes Eberlei. "The institutionalization of participation is still in its infancy" (Eberlei, 2006: 5).

29. While the present study moved on into Phases 2 and 3, the consultants became increasingly aware that both the secondary information on the PO in Mozambique and most of the literature on international experiences of participation in PRS monitoring was of little help, for identifying a conceptual framework adequately enough to inform the case study under consideration.

30. Overall, secondary information, directly or indirectly relevant for the case study on the PO in Mozambique, provides no good and reliable understanding of the merits and demerits of citizen participation in PRSP, or PARPA in the particular case of Mozambique. Some sources embed their analyses on citizen participation in misleading and vague rhetoric like "deep", "comprehensive", "unique" or even "absolute control". These authors use all their convincing power not to appear falling in the trap of self-deception, unwarranted optimism or wishful thinking. Other sources are full of material with no clear distinction between advocacy and research, which is chiefly due to the haphazard data collection and weak analytical and theoretical foundations of the empirical research. Others still reveal a dissimulated but real unwillingness to foster a true decentralization and redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, particularly the most marginalized and excluded from the political and economic processes, to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

31. The search for a satisfactory conceptual framework is far from being an academic matter. On the contrary, a clear and explicit identification of the key assumptions or perceptions lying underneath the dominant views and analyses on citizen participation is perhaps the key to avoid that this subject continues plunged in an innocuous and self-defeating intellectual quagmire.

32. Fortunately, while Phase 2 of this study was in progress, the local consultant made some parallel analytical work, which was closely related and added additional value and inputs to the preliminary literature review.[8]

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[8] Such parallel work responded to an invitation from FDC, a Mozambican NGO, for a more in-depth elaboration and an oral presentation on types of citizen participation that go beyond information and consultation. This presentation was motivated by an earlier debate, also with some CSOs, focused on the Rural Development Strategy in Mozambique. While debating this specific issue, in August 2006, Francisco questioned one of the NGOs' representatives, more or less in the following terms: "Do you really regard citizens or CSOs as partners of the Government? The international cooperation agencies, yes, they are in many respects Government's partners. But are CSOs really partners of Mozambican Government as well?". Francisco's presentation of 13th March 2007 has provided the

33.   Thus, before moving any further into the key issues underlying the PO in Mozambique, explicitly outlined in the initial ToR, it seems useful to precede the discussion of the main findings with the introduction of a conceptual framework of great value, not only for a general debate on citizen participation, but for a more illuminating discussion on the specific case of the PO in Mozambique.

2.2 The "Ladder of citizen participation" – The Actuality of Arnstein's typology

34.   Back in the 1960s, Sherry Arnstein, writing about citizen involvement in planning in the United States, outlined a typology of eight levels of participation. For illustrative purposes, as Figure 2.1 depicts, Arnstein arranged the eight types in a ladder pattern, grouped in three main levels, where the rungs correspond to the extent of citizens' power in determining the end product.

35.   Contrary to the changes more recent authors have made to Arnstein's typology (Driscoll et al., 2004; Wilcox, 2007), Francisco (2007) followed the initial framework in his work for the FDC presented on the 13th of March 2007.

36.   Although the present study has not been initially outlined and undertaken with a clear awareness and understanding of the analytical implications that can be drawn from Arnstein's typology, this fact in itself is

Figure 2.1: "Ladder of Citizen Participation"

Rungs	Levels
8 Citizen Control	
7 Delegated Power	Citizen Power
6 Partnership	
5 Placation	
4 Consultation	Tokenism
3 Informing	
2 Therapy	Nonparticipation
1 Manipulation	

Source: Arnstein, 1969: 2.

helpful to place the methodological and analytical limitations of this study acknowledged above in the right analytical context.

37.   The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) Manipulation and (2) Therapy. These two rungs describe levels of false or "non-participation" that have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Rungs 3, 4 and 5 progress to levels of "tokenism" that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice: (3) Informing, (4) Consultation and (5) Placation. On these levels of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But, as Arnstein pointed out, they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful. "When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no 'muscle', hence no assurance of changing the status quo" (Arnstein, 1969: 2). As for rung (5) Placation, Arnstein considers it simply a higher level of tokenism because the ground rules allow have-nots to advise, but the power-holders retain the right to decide.

38.   Further up the ladder are the higher levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making clout. Citizens can enter into a (6) Partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs, (7) Delegated Power and (8) Citizen Control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power.

opportunity to share with CSOs' representative some of the preliminary findings of this study, which were discussed within the broader context of a conceptual framework that seems useful for this study as well.

39.   Obviously, as Arnstein admitted, the eight-rung ladder typology entails some limitations. Firstly, this is a simplification, though it can help to illustrate the point that there are significant gradations of citizen participation. Secondly, the ladder juxtaposes powerless citizens with the powerful, in order to highlight the fundamental divisions between them. Actually, neither the have-nots nor the power-holders are homogeneous blocs. Each group encompasses a host of divergent points of view, significant cleavages, competing vested interests, and splintered subgroups.

40.   Thirdly, Arnstein's typology does not include an analysis of the most significant roadblocks to achieving genuine levels of participation. These roadblocks lie on both sides of the simplistic fence. On the power-holders' side, they include racism, paternalism, and resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots' side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's political and socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge-base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens' group in the face of futility, alienation and distrust.

41.   Finally, as Arnstein points out, another caution about the eight separate rungs on the ladder is advisable since in the real world of people and programmes, there might be 150 rungs with less sharp and "pure" distinctions among them. Furthermore, some of the characteristics used to illustrate each of the eight types might be applicable to other rungs.

42.   Arnstein's typology of citizen participation cannot be adequately and fully explored in the context of the present study because it has not been outlined with that purpose in mind. Above all, primary information on the PO in Mozambique gathered during Phase 2, only in a limited way provided some inputs to consider a few of the eight rungs of citizen participation. In spite of that, in some interviews suggestions and references to illusory forms of participation were made, including explicitly to several forms of manipulation and therapy. However, these aspects have been neither discussed in length with all interviewees, nor even were they considered within the topics included in the questionnaire.

43.   In spite of this methodological limitation, Arnstein's typology can still be useful as a conceptual framework for the study of the PO in Mozambique. On the one hand, with this framework one is better equipped to place the available information in a broader and more systematic analytical context. On the other hand, if one can understand and distinguish better effective citizen control or empowerment from illusory forms of citizen participation, the main goal set for this consultancy can be more adequately fulfilled.

2.3 Making Perceptions and Expectations on Citizen Participation Explicit

44.   The main goal and expectation behind this consultancy is that it will generate knowledge and allow for extracting lessons learned about good practices of participation and social accountability processes in PRSP implementation and monitoring.

45.   However, the level of satisfaction does not depend only on the quality of the information collected and the analytical framework used in the analysis. It also depends on the very nature of the expectations people hold, particularly the criteria and standards individual views are resting on. Box 2.1 highlights in a summarized way the substance and forms of three main expectations, which are often left implicit in the analyses of citizen participation but need to be made explicit for the good of the overall analysis and understanding of the subject matter studied.

BOX 2.1 MAKING EXPECTATIONS ON THE PO IN MOZAMBIQUE EXPLICIT

Being explicit with regard to the underlying assumptions of people's expectations about the Poverty Observatory in Mozambique can be half way through avoiding misunderstandings and disagreements.

Consciously or unconsciously, planners, politicians, analysts, project leaders, observers, interviewees, consultants and power-holders have their own points of view, assumptions and perceptions, which directly or indirectly influence their assessment of the data and qualitative information on poverty implementation and monitoring policies. This is so for a variety of reasons, such as: the diversity of backgrounds and life experiences people have gone through, the different learning processes about living conditions and alternative policy strategies to tackle poverty.

The team of two consultants worked constructively, exploiting the secondary and primary information. In the interviewing process the consultants tried to take into consideration both the complementary and the divergent points of view and expectations of citizens. For that, the interviewees comprised not only people directly involved in CSOs' activities, but also some who are not at all involved in or interested in being part of existing political participative processes.

Citizens' expectations can vary significantly in content, substance, and form. This is typical of a growing society in terms of pluralism, diversity, openness and strength. The following characterization is aiming at simplifying the relevant patterns of though that is beneath the analyses and evaluations of public and private social and economic policies in contemporary Mozambique. At least three main expectations are particularly influential in the way people assessed and evaluated the usefulness, role and impact of the PO in Mozambique.

1. *Ignorance, prejudice and informal fallacy* – Perhaps the greatest hindrance to critical thinking is ignorance, the lack of essential background knowledge and firm understanding of the subject at hand. In turn, prejudice refers to judgments that are not based on evidence or study. It is a belief held without good reason or consideration of the evidence for or against its being true. Prejudicial views can be either favourable or unfavourable. Finally, informal fallacy happens when lack of known evidence against a belief is taken as an indication that it is true.

2. *Wishful thinking and ad hoc voluntarism* – This is the pattern of though that interprets facts, reports, events, and perceptions according to what one would like to be the case, rather than according to the actual evidence. This is an extremely common and tempting viewpoint, both among international and Mozambican actors. It is tempting because it helps avoiding many unpalatable truths. In extreme forms, particularly if done intentionally and without regard for the truth, it is a kind of self-deception, misinterpretation, falsification or perversion of the truth. In milder forms, wishful thinking favours an unwarranted optimism. In both cases, people can go through surprising rationalizations, in order to avoid confronting evidence that would undermine their shaky arguments. Sometimes rather subtle features go along with wishful thinking, such as: jargon, ad hoc hypothesis, pseudo-profundity, victimization, and the so-called 'politician's answer' and truth by consensus.[9] One of the most dangerous features in wishful thinking is to put a veil between the observer and the truth, which can pose serious difficulties for introducing improvement, in conformity with reality.

3. *Critical thinking and professionalism* – This third pattern of though or attitude can also be found in many international and national actors. It differs from the above two stances because critical thinking is neither dogmatic nor gullible. The most distinctive features of the critical and professional thinkers' attitude are open mindedness and scepticism, as well as a high ethical standard and quality of work expected from a person or an organization that is said to be well trained in a particular job and task.

For the purpose of this study on the PO in Mozambique, the relevance of this typology lies in the fact that these patterns of thought do influence the underlying expectations people have as far as citizen participation is concerned. Being aware of this can be very useful and healthy, particularly in drawing conclusions and recommendations on the merits and demerits of existing types of citizen participation in Mozambique. Above all, it can avoid misunderstandings, particularly when identifying priorities and proposing alternatives for improvement.

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[9] This set of terms is drawn from basic tools for clear and critical thinking, such as Bishop (2004), Carroll (2000, 2004) and Warburton (1998).

PART 3
THE POVERTY OBSERVATORY IN MOZAMBIQUE

3. A Snapshot of the Context of Citizen Participation in Mozambique

46.   This section draws on some parts of the first deliveries of this consultancy and considers a few other aspects relevant to contextualize this case study. This broader institutional context seems helpful to better understand both the potentials and the shortcomings of the PO in Mozambique.

3.1 Citizen Political Control: Direct and Delegated Power versus Abstention

47.   The process of making political and administrative power-holders accountable to Mozambican citizens is a multidimensional endeavour, involving a variety of social means and mechanisms, made available or developed in Mozambique over half a century or so.

48.   Since the independence of Mozambique in 1975, following the overthrow of the dictatorship in Portugal in the previous year, political power was handed over to FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) without elections, which turned officially into a Marxist-Leninist Party in 1979. Ever since, the new power-holders in Mozambique have run the country, first through a one-party system of Government that lasted a decade and a half, and then, after the signing of the peace agreement in 1992, between the FRELIMO Government and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), as part of a multi-party system set up. Renamo became the main contender and opposing political force to Frelimo and its Government.

49.   From the establishment of a relatively democratic political system in Mozambique, following the approval of the 1990 Constitution, Mozambican citizens have enlarged their ability to making decision-makers and power-holders accountable to them, first of all through electing the President of the Republic and thirty three Presidents of the Municipalities, by universal, direct, secret and periodic suffrage.

50.   With regard to the remaining constitutional representatives of the sovereign organs, namely the legislative power and the public administration, the Mozambican citizens exercise their decision power through delegated rather than direct power. Under the existing Constitution, Mozambican citizens delegate their power, on the one hand, to political parties, which appoint the deputies to the People's Assembly, who are accountable more to their political leaders than to the citizens.

51.   On the other hand, the elected President of the Republic is delegated a wide range of power, including to be the head of State, the head of the Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed and security forces. In these functions he appoints and can dismiss the presidents of the various branches of the judicial power, the Attorney-General and their deputies; the Prime Minister, Ministers and Deputy Ministers and Secretaries of State, Provincial Governors, Rectors and Deputy Rectors of State universities as well as the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mozambique.

52.   At the lower public administrative levels – provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities – at least 128 district administrators and more than 400 heads of administrative posts and localities are all appointed by the Government. These political and administrative power-holders are also more accountable to those who nominate them than to the citizens.

53.   Under the existing constitutional setting, Francisco (2007) estimates that the Mozambican citizen exercises a direct power in less than five percent of the sovereign organs, while with regard to the remaining 95 per cent, the citizen power is delegated to the parties, the elected President of the Republic and the Presidents of the 33 Municipalities, who hold the power to nominate the executive and other public administrative organs and representatives.

54.   The 1992 peace agreement has so far proved successful and relatively sustainable. Three general elections have been held since (in 1994, 1999 and 2004). FRELIMO has remained in power, though it has faced quite a strong challenge from RENAMO, particularly in the first and second elections.

55.   In the 2004 general elections, FRELIMO and its candidate, Armando Guebuza, Mozambique's current President, emerged as clear victors. However, such a victory was in part clouded by the poor turnout of registered voters nationwide, which is well illustrated by Figure 3.1 (de Brito et al., 2005; de Brito, 2006; Ruigrok, 2005; Hanlon, 2001, 2002).

56.   Mozambique has always had a rather centralized governance system, in which all civil public staff, even in the smallest locality, are generally appointed

Figure 3.1: Level of Abstention in the 1994, 1999 and 2004 General Multi-Party Election, Mozambique

Fonte: de Brito, 2006

by the central Government. Under the process of reforms following the peace agreement, in 1994 the country adopted a new legal framework for local Government reform and political participation, which proposed to turn all 128 districts into municipalities. If this decision had gone ahead it would constitute a radical break with the past towards a true process of political decentralization and democratization.

57.   However, in 1997 FRELIMO's parliamentary majority repealed the law and opted for holding municipal elections in 33 urban municipalities only. Since 1998, in the 33 municipalities every five years a municipal president (mayor) and municipal assembly are elected. The municipal president then chooses local ministers, known as vereadores, who administer the various departments of the municipality.[10]

58.   The first municipal elections in Mozambique were a sobering experience for the Mozambican policy as a whole, since RENAMO and most other smaller opposition parties decided to abstain from participation, arguing that the Government was bent on fraud. Less than 15% of the registered voters turned up and cast their ballots.

59.   In the second local elections, held in November 2003, which were the first inclusive ones, turnout was still relatively low, averaging about 28% of the more than two million registered voters in the 33 municipalities. In these elections, the Government party retained a firm hold on local politics in 28 urban districts, including Maputo. In turn, RENAMO mayoral candidates were elected in five out of the 33 municipalities, including Beira in Sofala Province, the second major city in the country.

60.   In short, Mozambique's political elites, regardless of their party affiliation, face a rather challenging task ahead. Part of the challenge entails trying to bring people back into formal politics, through the existing multi-party electoral mechanism. Another part of the challenge

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
[10] Apart from these municipalities, there are also so-called local state organs, consisting of 129 districts, 393 administrative posts and 1048 'localidades' (local municipalities). In all cases the administrators, as well as provincial governors, are appointed centrally.

concerns the need to develop complementary alternatives for achieving a more effective and efficient participation of civil society in the solution of the country's problems.[11]

3.2 Citizen Economic Power: State Landlord and Informal Tenants

61.   In contrast to the radical political and legal changes between the 1975 Constitution and the two most recent Constitutions (1990 and 2004), with regard to economic power Mozambican citizens have not been empowered at all. The ownership of land is vested in the State, and land may not be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered or alienated by citizens (Francisco and Paulo, 2006; Hamela, 2003).

62.   The Constitution acknowledges that as a universal means for the creation of wealth and social well-being, the use and enjoyment of land shall be the right of all the Mozambican people. But the State determines the conditions for the use and enjoyment of land, which is granted to individual or collective persons, taking into account its social purpose.

63.   In theory, the terms for the establishment of rights in respect of land tenure are governed by a specific law, but in practice citizens counter the law with their de facto property rights. The gap between the formal enforcement of the land law and the many informal kinds of land usage, or even the *de facto* private appropriation, leads to a heterogeneous setting not only among the power-holders, but chiefly among the have-nots and most disadvantaged poor people. In these circumstances, it is no surprise that informality is so overwhelmingly dominating, not only in land use, but with regard to other factors of production, such as financial capital and the labour force (Francisco and Paulo, 2006; Hamela, 2003).

64.   Without discussing any further the advantages and disadvantages of the delegation of citizen power to the State and its representatives, one can conclude that the remarkable rise in citizens' abstention from exercising the right to vote, and the overwhelming dominance of the informal economy in Mozambique cast serious doubts as to the efficacy and efficiency of the delegated power with regard to most political organs and economic assets.

3.3 Other types of citizen participation in a changing political environment

65.   Understanding the institutional context and some of its social, political and economic rules briefly described above, is paramount for any attempt to make sense of the principle of "permanent democratic participation by citizens in the affairs of the nation", declared in the 1990 and 2004 Constitution (Art. 73), and find adequate ways to avoid such a principle to become mere wishful thinking.

66.   If citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power, as Arnstein put it, then in practice it is the redistribution of power that will eventually enable the have-not citizens to be deliberately included in decisions that determine their future. Nowadays, most of the Mozambican citizens are generally excluded from the decision-making in relevant political and economic processes. In the long run, this situation is far from healthy and sustainable. Both the major political parties and other national and international actors, including the international cooperation agencies, must be concerned with this fragile institutional situation.

67.   One way of expressing such a concern is to genuinely contribute to new means that are likely to allow the have-nots and middle class CSOs to increasingly determine how

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[11] Commenting on this specific section, following Francisco's presentation during the debate of 13th March 2007 held by FDC, Ms Graça Machel, the head of this prominent NGO and Mozambique's former First Lady, appealed to her organization and other CSOs to follow and give a better thought to the implications of direct and delegated citizen power and the problems associated with abstention. The fact that deputies and other policy makers and Government officials are not made directly accountable to the citizens should be a motive of concern, commented Graça Machel. This is, in fact, an unresolved problem that affects many other African countries, added the head of FDC and stressed the need to discuss the issue further and find better forms of citizen participation, power representation and social accountability.

information is shared, goals and policies are set, resources are allocated, programmes are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parcelled out. In short, contribute to means by which citizens can induce significant social reform to enable them to share in the benefits of economic growth.

68.   Since 1990, the mass media have acted under the constitutional principles of freedom of expression and information, in a generally free environment. However, as from 2000 the image of freedom of expression in Mozambique has been hardly damaged, both because of the controversies associated with the murder of renowned journalist Carlos Cardoso in 2000, and the continued and increasing corruption scandals.

69.   In recent months, the Law on Mass Media has been under revision, a process seen with suspicion by some analysts as an opportunity for the 'establishment' to control the national mass media (Afrol News, 2006, Dias, 2006). The independent news found in the Internet indicate that the terms of reference for the revision of the Law on Mass Media are far from clear, and the revision process has been promoted by bureaucrats linked to the Information Office, an organ closely related to the Prime-Minister's Cabinet.

70.   These concerns are consistent with recent reports calling public attention to the likelihood of an increase in abuse of public office for private gain in Mozambique, abetted by several factors in the current institutional and political environment, including: i) The dominance by a single party of all branches of Government, which undermines the concept and practice of checks and balances; ii) A lack of direct accountability to citizens and weak control mechanisms to detect abuses; iii) Impunity for those with wealth and connections to the politically powerful; iv) Discretionary application of the law to favour politically-connected individuals (Septor et al. 2005: 2).

71.   Besides Septor et al.'s assessment, another report entitled 'Strategic Conflict Assessment in Mozambique' (Vaux et al., 2006) identifies the following relevant features of Mozambique today: the centralized power based on a patronage system (clientelism); exclusion of the political opposition; regional imbalances; grievances around corruption in service delivery; and voter alienation.

72.   Vaux et al. argue that the fact Mozambique has been praised by donors as a 'success' case, aid policy reflects this favourable bias towards Mozambique. "Donors have moved towards budget support, collective action and a flexible approach in order to accommodate Government interests", write Vaux et al. (2006: 30), and then remark:

> It would be unwise to assume that the more aid flows to Mozambique the more stable it will become. Aid may fuel greater demands for patronage on a wider and more lavish scale, exacerbating competition among 'greed' elements and increasing the grievances of poorer people. In many ways Mozambique is still a 'fragile state'. Donors should continue to bear in mind the DAC Principles for working in fragile states … Such an approach would put more focus on contextual analysis, more emphasis on justice, independent monitoring of government's performance on poverty reduction and balancing the powers of the state with other institutions including civil society … Despite Mozambique's positive progress and willingness to engage with the agenda of donors, the trend is towards centralization and consolidation of power within a narrow elite, which will be obliged to offer patronage to a wide and 'greed' circle of clients. The tendency towards corruption will undermine development and also undermine democratic processes, potentially creating a vicious spiral. Many of the underlying problems in the civil war, notably regional discrepancies, remain unresolved and could be mobilized in conflict between elites (Vaux et al., 2006: 30-31).

73.   In the 2006 Global Integrity Index, an indicator assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms that promote public integrity, Mozambique received an overall "weak" rating. The Reporter's Notebook argues that corruption in Mozambique is made possible by the very nature of the Mozambican state, where the power of the ruling party overlaps with the state machinery. Despite massive fraud, especially in the privatization process, the GII Report asserts that no senior Government representative has ever been convicted, so corruption continues with impunity.

74.   According to Mosse (2007b), pledges to strengthen transparency and integrity are easier said than done. Likewise, Alice Mabote, leader of the NGO Humans Rights League,

asserts that Mozambique's problems stem from the lack of accountability practices, particularly in the Parliament, which provides an incentive for corruption.

75.   Much more could be said on alternative means of citizen participation, especially means to tackle the discredited Mozambican judicial system, widespread corruption, failure to apply the law, lack of a record of prosecutions, and so forth. While such alternative means can be found in works such as those of Mosse (2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), Septor et al. (2005), UTRESP (2005) and Vaux et al. (2006), to conclude this section it seems more relevant to highlight a few features on the civil society context in Mozambique.

3.4 Civil society context in Mozambique

76.   In less than the average lifespan of a Mozambican citizen[12], the country has undergone drastic shifts in political regimes, from Portuguese colonial power through one party rule and a centrally planned economy, civil conflict and massive rural displacement to the currently pluralistic, market led approach to development. Mozambicans who have lived an average lifespan have experienced major changes in their citizenship, from pre-independence classification as colonial, assimilated or indigenous to post independence legal equality, with more recent rights to express their opinions through voting. Economic models framing national policy have also changed fundamentally (Johnson, 2005).

77.   The Mozambican born people have also experienced a radical change in their opportunities from engaging in organised forms of civil society activity. Pre independence civil society organisations were predominantly sports and cultural associations, not so much because people were politically unaware or indifferent to the political conditions of Mozambique but simply because of the hard dictatorship imposed by the Portuguese colonial regime.

78.   Until a few years before the introduction of the 1990 Constitution, the only civil society organizations allowed in Mozambique were those established by the ruling party and its Government, the so-called Mass Democratic Organizations[13]. The most prominent organization was the so-called Grupos Dinamizadores (GDs – dynamising groups), created soon after independence with the intention of mobilising the population to support the policies of the new Government. In many cases the GDs acted as popular tribunals and public administrative organs.

79.   According to Matsinhe, AMODEFA (Associação Moçambicana para a Defesa da Família), created in 1989, was one of the first NGOs established in Mozambique in consequence of the institutional reforms the Bretton Woods and other international agencies (e.g. OMS, UNFPA, UNDP, etc.) required, as a precondition for providing help in the emergency Mozambique was facing (hunger, drought, floods, political refugees and war conflict).[14]

80.   To the knowledge of the authors of this work, the most comprehensive and perhaps so far only national representative census of the non-profit organizations in Mozambique is the one conducted by INE in 2004/05 (INE, 2006a). This is probably the best data source to draw a national view on the present situation of Mozambican civil society, for the organizations considered in the census are exactly the ones that comprise the so-called civil society and its organizations.

81.   According to INE (2006) there are almost 5,000 non-profit organizations working in Mozambique today. About 92% of these are associations formed in the countryside by small-

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[12] Average life expectancy 46 years (National Institute of Statistics)

[13] OMM (Organização da Mulher Moçambicana), OJM (Organização da Juventude Moçambicana), the Children's organization (Organização dos Continuadores da Revolução), OTM (trade union organization).

[14] For further reading on the genesis of NGOs in Mozambique in the 1990s see Matsinhe (2005: 22-78).

scale farmers, cattle herds-men, artisans, fishermen and other groups to improve their communities and livelihoods (see Figure 3.2). The remaining 8% comprise national NGOs (3%), foreign NGOs (4%) and about 1% of no specified organizations.

82.   Among many other relevant features, from INE's census of Mozambican CSOs the following deserves to be mentioned:

83.   The association movement is growing steadily and an overwhelming majority of them emerged after 1990, when the new constitution introduced freedom of association.

84.   The existing associations are predominantly local. As Figure 3.3 shows, over 75% of all non-profit organizations function at the local or district level.

85.   The territorial distribution of the CSOs is very heterogeneous. About 70% of the CSOs are concentrated in five provinces, namely: Nampula, Gaza, Maputo province and city, and Inhambane.

86.   The majority of the NGOs in Mozambique are of religious type (52%), while 25% focus explicitly on political issues.

87.   In the next three pages a reworked mapping of the key actors as prepared for the first delivery of this study is presented. The mapping has been expanded with the objective to place the CSOs actively participating in the PO in Mozambique in a broader context of the much more complex and growing diversity in the public domain in Mozambique, particularly the State and Government institutions, but also the relevant bilateral and multilateral international organizations, and civil society.

88.   The three tables do not claim to be exhaustive and cover all the countless organizations that are emerging in Mozambique. Instead, they are aiming to highlight the key types of organizations from the main stakeholders engaged in the development process of Mozambique.

Figure 3.2: Non-profit Organizations by Type of Organization, Mozambique 2003 (in %)

INE, 2006

Figure 3.3: Non-profit Organizations by Geographical Coverage, Mozambique 2003 (in %)

INE, 2006

89.   Table 3.1 covers only public entities which are directly relevant and very influential in the development process, including organs of sovereign authority, ministries and national directorates, public funds, State media and institutes as well as provincial and district public actors. Table 3.2 refers to bilateral and multilateral donors, regional and intergovernmental organizations and international NGOs, highlighting in particular the international cooperation partners that comprised the so-called G18 set up for the budget support.

Table 3.3 maps the key civil society actors in Mozambique, starting from those directly associated with the so-called G-20 and the process of monitoring the PARPA, and then extending to a wide range of organizations in diverse areas: sports, arts, political parties, independent mass media and academic and research organizations. In this context, a category seldom taken into consideration when speaking about CSOs corresponds to the so-called informal civil society organizations, which actually comprise the bulk of the current and especially the promising new CSOs in the future.

TABLE 3.1: MAPPING KEY ACTORS IN THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT, MOZAMBIQUE

1 — STATE, GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

1.1 ORGANS OF SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC	ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC	COUNCIL OF MINISTERS	ADMINSITRATIVE COURT	CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL	COURTS				6

1.2 MINISTRIES & NATIONAL DIRECTORATES

DNP	DO	DPM	MAE	MCT	DDS	MINAG	MISAU	MJD	9
DMEAP	DPC	MAAC	MCAA	ME	DPAC	MINED	MJ	MOPH	9
MPD	DNPDR	MTC	MT	MMAS	PRM	PIC	INGC	MDN	9
MP	MICOA	MI	MRM	MMEC	SISE	BM	INGC	MOPH	9

1.3 PUBLIC FUNDS MEDIA & INSTITUTES

PROAGRI	SETSAN	UTRAFE	DPPF	FIL	CPI	BM	NAO	GOVNET	9
GEST	SISTAFE	UTRESP	FCP	EDM	INSS	IPEX	TDM	AHM	9
INE	INIA	UEM	LURIO UNY.	J. NOTICIAS	TVM	GOV WEB	CHRAJ	RM	9
RPOAUDE	ISRI	UP	INCM	J. DOMINGO	AIM				6

1.4 PROVINCIAL PUBLIC ACTORS

PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR	GOVERNOR CABINET	PERMANENT SECRETARY	PROVINCIAL DIRECTORS	DEPUTY PROV. DIRECTOR	PROVIN. POLICE				6
PPDF	DISTRICT ADMINISTRACTORS	FUTUR	FFA	CPE	CCCPs				6
DPPF	FFPI	FFHA	FARE	CARE-PCRs					5

1.5 DISTRICT ACTORS

DISTRICT COUNCILS	HEAD OF ADMINIST. POST								2

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(1) Meaning of the acronyms is detailed in the annex

(2) There may be some public organizations not mentioned here that might have been active the PARPA processes.

(3) IGOs – International Government Organizations

TABLE 3.2: MAPPING KEY ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGENCIES, MOZAMBIQUE

2 DONORS & OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGs											
2.1	**G18**	ADB	CANADA	EIU	FRANCE	IRELAND	NETHERLAND	PORTUGAL	SWEDEN	UK	9
		BELGIUM	DENMARK	FINLAND	GERMANY	ITALY	NORWAY	SPAIN	SWITZERLAND	WB	9
2.2	**BILATERAL & MULTILATERAL**	USAID	OECD	UNICEF	UNIDO	UNDP	DFID	UNESCO	UNFPA	UNHCR	9
		IMF	WHO	FAO	OTI	SDC	SDC	GTZ	WFP	WHO	9
		IFAD	OCHA	UNDESA	UNIDO	UNIFEM	UN-Habitat	WTO	UNWTO	UNV	9
2.3	**NGOs & FOUNDATIONS**	ADA	HELVETAS	AGA KAN FOUND.	ACTION AID	SAVE THE CHILDREN	GREENPEACE	DED	AFRICAN AFFAIRS	HALO TRUST	9
		AFVP	ADECOMA	APDF	CU	LSN	DAI	FES	HAI	OXFAM	9
2.4	**REGIONAL & INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**	SADC	AECI	RED CROSS	PRICE WATERHOUS. COOPERS	NORAD	SCOTT WILSON MOZ LDA.	APNET	WORLD VISION	ISCOS	9
		NEPAD	EISA	SNV	MSJ	IFC	AFRICAN GENDER INSTITUTE	KPMG	IUCN	MISA	9

81

(1) Meaning of the acronyms is detailed in the annex

(2) There may be some public organizations not mentioned here that might have been active the PARPA processes.

(3) IGOs – International Government Organizations

TABLE 3.3: MAPPING KEY ACTORS IN CIVIL SOCIETY, MOZAMBIQUE

3 — CIVIL SOCIETY

G-20 & FORUNS

Section													#
3.1 NETWORK & SPECIALIZED NGOs	KULIMA	GMD	ASA	FM	FT	TEIA	SOCREMO	LEMO	FOG-Pemba	RC			10
	LINK-FORÚM	FDC	ORAM	ABIODES	RENSIDA	ARAM	PROGRESS	MULEIDE	FOG-Quelimane	VIDA			10
3.2 RELIGIOUS	CISLAMO	CCM	CEM	MIM	CCT	FCF	AMICUMO	NCDS	KINDLIMUKA	ACIANA			10
3.3 TRADE NIONS	CONSILMO	UNAC	OTM-CS	ROSA	GTA	FECIV	ARO-JUVENIL	MONASO	OKHALIHANA				9
3.4 PRIVATE	AIM	CTA	ACM	AMB	FEMA	MSF	FOPROSA	UCB	AMODEFA				9

FORMAL & INFORMAL ACTORS

Section													#
3.5 SPORTS CLUBES & CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS	CFVM	GDM	CFB AAM	SQB	GDCTP	CFN	GDEVM	SMBM	TEXTAFRICA				9
	MATCHEDGE	CDCS	CT	PÚNGUE	FCL	LMM	MAXAQUENE	SNC	CHINGALE				9
	ACM	Hoquei	AAM	CFB	APBS	AMF			LMF (MUTOLA)				7
3.6 POLITICAL PARTIES & ODMs	FRELIMO	PDD	FL	MNM	PUN	PPM	PARENA	MSBP	PSLD	OMM	ONJ		11
	RENAMO	PIMO	AIM	PCN	FAP	FUMO	PLDM	NRP	PCM	OJM	ONP		11
3.7 MASS MEDIA	SAVANA	FIM DE SEMANA	ZAMBEZE CANAL M.	TEMPO	O PAÍS	DSTV	MAGAZINE	MEDIA FAX	MIRAMAR	TVCABO	STV		11
3.8 ACADEMIC, CONSULT & RESEARCH	ICTEM	ISPU	CEA	ACIMO	AMECON	IFBM	AUSTRAL	KULA	IFMA				9
	E&Y	KPMG	UCM	CEP	IESE	ETICA	AMECON	KEPA	I. J. NEGRÃO				9
	CONSULTEC	AFRISURVEY	GERSTER CONS.	BIP	IMPACTO	MABUKO	RURAL CONSULT	EUROSIS	CENTRO TERRA VIVA	VERDE AZUL			10
3.9 INTERNET	TROPICAL	STOP	ZAMBEZIA	NOTMOC	CCMUSA	VERTICAL	IMENSIS	TELEDATA					8
3.10 SOCIAL CULTURAL REGIOUS & ECONOMIC INFORMAL INTER-HELP	ARMV	CNCS	N. GENERO	LDH	AADOM	EJC	ACOMAU	AJAM	AMOREPESO	FAMOD	UGC		11
	ACRIDEC	AMODIA	DHM	APOJ	FM	AAIM	AVIDRAMO	ADEMIMO	AJODEMO				9
	AMAJOR	ARCAP	AZADER	ARE	AMRU	ADCR	AJOVAM	PASCO	ASHUDEC	AVIMAS	MIM		11
	AJUDECO-INHAMBANE	AAGILE	COMUTRA	CEM	FECIV	ORAM	ACORD	BCI-F	NOVO BANCO	ATROMAP	CMA		11
	AEPRIMO	ANAILE	ACIANA	GAPI	GPN	BIM	ADELNA	OLIPA	OPAVELA	ASSOTSI	CCM		11
	XITIQUE/	ODYANA	KURHIMELA	TSIMA	AMOGED	ASSOMUDE	KUTHEKELA	XIVUNGA	KUVEKELISSA	OVALIHA			10
	STIQUI	OSSOKEIA	KURHIMELISSA	ACTIVA	AMODE	CADECOS	YAKUHALANA	KUGARISSICA	GANHO-GANHO	CODEZA	MALE		11

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(1) Meaning of the acronyms is detailed in the annex

(2) There may be some public organizations not mentioned here that might have been active the PARPA processes.

4. The Poverty Observatory (PO) in Mozambique

90.   The following section contains a description of the PO in the official discourse, including its objectives, composition and structure, organization chart and main financial supporter. This description is followed by the main messages drawn from the interviews, among them some with MPD's staff, including two who have in the past organized the POs.

4.1 The PO as it is portrayed officially

| Box 3.1: Poverty Observatory in Mozambique, 2003-2007 |
|---|
| **A MECHANISM FOR EVALUATING AND MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTAION OF PARPA** |
| As part of the effort to evaluate and monitor the implementation of its current programme on poverty reduction popularly known as PARPA, the Government decided to set up the Poverty Observatory (PO). The PO is seen as a tool for both Government and its partners to follow-up the implementation of the PARPA, monitoring, evaluation and consultation processes envisaged within all actions intended for poverty reduction. |
| In this respect the PO is a consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and action that have been specifically assigned to public and private sector within the context of PARPA. As a consultative body, PO is expected to support the Government and its partners in the supervision and coordination, and draw on the combined energies of all stakeholders. |
| On the 28 April 2003 the Government of Mozambique formally launched the forum of the Poverty Observatory and opened its first meeting. The meeting was opened by President Joachim Chissano. In his opening statement he spoke of the objectives of the PO as a forum for consultation between Government and development partners, internal and external. He spoke of the permanent status of the PO as a mechanism for interaction to address the problem of poverty. His address stressed the need to reduce poverty through socio-economic development as indicated in the programme of the Government, PARPA. |
| The first session of PO chaired by the Minister of Planning and Finance, was attended by most Ministers as well as representatives from all ministries. The Governor of the Central Bank, Provincial Governors, the private sector and representatives of the civil society were also present. The meeting also hosted 20 donors including 17 bilaterals, the World Bank, the IMF and UNDP. |
| Most delegates recognized the Government's continued commitment to poverty eradication, to the implementation of economic reforms and the PARPA. Delegates agreed that the key challenge confronting Mozambique was that of poverty and need for the poor to benefit from the growth and expansion in the economy. Thus, the implementation of PARPA was seen as a key strategy for sustaining poverty reducing growth. |
| At the meeting, the Government presented the structure of the PO and its role as well as that of the required technical support from DNPO. |
| **Objectives of the Poverty Observatory** |
| Broadly speaking, the PO is intended to provide guidance to Government and to ensure transparent interaction between Government and partners involved in the fight against poverty. |
| It is intended to have a permanent feature and to ensure that adequate data and information pertaining to the fight against poverty are effectively disseminated. |
| The main objective is to monitor and evaluate the performance in the implementation of PARPA by collection of data on progress achieved and analyzing the data to better orient required action, conducting studies, research, meetings, seminars and establishing data banks, documenting experiences of best practices as well as publications. The PO will be expected to make suggestions to Government in order to promote the greatest impact of the implementation of the PARPA. |
| **Composition of the Poverty Observatory** |
| The PO is made up of two groupings: An ad hoc advisory group known as the Opinion Council and a permanent body known as the Technical Secretariat. |
| The Opinion Council is made up of 60 members representing the central bodies of the State, civil society organizations, and from international development partners. More specifically, the breakdown is as follows, out of the 60 members, 24 are from selected Government bodies and ministries, such as Planning and Finance, Health, Education, Agriculture, State Administration, Justice, the Central Bank, and the National Institute of Statistics, and the DNPO with its special position in the Technical Secretariat of the Poverty Observatory. |
| The remaining 36 members are from civil society organizations, academic community, as well as religious organizations, trade unions, private business community, and international development partners. |
| As part of the institutional responsibilities of the Ministry of Planning and Finance under the coordination of the preparation of the PARPA and other economic and inter-sectoral instruments, MPF will support the workings of the PO through a Technical Secretariat which is to establish within the DNPO. |
| **Technical Secretariat** |

The Secretariat activities will be carried out by the DNPO which will ensure that it caters for all logistical needs of the PO. Other assignments include:

- Coordination of the work undertaken by relevant ministries in the implementation of the medium and short term planning instruments and support data and information collection and their analysis to ensure the smooth functioning of the PO;
- Collaborate with Government and non-governmental members in their support for PARPA.
- Propose research and studies on poverty and social development relevant to the work of the PO.
- Collect and disseminate examples of good practices in the fight against poverty.

PO Organization Chart

POVERTY OBSERVATORY IN MOZAMBIQUE

ORGANIGRAM IN 2003-2007

MOZAMBICAN GOVERNMENT

POVERTY OBSERVATORY

OPINION COUNCIL

GOVENMENT ENTITIES (MINISTRIES, NATIONAL DIRECT. & OTHER)

CSOs

COOPERATION PARTNERS

TECNHICAL SECRETARIAT (DNPO)

MPD, 2006

UNDP, through a project titled "Support to PARPA's Monitoring and Evaluation System" will assist the Secretariat of the PO in the following activities:

- Capacity building of technical secretariat of the Poverty Observatory (OP) for poverty monitoring and MDGs performance tracking.
- establishment/strengthening of poverty monitoring information systems at provincial level;
- Poverty related strategic and impact evaluation studies.
- Nationwide sensitization and dissemination of PARPA and MDGs.
- revision and updating of PARPA with a focus on mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues (HIV/AIDS, Gender, ICT, demining and disaster prevention and management) in the PARPA and integration of the MDGs.

Sources: MPD, 2007; OP, 2007; SARPN, 2006 http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000372/index.php.

4.2 Institutional Assessment of the PO Concept: Confronting Expectations

91.   Since the launch of the first PO in April 2003, so far five more plenary session of the PO were held at the national level. At the provincial level, the Provincial Poverty Observatories (PPOs) have started to be organized in 2005; several provinces have already held three PPOs

(e.g. in Nampula), [15] while most of them organized at least one or two provincial plenary sessions.

92.   The analysis of secondary information and testimonials about past POs, both at the national level and in two provincial capitals (Beira and Nampula), reveal that POs have been set up and undertaken as an ad hoc consultative forum for Government, international cooperation agencies and civil society to fight poverty by means of participatory monitoring and evaluation of the PARPA.

93.   It needs to be mentioned that the PO emerged following more than a decade of steady evolution of Mozambican's civil society, after the introduction of freedom of association and expression on the basis of the 1990 Constitution. Informing the citizens of their responsibilities, rights and opportunities, as those associated with the aid provided by the international community, is undoubtedly an important first step towards citizen participation and empowerment.

94.   Both informing and consultation are important steps to strengthening public awareness, generating knowledge and improving citizen participation in monitoring public goods, such as the PARPA. However, the most effective and efficient tools for both informing and consultation are the mass media, opinion polls, public debates and hearings, seminars, workshops, conferences, and a variety of advocacy means. Forums like the POs, which are held once a year during a plenary session of one day, cannot really serve this purpose.

95.   In spite of this, several interviewees take for granted that it is good enough that the PO has been set up as a mere consultative instrument. Some seem to fear that allowing to move beyond consultation could lead to confusion of responsibilities between decision makers and decision takers or implementing actors.

96.   In turn, other analysts by pointing to the dangers of exclusion and alienation of citizens from their rights and responsibilities argue that M&E mechanisms can only be worthwhile if consultation processes are complemented by effective and efficient channels for feedback, mutual accountability and power negotiations.

97.   The summary of the interviews presented in the second delivery contain many and in some cases contradictory positions as to the concept, role and goal of an instrument such as the PO. While some see the PO as a typical example of a window-dressing ritual in the tokenism perspective pointed out by Arnstein, others defend it as an opportunity for increasing sharing and redistribution of power through negotiation among the main stakeholders.

98.   Regardless of the variety of expectations and points of views regarding the PO some features are generally acknowledged as facts. By facts in this case one can refer to any feature that is well documented and confirmed, such as the following: 1) In the past, POs met once a year, which is hardly adequate for meaningful policy inputs if no effective and efficient channels for more regular monitoring, feedback and implementation complement the yearly plenary sessions of the PO; 2) The outputs from the POs are blurry and not binding for the stakeholders, if for no other reason than that the PO itself is not perceived by Government and its international partners as a social accountability mechanism.

99.   Based on the divergent and common views about the PO, the consultants found serious quality problems in terms of its efficiency, efficacy and aspects associated with the value for money.

100.   There are some variations in quality, not only in Maputo but in the two provincial capitals visited as well. According to some participants, earlier POs held in Maputo - particularly the one of 2004 - reached a relatively good standard, in part because the CSOs were committed and with high expectations that this instrument could be used to contributing with critical and realistic analyses relevant for poverty reduction in Mozambique. In 2004 the G20 presented its Annual Report on Poverty, the so-called RAP 2004, which became the landmark of Mozambican civil

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[15] In Nampula instead of "poverty observatory" the people in charge for organizing the POs decided to call it a "development observatory".

society. Later POs, including the draft of the 2006 RAP presented at the sixth PO of 26th March 2007, have not kept or improved the standards achieved in 2004.

101.   In turn, the interviewees who attended past provincial POs in Beira and in Nampula recalled that the initial POs were very superficial and mere formality. They consisted mainly of public speeches which added no value to the understanding of the poverty situation in their respective provinces and the country in general.

102.   At the third PO in Nampula, however, the material provided by the UCODIN showed good progress and emphasized the need for additional work and a more effective and efficient M&E. Yet, an odd feature found by the consultants was that by March 2007, the synthesis of the PO of August 2006 was still in the form of a preliminary draft and not for quoting or public use. Another weakness was the fact that past POs never paid any attention to the Development Strategy for 2003-2007 in Nampula.

103.   Thus, the consultants are led to the conclusion that, with the exception of very isolated cases, most POs held so far, at national and provincial levels, were of relatively weak quality in all relevant aspects: the agenda content, the substance of the issues tackled, the results of the debate, and their implications for future outcomes.

104.   This inference is particularly supported by the description of the preparation of the sixth and latest national PO in March 2007[16]. The description is self-evident and provides enough details for readers to draw their own conclusions about the standards and quality of the latest PO. But obviously, as pointed out above in reference to the type of expectations people have about citizen participation in general and the PO in particular, the conclusions may vary significantly notwithstanding the facts.

105.   This can be better illustrated by the following table that summarizes three possible assessments, consistent with the three main attitudes made explicit in Box 2.1. As Table 4.1 shows, those who hold very low expectations about the societal role of CSOs tend to take their ignorance, prejudices or informal fallacies uncritically and for granted. This explains the sort of remarks stemming from the first pattern of thought, drawn either literally from the interviews or from the secondary information.

106.   The second set of observations on the PO originates from a pattern of though that interprets evidence in the light of one's wishful thinking (what one would like the PO to be), rather than according to what it actually is.

107.   The third set of observations on the PO corresponds to a higher level of expectations. It is founded on both a critical assessment of what the PO has become in practice, and the wish to keep the standard high, using criteria such as efficacy, efficiency, good performance and value for money.

Table 4.1:. Assessing the PO in Mozambique According to Three Main Expectations	
1. Ignorance, prejudice and informal fallacy	**3. Critical Thinking and Professionalism**
• The PO in Mozambique can be seen as a step forward and a good achievement for CSOs, because before that CS was not listened to and taken into consideration. • CS is too weak and in its infancy. It does not deserve to be treated as an adult and an equal partner, because CS cannot pretend to have the power the Government and donors have.	• The PO started as demand from international cooperation agencies, aiming at holding Governments accountable in ways that have consequences for their stay in power. • Donors acknowledged that past structural adjustment policies failed because of a lack of Government commitment, or "ownership".

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[16] A detailed description has been provided in the second delivery of this consultancy, in section 5 entitled "Preparation of a PO. The case of the 6º PO in March 2007". The evidence gathered in that part of the report was possible thanks to a fortunate coincidence. While the interviewing process for this study was in progress, by mid-February the MPD decided to schedule the sixth PO for March 2007. This provided a very good opportunity for a close follow up, almost step by step, of the process leading to the sixth PO.

- Government and donors can be partners because they are true power-holders in Mozambique. On the contrary, CS is too poor, dispersed, weak, ignorant and powerless. This is the reason why neither the Government nor donors respect Mozambican citizen and CS in general. Some may feel pity for us, but others simply treat citizens as "nobodies".

- CS should be happy because now the Government is listening to it and at least allows people to complain and point out the things that are not very good.

2. Wishful thinking

- The PO is an outstanding and original concept for citizen involvement, empowerment and inclusion in participatory planning.

- The PO is a true mechanism, unique and original for a country like Mozambique

- It is a very useful forum for beneficiary and stakeholders feedback

- It is a participatory process for it involves all stakeholders

- Good mechanism for broad-based inputs into policy making and the development planning process

- There is a good level of understanding of the PO concept at central level

- Government holds the initiative and power but it is open for wider public participation

- Allows for CSOs' active participation

- Through the PO, Government gets a good feeling of the pulse at the grass-root levels on PARPA and development generally.

- Participation by CS is expected to broaden national ownership beyond the level of the Government, but that depends more on the national institutions than on the conditionalities set by donors.

- Bringing pro-poor issues to the programmes and try to put the CS to "follow the money" and monitor a sustained and effective implementation of PRSP is a goal that is far from being achieved.

- The main problem with the PO in Mozambique is its very naïve and too restrictive concept, as far as citizen participation is concerned. As it is now, the PO is a purely consultation instrument with no power for negotiation.

- The PO is often presented as an opportunity for sharing information and dialogue, which in itself is seen to be good enough.

- However, since the information is often provided at a late stage in planning, and with no intentions to contribute for instance to the debates in Parliament, citizens have little opportunity to influence the programmes designed allegedly on their behalf or "for their benefit".

- The PO has been more an event, a big event, with no linking mechanisms with the legal power and articulation with the relevant planning stages associated with the PES (socioeconomic planning) and the Budget.

- The success of the forum is measured by how many people come to the meetings, take brochures home, or intervene during the open debate.

- Power-holders make no commitments to act upon the suggestions and requests made in the debate.

- There have been increasing reports of fatigue and dissatisfaction for the extent of time people spend virtually for nothing.

- The understanding of the PO concept varies, depending on the underlying expectations; an increasing number of CS activists seem disappointed and discouraged with the PO.

- The present concept of the PO allows for no significant social reform, to say nothing about sharing in the benefits of the affluent society.

- Allows for CSO to "participate in participation"

- There are serious doubts as to the extent the CSOs currently involved in the PO represent a significant and wide spectrum of CS's diversity of interests and priorities.

108. In the following paragraphs the questions related to "institutional assessment and process mapping" as outlined in the ToR are dealt with in detail. The answers are based on the information collected during phases 1 and 2 of this study.

a) What is the legal, institutional, and organizational framework of POs (*de juri* and *de facto*)?

109. The POs have no explicit legal basis. In practice, the Government and its international cooperation partners see the PO as a forum for consultation, exchange of ideas and public dialogue, and thus a way to legitimize the policies they formulate and implement. More specifically, the PO is a consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and actions that have been assigned to the public and private sector within the context of PARPA. As a consultative body, the PO is expected to support the Government and its partners in the supervision and coordination, and draw on the combined energies of all stakeholders.

110. The PO turned into a Government instrument for inviting citizens' opinions, whenever found useful. The Government makes no commitment, or offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken into consideration. Thus, the PO is a purely consultative forum, which is articulated neither with any relevant sovereign organ (e.g. Parliament), nor with the actual planning process of the Annual Economic and Social Plan (PES) or the State Budget.

111. The organizational framework of the POs is consistent with their core concept, as a consultation forum set up for promoting dialogue among main actors, involved in the process of

elaboration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of PARPA and other public planning instruments. Thus, by principle the very PO concept entails no mechanism to insure that citizen's views will be heeded by the Government officials or any other person in charge of the specific issues tackled during the POs.

b) How the process of formulating and monitoring the implementation of PARPA takes place (in theory and in practice)?

112.   In theory, the text of PARPA I (2001-2005) states that the guiding principle of the strategy for consultations and the dissemination of public information reflects the belief that the development planning instruments (including the PARPA) should be based on a participatory process involving representatives of the Government, the private sector, trade union confederations, civil society in general, as well as funding agencies (including donors). Collective participation at the stage of diagnosis, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation may result in greater co-operation, transparency and effective partnerships in the implementation of measures (GoM, 2001: 201).

113.   The PARPA section on the "Consultation mechanisms" in the final phase of PARPA preparation (2001-2005) describes the main characteristic of the consultation and dissemination strategy as "unity of the process". "This means that the gathering of views … should serve as a source of information for developing the respective plans and economic management instruments (Government programme, strategic plans, sectoral and territorial programmes, the PARPA, CFMP, PTIP, PES, OE)" (GoM, 2001: 103). The text continues: "Other opinion gathering tools (e.g. direct consultations, participatory evaluations) constitute important auxiliary means for the planning and programming process" (GoM, 2001: 103).

114.   In practice, a major difference between the preparation of PARPA I (2002-2005) and PARPA II (2006-2009) was that in the latter the Government had the possibility to use the PO to publicly legitimize the new document, while in the former it had to undertake meetings with many different national stakeholders. In principle, the possibility to use an instrument like the PO facilitates the process of consultation, but in the end if the PO is an informal and not very operative mechanism there is the danger that both the Government and those who regularly participate in the PO take a rather simplistic view in assuming that all sides of civil society have been considered.

115.   By reviewing PARPA II it is apparent that the Government has not accepted the proposal, made during the preliminary critical reflection on lessons to be learnt from PARPA I, which was organized by the Ministry in charge to lead the preparation of PARPA II. A very explicit proposal was put forward on the grounds that PARPA II could become more effective and efficient if it was transformed into an instrument for public-private partnership between the Government and other – particularly national – actors, since foreigners are the only ones treated as partners by the Government (Francisco, 2005).

116.   Like in the case of PARPA I the Government continues regarding PARPA II as its own instrument. It accepts to share it and expose it to public debate, in forums such as the PO, but in the end it holds the right to decide whether or not to take into consideration suggestions and recommendations from civil society stakeholders.

117.   Although issues such as the share of the PARPA priority sectors in Government expenditure may be discussed in the PO, the opportunity for substantive dialogue is limited by the fact that the PO meets only once a year, for one day (G-20, 2004; Hodges and Tibana, 2005), and no conditions are created for the plenary sessions to end for instance with a public declaration or a public commitment in relation to future priorities, tasks and issues.

118.   Without pretending to expand much further on this question, in addition to what has been said, Table 4.2 puts in parallel some quotations drawn from two relevant sources. One is the document of PARPA I, which summarizes the process of formulating and monitoring the implementation of PARPA; the other one is an independent assessment of the political economy of the budget in Mozambique and its relation to the PARPA.

Table 4.2: Process of Formulating and Monitoring the Implementation of PARPA	
In Theory	**In Practice**

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119. **Principles and mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation (from PARPA I #s 310-314)**

310. The process of elaborating a strategy:
The first draft of the monitoring and evaluation strategy was finished and subjected to a process of consultation with various sectors of Government, donors, and representatives of civil society in July and August of 2000. In this strategy, a distinction was made between monitoring and evaluation given the different timeframes, objectives, and instruments used.

311. Fundamental principles
The PARPA's monitoring and evaluation strategy rests on three fundamental principles:
- Integration of PARPA monitoring into the existing mechanisms for monitoring Government programmes;
- Differentiation between process and impact indicators …
- Use of the monitoring of the PARPA as a mechanism for continual revision of targets and plans, while retaining the key strategic objectives.

312. Objectives
- Monitoring aims to fulfil the following principal functions:
  o To allow the progress of poverty reduction programmes to be followed …
  o To periodically assess changes in the welfare of the population, and … possible impact of public policies…
  o To develop mechanisms to ensure the effective flow of information, as and when required, to all stakeholders…

312.2 Evaluation seeks essentially:
- To measure the extent of changes in poverty levels (and other basic indicators) in various sub-groups … and external factors;
- To evaluate the effectiveness of the commitment of the Government and other participating institutions, in the fight against poverty.

313. Mechanisms and instruments
- Integrating the PARPA monitoring into mechanisms for existing Government programmes avoids the duplication or multiplication of reports, and will not overburden the relevant institutions involved … it will ensure that the PARPA is fully integrated into the overall programme of the Government and the various sectors involved … PARPA will be reflected in the Economic and Social Plan (PES) …
- Execution Reports, produced quarterly by the National Directorate of Public Accounting of the MPF … to track the financial execution …in accordance … of budgetary indicators.
- Besides the traditional monitoring mechanisms, through quantitative data produced by INE …it is expected that use will be made of more qualitative and participatory methods … Participatory Poverty Assessments and Rural Participatory Diagnoses are planned …
- Therefore, the monitoring of the PARPA is organized around three processes: (1) the monitoring of sectoral results, process indicators, and programmed activities in accordance with the approved operational matrix; (2) monitoring of budgetary execution to track the allocation of resources to priority sectors; and (3) the monitoring of impact and welfare of households and communities through national statistical surveys and participatory qualitative evaluations.

</td><td>

Political Economy of the Budget in Mozambique
Hodges and Tibana (2005) & Renzio and Sulemane (2007)

- … The PARPA, which was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2001 and covers the five-year period from 2001 to 2005, is a much more fully developed planning document (than the Government Programme), with the main elements of a logframe and a medium term budget framework. However, although copies of the PARPA were made available to parliamentarians (and deputies received a special PowerPoint presentation on the plan), PARPA was not formally debated and approved by parliament (Hodges and Tibana, 2005)

- …. Nonetheless, the fact that the PARPA was not endorsed by parliament does mean that it has less legitimacy than the *Programa do Governo*. Furthermore, at times some government officials do at times refer disparagingly to the PARPA (out of earshot of donors) as a donor driven document, adopted only to obtain access to debt relief. As a consequence, the PARPA does not have a legally defined relationship with the annual PES, which may explain, in part at least, why there has been no real concern within government about the latter's lack of a logical framework and why little progress has been made towards revising the methodology of the PES [MPF, 1998] in order to turn it explicitly into the annual instrument for operationalization of the PARPA (Hodges & Tibana, 2005)

… The linkages between …[planning and budget] various instruments … are largely theoretical. Contrary to the diagram, the content of the Government's annual operational plan, the PES, is not explicitly derived from the PARPA and the strategic sectoral and territorial plans. Although the PARPA and some of the strategic plans, to a greater or lesser extent, have the necessary elements of a programmatic logframe approach, this is not yet the case for the PES, which still consists essentially of a long list of activities and outputs without a coherent programmatic framework. The preparation of the PES is based on a methodology developed in 1998, prior to the adoption of the PARPA and most of the sector strategic plans [MPF 1998]. As a result, the PES has not yet really become an effective instrument for the annual operationalization and monitoring of the PARPA, contrary to the declared intentions in the PARPA document itself that the PES and its balanço should perform this role (Hodges & Tibana, 05)

MPF has started to take some initial steps to correct these weaknesses, notably by improving the structure and content of the Balanço do PES for 2003 to report on PARPA implementation and by making a commitment with the general budget support donors, in April 2004, to prepare a matrix of priority targets, known as the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) … (Hodges and Tibana, 2005).

… the existence of a 'double fragmentation' problem (poor integration between sectors and central agencies, and between planning and budgeting institutions and mechanisms) is generating ownership problems in sector ministries and a lack of results-orientation (Renzio and Sulemane, 2007: 3).

</td></tr>
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c) What are the linkages, gaps, and tensions between POs at national, provincial and district levels?

120.   Due to constrains of time and other resources the consultants only visited two provincial capitals, Beira and Nampula, and thus are not in the position to make generalizations as to the linkages, gaps and tensions between POs at the national, provincial and district levels. However, based on the information gathered the following findings (see table 4.3) can be highlighted.

Table 4.3: Linkages, Gaps and Tensions between POs at National, Provincial and District Levels

National Poverty Observatories (NPOs)	Provincial Poverty Observatories (PPOs)
• National plenary POs started in April 2003, and ever since became an annual event which gathers representatives from Government ministries at the highest level, private sector, civil society, donors and other international cooperation agencies. • The synthesis of the 2003 NPO indicates that POs should be held annually to allow the impact assessment of implemented programmes. With regard to the POs' territorial comprehensiveness, the 2003 synthesis admitted the possibility to extend the initiative to the provincial level, but advanced nothing else on that. • In the 2003 synthesis the international partners already suggested that the PO should be extended to provincial and district levels, just as they should include political parties. On this the Government responded that these suggestions would be analyzed later on because this type of broader representativeness raised some challenges due to the wide diversity of CSOs. • According to the synthesis of the 2004 PO, the G20 argued that priority should be given to the setting up of consultation councils at the provincial and district level, both in rural and urban areas. Such councils should include representatives from main interest groups, including political parties. Likewise, the international cooperation partners praised the frank and open dialogue provided by the PO and insisted that the PO initiative should be replicated at the provincial, district and municipal levels. • The synthesis of the third PO (2005) recommended that PARPA II should be elaborated following the "bottom-up" logic, rather than the usual "top-down" logic. "The planning process should start from the district". However, in practice the evidence shows that little has been done to implement this recommendation. • The synthesis of the sixth PO in 2007 makes no reference to the PPOs at all. A few representatives from some provinces attended the plenary session of the sixth PO, but the process of selection and invitations follows no systematic and justified criteria.	• Since 2005 provincial governors started to promote their own annual provincial POs (PPOs). In 2005 the MPD distributed a document with some guidelines for the preparation of PPOs. • This document defines the PPO as follows: *The PPO is a consultation and participatory forum between the Government and its intervening partners in the PARPA's monitoring and evaluation.* • In Nampula the actors decided to name the PO "Development Observatory" (DO), rather than „Poverty Observatory", for they regard the former name more positive and inspiring than the latter. • At the 2006 DO in Nampula only the national G20 sent a representative from Maputo, Mr. Paulo Cuinica, the G20 secretary. • As reported in the second delivery, the linkages between national and provincial staff members directly involved in the POs are rather sporadic and weak. The same happens among the CSOs themselves. • Surprisingly the consultants noticed that the Development Observatories in Nampula have given significant attention to the national PARPA and so far totally ignored the very Strategic Development Plan for Nampula, set for 2003-2007. The Government officials acknowledged this failure and stated that they plan to update the provincial strategic plan referred to. • In Beira, the difficulties and gaps between national and provincial level are similar to those found in Nampula. However, the interviewees met and the documents gathered put a stronger emphasis on the legal institutionalization of PPOs. • The leading NGO in Beira, FOPROSA, commissioned a study aiming at identifying alternatives to the informal setting of POs comparable to the legal set up for participation at the districts (Chizinane, 2007).

National and Provincial POs versus the Legal Setting for Participation at the District Level

• In 2003 the Government of Mozambique approved the Law for Local State Bodies (nº 8/2003) known as LOLE *(Lei dos Órgãos Locais do Estado*), and in April 2005 its regulations were approved. The LOLE defines the role, responsibilities and status of provincial and district Governments as "de-concentrated units" of the central state. The LOLE legally formalises the district consultation and the way civil society representatives should be taken into account by the local public authorities. Nine principles regulate the community participation at the district consulting councils: a) Participation; b) Representativeness; c) Diversity; d) Independence; e) Ability; f) Transparency; g) Accountability; h) Inclusiveness and i) Articulation.

• The LOLE reflects a shift towards a more territorial governance and accountability structure, with the inclusion of a permanent secretariat at the district and provincial level and an indication that more horizontal planning and coordination will be required. The objective of the LOLE is to move the public administration closer to the citizens and to mobilise participation in the management of public affairs, making the district a budget unit, with decentralised participatory planning and decentralised financial execution at the district level. While the law itself does not make provision for Consultative Councils at the district level, this mechanism for downward accountability has been introduced in the regulation of the law. This is important as the ad hoc arrangement makes no provision for any form of local democracy besides the 33 municipalities (SIDA, 2005: 15).

d) What are the recommendations to improve the legal, institutional and organizational framework of POs?

121.   Immediately after the recent sixth PO of 26th March 2007, several CSOs organized a two days workshop in Beira (29-30th March 2007), with the objective to evaluate the performance of CSOs at the national and provincial POs, and then outline alternative ways to strengthening their participation and capacity to make a difference in future contributions to poverty issues.

122.   The workshop produced critical reflections, the elaboration of a SWOT analysis of CS participation at the POs and the identifications of priorities for future work. At the workshop a representative from the MPD invited to attend the sessions admitted that "for the Government the

participation of CS is not a favour (granted by Government) but a right of citizens". With regard to the legal formalization of the POs, he said that the reference to be taken into consideration is the LOLE. This law for district and local structures indicates that at a certain stage consulting and interactive forums among districts and provinces need to be created. According to information provided by the MPD, the Government plans to create a legal framework for the PO, but has so far shown no clear idea on how to move forward.

Table: 4.4: SWOT on Civil Society Participation Outlined at the CSOs Workshop in Beira, 29-30th March 2007	
STRENGHTS	**THREATS**
• CS has a common vision and intention	• The interaction between Government and CSOs is weak and there is the danger of breaking the dialogue
§ CSOs are growing and diversifying	• PO is not legally recognized
• Representativeness of CS is improving	• Procedures are generally ad hoc
§ Knowledge at national level is strong	• Very high dependency of CSOs on international aid and the danger that foreign agendas prevail
• CS expresses its view through its own RAP	• Weak articulation among CSOs
	• CS's agenda is controlled by some groups on an informal and ad hoc basis
WEAKNESSES	**OPPORTUNITIES**
• Information sharing is weak	§ Government's openness to more and better dialogue
• Weak thematic representativeness at lower levels	§ The poverty reduction agenda is in place
• Lack of adequate budget for more active participation	§ The development and strengthening of networks
• The increasing sense of fatigue, frustration and alienation from political and economic decision making mechanisms	§ Possibility to invite Government officials to CSOs' meetings
	§ Creating channels for feedback and checks and balances on relevant issues
	• Expand the level of citizen participation to more effective and efficient forms, such as partnerships at different territorial levels and among sectors or different actors

Source: CCM, 2007: 9-12).

123.   As the second delivery shows, while some interviewees regard the lack of a legal basis as a shortcoming and, in part, an explanation for the inefficiency and little use of the POs, others believe that the solution will not consist in legal institutionalization, but in a more active role of CS, using the space they have already been provided within the PO process.

124.   However, one obvious advantage of a legal basis for the PO would be clear terms of reference and a more precise description of the role and responsibility of all stakeholders (Government, CS and international cooperation partners) as well as of the process including the preparatory phase (timeframes, frequency). For lack of such ToR the way how the POs are conducted now is completely at the discretion of the Government.

125.   The CSOs and Government should urgently try to achieve a consensus with regard to a more and better articulation of CS at all levels of the PO cycle, starting from the preparatory meetings. Additionally, the Government should determine the schedule for the whole cycle well ahead and

inform the stakeholders on the dates with enough time for the CSOs to prepare for a meaningful participation.

126.   In the past the Government provided the basic documents to CSOs too late, which is also expressed in the preliminary synthesis of the Beira CSOs' workshop. It is important that Government share in time the relevant information to allow CS for a more qualified preparation and contribution to the PO.

127.   The PO to become an effective instrument of participation and accountability should have a more permanent character, possibly with permanent thematic working groups who meet periodically, instead of being limited to the annual plenary session with some ad hoc preparatory meetings.

e) What are the recommendations to improve the linkages between the POs at national, provincial and district levels?

128.   The Consultative Councils that have been recently established at district level are a good foundation for a more "bottom up" planning and monitoring process. The outcomes of their work should feedback to the provincial level (Provincial PO), which should be closely linked to the district Consultative Councils. The work of the PPO in turn should feedback to the National PO.

129.   The former recommendation has an implication for the timing of the PO cycle on provincial and national levels. In the past the dates of the national POs have not been harmonized with the dates of the PPOs. To allow a better linkage and feedback from bottom to top, the process should be scheduled in a way that the PPOs are held prior to the national POs.

130.   The Beira workshop also revealed that CSOs lack updated and accurate data at the community level, which need to be compared with the data and information provided by the Government. The collection of these data requires a more systematic linkage between the three levels also on the part of CS.

f) What are the recommendations to improve the role of POs in the process of formulating and monitoring the implementation of PARPA?

131.   Recommendations requested here are related to section b above, namely the gap between theory and practice. As shown in section b above and the quotes highlighted in Table 4.2 the linkages between planning and the budget instruments are largely theoretical. The content of the Government's annual operational plan, the PES, is not explicitly derived from the PARPA and the strategic sectoral and territorial plans.

132.   PARPA is framed around priority objectives while planning such as the PES still consists essentially of a long list of activities and outputs without a coherent programmatic framework.

133.   The issues raised by Hodges and Tibana regarding the accountability of Government to the legislative power appear to be complex issues that need to be dealt with in the long run. In the meantime, and in a shorter perspective, the PO could play a positive role if its consultative nature were complemented with channels that provide for feedback and accountability checks and balances involving CSOs.

134.   It is here that partnership for communicative power could play a positive role in implementing and monitoring PARPA, the budget and other planning instruments (see also recommendations in section n) below).

5. Stakeholders' Participation in the PO in Mozambique

g) What is the role of CSO in the Poverty Observatory? How civil society is represented in the POs (at national, provincial and local levels)?

135.   The evidence presented in previous deliveries and this very report shows that the role of CSOs in the POs is to "participate in participation". For the two major power-holders in Mozambique, the Government and donors, the role of CS is to legitimate the programmes elaborated and implemented.

136.   Starting from the typology of participation proposed by Arnstein (see table 2.1), we situate the PO as it actually works on the level of tokenism (rungs 3-5 information, consultation, placation). The ladder also shows the potential to reach more significant levels of participation, moving up to the higher rungs to citizen power (see recommendations).

137.   Civil society representation on the national level is formally through G20, a loose network of CSOs. Originally it consisted of 20 organizations – therefore the name – according to the assignment of PO seats to the stakeholders (20 Government, 20 CS and 20 donors). Actually the number of participating CSOs is higher, but participation varies according to the time and interest of CS representatives.

138.   At provincial level, G-20 claims to have similar networks. As the experience in Beira and Nampula shows, however, the participation dynamics are different from the national PO and G-20 is not necessarily the driving force of CS in the provinces. What is noteworthy in Nampula is the fact that all 20 districts have a CS-representative in the PPO. Also the private sector is strongly represented with 10 seats in the PPO Nampula. But the informal sector is not represented.

h) How is the G20 constituted? How representative is the G20? How inclusive is the G20?

139.   The name of G-20 emerged from the 20 CSOs that participated in the first Poverty Observatory in 2003, and afterwards set up a network that came to be known as the G-20. According to its first "Annual Poverty Report" [G-20, 2004], the network has since expanded to include more than 100 civil society organizations, involved in activities ranging from community development to debt reduction campaigning, health and HIV/AIDS, and socio-economic research.

140.   G20 comprises a wide range of organizations with different backgrounds and very diverse ideologies and interests: Relieve and development NGOs, church organizations, private business and trade unions, among others, which makes the claim of the G20 to speak with one voice rather unrealistic. Noteworthy is the absence of academia (universities).

141.   A prominent absent in the CS representation on the POs is the informal sector, on national as well as on provincial level (at least in the two Provinces visited; but no interviewee could affirm that the informal sector is present in any PO, national or provincial). This is a real weakness and all the more worrying as the informal sector in Mozambique is very large, as actually the huge majority of Mozambican people earn their livelihood in the informal economy. This is well confirmed by INE's census and surveys on the informal labour market and the non-profit institutions currently existing in Mozambique (INE, 2006a, 2006b, Francisco e Paulo, 2006).

142.   While this study was conducted the G20 was also undertaking a parallel reflection which is still in progress, aiming at responding to some of this type of question, such as its constitution and forms of representing the civil society.

143.   Mr. Carlos Fumo is the consultant in charge to study the G-20 platform and propose alternative ways to operationalize it. A Power Point presentation has already been discussed

with the members of the G20 Secretariat. The consultant's main preliminary findings were the following:

§   Three main reasons for the emergence of the G20: 1) Donor pressure associated with the HIPC and the preparation of the first PRSP; 2) CS's growing maturation, through processes such as the land campaign, debt and landmines issues, which demand a more institutionalized involvement in the development process; 3) Openness from the Mozambican Government for a more institutionalized relationship, through the PO.

§   G20 as a platform for: 1) A direct relationship and participation at the PO; 2) Organized articulation with the Government, private sector and donors; 3) Bringing together diversified ideas and interests: "One voice; strengthening through union".

§   G20 platform is characterized by. 1) Informal collaboration; 2) Small (structure) and strong (capacity) secretariat; 3) Efficient communication; 4) Inclusiveness at all levels (national, provincial and district).

§   Main challenges in the past: 1) Maximization of opportunities that emerged to influence the development process (e.g. PO, PARPAII, Joint Review, RAP); 2) Recording the experience.

§   Key players in the G20: 1) Dr. Negrão as the founder and key leader; 2) The GMD and FDC as the main promoters; 3) The initial CSOs that joined the platform and contributed for the G20's image of confidence and credibility.

§   One of the strategies of the G20 should be the use of the PO and the Joint Review as platforms for dialogue, influence the way the resources are allocated, strengthening social responsibility, capacitate the CS for strategic partnerships and act as a broker, promote special relationships with media.

§   Alternative scenarios for the G20 in the future: Scenario 1: Continue on an informal basis, as a FDC guest. The FDC would continue to provide technical and administrative assistance, serve as a "legitimate face" for the CS platform, and then there would be some coordinating groups comprised of key organizations selected from various CSOs. Scenario 2: A formal and legally registered organization, legally autonomous, with a strong secretariat and formal linkages with the provincial G20s. The disadvantage of this option, according to the consultant, is the highly concentrated power and a high risk that the secretariat will become detached from its constituents, turning into yet another NGO. Scenario 3: A network or a "nomadic" and rotating organization. While this option could promote more inclusion and ownership from the CSO members, it does not allow for a more effective and continuous intervention.

i) Are the social groups excluded? How is the participation of ordinary citizens?

144.   In principle, no social groups are excluded from participating in the G20. As the second delivery testified the G20 secretariat announces in the daily newspaper some events and invites any civil society organization or ordinary citizen to participate in the process, such as the preparatory meetings held on the 21st and 22nd February in anticipation of the sixth national PO that took place on the 26th March 2007. A similar invitation was also made trough the newspaper for the Joint Review undertaken between the Government and its cooperation partners.

145.   However, it needs to be said that there has never been conducted a comprehensive study on how social groups are included and to what extent the most conventional and well-known CSOs represent the wide spectrum of Mozambican social groups. Analyzing Table 1B, presented above, the consultants suspect that the most prominent CSOs represent a relatively small and mostly urbanized middle class elite, while the bulk of the civil society organizations emerge and develop informally and away from the formal mechanisms associated with the Government and donors.

146. These hypotheses are shared by other analysts, such as Pequenino (2006) and Matsinhe (2005), to mention just two examples. But for the time being, they lack representative and adequate confirmation, and need further research.

j) How independent from the government is the CSOs participating in the G20? Does the PO undermine CSO autonomy (agency) to provide independent perspectives to the PO?

147. At first glance the CSOs participating in the G20 are independent from the Government. No factual evidence has been found to suggest any direct dependency of the existing CSOs in relation to the Government. However, based on several remarks made by interviewees off the record one cannot disregard that a second glance could come to other conclusions. Due to lack of information and time the consultants could not conduct a more in-depth analysis, which would be necessary for a differentiated answer to the question.

148. With regard to the likelihood of PO undermining CSO autonomy (agency) to provide independent perspectives to the PO, perhaps the most visible and immediate evidence for that is the rather ad hoc way the POs are organized and the fact that so far the major stakeholders, the Government and donors, have limited the POs to mere informing or (non-committal) consulting forms of citizen participation.

149. It is widely known that citizens, who feel constricted by futility, legalistic jargon and rhetoric, and prestige of the official and power-holders, are hardly free to develop their autonomy, initiative and critical thinking.

k) What is the analytical research base for SOS/G20 contributions to the PO? Does CSO gather independent information to monitor PARPA?

150. Since 2004 the G20 has prepared an annual poverty report (RAP) based on participatory assessment. The most ambitious coverage was achieved in 2004, which involved 10 thousand households.

151. Moreover, the report argued for rethinking the concept and definition of poverty in the PARPA to pay equal attention to quantitative and qualitative aspects. This proposal was partially taken into account in PARPA II.

152. In 2005 G20 also prepared its RAP, while the 2006 RAP is still in draft form. One feature that immediately catches one's eye when comparing the three RAPs is that their methodology has changed over time, not always in the direction of improved quality.

153. But perhaps the most important weakness of the RAPs is that they are not really focused on monitoring and evaluating PARPA. Regardless of the quality of their analyses on poverty, in the end such analyses cannot immediately be confronted with the Government's assessment and information and hardly serve as a basis for dialogue between Government and CS on PARPA implementation.

154. Contrary to what the Programme Aid Partners (PAPs) do in relation to M&E of PARPA, the G20 has so far not developed a methodology to monitor and evaluate the Government's performance assessment (PAF), which is a multi-annual matrix of specific priority targets and indicators based on PARPA, updated on an annual basis through the PES process and agreed through cross-governmental dialogue. Each year the signatories – Government and its cooperation partners – attach the agreed PAF to their Memorandum of Understanding approved at the end of the annual Joint Review.

155. The explanation found for this during the interviews is that the G20 regards the Joint Review as a very technical process and it thought the RAP could complement the Government data with alternative analyses of the poverty situation. This is a flawed argument, in the sense that the G20 has so far missed the opportunity to provide a truly independent assessment of the PAF, and thus a useful contribution to the work undertaken by Government and its international cooperation partners.

l) What is the cost of CSO participation in POs (time and resources)? Are there resource barriers for CSO participation?

156. The PO is made up of two organs, namely the ad hoc advisory group named Opinion Council and a permanent Technical Secretariat placed at the Ministry of Planning. UNDP has played a critical role in establishing the PO Technical Secretariat with seed funding of about US1.5 million dollars and continues to support capacity strengthening activities.

157. The consultants have not made a cost-benefit analysis to assess the overall cost as compared to the value for money of CSO participation. In Beira, as reported in the second delivery, an interviewee argued that most of the supposed members of the Opinion Council and permanent Technical Secretariat do not participate actively in the PPO preparation and activities due to lack of monetary incentive. However, when questioned whether this is the only or even the main problem faced by the PPO in Beira, the interviewee admitted that in reality the outcome and level of quality expected from the PPOs are not worth spending significant time and financial resources.

158. A bottleneck of meaningful CS participation is capacity. Capacity development and mobilizing the capacity available in CS might suffer from financial constraints. However, as the consultants could confirm in the interviews with donor agencies, finding financial resources for capacity development and for mobilizing this capacity for citizen participation in the PO should not be a problem. Several donors are financing or ready to finance capacity development programmes for CSOs to enable them for qualified participation in policy debates.[17]

m) What are the facts that impact the quality of CSOs participation in POs?

159. Many observations in this report have directly or indirectly answered to this question, but in Table 4.5 the main arguments are summarized, putting side-by-side the viewpoints of Government and donors on the one hand, and of the CSO viewpoint on the other.

Table: 4.5. Factors that Impact the Quality of CSOs participation in POs	
Viewpoint of Government and Donors	**Viewpoint of CSOs**
• The very concept, structure and organization of the PO determine the weak quality and low expectations one can have from CSO participation. This is the fault of nobody in particular. The explanation can be found in the way citizen participation is conceived. If it does not allow for high standards of professional commitment and mutual accountability, then the alternative left is to be ad hoc, uncommitted and voluntarist; even when one assumes to be dealing with important and high priority tasks.	• Mozambican citizens are not yet fully taking up their rights and opportunities to engage in structured civil society groups. As Johnson points out, it still seems acceptable for non-civil society commentators to reiterate the stereotype of Mozambican civil society being "weak". While many civil society actors themselves refute this generalization, Johnson adds, there is little doubt that the diversity of roles adopted by civil society bodies in neighbouring countries is not yet effectively taken up in Mozambique. Useful observations conclude that civil society is broad but lacks depth, and that civil society shows potential, to build from an already well established base (Johnson, 2005: 10).
• The UNDP's report (Rasappan et al., 2007) on the "PO: lessons learned" refers to confusion on the actual role of members within PO. "Many seem to think that they are supposed to monitor the government and operations in a simplistic manner", states the report. Unfortunately, it provides no indication on how to monitor in a non-simplistic manner.	
• Rasappan et al.'s (2007) report admits that the concept of the PO and the specific roles and responsibilities of the membership has not been made clear, especially at the lower levels.	• Lack of intellectual and technical capacity, as well as the weak experience in dealing with CS issues in a professional manner. Part of this weakness can be due

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[17] To mention only one: DFID together with Irish Aid is preparing a multi-annual financing for a Civil Society Support Mechanism for Monitoring and Advocacy on Governance.

• Rasappan et al.'s (2007) report does not use the terms weakness, failures or shortcomings, but in the section entitled "Areas for strengthening" a long list of features infers a low level of quality of CSOs participation in the POs. The areas for strengthening comprise conceptual aspects, structure, management and implementation.	to limited financial resources, issues that could be better addressed by two main power-holders, Government and donors. • CSOs need to learn the value of professionalism together with entrepreneurship and other values that are not necessarily depending on money and profit. There are common traits and values at work that define any worker or even activist as a true professional, which has to do more with attitude than with the job itself.

n) What are the concrete recommendations to improve civil society voice and agency in the PO?

160.   At least two concrete recommendations to improve civil society voice and agency in the PO and other forms of M&E of PARPA have already been mentioned in previous deliveries, which need to be highlighted at this stage.

161.   One recommendation is relatively old and was mentioned in the second delivery. In 2000 the GMD put forward the idea of a systematic forum and mechanism that avoided the ad hoc way of dealing with monitoring and evaluation of PRSP. The GMD called it a National Committee for Monitoring Poverty, which corresponded to the chart presented in Figure 4.1. This is a concrete recommendation not yet taken seriously, which has several advantages as compared to the present situation: It gives the PO the character of a permanent mechanism, it strengthens the role of CS putting it at the same level as the donors, and it aims at linking the M&E or communicative power, to use Eberlei's (2006) expression, with the legal power, the Parliament.

Figure 4.1 A sketch of a Proposal for a Partnership Between Government and CSOs

162.   To make citizen participation meaningful, the PO – besides bringing Government and CS together – should establish linkages to the legislative power. As Eberlei (2006) pointed out correctly, it is not the role of CS – in our case of the PO – to step into the function of the executive or legislative power. But the communicative power as resulting from the debate on policy issues conducted by CS to become relevant, it needs to be transformed by the elected representatives (executive as well as legislative organs, according to the area of competence of each) into administrative power. Since the Parliament approves the annual plans and budget,

the link between PO and Parliament is highly relevant to allow the voice of the citizens be heard by and taken into account in the decisions of Parliament.

163.   The second recommendation is closely related to the previous one. It aims at moving beyond tokenism into partnership. The recommendation, already forwarded by Francisco in 2005 to overcome the feeling of fatigue among CS activists, now has gained in relevance and strengths in the light of the empirical evidence collected for this study and of a more systematic analytical reflection.

164.   The participation of CS in the PO has the potential to become a real partnership, analogous to the current partnership between Government and the international cooperation partners. This means moving from a mere consultation without binding commitments to a negotiation process, where the CS takes part in the formulation of policies and where agreements with mutual commitments are reached. This would give life to the second meaning of the term "accountability", i.e. enforceability.

165.   These two recommendations can be enriched by the successful experience of partnership the Government has with its Programme Aid Partners (PAPs). As Francisco pointed out in 2005 and the second delivery of this study illustrates further, the proceedings and tools applied in the annual Joint Review process could serve as a reference to foster a sort of tripartite partnership among Government, CSOs and donors. May be even the merging of certain elements of both the Joint Review and the PO (such as the thematic working groups for the preparation of the plenary) could be considered.

166.   A third recommendation has to do with the organization and capacity of CS itself. As was mentioned in former paragraphs, CS and its umbrella organization G20 must adopt a more professional approach in their participation in the PO and in the policy debate in general. To be a valid interlocutor and partner of Government and donors, they must build up a knowledge base around the core issues, identifying and mobilizing the best professional capacity available among CS actors. This requires a more permanent attention to the themes and certainly more time and money. May be there is need to be selective and concentrate an a few subjects CS considers priority for their participation.

6. Monitoring and Evaluation

o) How stakeholders have agreed on the indicators and processes to monitor the PARPA?

167.   There is a close interaction between the Government and Programme Aid Partners (PAP). Following the definition of a matrix with more than hundred indicators for PARPA I, the PAP has worked on a more operative Performance Assessment Framework (PAF). In the past three to four years the PAP has used this PAF matrix. In the 2006 *Aide Mémoire* the PAP mentioned that the selection of PAF indicators for 2007-09 would be carried out following the approval of PARPA II, which happened in May 2006.

168.   For several reasons, apparently more related to the CSOs' understanding of the importance of PARPA indicators, CSOs have generally neglected the indicator issue in the past. For instance, the RAP pays no direct attention both to PARPA and PAF matrixes. Instead, the RAP has its own topics, with no systematic and continuous methodology from year to year. Thus, PARPA indicators are dealt with by CSOs indirectly rather than through a close follow up and monitoring.

p) How baselines were prepared and used to monitor the PARPA?

169.   Baselines are prepared by the MPD with sporadic and almost no contribution from CSOs. This might be due to the fact that existing representatives of CSOs have concentrated their attention to drawing their own analytical frameworks for evaluating the PARPA.

q) What roles provincial poverty observatories play, also for the outcomes at national level?

170.   So far PPOs have played a very little role for the outcomes of PARPA at national level. As this report reveals, initially PPOs were not contemplated as part of the national initiative launched in 2003. However, following the request of CSOs and international cooperation partners at national and provincial levels, from 2005 provincial governors accepted to organize their own PPOs.

171.   Besides being a recent process, in practice the PPOs are rarely or even badly articulated with the national PO. There is no time coordination as to when Provinces should have their POs and what should be their common issues.

r) What are the learning mechanisms generated by the PO in Mozambique?

172.   The main learning mechanism generated by the PO in Mozambique is leading to a growing awareness and demand from CSOs and individual activists and analysts for genuine, more effective and efficient processes of participation in order to assure that public programmes become increasingly more relevant to their needs and responsive to their priorities.

173.   Both Government and international cooperation partners do not oppose the demand that citizen participation should go beyond just a window-dressing ritual. The challenge they both launch is that CSOs should put forward clear and workable proposals for improving their own participation.

s). How the macro enabling environment (including the General Budget Support scheme) affected the PO legal provisions and political setting?

174.   There has not been any direct linkage between macro enabling environment, particularly the one related to the General Budget Support scheme, and the PO. first of all presumably because the PO has no legal provisions. As Rasappan et al. (2007) found in their report for the UNDP, the PO has been set up as an ad hoc body with no significant budget, particularly for PPOs, and a limited formal incentive system for active participation by CSOs (incidental costs incurred by CSO members to participate, e.g. travel, communication, printing etc.).

t) What were the lessons learnt during the process, and how these lessons were incorporated by the PO, the Government of Mozambique, and CSOs?

175.   Perhaps the most important lesson learnt from the process the PO has experienced in Mozambique is that its main goal - that is to follow the progress of PARPA actions and the level of PARPA performance and to provide useful feedback to Government by a broad-based monitoring and evaluation - cannot be achieved without other channels for mutual commitment and accountability on a more professional and systematic basis.

176.   The PARPA seems to have reached a stage of growth that needs more effective and efficient forms of value-adding feedback mechanisms. Otherwise, participation will turn into a window dressing ritual and Government will not obtain useful feedback because entities representing relevant segments of society will increasingly give up to participate in the M&E processes.

PART 4
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

7. Conclusions: Impact Assessment

177.   Based on the evidence the consultants collected, the interviews conducted with key stakeholders and the consultants' own considerations and evaluation, it is possible to conclude that in spite of the weaknesses found in the existing PO in Mozambique, this initiative has the potential for a more participative implementation and monitoring of PARPA. The consultants found that the motivation and demand, if not effective at least a latent demand, for CS participation in PARPA implementation and monitoring in Mozambique are well supported by the secondary information gathered and the interviews/meetings conducted with key stakeholders.

178.   The findings of this case study support the view that strengthening citizen participation in the implementation and monitoring of PRSP and other public policies and programmes, can be highly positive, useful and relevant for the development of Mozambique. Positive because public administration in general and Government in particular need to be made accountable to their constituencies, chiefly to those citizens who are supposed to benefit most from programmes like PARPA. Useful, provided that the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) instruments turn into effective and efficient mechanisms; producing the results desired or intended with minimum waste of time, money or effort (Hornby, 2000: 371-372). Relevant in the sense that they have the potential to counteract the widespread sense of exclusion and alienation from the political and economic decision-making processes the have-not citizens often experience. In the case of Mozambique, this is well corroborated by the increasingly poor turnout of voters in national and municipal elections, and by the overwhelming number of informal entrepreneurs, mostly very poor, who are extralegal and excluded from the formal economic system.

179.   A fair assessment of the PO in Mozambique comes to the conclusion that it is more an event than an effective and efficient M&E mechanism. This conclusion rests not only on the fact that the PO meets once a year, for just one day plenary session, but it also justified because in the intermediary period between the annual sessions the activities and networking among key stakeholders produce no outcomes able to induce significant social reforms which enable citizens to share in the benefits of the affluent society.

180.   But in trying to assess the views on the usefulness and impact of the PO in Mozambique the consultants found that the evaluations vary much among the representatives from the stakeholders involved. The main differences depend chiefly on the expectations the participants hold with regard to the usefulness and role an instrument such as the PO can, or could eventually, play in the public dialogue and interchange among actors involved in processes of poverty reduction. Schematically and according to the level of expectations, the views expressed can be arranged in three groups.

7.1 Impact Assessment of the PO According to Very Low Expectations

181.   One group consists of the interviewees with low or very low expectations from the PO. This view is expressed for instance by the CSO activist who assesses the performance of the PO as satisfactory or good. His assessment is based on the fact that in the past civil society was completely ignored and at least now the PO allows representatives from the CSOs to participate and present their statements at the plenary sessions. Another example of this type of

reasoning is the statement that holding a PO plenary session once a year is good enough for meaningful policy inputs from civil society.

182.   Among the interviewees with the lowest expectations the most striking were those who expressed feelings of inferiority, gratitude and servitude to both Government and international representatives, on the grounds that the power-holders are not only providing help to the people but invite the powerless to express their concerns, difficulties and needs. Whether or not their opinions and proposals are ever taken into consideration in practice and contribute to change the status quo appears as being less relevant than the satisfaction or honour the simple invitation for a high level gathering represents for these interviewees.

7.2 Impact Assessment of the PO According to Medium Expectations

183.   A second group of interviewees shows a medium expectation from the PO. It is not easy to distinguish clearly the various characteristics of these views, ranging from mild or even extreme wishful thinking patterns of thought to the more or less realistic expression of hope that in spite of the limitations found in the PO, with some minor changes it can become an effective and efficient M&E mechanism in processes of poverty reduction.

184.   In any case, at least some of the activists and analysts in this second group admit that several areas in the setup of the PO need strengthening and some changes. Such areas range from the very concept of the PO to the structure and the management, as well as the implementation and the impact of the PO in M&E of public policies and planning programmes.

185.   To mention just a few of the concerns people in the second group expressed - whenever invited to an in-depth analysis of the PO's performance. They acknowledged a wide range of problems that need careful consideration, summarized here in the following 12 statements: i) Confusion on the actual role of members within PO; ii) Ambiguity of the concept of the PO and of the specific roles and responsibilities of the membership; iii) A limited formal incentive system for participation by CSOs and no significant budget for provincial POs; iv) Lack of clarity on the formal role and contribution of the PO to policy making; v) Doubts on the contribution of PO feedback and how such feedback is being integrated into the PARPA performance tracking; vi) Weak formalization of the PO for feedback and follow up actions; vii) The fact that PO meets once a year is felt to be inadequate for meaningful policy inputs; viii) CSO representation in the District Councils is said to be biased with only selected people being members of the Council; viii) No definite structure for information of CSOs and NGOs to enable them to participate and contribute to performance data collection and inputs; ix) The existing organizational guidelines have so far not led to a formal mechanism, and in practice ad hoc procedures prevail; x) The publicity on PARPA through the PO has been minimal though there is specific publicity and dissemination work being undertaken by NGOs and CSOs; xi) There is only a general understanding on PARPA and role of the PO, especially at the lower levels; xii) Need for advanced skills at the PO Secretariats for strengthening the management at all levels to improve efficiency and effectiveness (Rasappan et al., 2007).

7.3 Impact Assessment of the PO According to High Expectations

186.   The third group corresponds to the interviewees who argue that initiatives such as the PO should come up to high expectations, and this means that rigorous principles, critical thinking and high professional standards should guide the use of such operational concepts like efficacy, efficiency and value for money.

187.   For the activists and representatives of various stakeholders that can be seen as part of this group, the amount of aid that Mozambique receives from the international community is extremely high, a fact that should not allow any sort of complacency or negligence in making power-holders transparent and truly accountable not only to creditors and donors but to the people that should share in the benefits of this aid. In this perspective, bringing pro-poor issues to the programmes and putting the CS in a position to "follow the money" and to induce a sustained and effective implementation of PARPA is a goal far from being achieved.

188.   Contrary to the two previous groups, the third group starts by questioning the very concept of the PO in Mozambique, particularly the fact that it has been conceived as a purely consultation instrument with no power for negotiation and no mechanisms and procedures for effective and efficient accountability through citizen participation.

189.   The widespread perception, well made explicit by Hodges and Tibana (2005), that the Mozambican society and the Parliament are too weak to make the Government as accountable to them as the foreign donors do, is corroborated when one compares the PO concept, structure, management, monitoring and evaluation procedures and tools with the way the Joint Review between the Government and donors works. Hodges and Tibana's (2005: 8) claim that Government's accountability to donors is much stronger than it is to Mozambican society, finds a striking confirmation in the lack of specific outcomes produced by past POs as compared to the proceedings and the commitments produced by the biannual Joint Review between Government and donors.

190.   The interviewees in the third group refute the argument that the PO in Mozambique at least provides the opportunity for sharing information and dialogue, for two reasons. On the one hand, there are other and often more effective means for sharing information and promote debate, ranging from the mass media to seminars and workshops. On the other hand, besides the fact that the PO is not a good information and consulting mechanism, reducing it to a mere consultative instrument prevents the citizen from yet another potentially useful M&E mechanism for effective citizen participation. Thus, a compelling argument against the view that the PO should just be a consultative forum is the apprehension that through this sort of events citizen participation easily becomes empty, meaningless and frustrating. It just allows for the Executive and donors to entertain the believe that citizens are taken into consideration.

7.4 The Consultants' Impact Assessment of the PO

191.   In face of the above three main groups of expectations, instead of rushing to take sides for this or that standpoint, the consultants consider it to be more useful to highlight the different appreciations, draw a parallel between them and allow for a more balanced and open picture.

192.   In spite of that, the consultants do have sympathy for and are inclined towards the third group of expectations. However, this does not mean the consultants consider conditions to be given and favourable for transforming the PO into a partnership mechanism, or a forum where citizens or CSOs representatives hold equal power as Government and donors.

193.   In this context the typology of the so-called "ladder of citizen participation" becomes useful and illuminating for three main reasons. Firstly, some of the interviews summarized in the second delivery insinuate that the PO in Mozambique is sometimes used by stakeholders with manipulative intent. Unfortunately, this study was not framed for and therefore did not enter into an analysis of this first bottom rung of the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 2.1. Likewise, the second bottom rung named therapy was not dealt with explicitly. In any case, some interviewees made claims of deceitful usage of citizen participation, which comes close to the hypothesis on the therapy in the sense that the PO appears to be some device for healing and exorcising the scars of the victimized people.

194.   Secondly, after reviewing the summaries of the interviews and the documental evidence on the proceedings and syntheses of past POs, one is led to conclude that the PO, as it stands now, can be best placed on the level of tokenism. A significant number of interviewees claimed that the PO was set up in part to respond to donors' demand for setting up a PRSP implementation and monitoring mechanism, rather than to empower citizens. In this sense, the idea of tokenism becomes applicable because tokenism occurs exactly when somebody does something only in order to satisfy a particular group of people but not in a sincere way (Hornby, 2000: 1260).

195.   Both information and consultation are important steps towards legitimate citizen participation, but too often limited to a one-way communication. These two steps are the characteristic traits of the PO both at the national and provincial levels and used as justification for their establishment and continuation. However, as the study argues, there are other means

likely to fulfil better this role expected from the PO. News media, pamphlets, posters, responses to inquiry, more regular meetings, debates, workshops and conferences as well as networking can be suitable instruments for raising awareness, improve knowledge and thus contribute to empowering citizens.

196.   There have been increasing reports of fatigue and dissatisfaction with the outcomes, the extent of time consumed and the amount of resources spent for achieving so little impact through the existing PO, in terms of inducing social reforms and improving public policies and planning.

197.   An assessment and eventual redefinition of the PO in Mozambique should match it against the ultimate goal of the PARPA and the contribution it is expected to make for the development of Mozambique.

u) What is the extent to which CSOs/G20 are able to influence the PARPA?

198.   The extent to which CSOs/G20 are able to influence the PARPA depends very much on the level of their participation and involvement in the political and economic processes.

199.   In practice, though, the declared intent and goals set up for the PO in Mozambique have been seldom consistent with the relatively high expectations this initiative fostered particularly with the most pro-active and dynamic CSOs and activists. By relatively high expectations it is meant the belief or hope that the PO would become an innovative consultative mechanism for Government, civil society and other key stakeholders to fight poverty by means of supporting effective citizen participation perceived as an increasing empowerment and share in the benefits of the affluent society.

v) How the impact of CSOs/G20 is measured?

200.   In the past, Government, international partners and even CSOs themselves put some value on meaningful citizen participation in monitoring the PARPA process, but this has usually been a "second-order" priority. As the evidence shows, if stakeholders do not put a deliberate and very high value on meaningful citizen participation in monitoring public goods as the PARPA, participation is unlikely to yield satisfactory results.

w) To what extent the PO achieved its own objectives and how it functions in practice?

201.   In short, the answer to the key question and thus to this last question as well can be stated as follows: The PO in Mozambique is a legitimate first step and instrument for an effective and efficient citizen participation in PARPA implementation and monitoring. In the past, the PO has not become an adequate participatory mechanism, not so much because of not being legally formalized or set up, but chiefly because the main power-holders, namely the Government and its international cooperation partners, converted it into a mere consultation instrument, not combined with other modes of participation.

202.   As it is set up now, the PO provides no assurance that citizens' concerns and ideas are taken into account. The fact that the PO structure is led by the Government only, rather than an independent or at least a partnership mechanism, converted it into a Government instrument for public hearing and uncommitted consultation, which in practice often turns into a window-dressing ritual, where people achieve nothing but "participating in participation". In turn, what the two main power-holders achieve is the comfort that they have gone through the requirement of involving the so-called ultimate beneficiaries in their programmes and projects.

8. Recommendations to Improve the PO in Mozambique

203. The role and function of the PO in Mozambique needs to be deeply reviewed, starting first of all from its very concept and goal. This is necessary to ensure that the PO does in fact contribute positively to an effective and efficient social accountability in poverty reduction strategies.

204. In the past the potential for a broad-based participation of citizens in general and CSOs in particular has not been adequately used because the PO has been restricted to a consultative instrument and had no complementary channels and mechanisms for feedback and accountability checks and balance. Moreover, the PO has seldom been able to monitor and evaluate the performance in the implementation of PARPA by collecting data on progress achieved and analyzing the data directly related to the relevant indicators of PARPA.

205. The consultants believe that if the PO were set up to call for a more pro-active CS involvement, with a clearer goal and a more effective and efficient structure and organization it could have the potential to evolve into an operational mechanism with the capacity to foster studies, research, meetings, seminars, and establish data banks, documenting experiences of best practices as well as publications.

206. One recommendation that the Government and international cooperation partners should consider seriously is to share with the CSOs their positive experience of partnership through mechanisms such as the Joint Review. Since 2005 CSOs have been invited to attend the Joint Review meetings, but simply as observers.

207. The consultants raised this particular issue to the interviewees. While the overall reaction to the idea of creating more effective synergies between the PO and the PAP was generally positive, some representatives from the Government and the donor community expressed reservations towards the proposal of a partnership with the CSOs. In turn, other interviewees argued that the best contribution and support international cooperation can give to CS is to allow and promote its true empowerment.

208. The PO should set up a flexible but operative system of public feedback, where citizens, service beneficiaries, and stakeholders at any level are invited to submit feedback on any aspect of the service delivery and performance of the Government to specially designated entities created by the Government (a kind of ombudsperson's office). But in order to avoid that such a system becomes a sort of the discredited "complaints book" the PO would have to establish creative channels for effective public accountability.

209. The consultants agree with Rasappan's (2007: 7) recommendation to regularize and formalize the PO with the objective to transform it into a more formal mechanism/process with specific purpose, processes, and follow-through actions. "This is an important improvement that is much needed to the PO mechanism", though additionally mechanisms need to be established to ensure that feedback coming from the PO members is channelled in the right direction and becomes actionable (Rasappan, 2007, 8).

210. Summing up, the consultants believe that PARPA should be treated as strategic public good. It is a public good because its success can have multiplying benefits, not only for the have-nots and most vulnerable people but across social borders, generations and population groups. As all public goods, whether local, national or international, PARPA tends to suffer from under provision, not so much in financial terms but for the simple fact that they are public. From the individual's perspective, it is often the best and most rational strategy to let others provide the good and then to enjoy it, free of charge and without contributing to its value.

211. It is not enough just to appreciate citizen participation for a meaningful participation to happen. Stakeholders need to make things work proactively. The drive or motivation to meaningful participation must come from the stakeholders themselves. This attitude should also be encouraged by surrounding organizations. Finally, successful citizen participation needs investment in time, thinking energy, design effort and money.

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10. Annex

10.1 Acronyms of Key Actors in Government, Donors and Civil Society

		Key Actors in Government
1	DNEAP	Direcção Nacional de Estudos e Análise de Políticas – National directorate of studies and Policy analysis
2	DNP	Direcção Nacional do Plano (National Directorate of Planning), of MPD
3	DNPDR	Direcção Nacional para o Desenvolvimento Rural
4	DO	Direcção Nacional do Orçamento (National Directorate of Budget), of MF
5	DPC	Direcção de Planificação e Cooperação (Directorate of Planning and Cooperation), of MISAU
6	DPM	Departamento de Programação Macro (Macro Programming Department), of DNPO
7	GEST	Gabinete de Estudos (Office of Studies), of MPF
8	MAAC	Ministério para Assuntos dos Antigos Combatentes
9	MAE	Ministério da Administração Estatal (Ministry of State Administration)
10	MCAA	Ministério para Coordenação da Acção Ambiental
11	MCT	Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia
12	ME	Ministério da Energia
13	MF	Ministério das Finanças (Ministry of Finance)
14	MI	Ministério do Interior
15	MIC	Ministério da Indústria e Comércio
16	MINAG	Ministério da Agricultura (Ministry of Agriculture)
17	MINED	Ministério da Educação (Ministry of Education)
18	MISAU	Ministério da Saúde (Ministry of Health)
19	MJ	Ministério da Justiça
20	MJD	Ministério da Juventude e Desportos
21	MMAS	Ministério da Mulher e da Acção Social
22	MNEC	Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros e Cooperação
23	MOPH	Ministério das Obras Públicas e Habitação
24	MP	Ministério das Pescas
25	MPD	Ministry of Planning and Development
26	MRM	Ministério dos Recursos Minerais
27	MT	Ministério do Trabalho
28	MTC	Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicação
29	P-DDS	Direcção Distrital de Saúde (District Health Directorate)
30	P-DPAC	Direcção Provincial de Apoio e Controlo (Provincial Directorate of Support and Control
31	P-DPPF	Direcção Provincial do Plano e Finanças (Provincial Directorate of Planning and Finance)
32	P-FCP	Fundo Comum Provincial (Provincial Common Fund), of MISAU
33	P-FIL	Fundo de Iniciativa Local (Local Initiative Fund), for OE resources provided to *autarquias* for investment
34	PROAGRI	Programa Nacional de Desenvolvimento Agrícola (National Programme for Agricultural Development)
35	PROAUDE	Fundo Comum de Apoio ao Sector da Saúde (Common Fund for Support to the Health Sector)
36	SETSAN	Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition
37	SISTAFE	SISTAFE Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado
38	UTRAFE	Technical Unit for the Reform of State Financial Administration)
39	UTRESP	Unidade Técnica para a Reforma do Sector Público (Technical Unit for Reform of the Public Sector)

		Key Actors in Bilateral and Multilateral Donors
1	AA	Action Aid
2	ACORD	Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development
3	ADA	Austrian Development Agency GmbH (Mozambique)
4	ADB	African Development Bank
5	ADECOMA	Associação de Cooperação Mozambique-Alemanha
6	AECI	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional
7	AFVP	Associaition Française des Volontaires dy Progrès (Mozambique)
8	Aga Khan	Aga Khan Foundation
9	APDF	Africa Project Development Facility (Mozambique)
10	ASDI	Agência Sueca de Cooper
11	Belgium	Embassy of Belgium to Mozambique
12	Canada	Embassy of Canada to Mozambique
13	CU	Concern Universal (Mozambique)
14	DAI	Dorcas Aid International (Mozambique)
15	DED	Serviço Alemão de Cooperação Técnica Social (Mozambique)
16	Denmark	Embassy of Denmark to Mozambique
17	DFID	Department for International Development, of the UK Government
18	EISA	The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
19	EU	Delegation of the European Commission to Mozambique
20	FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
21	FES	Fundação Friedrich Ebert (Mozambique)
22	Finland	Embassy of Finland to Mozambique
23	France	Embassy of France to Mozambiqye
24	G-18	G-18 Group of 18 GBS donors
25	G20-ES	Executive Secretary, G20
26	Germany	Embassy to Germany to Mozambiqye
27	GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
28	HAI	Health Alliance International (Mozambique)
29	HALO Trust	HALO Trust (Mozambique)
30	IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
31	IFC	International Finance Corporation
32	ILO	International Labour Organization
33	IMF	International Monetary Fund
34	Ireland	Embassy of Ireland to Mozambique
35	Irish Aid	Irish Aid
36	ISCOS	Instituto Sindicale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (Mozambique)
37	Italy	Embassy of Italy to Mozambiqye
38	Kepa	Kehitysyhteistyön Palvelukeskus
39	KPMG	HPMG Auditores Independentes
40	LSN	Landmine Survivors Network (Mozambique)
41	MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
42	Netherlands	Royal Netherlands Embassy
43	Norway	Embassy of Norway to Mozambique
44	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
45	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
46	Oxfam	Oxfam GB (Mozambique)
47	Portugal	Embassy of Portugal to Mozambique
48	SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
49	SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
50	Sweden	Embassy of Sweden to Mozambique
51	Switzerland	Embassy of Switzerland to Mozambique
52	UK	British High Commission
53	UN	United Nations

54	UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
55	UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
56	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
57	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
58	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
59	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
60	UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
61	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
62	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
63	UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
64	UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
65	UNV	United Nations Volunteers
66	UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
67	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
68	WB	The World Bank Office in Maputo
69	WFP	World Food Programme
70	WHO	WHO Mozambique Country Office
71	WTO	World Trade Organization

	Key Actors in Civil Society	
1	**AAC**	Associação dos Antigos Combatentes (Veterans Association)
2	**AAM**	Associação Académica de Maputo
3	**ABIODES**	Associação para Agricultura Biológica Biodiversidade e Desenvolvimento Sustentável
4	**ACIANA**	Associação Comercial e Industrial de Nampula
5	**ACM**	Associação Comercial de Moçambique
6	**ACM**	Associação Comercial de Moçambique
7	**ACORD**	Rural Development
8	**ACTIVA**	Associação das Mulheres Empresárias e Executivas
9	**AEPRIMO**	Association of Private Companies of Mozambique
10	**AICIMO**	Scientific Research Association of Mozambique
11	**AIM**	Associação Industrial de Moçambique
12	**AMB**	Associação Moçambicana dos Bancos
13	**AMECON**	Associação Moçambicana de Economistas, Mozambican Association for Economists
14	**AMF**	Associação Moçambicana de Fotografia
15	**AMODE**	Associacao Mocambicana Para o Desenvolvimento e Democracia
16	**AMODEFA**	Associação Moçambicana para a Defesa da Família
17	**AMODIA**	Associação Moçambicana dos Diabeticos
18	**AMOGED**	Associação moçambicana dos desmobilizados de guerra
19	**ANJ**	Associação Nacional dos Jornalistas
20	**APBS**	Associação Provincial de Boxe de Sofala
21	**APNET**	African Publishers Network (Mozambique)
22	**ARAM**	Associação Rural de Ajuda Mútua (Mozambique)
23	**ARE**	Associação Reconstruindo a Esperança
24	**ARO-JUVENIL**	Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Juventude (Moçambique)
25	**ASA**	Associação da Sociedade Aberta
26	**ASSOMUDE**	Associação da Mulher para a Democracia (MoZambique9
27	**ASSOTSI**	Associação dos Vendedores Informais
28	**ATAP**	Associacao dos Tecnicos Agro Pecuarios
29	**BIP**	Bureau de Informação Pública (Mozambique)
30	**CADECOS**	Associação monte Sinai
31	**CCM**	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique
32	**CCT**	Comissão Consultiva de Trabalho (Labour Consultative Commission)
33	**CDCS**	Clube Desportivo da Costa do Sol (Maputo)
34	**CEA**	Centre for African Studies
35	**CEEI-ISRI**	Instituto Superior Politecnico E Universitario

36	**CEM**	Conferência Episcopal de Moçambique
37	**CEP**	Centre for Population Studies
38	**CFB**	Clube Ferroviário da Beira
39	**CFN**	Clube Ferroviário de Nampula
40	**CFVM**	Clube Ferroviário de Maputo
41	**CHAMBER**	Chamber National de Commerce du Mozambique
42	**CHINGALE**	Chingale de Tete Soccer Team
43	**CHRAJ**	Centro do Formação Juridica e Judiciaria
44	**CIP**	Centre for Public Integrity
45	**CISLAMO**	Movimento Islâmico de Moçambique
46	**CNCS**	Conselho Nacional de Combate à SIDA (National Council to Combat AIDS)
47	**CODEZA**	Corredor de desenvolvimento comunitario da região do Vale do Zambeze
48	**COMUTRA**	Comite da Mulher Trabalhadora
49	**CONSILMO**	Confederação dos Sindicatos Livres de Moçambique
50	**CRUZEIRO**	Cruzeiro do Sul, Instituto José Negrão
51	**CT**	Chilgale de Tete
52	**CTA**	Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique
53	**E&Y**	Ernerst and Young (Mozambique)
54	**EJC**	Economic Justice Coalition
55	**ÉTICA**	A corruption watch-dog organization
56	**EUROSIS**	Eurosis – Consultoria e Formação em gestão Lda.
57	**FAMOD**	Forum of Mozambican Disabled Persons Associations
58	**FAP**	Patriotic Actionm Front
59	**FAWEMO**	Forum of African Women Educators in Mozambique
60	**FCF**	Fundação Contra a Fome
61	**FCL**	Futebaol Clube de Lichinga
62	**FDC**	Fundação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade
63	**FECIV**	Forum de Educação Cívica
64	**FEMA**	Fórum Empresarial para o Meio Ambiente
65	**FM**	Fórum Mulher
66	**FOG-Pemba**	Forum das Organizações não-Governamentais de Pemba
67	**FOG-Quelimane**	Forum das Organizações não-Governamentais de Pemba
68	**FOPROSA**	Provincial Forum of NGOs in Beira
69	**FRELIMO**	FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
70	**FT**	Fórum Terra
71	**FUMO**	United Front of Mozambique
72	**G-20**	Group of civil society organizations involved in monitoring poverty issues
73	**Ganho-Ganho**	Informal arrangement of labour at the community level
74	**GDEVM**	Grupo Desportivo Estrela Vermelha de Maputo
75	**GDM**	Grupo Desportivo de Maputo
76	**GMD**	Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (Mozambican Debt Group)
77	**GTA**	Grupo de Trabalho Ambiental
78	**IFBM**	Instituto de Formação Bancária de Moçambique
79	**IFMA**	Instituto das Filhas de Maria Auxiliadora
80	**INIA**	Instituto Nacional de Investigacão Agronómica
81	**INS**	Instituto Nacional de Saúde
82	**ISRI**	Instituto Superior de Relacione Internaciones - Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais
83	**KINDLIMUKA**	Netowrk of Pleople Living with HIV/SIDA
84	**KUGARISSICA**	Associação Juvenil para o Desenvolvimento Comunitário
85	**KULA**	Estudos e Pesquisas Aplicadas
86	**KULIMA**	Organismo para o Desemvolvimento socio-Economico Integrado Mozambique
87	**Kurhimela**	Informal arrangement of labour at the community level
88	**Kurhimelissa**	Informal arrangement of labour at the community level
89	**LDH**	Liga dos Direitos Humanos (Human Rights League)
90	**LEMO**	Liga dos Escuteiros de Moçambique
91	**LINK**	Link-forum de ONGs
92	**LMM**	Liga Muçulmana de Maputo

93	**Male (Yakulahlana)**	Sort of solidarity informal fund
94	**MATCHEDGE**	Matchedge Soccer Team
95	**MAXAQUENE**	Maxaquene Soccer Team
96	**MIM**	Movimento Islâmico de Moçambique
97	**MNM**	Mozambican Nationalist Movement
98	**MONASO**	Rede Moçambicana de Organização na Luta Contra o Sida
99	**MSF**	Médicos Sem Fronteira
100	**MULEIDE**	Associação Mulher Lei Desenvolvimento
101	**NCDS**	National Council for AIDS (Mozambique)
102	**NET**	Núcleo de Estudos da Terra
103	**NOTMOC**	Notícias de Moçambique
104	**NSJ**	Southern African Media Training Trust
105	**OJM**	Organização da Juventude Moçambicana (Mozambican Youth Organization)
106	**OKHALIAHANA**	Forum of Civil Society Organizations in Nampula
107	**OMM**	OMM Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Mozambican Women's Organization)
108	**ORAM**	Associação Rural de Ajuda Mútua
109	**OTM-CS**	Organization of Mozambican Workers-Trade Union Centre
110	**PANDORA**	Pandora Box Lda
111	**PARENA**	National Reconciliation Party
112	**PCM**	Communist Party of Mozambique
113	**PCN**	National Convention Party
114	**PDD**	Party for Democracy and Development
115	**PENHAI**	Associação juvenil Penhai
116	**PIMO**	Independent Party of Mozambique
117	**PPM**	Mozambican People's Progress Party
118	**PROGRESS**	Progress Association
119	**PUNGUE**	Pungué Soccer Team
120	**RD**	Rede de Criança (Moçambique)
121	**RENAMO**	Mozambique National Resistance
122	**RENSIDA**	Rede Nacional Contra o SIDA
123	**ROSA**	Network on Agriculture Service and Food Security
124	**SADC**	Southern Africa Development Community
125	**SMBM**	Sport Macúti e Benfica
126	**SNC**	Sporting Clube de Nampula
127	**SOCREMO**	Sociedade de Crédito de Moçambique, S.A.R.L.
128	**SQB**	Sport Quelimane e Benfica
129	**TEIA**	Forum Nacional de ONGs Moçambicanas
130	**TEXTAFRICA**	Textafrica Soccer Team
131	**TRIMODER**	Movimento de Desenvolvimento Regional
132	**Tsima**	Informal arrangement of labour at the community level
133	**UCB**	União Comercial de Bancos
134	**UCM**	Catholic University of Mozambique
135	**UEM**	Eduardo Mondlane University
136	**UGC**	União Geral das Cooperativa
137	**UNAC**	União Nacional dos Camponeses (National Peasants Union)
138	**VERDE AZUL**	VERDE AZUL – Gestão de Recrusos e Planificação
139	**VIDA**	Voluntariado Internacional para o Desenvolvimento Africano
140	**Xitique/Stiqui**	Savings and credit informa squeme
141	**Xivunga**	Informal family or individual exchange of labour